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Unlike in controlled settings, social scientists' performance when predicting real-world societal trends is indistinguishable from that of laypeople or naive statistical methods. There is no conclusive evidence that domain-specific expertise improves predictive accuracy of societal change. Causal models in social sciences are oversimplified, confusing levels of analysis, and generally lack specificity about the magnitude or distribution of effects, limiting prediction accuracy. Engaging in counterfactual thought experiments to go beyond the most obvious factors specified in a theory, predictive accuracy in social sciences can be improved. Integrating broad foundational models with context-specific time series data, as in meteorology, can enhance the accuracy of social science predictions. Enhancing analytical training and understanding of temporal dynamics can yield more precise, riskier predictions, the practical application of which requires the fostering of intellectual humility in scientists. We examine the opportunities and challenges of expert judgment in the social sciences, scrutinizing the way social scientists make predictions. While social scientists show above-chance accuracy in predicting laboratory-based phenomena, they often struggle to predict real-world societal changes. We argue that most causal models used in social sciences are oversimplified, confuse levels of analysis to which a model applies, misalign the nature of the model with the nature of the phenomena, and fail to consider factors beyond the scientist's pet theory. Taking cues from physical sciences and meteorology, we advocate an approach that integrates broad foundational models with context-specific time series data. We call for a shift in the social sciences towards more precise, daring predictions and greater intellectual humility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human lives are radically uncertain. Making sense of such uncertainties is the hallmark of wisdom. Sense-making requires narratives, putting them in the center stage of human everyday decision-making. Yet what if radical uncertainty is a narrative itself? Moreover, do laypeople always consider such narratives irrational? Here we pose these questions to enrich a theory of choice under uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do experts in human behavior think the world might change after the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic? What advice do they have for the postpandemic world? Is there a consensus on the most significant psychological and societal changes ahead? To answer these questions, we analyzed interviews from the World After COVID Project—reflections of more than 50 of the world’s top behavioral and social science experts, including fellows of National Academies and presidents of major scientific societies. These experts independently shared their thoughts on possible psychological changes in society in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and provided recommendations how to respond to the new challenges and opportunities these shifts may bring. We distilled these predictions and suggestions via human-coded analyses and natural language processing techniques. In general, experts showed little overlap in their predictions, except for convergence on a set of social/societal themes (e.g., greater appreciation for social connection, increasing political conflict). Half of the experts approached their post-COVID predictions dialectically, highlighting both positive and negative features of the same domain of change, and many expressed uncertainty in their predictions. The project offers a time capsule of experts’ predictions for the effects of the pandemic on a wide range of outcomes. We discuss the implications of heterogeneity in these predictions, the value of uncertainty and dialecticism in forecasting, and the value of balancing explanation with predictions in expert psychological judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human societies are not static. Attitudes, norms, institutions, behavior, and cultural products shift over time, sometimes with dizzying speed. However psychological science has either largely ignored cultural change or tacitly treated it as a source of noise. These changes in fact have important implications not only for psychological theory and research, but also policy, public health, and daily life. The present special issue draws together cutting-edge research and theory that addresses what one might think of as "the What," the "Why," and the "How" of cultural change. The articles encompass a range of theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches and focus on a diverse set of phenomena and processes ranging from personality to prejudice, to collective memory. Here we provide a brief overview and introduction, laying out our hopes to encourage more psychologists to consider cultural change in their own research and to join us in the emerging field of cultural dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can people wisely navigate social conflict? Two preregistered longitudinal experiments (Study 1: Canadian adults; Study 2: American and Canadian adults; total N = 555) tested whether encouraging distanced (i.e., third-person) self-reflection would help promote wisdom. Both experiments measured wise reasoning (i.e., intellectual humility, open-mindedness about how situations could unfold, consideration of and attempts to integrate diverse viewpoints) about challenging interpersonal events. In a month-long experiment (Study 1), participants used either a third- or first-person perspective in diary reflections on each day's most significant experience. Compared with preintervention assessments, assessments made after the intervention revealed that participants reflecting in the third person showed a significant increase in wise reasoning about interpersonal challenges. These effects were statistically accounted for by shifts in diary-based reflections toward a broader self-focus. A week-long experiment (Study 2) replicated the third-person self-reflection effect on wise reasoning (vs. first-person and no-pronoun control conditions). These findings suggest an efficient and evidence-based method for fostering wise reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: We test the proposition that both social orientation and cognitive style are constructs consisting of loosely related attributes. Thus, measures of each construct should weakly correlate among themselves, forming intraindividually stable profiles across measures over time.Method: Study 1 tested diverse samples of Americans (N = 233) and Japanese (N = 433) with a wide range of measures of social orientation and cognitive style to explore correlations among these measures in a cross-cultural context, using demographically heterogeneous samples. Study 2 recruited