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This piece examines a hitherto underexplored legal history chapter in international criminal law pioneer Benjamin Ferencz’s career, and, based on that, offers fixes for problems in current atrocity victim law. Known primarily for his Nuremberg prosecutorial exploits, Ferencz actually spent most of his career innovatively seeking reparations for Holocaust survivors and then later, with the benefit of such experience, sought to ensure coverage of victims in the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute. After examining this history, the article maps Ferencz’s trailblazing practices onto the atrocity victim lex lata. It then considers that law’s deficits, including front-end and back-end problems (i.e., at the investigation and early release application phases), International Criminal Court retributive versus reparative mission dissonance, inadequate funding, hindrances to proactive victim participation and victim exclusion in prosecuting aggression. For each problem, Ferencz’s history offers viable solutions, such as victim-oriented investigations, bifurcated retribution/restitution processes, bilateral treaty funding, transnational victim networking, and charging illegal use of force as crimes against humanity. As a result, perhaps such proposed modifications of the framework should not be called lex ferenda, but rather ‘lex ferencza.’

If the Nuremberg Trials represent the birth of international criminal law (ICL), then the public relations efforts of their personnel represent the birth of ‘communication in international criminal justice’. This aspect of the Allied post-World War II prosecutions of Nazi war criminals has been hitherto underexplored in the literature. This article fills the gap by examining the origins and development of American efforts to give an account of the Nuremberg Trials while they were unfolding and in their immediate aftermath. It begins with the public relations (PR) efforts of Robert Jackson, Chief Prosecutor for the initial International Military Tribunal (IMT) trial of the major Nazi war criminals, and his PR ‘right hand man’, Gordon Dean. Jackson and Dean took a multi-prong approach to messaging about the IMT, seeking to educate their Allied partners about the strategic advantages of a due-process-oriented proceeding, while persuading the American political establishment about the nascent Cold War-positioning advantages of such a justice strategy, as well as disabusing the global citizenry of the ‘victors’ justice’ narrative in favour of a ‘global rule of law’ mythology. Once the IMT trial was concluded, and confrontational US-Soviet bipolar reality became entrenched, American personnel for the subsequent Nuremberg Military Tribunal (NMT) trials took a different tact. In terms of outreach efforts, PR now focused on German attitudes toward prosecution efforts: NMT staff used appeals to justice in a heroic effort to keep resources flowing and the trial timelines open-ended. Bureaucratically, the PR apparatus eventually flowed to the creation of a ‘Special Projects Branch’, which sought to present the public with key excerpts from the NMT trials and provide various German prosecutors’ offices with transcripts and evidence for potential future trials. From its inception, therefore, ICL’s embryonic PR-sphere served as a battleground for competing concerns of transnational justice versus global realpolitik. Between those diametrically opposed policy poles, it carved out a space for education efforts vis-à-vis the local population, preservation of the historical record, and creation of a nascent bureaucratic structure for PR efforts. These modest achievements would lay the groundwork for the modern development of the field of communication in international criminal justice.

This article argues that Internet censorship is more fragile than is generally supposed and is, in fact, vulnerable to abrupt collapse. The volume and rapidity of online communication renders perfect policing of the Internet technologically impossible. Authoritarian governments are thus forced to rely on Internet users to police themselves in the form of self-censorship. This strategy has proven largely successful—legal ambiguity regarding what constitutes impermissible speech fosters norms of self-censorship. This reliance on self-censorship, however, renders these censorial systems susceptible to shocks. We set out a model that explains sudden breakdowns in Internet censorship that we term “cyberspeech cascades.” A cyberspeech cascade occurs when small expressions of online dissent produce large shifts in public perception regarding the acceptable limits of online expression that are, in fact, inaccurate. Online bandwagons of progressively more brazen speech proliferate into large-scale torrents of uncensored expression, triggering the temporary collapse of self-censorship norms online.

