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Thomas C. Field Jr., Stella Krepp, and Vanni Pettina’s edited volume Latin America and the Global Cold War gathers scholars from 16 countries to move us away from the common US-centric perspective ...

IntroductionSmoking is a leading cause of premature deaths globally. The health benefits of smoking cessation are many. However, majority of quit attempts are unsuccessful. One way to potentially improve success rates is to evaluate new combinations of existing smoking cessation therapies that may work synergistically to decrease the intensity of withdrawal symptoms and cravings.AimsTo evaluate the feasibility, efficacy and safety of the combination of varenicline and nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) lozenges versus varenicline alone in assisting hospitalised smokers to quit.Methods and analysisThis is a multicentre, randomised, placebo-controlled trial. Adults with a history of smoking ≥10 cigarettes per day on average in the 4 weeks prior to their hospitalisation will be recruited. Participants will be randomly assigned to either the intervention group and will receive varenicline and NRT lozenges, or the control group and will receive varenicline and placebo lozenges. All participants will be actively referred to behavioural support from telephone Quitline. Participants are followed up at 1 and 3 weeks and 3, 6 and 12 months from the start of treatment. The primary outcome is carbon monoxide validated prolonged abstinence from 2 weeks to 6 months after treatment initiation. Secondary outcomes include self-reported and biochemically validated prolonged and point prevalence abstinence at 3, 6 and 12 months, self-reported adverse events, withdrawal symptoms and cravings, adherence to treatment, Quitline sessions attended and others. According to the Russell Standard, all randomised participants will be accounted for in the primary intention-to-treat analysis.Ethics and disseminationThe trial will be conducted in compliance with the protocol, the principles of Good Clinical Practice, the National Health and Medical Research Council National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (updated 2015) and the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research (2018). Approval will be sought from the Human Ethics Committees of all the participating hospitals and the university. Written informed consent will be obtained from each participant at the time of recruitment.Trial registration numberAustralia New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry (ACTRN12618001792213).

Introduction and Aims Nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) is recommended as a smoking cessation aid for hospitalised smokers. We examined factors associated with NRT use during hospitalisation and after discharge, and NRT uptake when systematically offered free of cost. Design and Methods A nested analysis was conducted using data from a clinical trial that evaluated the effectiveness of a pharmacist-led smoking cessation intervention in 600 hospitalised smokers. Results NRT was used at least once by 285 (48%) participants during hospitalisation and by 287 (48%) participants during the 12 months post-discharge. Heavy smokers and those who expressed interest in using NRT for their next quit attempt at baseline interview were more likely to use NRT during hospitalisation [odds ratio (OR) 1.94, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.38, 2.74; OR 2.09, 95% CI 1.48, 2.95] and after discharge (OR 1.70, 95% CI 1.20, 2.41; OR 1.97, 95% CI 1.39, 2.79). Those using six or more medications were more likely to use NRT during hospitalisation (OR 1.65, 95% CI 1.05, 2.61). Post-discharge NRT users were more likely to have been initially admitted for a respiratory or cardiac problem (OR 1.51, 95% CI 1.05, 2.18). When NRT was offered free of cost to a subset of patients (n = 300), 157 (52%) used NRT during hospitalisation. Nicotine dependence and interest in using NRT predicted its use (OR 2.26, 95% CI 1.38, 3.70; OR 2.58, 95% CI 1.58, 4.20). Discussion and Conclusions Targeting heavy smokers, those with cardio-respiratory conditions and those interested in using NRT regardless of regimen complexity could improve NRT uptake.

The Chilean political transition that took place in 1932 is commonly viewed as positive for civil-military relations. This article argues that the very means used to restore stable civilian rule in...

The idea of introducing a monetary remedy for harm arising out of the misdirected exercise of public power has waxed and waned in popularity in Australia over the years. Though few would dispute the intuitive appeal of the sentiment that ‘wrongs should not go unremedied’, the question of why this is so and how harm arising from maladministration could, or should, be repaired remains unresolved. This article canvasses a number of the potential justifications for the creation of such a remedy, before noting the various avenues the Australian courts have considered, and closed down, which might otherwise have led in that direction. These rejected opportunities have included the expansion of existing tort actions (eg misfeasance in public office and breach of statutory duty), the creation of new causes of action in tort (eg the Beaudesert tort and constitutional torts), and the interpretation of statutory remedial powers (eg the power to ‘do justice between the parties’ pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)). Whatever the virtue of a remedy on this front, it is clear that it will need to be a matter of legislative, rather than judicial, intervention.