a new sample of 485 Americans and Canadians and examined their profiles on measures of social orientation and cognitive style twice, one month apart, to assess the stability of individual profiles using these variables.Results: Despite finding typical cross-cultural differences, Study 1 demonstrated negligible correlations both among measures of social orientation and among measures of cognitive style. Study 2 demonstrated stable intraindividual behavioral profiles across measures capturing idiosyncratic patters of social orientation and cognitive style, despite negligible correlations among the same measures.Conclusion: The results provide support for the behavioral profile approach to conceptualizing social orientation and cognitive style, highlighting the need to assess intraindividual stability of psychological constructs in cross-cultural research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An LLM-ABM hybrid could use LLM to derive empirically based rules of social decision-making or behavior to simulate social interactions of individuals with specific characteristics and beliefs (4). Already, LLM engineers have been fine-tuning pretrained models for the world that "should be" (12) rather than the world that is, and such efforts to mitigate biases in AI training (2, 13) may thus undermine the validity of AI-assisted social science research. With the democratization of AI-assisted data collection, the importance of early-stage social science training and supporting quantitative methods (such as computation and statistics) is crucial, calling for revision of social science education programs. INSIGHTS Advances in artificial intelligence (AI), particularly large language models (LLMs), are substantially affecting social science research. [Extracted from the article]

We have introduced a common wisdom model to establish a shared language, clarify underlying theoretical assumptions, advance assessment tools, and foster evidence-based interventions for stimulating wisdom during challenging societal times. The common wisdom model synthesizes the views of numerous contemporary scientists working on wisdom and includes two components: perspectival meta-cognition and moral aspirations. Having received insightful commentaries on our model, here we consider the overall motivation for the model, address remaining jingle-jangle fallacies, clarify the meaning of morality for wisdom, and expand upon the relationship between moral and meta-cognitive components within the common wisdom model. We reflect on how the common wisdom model provides a nexus for integrating insights across multiple areas of research, affording plentiful opportunities for future research into wisdom's development, function, and underlying processes. We situate our reflections in the context of present-day pandemic-related uncertainties and unfolding societal shifts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest in wisdom in the cognitive sciences, psychology, and education has been paralleled by conceptual confusions about its nature and assessment. To clarify these issues and promote consensus in the field, wisdom researchers met in Toronto in July of 2019, resolving disputes through discussion. Guided by a survey of scientists who study wisdom-related constructs, we established a common wisdom model, observing that empirical approaches to wisdom converge on the morally-grounded application of metacognition to reasoning and problem-solving. After outlining the function of relevant metacognitive and moral processes, we critically evaluate existing empirical approaches to measurement and offer recommendations for best practices. In the subsequent sections, we use the common wisdom model to selectively review evidence about the role of individual differences for development and manifestation of wisdom, approaches to wisdom development and training, as well as cultural, subcultural, and social-contextual differences. We conclude by discussing wisdom's conceptual overlap with a host of other constructs and outline unresolved conceptual and methodological challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest in the topic of wisdom-focused education has so far not resulted in empirically validated programs for teaching wisdom. To start filling this void, we explore the emerging empirical evidence concerning the fundamental elements required for understanding how one can foster wisdom, with a particular focus on wise reasoning. We define wise reasoning through a combination of intellectual humility, recognition of world in flux/change, open-mindedness to diverse viewpoints, and search for compromise/integration of diverse perspectives. In this article, we review evidence concerning how wise reasoning can be facilitated through experiences, teaching materials, environments and cognitive strategies. We also focus on educators, reviewing emerging evidence on how the process of explaining and guiding others impacts one's wisdom. We conclude by discussing the development of wisdom-focused education, proposing that greater attention to the situational demands and the variability in wisdom-related characteristics across social contexts should play a critical role in its development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a study on how folk standards of sound judgment with rationality versus reasonableness. Topics discussed include focus on rationality or reasonableness; people's intuitions and behavior align with the concepts of rationality from game theory and reasonableness from legal scholarship; and viewing reasonableness as sensitive to social context, as evidenced in spontaneous descriptions, and social perceptions.

• We examined if children's trust in confident advisors depends on whether advisors have complete or partial information. • When informants had complete information, children trusted a confident informant over a cautious one. • When informants only had partial information, children's trust in confidence was diminished. • Our findings are the first to suggest young children understand when confidence is unwarranted. Young children trust confident informants over cautious ones, and this tendency can lead them to heed the claims of informants whose confidence is unjustified. The ability to recognize overconfidence, and not be swayed by it, is therefore important for children to obtain accurate information and to make better decisions. In two experiments (total N = 232), we show that 4- to 6-year-olds use information about whether speakers are fully or only partially informed to judge whether confident claims should be heeded. In each experiment, children were shown scenarios in which a confident speaker and a cautious one gave conflicting claims. When both speakers were completely informed, children expressed more trust in the confident speaker's claim. However, when both speakers only had partial information, children did not believe the