On the surface, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s June 2018 Singapore summit with Donald Trump arguably ushered in a new era of good relations that banished the spectre of war hanging over the Korean Peninsula. But such irenic optimism may be unwarranted. In light of ongoing bellicose rhetoric between Trump and Kim, this paper considers the potential risk and consequences of a twenty-first century armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. In addition to the rich variety of scenarios and issues raised by such a potential war, this hypothetical conflagration serves as fertile ground for exploring the contours and potential twilight zones of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). For example, in the case of a possible US invasion of North Korea, the paper considers that an initial routing of the country’s armed forces could lead to the formation of organized armed groups (OAGs) mustering against American forces. Should only OAG members with “continuous combat functions” be permissible targets or should all members of the group? In light of widespread adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty, might the United States have a customary international law obligation to remove its anti-personnel landmines from the DMZ? In the event of a threatened US invasion, could Kim Jong Un possibly be justified in a first-strike launch of nuclear missiles? These are among the cutting-edge questions explored in this paper within the context of a hypothetical war on the Korean Peninsula. The paper divides itself into four sections. Part II reviews the history of the 1950-1953 Korean War and provides the historical and factual predicates necessary to understand the legal issues that might arise in any future potential conflict. It also considers the LOAC violations/war crimes that took place during that war. Part III then analyses the issues that could arise in a modern clash between North and South Korea. In the first instance, it considers what body of law would apply to the various belligerent parties in terms of whether the struggle would be considered a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) or an international armed conflict (IAC). After identifying the relevant legal regime, it will analyse various substantive legal issues, including: (1) the potential for a repeat of 1950-1953 war crimes and the manner in which they might be committed; (2) issues related to contemporary remnants from that mid-twentieth century conflict (e.g., use of landmines); (3) issues arising from North Korea’s unsavoury reputation as a rogue state (e.g., calling into question the possibility of such tactics as hijacking, torture, use of child soldiers, and use of human shields and other tactics of asymmetrical warfare); and (4) other more complex issues, such as potential civilian participation, explosive weapons in dense urban areas, drone strikes, cyberwarfare and potential use of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the paper concludes by combining the historical and legal perspectives to offer insights on the odds and likely nature of any potential future conflict.

The status of ordering in international criminal law has customarily been defined as a mode of liability. As such, ordering has additionally been burdened with a causal nexus between the order and the actual commission of the crime. The ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence has established, as the Kamuhanda judgment indicates, that the order must have “a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the illegal act,” creating thereby a situation in which the speaker, that is, the superior officer or any other person in the position of command and/or authority could fully shift the burden of liability to the principal perpetrator of the crime. Furthermore, in the situation in which the physical crime is not executed, the superior would again not be held liable. These are only some of the problems arising from the traditional status of ordering as a mode of liability. Moreover, the ICC’s Rome Statute and its second key document, The Elements of Crimes, do not clearly distinguish between ordering as a mode of liability and as an inchoate offense. While pursuing an immaculate historical overview and analysis of ordering as one of the most thought-provoking and less than adequately understood forms of potential criminal conduct, as part of his proposal for a unified liability theory of atrocity speech law, Gregory Gordon offers a persuasive line of argumentation that “the crime of ordering should be modified from its present restrictive form and expanded to encompass inchoate liability.” What had once been assigned the status of a mode of liability by the ICTY and ICTR, for example, could and should be elevated to the level of a substantive offense with inchoate liability. After Cassese and Cryer, who have both briefly addressed a redefinition of ordering as an inchoate offense, Gordon’s line of argumentation is the best developed thus far and falls impeccably within the grand framework of potentially culpable propagandistic, cognitive and linguistic forms of intentional actions such as directive and commissive types of speech acts. While the former indicates that the speaker wants the targeted listener to do something and can be conveyed through orders, commands, demands, instructions, pleas or a combination of these and other types of directive speech acts, in the latter, the speaker commits himself to doing something in the form of promises, vows, threats and similar types of commissive speech acts. That is also why Gordon’s proposal to accord ordering the status of an inchoate offense lies at the heart of a cognitive process which integrates in time the intentional and the criminal components of an order on both ends of the speech act, the speaker’s and the listener’s.