This article examines the structural and institutional changes that have occurred since the controversial United States School of the Americas (SOA) closed and its successor, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), opened in 2001. Placing these changes within a constructivist framework, the article uses the school as a case study to argue that human rights norm diffusion has both increased the amount of human rights in the curriculum and put the school in a much stronger institutional position than it had been. Human rights activists had successfully prompted change, but did not achieve their goal of closing the school. This article contributes to the literature by demonstrating how ideas about human rights can have important and lasting effects, but not always in ways that are either predictable or desirable for the political activists who spark them.

As more Latin American migrants make their way to the United States, the issue of transnationalism has received increased scholarly attention. Transnationalism refers to the delinking of the individual from his or her government and an increase in international ties as a result of the economic globalization that promotes the movement of people, goods, money, and ideas. Prevailing consensus is that the state, particularly in Latin America, is weakened by transnationalism because individuals are freer than ever from state control. This article argues that examining Latin American emigrant policies yields a different conclusion, namely that the state's response to transnational pressures has made governments more active and relevant in certain ways than in the past. Studies of transnationalism must therefore incorporate state strategies for a better understanding of its impact on Latin American governments.

Accountability is frequently described as one of the key ‘values’ or ‘ideals’ that administrative law is designed to uphold. Accountability’s greatest claim to hold the status of a value might be its ubiquity: it has been described as the ‘buzzword of modern governance’, the ‘uber-concept of the 21st century’, and a ‘theme … central to all discussion of government’. Yet the modern meaning of accountability has developed very recently. The word ‘accountability’ can be found in Australian cases over the last century but most refer to the accountability of fiduciaries (such as liquidators and executors) in equity, of taxpayers, of tortfeasors, in electoral matters and of public companies, rather than of government bodies. The concept of the ‘accountability’ of government to those governed has become prominent only fairly recently.

The purpose of this article is to explain the contradictions in Michelle Bachelet's presidency by focusing on the paradoxical nature of presidential power, the limits on the executive in the Chilean constitution, and how those limits affected President Bachelet's government. At the outset of her presidency, she faced the problem of wanting to promote inclusive policies while simultaneously experiencing political pressure to maintain elite consensus. Due to institutional and political constraints, Bachelet's rhetoric of inclusion could not be realized, and she eventually decided to opt for the more traditional elite consensus approach. In our view, the emphasis on achieving elite consensus produced contradictory results. It sustained Bachelet's personal image as a national leader, but limited her ability to get effective legislation passed. Indeed, the Concertación itself was blamed for inaction rather than the president as an individual.

Even as the era of military rule in Latin America fades well into the past, empirical and theoretical questions about civilian–military relations remain highly relevant. For the first time in the region's history, most governments have been working to manage civilian–military relations within a setting of democratic rule. This article is intended to contribute to the debate over the importance of civilian expertise in the relationship between Latin American civilians and the armed forces. Its main argument is that broader permanent defense-related civilian positions in government contribute the most to democratic civilian–military relations, whereas nonpermanent positions are also important but transitory and do not necessarily foster long-term democratic stability. The policy implication is that governments should focus on expanding the number of permanent civilian positions related to defense in both the executive and legislative branches.

The recent political, economic and social histories of Bolivia and Ecuador point to a broader, post-neoliberal trend emerging in Latin America. Presidents Evo Morales and Rafael Correa have closely followed the basic model of twenty-first-century socialism as an alternative to free market capitalism. In theory, both leaders have successfully re-founded their countries with new constitutions that encompass the interests of all sectors of society. In practice, however, we argue that a volatile economic climate, poorly implemented reforms, increased opposition, and low political tolerance all indicate limitations to the viability of twenty-first-century socialism as a post-neoliberal development model.