confident speaker over the more cautious one. These effects did not vary with age. The present findings are the first to suggest that children as young as 4 understand when confidence is unwarranted, and they may indicate that reminders that a speaker is only partially informed could help children recognize when confidence is unjustified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do different modes of thinking about the self lead to differences in performance on a contextual memory task? We conducted a pre-registered replication of the study of self-construal priming on spatial memory by Kühnen and Oyserman (2002; Study 2), simultaneously evaluating the role of task-compliance, operationalization specificity, and cross-cultural robustness. In the original study, participants either circled first-person plural (interdependent condition) or singular pronouns (independent condition) when reading a passage and subsequently memorized and recalled a set of objects presented on a visual-spatial grid. When employing a digital version of the original procedure, we were able to replicate the original findings, with better recall of objects in their original location in the interdependent (vs. independent) condition. Notably, the effect of self-construal priming on spatial memory was strongest when screening out participants who did not comply with instructions on the pronoun task and absent when including non-compliant participants. Moreover, in contrast to the original study, effects of priming were not specific to object-&-location operationalization of spatial memory recall, and also present for location-independent object recall and object-independent spatial placement recall. Additionally, condition effects were robust across observed cultural differences: Though white participants performing less successfully compared to non-white participants, both groups were comparably susceptible to priming effects. We discuss the present results and insights learned from the replication process in light of the on-going debate about the replicability of psychological experiments, highlighting the notion of task-compliance, methodological transparency and cross-cultural factors for further advancement of psychological science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose that class is inversely related to a propensity for using wise reasoning (recognizing limits of their knowledge, consider world in flux and change, acknowledges and integrate different perspectives) in interpersonal situations, contrary to established class advantage in abstract cognition. Two studies--an online survey from regions differing in economic affluence (n = 2 145) and a representative in-lab study with stratified sampling of adults from working and middle-class backgrounds (n = 299)--tested this proposition, indicating that higher social class consistently related to lower levels of wise reasoning across different levels of analysis, including regional and individual differences, and subjective construal of specific situations. The results held across personal and standardized hypothetical situations, across self-reported and observed wise reasoning, and when controlling for fluid and crystallized cognitive abilities. Consistent with an ecological framework, class differences in wise reasoning were specific to interpersonal (versus societal) conflicts. These findings suggest that higher social class weighs individuals down by providing the ecological constraints that undermine wise reasoning about interpersonal affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More than half a century of cross-cultural research has demonstrated group-level differences in psychological and behavioral phenomena, from values to attention to neural responses. However, cultures are not static, with several specific changes documented for cultural products, practices, and values. How and why do societies change? Here we juxtapose theory and insights from cultural evolution and social ecology. Evolutionary approaches enable an understanding of the how of cultural change, suggesting transmission mechanisms by which the contents of culture may change. Ecological approaches provide insights into the why of cultural change: They identify specific environmental pressures, which evoke shifts in psychology and thereby enable greater precision in predictions of specific cultural changes based on changes in ecological conditions. Complementary insights from the ecological and cultural evolutionary approaches can jointly clarify the process by which cultures change. We end by discussing the relevance of cultural change research for the contemporary societal shifts and by highlighting several critical challenges and future directions for the emerging field of cross-temporal research on culture and psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Judgments differ from decisions. Judgments are more abstract, decontextualized, and bear fewer consequences for the agent. In pursuit of experimental control, psychological experiments on bias create a simplified, bare-bone representation of social behavior. These experiments resemble conditions in which people judge others, but not how they make real-world decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers and psychological scientists have converged on the idea that wisdom involves certain aspects of thinking (e.g., intellectual humility, recognition of uncertainty and change), enabling application of knowledge to life challenges. Empirical evidence indicates that people's ability to think wisely varies dramatically across experiential contexts that they encounter over the life span. Moreover, wise thinking varies from one situation to another, with self-focused contexts inhibiting wise thinking. Experiments can show ways to buffer thinking against bias in cases in which self-interests are unavoidable. Specifically, an ego-decentering cognitive mind-set enables wise thinking about personally meaningful issues. It appears that experiential, situational, and cultural factors are even more powerful in shaping wisdom than previously imagined. Focus on such contextual factors sheds new light on the processes underlying wise thought and its development, helps to integrate different approaches to studying wisdom, and has implications for measurement and development of wisdom-enhancing interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is much debate about the notion of emotional complexity (EC). The debate concerns both the definition and the meaning of ostensible cultural differences in the construct. Some scholars have defined EC as the experience of positive and negative emotions together rather than as opposites, a phenomenon that seems more common in East Asia than North America. Others have defined EC as the experience of emotions in a differentiated manner, a definition that has yet to be explored cross-culturally. The present research explores the role of dialectical beliefs and interdependence in explaining cultural differences in EC according to both definitions. In Study 1, we examined the prevalence of mixed (positive-negative) emotions in English-language online texts from 10 countries varying in interdependence and dialecticism. In Studies 2-3, we examined reports of emotional experiences in 6 countries, comparing intraindividual associations between pleasant and unpleasant states, prevalence of mixed emotions, and emotional differentiation across and within-situations. Overall, interdependence accounted for more cross-cultural and individual variance in EC measures than did dialecticism. Moreover, emotional differentiation was associated with the experience of positive and negative emotions together rather than as opposites, but only when tested on the same level of analysis (i.e., within vs. across-situations). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultures differ in many important ways, but one trait appears to be universally valued: prosociality. For one's reputation, around the world, it pays to be nice to others. However, recent research with American participants finds that evaluations of prosocial actions are asymmetric--relatively selfish actions are evaluated according to the magnitude of selfishness but evaluations of relatively generous actions are less sensitive to magnitude. Extremely generous actions are judged roughly as positively as modestly generous actions, but extremely selfish actions are judged much more negatively than modestly selfish actions (Klein & Epley, 2014). Here we test whether this asymmetry in evaluations of prosociality is culture-specific. Across 7 countries, 1,240 participants evaluated actors giving various amounts of money to a stranger. Along with relatively minor cross-cultural differences in evaluations of generous actions, we find cross-cultural similarities in the asymmetry in evaluations of prosociality. We discuss implications for how reputational inferences can enable the cooperation necessary for successful societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do cultures change? The present work examined cultural change in eight cultural-level markers, or correlates, of individualism in the United States, all of which increased over the course of the 20th century: frequency of individualist themes in books, preference for uniqueness in baby naming, frequency of single-child relative to multichild families, frequency of single-generation relative to multigeneration households, percentage of adults and percentage of older adults living alone, small family size, and divorce rates (relative to marriage rates). We tested five key hypotheses regarding cultural change in individualism-collectivism. As predicted by previous theories, changes in socioeconomic structure, pathogen prevalence, and secularism accompanied changes in individualism averaged across all measures. The relationship with changes in individualism was less robust for urbanization. Contrary to previous theories, changes in individualism were positively (as opposed to negatively) related to the frequency of disasters. Time-lagged analyses suggested that only socioeconomic structure had a robust effect on individualism; changes in socioeconomic structure preceded changes in individualism. Implications for anthropology, psychology, and sociology are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Are people wiser when reflecting on other people’s problems compared with their own? If so, does self-distancing eliminate this asymmetry in wise reasoning? In three experiments (N = 693), participants displayed wiser reasoning (i.e., recognizing the limits of their knowledge and the importance of compromise and future change, considering other people’s perspectives) about another person’s problems compared with their own. Across Studies 2 and 3, instructing individuals to self-distance (rather than self-immerse) eliminated this asymmetry. Study 3 demonstrated that each of these effects was comparable for younger (20–40 years) and older (60–80 years) adults. Thus, contrary to the adage “with age comes wisdom,” our findings suggest that there are no age differences in wise reasoning about personal conflicts, and that the effects of self-distancing generalize across age cohorts. These findings highlight the role that self-distancing plays in allowing people to overcome a pervasive asymmetry that characterizes wise reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to psychological and popular opinion, older persons are especially susceptible to consumer fraud. Research on cognitive and affective aging reveals age-related changes that could increase the vulnerability of older persons to consumer fraud. However, this research does not show that consumer fraud actually is more prevalent among older persons. In generalizing from laboratory findings of cognitive decline to age differences in the prevalence of consumer fraud, psychologists may underestimate the influence in everyday life of possible protective factors associated with old age, including increased experience and changes in goals, lifestyle, income, as well as purchasing and risk behaviors. We review evidence on the prevalence of consumer fraud and conclude that there is no clear indication that it is more prevalent among older persons. Aggregating across all consumer frauds, there is evidence that consumer fraud is less common among older persons than adults of other ages. This evidence is potentially flawed, however, because of failings inherent in the methodologies. In the absence of irrefutable data, it is premature to conclude that consumer fraud is less prevalent among older adults, but it is also premature to conclude that consumer fraud is more prevalent among older persons, as is assumed in conventional and psychological wisdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the dawn of psychology as a science, conceptual and methodological questions have accompanied research at the intersection of culture and psychology. We review some of these questions using two dominant concepts-independent versus interdependent social orientation and analytic versus holistic cognitive style. Studying the relationship between culture and psychology can be difficult due to sampling restrictions and response biases. Since these challenges have been mastered, a wealth of research has accumulated on how culture influences cognition, emotion, and the self. Building on this work, we outline a set of new challenges for culture and psychology. Such challenges include questions about conceptual clarity, within-cultural and subcultural variations (e.g., variations due to social class), differentiation and integration of processes at the group versus individual level of analysis, modeling of how cultural processes unfold over time, and integration of insights from etic and emic methodological approaches. We review emerging work addressing these challenges, proposing that future research on culture and psychology is more exciting than ever. WIREs Cogn Sci 2014, 5:1-14. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1267 Conflict of interest: The authors have declared no conflicts of interest for this article. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laypeople and many social scientists assume that superior reasoning abilities lead to greater well-being. However, previous research has been inconclusive. This may be because prior investigators used operationalizations of reasoning that favored analytic as opposed to wise thinking. We assessed wisdom in terms of the degree to which people use various pragmatic schémas to deal with social conflicts. With a random sample of Americans, we found that wise reasoning is associated with greater life satisfaction, less negative affect, better social relationships, less depressive rumination, more positive versus negative words used in speech, and greater longevity. The relationship between wise reasoning and well-being held even when controlling for socioeconomic factors, verbal abilities, and several personality traits. As in prior work, there was no association between intelligence and well-being. Further, wise reasoning mediated age-related differences in well-being, particularly among middle-aged and older adults. Implications for research on reasoning, well-being, and aging are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors discuss the argument of Kraus and colleagues on their paper regarding social class differences. They explore the social ladder theory used by Kraus and colleagues which argues that people act on the subjective perception according to their social rank. They hope that the theory of Kraus and colleagues will provide an impetus with great focus on the impact of social class on cross-class dynamics. They state that social class is alive, however, it is not culture-free.

People from different cultures vary in the ways they approach social conflicts, with Japanese being more motivated to maintain interpersonal harmony and avoid conflicts than Americans are. Such cultural differences have developmental consequences for reasoning about social conflict. In the study reported here, we interviewed random samples of Americans from the Midwest United States and Japanese from the larger Tokyo area about their reactions to stories of intergroup and interpersonal conflicts. Responses showed that wisdom (e.g., recognition of multiple perspectives, the limits of personal knowledge, and the importance of compromise) increased with increasing age among Americans, but older age was not associated with wiser responses among Japanese. Younger and middle-aged Japanese showed greater use of wise-reasoning strategies than younger and middle-aged Americans did. This cultural difference was weaker for older participants' reactions to interpersonal conflicts and was actually reversed for intergroup conflicts. This research has important implications for the study of aging, cultural psychology, and wisdom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Past research on cognitive dissonance indicated that people from independent (e.g. European-American) and interdependent (e.g. East-Asian) cultural backgrounds show different patterns of choice justification: whereas choice made for oneself affirms the independent view of the self, choice made for close others affirms the interdependent view of the self. We hypothesized that interpersonal choice considerations may be temporally accessible even among habitually independent European-Americans. The present research provides the first experimental evidence that choice justification varies as a function of both subliminal affiliation priming and the target of choice (self vs. close others). Results from three studies indicate that subliminal priming of affiliation increases justification of a choice European-Americans made for a close other, while decreasing justification of a choice made for the self. Implications for theories related to cognitive dissonance, subliminal processing and cultural meaning systems are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Although humans strive to be wise, they often fail to do so when reasoning over issues that have profound personal implications. Here we examine whether psychological distance enhances wise reasoning, attitudes and behavior under such circumstances. Two experiments demonstrate that cueing people to reason about personally meaningful issues (Study 1: Career prospects for the unemployed during an economic recession; Study 2: Anticipated societal changes associated with one's chosen candidate losing the 2008 U.S. Presidential election) from a distanced perspective enhances wise reasoning (dialecticism; intellectual humility), attitudes (cooperation-related attitude assimilation), and behavior (willingness to join a bipartisan group). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research provides experimental evidence for cultural influence on one of the most basic elements of emotional processing: attention to positive versus negative stimuli. To this end, we focused on Russian culture, which is characterized by brooding and melancholy. In Study I, Russians spent significantly more time looking at negative than positive pictures, whereas Americans did not show this tendency. In Study 2, Russian Latvians were randomly primed with symbols of each culture, after which we measured the speed of recognition for positive versus negative trait words. Biculturals were significantly faster in recognizing negative words (as compared with baseline) when primed with Russian versus Latvian cultural symbols. Greater identification with Russian culture facilitated this effect. We provide a theoretical discussion of mental processes underlying cultural differences in emotion research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although recent findings indicate that people can reflect either adaptively or maladaptively over negative experiences, extant research has not examined how culture influences this process. We compared the self-reflective practices of Russians (members of an interdependent culture characterized by a tendency to brood) and Americans (members of an independent culture in which self-reflection has been studied extensively). We predicted that self-reflection would be associated with less-detrimental outcomes among Russians because they self-distance more when analyzing their feelings than Americans do. Findings from two studies supported these predictions. In Study 1, self-reflection was associated with fewer depressive symptoms among Russians than among Americans. In Study 2, Russians displayed less distress and a more adaptive pattern of construals than Americans after reflecting over a recent negative event. In addition, they self-distanced more than