What is the relationship between international human rights law and domestic laws that strive to protect free speech while regulating hate speech, and incitement to terrorism and genocide? Examining the interplay between and among these different legal regimes demonstrates that international and domestic approaches to regulating hate speech and incitement help inform our general notions of the human rights boundaries regarding speech regulation. These policy and enforcement lessons are invaluable for any effective approach to criminalizing incitement to genocide and incitement to terrorism. The former has already been developed with those lessons in mind, but the latter is at an early stage. In addition, although incitement to genocide superficially differentiates itself from incitement to terrorism in certain obvious ways – most importantly the discriminatory-liquidation bent of genocide versus terrorism’s intimidation-for-political gain focus, they actually share much in common. This is true upon deeper consideration of each delict’s elements, overall objectives, enforcement priorities, and rhetorical techniques. Given these resonances, development of incitement to terrorism could benefit greatly from the jurisprudential wisdom that has accumulated around incitement to genocide. In turn, both of these speech-offense branches are helpfully contextualized, from doctrinal and policy perspectives, by international human rights and domestic laws. This paper examines how these legal regimes, different in many important respects but also inextricably linked in certain others, interact with and influence one another. Whether the goal is to eliminate enemies through concentration camps or via blowing up thousands of citizens at once, the speech that inspires the perpetrators can be studied as the lynchpin for, and foundation of, international crimes. Understanding and eradicating one might then lead to better understanding and eradicating the other. We must keep this in mind as we attempt to develop a comprehensive and effective approach to incitement law.

By the second half of the 1990s, the ad hoc tribunals started issuing judgments and providing invaluable insights into the relevant offenses. Regarding incitement, the foundational cases of Prosecutor v. Akayesu (1998) and Prosecutor v. Nahimana (the so-called Media Case) (2003) laid out the essential elements of the crime: (1) direct; (2) public; (3) incitement; and (4) mens rea. The jurisprudence clarified that persecution applied to a wide range of discriminatory actions, including use of hate speech perpetrated against a victim group when it effects a deprivation of fundamental rights. Building on this, an ICTR Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Ruggiu (2000) established that hate speech not calling for violence could qualify as persecution. Finally, jurisprudence also developed around the crimes of instigation (violence advocacy resulting in violence, wherein the advocacy made a contribution), and the comparable crime of ordering (instigation plus a superior-subordinate relationship between the speaker and listener).

Chapter 1 limns the chronology of speech and government-sponsored mass violence over the centuries. After an overview of pre-twentieth century hate rhetoric, it focuses on Ottoman propaganda in relation to the Armenian Genocide. It then describes the Nazi hate speech campaign against the Jews, the archetypal modern template for mass murder agitprop. It then moves to the post–Cold War period and examines the role of speech in the 1990s atrocities committed in the Balkans and Rwanda. The chapter concludes by examining more recent instances of atrocity rhetoric connected to mass crimes: postelection violence in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire; extremist Buddhist attacks against Muslims in Myanmar; the Islamic State’s genocidal violence against the Yazidis; and Dinka versus Nuer bloodshed in South Sudan. In tracing this history, two overarching rhetorical strategies become apparent—exclusion (defaming and dehumanizing the out-group) and threat (warning that the out-group threatens violence so must be eliminated first).

Chapter 6 explains that offence of hate speech as crime against humanity-persecution (CAH-persecution) is fragmented as the ICTR concluded that non-advocacy hate speech deprives the target group of fundamental rights so can be charged as CAH-persecution. But the ICTY disagreed in Prosecutor v. Kordić (2001), finding that non-advocacy hate speech is insufficiently grave to serve as the actus reus for CAH-persecution. The 2007 Media Case Appeals Chamber judgment failed to resolve the split. The ICTR’s approach to instigation, admixing Civil Law and Common Law conceptions, has puzzled jurists regarding its relationship to incitement. Moreover, given an ambiguous “contribution” element, recent jurisprudence has arguably saddled instigation with a “but for” causation requirement and has appended a doctrinally indefensible element to its base “prompting” actus reus: a “different forms of persuasion” requirement. The offense of ordering is problematic because it excludes inchoate liability -- criminalizing commands by a superior only if a subordinate actually carries them out.