Borders and Bridges: A History of U.S.-Latin American Relations. By Stewart Brewer. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. Pp. 197. $49.95 cloth. Neighborly Adversaries: Readings in U.S.-Latin American Relations, 2nd ed. Edited by Michael LaRosa and Frank 0. Mora. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007. Pp. 371. $29.95 paper. Addicted to Failure: U.S. Security Policy in Latin America and the An dean Region. Edited by Brian Loveman. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006. Pp. 367. $27.95 paper. Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America since 1945. By Alan McPherson. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. Pp. 208. $45.00 cloth. Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean. Edited by Alan McPherson. New York: Berghahn Books, 2006. Pp. 301. $85.00 cloth. Making the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalization. By Thomas F. O'Brien. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2007. Pp. 390. $24.95 paper. U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years: Oppor tunities Lost or Opportunities Squandered? By David Scott Palmer. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006. Pp. 125. $24.95 paper.

In the past decade an effort to reform the military's role in defence institutions such as intelligence services has been underway across Latin America. Utilising the cases of Argentina, Chile and Peru, this article will argue that reform has occurred, but has been limited in terms of expanding civilian authority, and will offer a means of understanding the dynamics of intelligence reform. In particular, incentives for civilians to pursue complicated reform have been absent. The military's proven ability to operate its own intelligence agencies constitutes a disincentive. To examine the dynamics of reform, the analysis centres on three variables: the number of institutions involved in overseeing intelligence, the degree of presidential control, and whether military intelligence activities are overseen by the civilian government.

Objective Understanding smokers’ quit experiences and their preferences for a future quit attempt may aid in the development of effective cessation treatments. The aims of this study were to measure tobacco use behaviour; previous quit attempts and outcomes; methods used to assist quitting; difficulties experienced during previous attempts; the motives and preferred methods to assist quitting in a future attempt; identify the factors associated with preferences for smoking cessation. Design Face-to-face interview using a structured questionnaire. Setting Inpatient wards of three Australian public hospitals. Participants Hospitalised smokers enrolled in a smoking cessation trial. Results Of 600 enrolled patients (42.8% participation rate), 64.3% (n=386) had attempted quitting in the previous 12 months. On a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high), current motivation to quit smoking was high (median 9; IQR 6.5–10), but confidence was modest (median 5; IQR 3–8). Among 386 participants who reported past quit attempts, 69.9% (n=270) had used at least one cessation aid to assist quitting. Nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) was most commonly stated (222, 57.5%), although the majority had used NRT for

Not long ago, I received a packet of papers, the contents of which explained why my latest article submission was rejected by a well-known peer-reviewed journal. Like everyone else, I've been in this position before, but this time two things led me to more contemplation than usual. First, it was the first rejection since I received tenure, and I noted that job security did little to dampen my disappointment. Second, it came very shortly after I ran into a senior colleague, who noted fairly casually that two of his articles had just been turned down, one of them by a top political science journal.

As South American dictatorships fade into the past, analyses regarding their military legacies have increasingly diverged and disagreed. The purpose of this article is to introduce a factor that has yet to be fully incorporated into these accounts, one that has usually been viewed as less useful in examining political transitions, namely historical military legacies. The study of the military's role in transitions has been hampered by an overemphasis on short-term factors, which in turn has resulted in unexpected empirical outcomes and the stalling of theory-building. Only analyses combining “mode of transition” and historical legacy will adequately explain the persistence of both military autonomy and civilian rule.

For years, scholars and policy makers alike have argued whether using the armed forces of Latin America to combat internal threats poses a threat to democracy. Bitter experience with repression and military rule led many observers to conclude that encouraging the armed forces to target enemies within their borders was a dangerous policy, as civilians would find it difficult to control the military's activities. Others have argued that soldiers should not be viewed simply as potential human rights abusers and therefore can play a productive role in protecting the country from its enemies. These arguments, of course, extend to U.S. policy. Should the United States train Latin American officers strategies, tactics, and doctrine that are focused on internal threats? In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 this debate has become even more important, as the United States has begun identifying an increasingly wide variety of internal terrorist threats. This article will argue that training Latin American militaries to fight those perceived threats mirrors the expansion of U.S. military training during the Cold War, and as such represents an obstacle to the process of democratization in the region. To address the debate, this article will examine the role of one of the key military training facilities in the United States, namely the School of the Americas (SOA), which was renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) in 2001. The analysis is based upon author interviews with permanent instructors, guest instructors (both military and civilian), and senior staff at the school in addition to documents from the school's archives, most notably descriptions of all courses that have been offered (as the school went through a variety of name changes) from 1948, then 1958-2002. ~ In the context of the debate over the military and internal enemies, the analysis will focus upon the activities and skills that the United States teaches Latin American soldiers in order to combat domestic enemies. The historical perspective is essential for understanding the current evolution of teaching at the school, as the negative implications of the school's past course emphases cannot be divorced from the potential implications of current shifts. No detailed analysis of course evolution has yet been done. After the Cold War ended, efforts were made by the SOA to stress human rights