Americans while analyzing their feelings, and self-distancing mediated the cultural differences in self-reflection. These findings demonstrate how culture shapes the way people reflect over negative experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It is well documented that aging is associated with cognitive declines in many domains. Yet it is a common lay belief that some aspects of thinking improve into old age. Specifically, older people are believed to show better competencies for reasoning about social dilemmas and conflicts. Moreover, the idea of aging-related gains in wisdom is consistent with views of the aging mind in developmental psychology. However, to date research has provided little evidence corroborating this assumption. We addressed this question in two studies. using a representative community sample. We asked participants to read stories about intergroup conflicts and interpersonal conflicts and predict how these conflicts would unfold. We show that relative to young and middle-aged people, older people make more use of higher-order reasoning schemes that emphasize the need for multiple perspectives, allow for compromise, and recognize the limits of knowledge. Our coding scheme was validated by a group of professional counselors and wisdom researchers. Social reasoning improves with age despite a decline in fluid intelligence. The results suggest that it might be advisable to assign older individuals to key social roles involving legal decisions, counseling, and intergroup negotiations. Furthermore, given the abundance of research on negative effects of aging, this study may help to encourage clinicians to emphasize the inherent strengths associated with aging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that differences in social orientation and in cognition that exist between cultures and social classes do not necessarily have counterparts in individual differences within those groups. Evidence comes from a large-scale study conducted with 10 measures of independent vs. interdependent social orientation and 10 measures of analytic vs. holistic cognitive style. The social measures successfully distinguish between interdependence (viewing oneself as embedded in relations with others) and independence (viewing oneself as disconnected from others) at the group level. However, the correlations among the measures were negligible. Similar results were obtained for the cognitive measures, for which there are no coherent individual differences despite the validity of the construct at the group level. We conclude that behavioral constructs that distinguish among groups need not be valid as measures of individual differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A large body of research documents cognitive differences between Westerners and East Asians. Westerners tend to be more analytic and East Asians tend to be more holistic. These findings have often been explained as being due to corresponding differences in social orientation. Westerners are more independent and Easterners are more interdependent. However, comparisons of the cognitive tendencies of Westerners and East Asians do not allow us to rule out alternative explanations for the cognitive differences, such as linguistic and genetic differences, as well as cultural differences other than social orientation. In this review we summarize recent developments that provide stronger support for the social orientation hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Central and East Europeans have a great deal in common, both historically and culturally, with West Europeans and North Americans, but tend to be more interdependent. Interdependence has been shown to be linked to holistic cognition. East Asians are more interdependent than Americans and are more holistic. If interdependence causes holism, we would expect Central and East Europeans to be more holistic than West Europeans and North Americans. In two studies we found evidence that Central and East Europeans are indeed more holistic than Westerners on three tasks, one of which examined categorization and two of which measured patterns of visual attention. These studies support the argument that cross-cultural differences in cognition are due to society level differences in independence/interdependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive scientists suggest that inviting people to explain contentious political issues might reduce intergroup toxicity because it exposes people to how poorly they understand the issue. However, whether providing explanations can result in more open-minded political thinking remains unclear. On one hand, inviting people to explain a political issue might make them more impartial and open-minded in their thinking. On the other hand, an invitation to explain a contentious political issue might lead to myside bias—rationalization of one's default position. Here, we address these contrasting predictions in five experiments (N = 1884; three pre-registered), conducted across a variety of contexts: with graduate students interacting with an actor in a laboratory setting, with US residents at the peak of the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections, with UK residents before the highly polarized 2019 Brexit vote, and with gun-control partisans. Across studies, we found that explaining politically contentious topics resulted in more open-minded thinking, an effect that generalized across coded (Studies 1–4) and self-report (Studies 3–4) measures. We also observed that participants who were made to feel like their explanations were welcomed felt closer to their discussion partner (Studies 3–4), an effect that generalized to all outgroup members with whom they disagreed with about the politically contentious issue (Study 4). We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings, and the potential for explanations to foster open-minded political engagement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated large language models' (LLMs) efficacy in classifying complex psychological constructs like intellectual humility, perspective-taking, open-mindedness, and search for a compromise in narratives of 347 Canadian and American adults reflecting on a workplace conflict. Using state-of-the-art models like GPT-4 across few-shot and zero-shot paradigms and RoB-ELoC (RoBERTa -fine-tuned-on-Emotion-with-Logistic-Regression-Classifier), we compared their performance with expert human coders. Results showed robust classification by LLMs, with over 80% agreement and F1 scores above 0.85, and high human-model reliability (Cohen’s κ Md across top models = .80). RoB-ELoC and few-shot GPT-4 were standout classifiers, although somewhat less effective in categorizing intellectual humility. We offer example workflows for easy integration into research. Our proof-of-concept findings indicate the viability of both open-source and commercial LLMs in