Chapter 11 explains that discrete fixes of individual atrocity speech offenses are not sufficient. It begins by considering the history of haphazard atrocity speech offense formulations and the resultant systemic incoherence in this area of law. From there, it considers how certain macro-structural changes can be made to realize the crucial speech-specific prevention, systematization, and expressive goals emphasized throughout this book. In the end, it proposes a “Unified Liability Theory” for atrocity speech law. That theory posits that the core atrocity offenses—genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—should be methodically attached to each type of liability—inciting, speech (abetting a proposed new offense for noncatalytic speech), instigating, and ordering. And this proposed change can be operationalized via treaty and/or a modification of the Rome Statute, as well as any other relevant legal instruments. The chapter concludes with consideration of the theoretical and practical implications of this proposed change.

In light of the compelling empirical connection between hate speech and atrocity, what laws, if any, criminalize the dissemination of such rhetoric? Chapter 2 begins to answer that question by examining international human rights instruments and domestic laws covering speech and violence. It notes there is an inbuilt clash in the principal human rights documents between free expression and freedom from invidious discrimination. Most of the world’s liberal democracies protect dignity against discrimination. The United States does not. The world’s most speech-protective jurisdiction, its Constitution’s First Amendment stipulates that the government may “make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” As the United States plays a prominent role in developing the criminalization of atrocity speech on the global stage, and as its Supreme Court has often held forth on issues of speech liberty, its domestic jurisprudence is a particular focus of this chapter.

“Kind words can be short and easy to speak, but their echoes are truly endless.”—MOTHER TERESA11.Sam Majdi, THE WISDOM OF THE GREAT 436 (2012).On April 15, 2016, in relation to his infamous November 1992 speech, a Rwandan High Court found Léon Mugesera guilty of incitement to commit genocide, inciting ethnic hatred and persecution as a crime against humanity....

Hate speech is widely considered a precondition for mass atrocity. Since World War II a large body of case law has interpreted the key offenses criminalizing such discourse: (1) incitement to genocide; and (2) persecution as a crime against humanity. But the law has developed in a fragmented manner. Surprisingly, no volume has furnished a comprehensive analysis of the entire jurisprudential output and the relation of each of its parts to one another and to the whole. Atrocity Speech Law fills this gap and provides needed perspective for courts, government officials, and scholars. Part 1, “Foundation,” explores the historical relationship between speech and atrocity and the foundations of the current legal framework. Part 2, “Fragmentation,” details the discrepancies and deficiencies within that framework. Part 3, “Fruition,” proposes fixes for the individual speech offenses and suggests a more comprehensive solution: a “Unified Liability Theory,” pursuant to which there would be four criminal modalities placed in one statutory provision and applying to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes: (1) incitement; (2) speech abetting; (3) instigation; and (4) ordering. Apart from the issue of fragmentation, experts have failed to find an accurate designation for this body of law. “International Incitement Law” and “International Hate Speech Law,” two of the typical labels, do not capture the law’s breadth or its proper relationship to mass violence. So with a more holistic and accurate approach in mind, this book proposes a new name for the overall body of international rules and jurisprudence: “atrocity speech law.”

Chapter 10 proposes a new atrocity speech offense—incitement to commit war crimes. It demonstrates that any imagined ills related to this proposed expansion of speech criminalization in the military context-- from supposed chilling effects to drags on operational efficiency – are easily outweighed by the salutary impact of wider proscription. The chapter contends that exposing intraforce military relations to the specter of greater verbal regulation will promote law of armed conflict (LOAC) compliance and esprit de corps, thereby ultimately enhancing broader functional objectives. It also explains why the proposal’s timing is propitious. War weapons have become more lethal and war tactics more savage. And the incitement offense has fossilized as a penal option within the narrow target-crime confines of genocide. As the international legal imagination has begun to visualize its utility in relation to other global crimes, notably terrorism, its adaption for LOAC violation purposes seems prudently incremental and normatively sound.