In the South, as in much of the United States, the demographic train has left the station. For over a decade the region has been attractive to migrants leaving either a Latin American country or areas of the United States with weaker economies and/or higher costs of living. Our projections going out to 2040 show continued growth under virtually all assumptions, signaling a permanent shift in what had traditionally not been a destination for Hispanics. Using U.S. Census data and other sources to develop projections, the core of our argument is that as the cohort of older (65 years and over) Latinos grows in North Carolina, there will be concomitant political shifts. Children who are citizens will eventually become eligible to vote, legislative districts will be transformed, and Hispanic adults will be taking care of a growing elderly population.

Since Latin American independence, U.S. presidents have consistently faced the issue of how to respond to domestic political conflict in the region. In particular, when unscheduled (and often unexpected) changes of government occur, should the United States extend diplomatic recognition to the new regime, or even revoke recognition of an already existing government? As scholars seek to explain the characteristics of post-cold war, post-twentieth century relations with Latin America, it is useful to analyze the development of recognition policy, which for many years was central to expressing approval or disapproval of governments. After the late 1960s, U.S. presidents deliberately removed recognition as a foreign policy tool. The purpose of this article is to examine U.S. recognition policy toward Latin American governments, to identify patterns in that policy, and to explain its decline. In 1992, President Alberto Fujimori enacted a "self-coup," suspending the judiciary and dissolving congress. The Bush administration did not mention recognition at all but rather suspended nonhumanitarian aid (Clayton 1999,294). Despite Fujimori's authoritarian seizure of power, he never faced revocation of recognition. Then in 2000, Fujimori presided over obviously fraudulent elections. The Clinton administration simply asserted its "right to draw its own conclusions and take its own action in response" (Gutierrez 2000). In both cases, U.S. recognition of the government was never in doubt. Yet for nearly 150 years, recognition policy represented a central component of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. In cases of presidents' shutting down the opposition or utilizing electoral fraud or of military officers' overthrowing a government, U.S. policy entailed deliberation over whether the government in question fulfilled all criteria for diplomatic recognition. Recognition has implied a wide range of consequences, including access to the courts of each country, protection of nationals, uninterrupted trade, and acceptance of coparticipation in treaties (Peterson 1997). Often, the policy was used to correct what U.S. presidents viewed as political misbehavior.(1) Now into the early twenty-first century, the United States no longer wields recognition as a foreign policy instrument, choosing instead to utilize more ad hoc strategies to express its will. A survey of diplomatic correspondence and secondary sources has made it possible to identify the instances when the United States deliberated about recognizing a new government and what rationale U.S. policy makers utilized to make the decision. There are a total of fourteen: * De facto control of the government * Fulfillment of international obligations * Evidence of popular support * Constitutionality of the government * Consensus with other American republics * Promise of holding elections * Degree of external influence * Protection of U.S. citizens and their property * Protection of civil liberties * Whether the government is anti-Communist * Promotion of stability * Fulfillment of U.S. treaty obligations * Need to protect foreign investment * Need for prior consultation with European powers Over time, the prevalence of certain rationale reveals clear shifts in policy. These shifts correspond to three distinct time periods: an emphasis on de facto control between 1822 and 1899; the rise of "dollar diplomacy," with a shift toward fulfillment of international obligations and protection of U.S. citizens and property from 1900 to 1934; and the gradual de-emphasis of recognition policy as a whole after 1934, culminating in its disappearance after 1969 and the concomitant rise of ad hoc policies. Development of the Policy The concept of recognition came out of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. …

This article explains the persistent influence of General Augusto Pinochet in Chilean politics. After leaving the presidency in 1990, he managed to fuse his personal position with that not only of the institution of the army but of the armed forces as a whole, making Pinochet and the military almost indistinguishable. By doing so Pinochet sought to equate any attack on him with an attack on the institution. The military, in turn, accepted him as its spokesman and defender. He viewed his role as that of Cincinnatus, an emperor twice called to save ancient Rome. Throughout the 1990s Pinochet represented a serious obstacle to democratisation. With his intimate ties to the military institution, his influence - perhaps even after death - can never be discounted.