automating the coding of complex constructs, potentially transforming social science research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, psychological scientists frequently made on-the-record predictions in public media about how individuals and society would change. Such predictions were often made outside these scientists' areas of expertise, with justifications based on intuition, heuristics, and analogical reasoning (Study 1; N = 719 statements). How accurate are these kinds of judgments regarding societal change? In Study 2, we obtained predictions from scientists (N = 717) and lay Americans (N = 394) in Spring 2020 regarding the direction of change for a range of social and psychological phenomena. We compared them to objective data obtained at 6 months and 1 year. To further probe how experience impacts such judgments, 6 months later (Study 3), we obtained retrospective judgments of societal change for the same domains (Nscientists = 270; Nlaypeople = 411). Bayesian analysis suggested greater credibility of the null hypothesis that scientists' judgments were at chance on average for both prospective and retrospective judgments. Moreover, neither domain-general expertise (i.e., judgmental accuracy of scientists compared to laypeople) nor self-identified domain-specific expertise improved accuracy. In a follow-up study on meta-accuracy (Study 4), we show that the public nevertheless expects psychological scientists to make more accurate predictions about individual and societal change compared to most other scientific disciplines, politicians, and nonscientists, and they prefer to follow their recommendations. These findings raise questions about the role psychological scientists could and should play in helping the public and policymakers plan for future events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present evidence for the strengths of the intellectual virtues that philosophers and behavioral scientists characterize as key cognitive elements of wisdom. Wisdom has been of centuries-long interest for philosophical scholarship, but relative to intelligence largely neglected in public discourse on educational science, public policy, and societal well-being. Wise reasoning characteristics include intellectual humility, recognition of uncertainty, consideration of diverse viewpoints, and an attempt to integrate these viewpoints. Emerging scholarship on these features of wisdom suggest that they uniquely contribute to societal well-being, improve leadership, shed light on societal inequality, promote cooperation in Public Goods Games and reduce political polarization and intergroup-hostility. We review empirical evidence about macro-cultural, ecological, situational, and person-level processes facilitating and inhibiting wisdom in daily life. Based on this evidence, we speculate about ways to foster wisdom in education, organizations, and institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Age and gender differences in narcissism have been studied often. However, considering the rich history of narcissism research accompanied by its diverging conceptualizations, little is known about age and gender differences across various narcissism measures. The present study investigated age and gender differences and their interactions across eight widely used narcissism instruments (i.e., Narcissistic Personality Inventory, Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale, Dirty Dozen, Psychological Entitlement Scale, Narcissistic Personality Disorder Symptoms From the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Version IV, Narcissistic Admiration and Rivalry Questionnaire–Short Form, Single-Item Narcissism Scale, and brief version of the Pathological Narcissism Inventory). The findings of Study 1 (N = 5,736) revealed heterogeneity in how strongly the measures are correlated. Some instruments loaded clearly on one of the three factors proposed by previous research (i.e., Neuroticism, Extraversion, Antagonism), while others cross-loaded across factors and in distinct ways. Cross-sectional analyses using each measure and meta-analytic results across all measures (Study 2) with a total sample of 270,029 participants suggest consistent linear age effects (random effects meta-analytic effect of r = −.104), with narcissism being highest in young adulthood. Consistent gender differences also emerged (random effects meta-analytic effect was −.079), such that men scored higher in narcissism than women. Quadratic age effects and Age × Gender effects were generally very small and inconsistent. We conclude that despite the various conceptualizations of narcissism, age and gender differences are generalizable across the eight measures used in the present study. However, their size varied based on the instrument used. We discuss the sources of this heterogeneity and the potential mechanisms for age and gender differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social issues (e.g., partisan politics, economic decisions, and interpersonal conflicts) often involve trade-offs, necessitating the consideration of multiple interests. Such issues do not have simple answers and benefit from wise reasoning-a set of metacognitive strategies that guide people toward managing complexity and balancing different interests. We review recent advances in research on wise reasoning, including evidence pertinent to the question of wisdom's trait-like and state-specific features, how it varies across situations, and how one can develop it. Overall, empirical studies suggest that researchers can understand wisdom better by paying attention to its situated nature across time and contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individualism appears to have increased over the past several decades, yet most research documenting this shift has been limited to the study of a handful of highly developed countries. Is the world becoming more individualist as a whole? If so, why? To answer these questions, we examined 51 years of data on individualist practices and values across 78 countries. Our findings suggest that individualism is indeed rising in most of the societies we tested. Despite dramatic shifts toward greater individualism around the world, however, cultural differences remain sizable. Moreover, cultural differences are primarily linked to changes in socioeconomic development, and to a lesser extent to shifts in pathogen prevalence and disaster frequency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on consequences of adversity appears inconclusive. Adversity can be detriment to mental health, promoting maladaptive patterns of thoughts. At the same time, posttraumatic growth studies suggest that overcoming major adversity facilitates growth in wisdom-related patterns of thoughts. We address this puzzle by examining how distinct types of adversity impact wisdom over time and how individual differences in self-distanced (rather than self-immersed) reflection on adversity relate to different wisdom trajectories. In a four-wave prospective year-long study, participants (N = 499) recalled and reflected every three months on the most significant recent adverse event in their life. They reported how much they engaged in wise reasoning—intellectual humility, open-mindedness to diverse perspectives and change, search for compromises and resolution—as well as self-distancing during reflections. Independent raters identified seven distinct adversity types (e.g. social conflict, economic hardship, major trauma) in open-ended descriptions. Growth curve analyses revealed little evidence of positive change in wise-reasoning over the course of a year, and some evidence of negative change for health-related adversity. Although self-distancing was associated with stability in wisdom, self-immersing was associated with negative change in wisdom in reflections on social conflicts over time. We discuss implications these results have for adversity, change vs. resilience in character strengths, and self-distancing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite differences in beliefs about the self across cultures and relevant individual differences, recent evidence suggests that people universally believe in a ‘true self’ that is morally good. We propose that this belief arises from a general tendency: psychological essentialism (PE). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fertility rates have been declining worldwide over the past 50 years, part of a phenomenon known as "the demographic transition." Prior work suggests that this decline is related to population density. In the present study, we draw on life history theory to examine the relationship between population density and fertility across 174 countries over 69 years (1950 to 2019). We find a robust association between density and fertility over time, both within- and between-countries. That is, increases in population density are associated with declines in fertility rates, controlling for a variety of socioeconomic, socioecological, geographic, population-based, and female empowerment variables. We also tested predictions about environmental boundary conditions. In harsher living conditions (e.g., higher homicide or pathogen rates), the effect of increased population density on fertility rates was attenuated. The density-fertility association was also moderated by religiousness and strength of social norms, where the relationship between density and fertility was attenuated in countries with high religiosity and strong social norms. We discuss why and when changes in population density may influence fertility rates and the broader implications of this work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Post‐traumatic growth typically refers to enduring positive psychological change experienced as a result of adversity, trauma, or highly challenging life circumstances. Critics have challenged insights from much of the prior research on this topic, pinpointing its significant methodological limitations. In response to these critiques, we propose that post‐traumatic growth can be more accurately captured in terms of personality change—an approach that affords a more rigorous examination of the phenomenon. Method: We outline a set of conceptual and methodological questions and considerations for future work on the topic of post‐traumatic growth. Results: We provide a series of recommendations for researchers from across the disciplines of clinical/counseling, developmental, health, personality, and social psychology and beyond, who are interested in improving the quality of research examining resilience and growth in the context of adversity. Conclusion: We are hopeful that these recommendations will pave the way for a more accurate understanding of the ubiquity, durability, and causal processes underlying post‐traumatic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: This research examines changes in emotionality following adverse experiences in daily life. We tested whether daily self‐distancing (vs. self‐immersing) in reflections on adversity results in positive change in emotionality. Additionally, we probed the "dosage" effect of repeated self‐distancing. Method: A micro‐longitudinal field experiment combined 4‐week daily diary and experimental manipulation of perspective during diary‐based reflections on adverse experiences to explore the trajectory of change in emotionality. Each day, participants (N = 149) described and reflected on one significant event from that day and rated emotionality. We randomly assigned participants to reflect from a self‐immersed or self‐distanced perspective. Results: Self‐distanced participants showed a change toward positive emotionality while maintaining the same level of negative emotionality, whereas self‐immersed participants did not show changes in positive or negative emotionality. We also observed that self‐distancing reached its maximum effect ("dosage") for positive emotionality in the third week of the diary. Conclusions: Repeated self‐distanced reflections can promote positive change in emotionality in the face of everyday adversity. Notably, repeated self‐distancing effectiveness has a saturation point. In contrast, self‐immersed reflections on adversity do not promote positive emotional change. Together, these observations raise the question how the default self‐immersed reflection on traumatic experiences impacts personal growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Song lyrics are rich in meaning. In recent years, the lyrical content of popular songs has been used as an index of culture's shifting norms, affect, and values. One particular, newly uncovered, trend is that lyrics of popular songs have become increasingly simple over time. Why might this be? Here, we test the idea that increasing lyrical simplicity is accompanied by a widening array of novel song choices. We do so by using six decades (1958–2016) of popular music in the United States (N = 14,661 songs), controlling for multiple well-studied ecological and cultural factors plausibly linked to shifts in lyrical simplicity (e.g., resource availability, pathogen prevalence, rising individualism). In years when more novel song choices were produced, the average lyrical simplicity of the songs entering U.S. billboard charts was greater. This cross-temporal relationship was robust when controlling for a range of cultural and ecological factors and employing multiverse analyses to control for potentially confounding influence of temporal autocorrelation. Finally, simpler songs entering the charts were more successful, reaching higher chart positions, especially in years when more novel songs were produced. The present results suggest that cultural transmission depends on the amount of novel choices in the information landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]