This article analyzes civil-military relations in Chile, focusing on the period between 1990 and 1998. It analyzes military interests and civil-military channels. The four main cases examined in this article are situations when civilians sought to make decisions the military opposed that affected core military interests. They shed light on the degree to which formal institutions were able to function effectively in very tense situations. The cases are the military movements of 1990 and 1993, the 1995 imprisonment of Manuel Contreras, and the 1998 constitutional accusation against Augusto Pinochet. The ability of the Chilean military to pursue its interests successfully by circumventing formal channels in the face of opposition from civilian policymakers demonstrates that the road to civilian supremacy is long and the end is not clearly in sight.

Background Emergency departments (EDs) face increasing service demands and the imposition of treatment targets which has led to continual process redesign and changes in staff skill mix and functions. Objective To identify extended ED pharmacist roles that could improve medication management and to implement and evaluate one such role change. Methods A focus group of clinicians sought to redesign processes around ED medication management. Preparation of medication charts for patients admitted from ED was selected. Baseline data were obtained to define elements of existing medication charting processes. Suitably trained ED pharmacists' trialled the effectiveness of making therapeutic suggestions on a medication chart ‘sticker' or by direct ‘consultation' with medical staff. At the conclusion of the study focus groups at each site evaluated clinical staff perceptions of the change. Results Focus group participants thought that ED pharmacists could undertake extended roles in analgesia, nausea control, antibiotic cover, addiction management and preparation of medication charts for admitted patients. In the pre-intervention audit ( n = 140), 74% required at least one intervention by the ward pharmacists to address medication discrepancies. Ward pharmacists detected 292 medication discrepancies (median 1, IQR 0–3). In the ‘sticker' intervention the ED pharmacist made 84 therapeutic suggestions of which 66 (78.6%) were accepted by medical staff. In the ‘consultation' intervention 230 therapeutic suggestions were made of which 219 (95.2%) were accepted. The qualitative evaluation found that pharmacist-prepared medication charts within the processes established were deemed safe, timely, accurate, complete and legible. Conclusion Support exists for ED pharmacists to expand their medication-related roles. ED pharmacists can safely prepare medication charts in a timely fashion and their therapeutic suggestions within a ‘consultative' framework are more beneficial than written advice. However, issues relating to resourcing, hours of service, service focus, statutory restrictions and training support for extended roles require resolution.

Objective Identification of challenges associated with quitting and overcoming them may improve cessation outcomes. This study describes the development and initial validation of a scale for measuring challenges to stopping smoking. Methods The item pool was generated from empirical and theoretical literature and existing scales, expert opinion and interviews with smokers and ex-smokers. The questionnaire was administered to smokers and recent quitters who participated in a hospital-based smoking cessation trial. Exploratory factor analysis was performed to identify subscales in the questionnaire. Internal consistency, validity and robustness of the subscales were evaluated. Results Of a total of 182 participants with a mean age of 55 years (SD 12.8), 128 (70.3%) were current smokers and 54 (29.7%) ex-smokers. Factor analysis of the 21-item questionnaire resulted in a 2-factor solution representing items measuring intrinsic (9 items) and extrinsic (12 items) challenges. This structure was stable in various analyses and the 2 factors accounted for 50.7% of the total variance of the polychoric correlations between the items. Internal consistency (Cronbach9s α) coefficients for the intrinsic and extrinsic subscales were 0.86 and 0.82, respectively. Compared with ex-smokers, current smokers had a higher mean score (±SD) for intrinsic (24.0±6.4 vs 20.5±7.4, p=0.002) and extrinsic subscales (22.3±7.5 vs 18.6±6.0, p=0.001). Conclusions Initial evaluation suggests that the 21-item challenges to stopping smoking scale is a valid and reliable instrument that can be used in research and clinical settings to assess challenges to stopping smoking.

The purpose of this article is to explain the contradictions in Michelle Bachelet’s presidency by focusing on the paradoxical nature of presidential power, the limits on the executive in the Chilean constitution, and how those limits affected President Bachelet’s government. At the outset of her presidency, she faced the problem of wanting to promote inclusive policies while simultaneously experiencing political pressure to maintain elite consensus. Due to institutional and political constraints, Bachelet’s rhetoric of inclusion could not be realized, and she eventually decided to opt for the more traditional elite consensus approach. In our view, the emphasis on achieving elite consensus produced contradictory results. It sustained Bachelet’s personal image as a national leader, but limited her ability to get effective legislation passed. Indeed, the Concertación itself was blamed for inaction rather than the president as an individual., El propósito de este artículo es analizar las contradicciones que se dieron durante la Presidencia de Michelle Bachelet. El artículo se enfoca en la naturaleza paradojal del poder presidencial, los límites que la constitución Chilena impone sobre el poder ejecutivo, y presenta un análisis de cómo esos límites afectaron al gobierno de la presidenta Bachelet. La Presidenta se vio, desde un principio, en la necesidad de escoger entre promover políticas de inclusión o mantener el consenso entre las elites. Dadas las limitaciones institucionales y políticas, la retórica de inclusión no se transformó en una realidad y ella escogió una política tradicional de consenso que favoreció a las elites. Desde nuestro punto de vista, el énfasis en lograr un consenso que favorecía a las elites produjo resultados contradictorios ya que, por un lado, sostuvo la imagen personal de Bachelet como líder nacional, pero, por el otro, limitó su capacidad para obtener la aprobación de legislación que produjera cambios efectivos. En última instancia, la Concertación, y no la Presidenta, fue vista como responsable por la falta de acción.

AlthoughArgentina and Brazil initially received more attention in that regard, Chile is a tempting new examplebecause retired General Augusto Pinochet, once a symbol of utter impunity (even entering theChilean Senate), was transformed into a rumpled octogenarian, and for the most part disappearedfrom public view (though not from public discourse). His successors in the role of army Commander-in-Chief began speaking in new terms, eschewing Pinochet’s intentionally inflammatory rhetoric,and even conceding that officers involved in human rights abuses could be brought before civiliancourts. In this vein, Paul Sigmund comes to the conclusion –based in large part on criticism of mybook on Chilean civil-military relations –that legalism has finally been restored to Chilean civil-militaryrelations (Sigmund, 2003). My own contention is that although Chilean governments have madeimportant strides, the legal foundations of military influence remained in place. I have elsewherecalled this “inching toward democracy” (Weeks, 2003). In this short response, I will address boththe criticism of my work and Professor Sigmund’s own hypothesis.I was surprised that Professor Sigmund stated that I do not define “salient interests” (Sigmund,2003: 248). I will not belabor the point, but rather refer the reader to my book where betweenpages 13 and 17, I address that very issue in detail (Weeks, 2003b: 13-17). The military is interestedin many issues, but attaches different importance to each interest, which in turn affects the waythey react to the expansion of civilian authority over those issues.Next, he claims that I “[do] not believe that the military will agree to the abolition of their appointedsenators” (Sigmund, 2003: 248). In fact, I argue that the military designated senators (not themilitary as a whole) very likely will not vote themselves out of power. The sentence Sigmund quotesfollows a discussion of the possibility of getting votes for such civil-military reform: “These votespotentially could come from members of the Concertacion who are named designated senators,but the military senators will not likely acquiesce to dismantling the system ” (Weeks, 2003: 161).The armed forces may, in the future, feel compelled to “agree to” the abolition of designatedsenators (perhaps as part of some political bargain) but as yet it has not come to pass.Professor Sigmund also quotes my book with regard to the solution of the 1993 boinazo, whichrequires elaboration. The concessions did not simply involve “an agreement on the treatment ofhuman rights cases ” (Sigmund, 2003: 247). As I point out, they also involved firing a Subsecretaryof War (Marcos Sanchez) that the army disliked, as well as compelling the Aylwin government to