Chapter 8 considers and proposes remedies for incitement to genocide’s problems. As a threshold matter, it considers the proposals of certain experts who have recommended scuttling the existing ICTR framework. The chapter considers these experts’ proposed alternative tests and concludes that, while making important contributions to the analytical exercise, these proposed frameworks have faults of their own and thus are not suitable as wholesale replacements. As a result, the chapter turns to potential ways to improve the existing framework. Solutions are offered with respect to the elements of “direct” (clarify and expand it), “public” (delete it), and “incitement” (break it down more effectively and add to it) as well as the looming and ambiguous presence and impact of causation (which jurists must more clearly explain is not an element). Finally, the chapter offers instruction to courts on thorough application of the proposed new framework with sufficient rigor and consistency.

“Those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you commit atrocities.”—VOLTAIRE11.François-Marie Arouet (pen name “Voltaire”), Questions sur Les Miracles, in 8 ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE VOLTAIRE, 691 (Chez Furne 1836). The actual quotation is “Certainement qui est en droit de vous rendre absurde est en droit de vous rendre injuste.” This would translate somewhat differently, but the above is the standard rendering of the quotation. ...

If the hate speech–core crime relationship is plagued by internal incoherence with respect to incitement to genocide and instigation and institutional incompatibility as concerns persecution, the problem in reference to war crimes is quite different. In effect, as Chapter 7 demonstrates, the issue is an absence of law. Remarkably, given the inherently violent nature of the battlefield, with the exception of directly ordering grave breaches, international humanitarian law contains no hate speech provisions. The same is true of the relevant international criminal law instruments—neither the ad hoc tribunal statutes nor the Rome Statute contains hate speech provisions in reference to war crimes. Providing an overview of the modern history of hate speech on the battlefield, this chapter explores the deadly implications of this normative vortex and details the relevant legal instruments that evidence it.

Chapter 3 considers the initial choices made by the newly formed body of international criminal law vis-à-vis atrocity speech. The framers of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT) recognized that Nazi barbarities were rooted in propaganda. Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter”(and a comparable Control Council Law No. 10 provision) permitted prosecutors to charge “crimes against humanity” against Nazi defendants, including Julius Streicher and Hans Fritzsche (before the IMT) and Otto Dietrich (before an American tribunal). This novel offense criminalized certain heinous acts committed against civilians that were outside the ambit of war crimes, including hate speech as persecution. The chapter then considers the origins of the Genocide Convention and its pioneering formulation of the incitement crime. Finally, it examines the ad hoc tribunal statutes and the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, each of which criminalizes incitement to genocide, persecution as a crime against humanity, instigation, and ordering.

Chapter 5 reveals the intrinsic ambiguity and incoherence within the incitement to genocide framework. It identifies four primary problems with the framework, as laid out in the ICTR foundational cases: (1) inadequate explanation of the scope of the “direct” element; (2) a deficient definition of the “public” criterion; (3) failure to identify the essential components of “incitement”; and (4) an inconsistent and incoherent treatment of “causation.” Moreover, the Media Case Trial Chamber judgment offered a basic doctrinal base to which, in theory, future decisions could return as a point of repair and build on as a platform for incitement’s normative development. Unfortunately, as this chapter demonstrates, subsequent cases, including Mugesera v. Canada (2005), the Media Case Appeals Chamber judgment (2007), and Prosecutor v. Bikindi (2008), have failed to do that. Thus, the current iteration of incitement fails to promote deterrence and could be manipulated by authoritarian governments to suppress legitimate expression.

Chapter 9 examines the rift between the ICTY and ICTR regarding nonadvocacy speech and persecution and considers which position makes better sense. Consistent with the chapeau and relevant precedent, it concludes that hate speech not directly calling for action should qualify as persecution. This is especially true given the many flaws of Kordić, the sole judgment to support the contrary position. The chapter also explains how to fix the issues related to persecution, including disentangling it from incitement by severing its suggested jurisprudential link to the Civil Law and excising the unsupported and unprecedented “different forms of persuasion” requirement from the crime’s actus reus. Similarly, it explains that jurists need to clarify the “contribution” requirement, and it demonstrates that, in light of the proper calibration of responsibility, “substantial contribution” is the proper standard. Finally, this chapter recommends jettisoning ordering’s restrictive target-crime-commission requirement and including inchoate liability within the offense’s ambit.

Deep-water massive (featureless) sands are commonly interpreted as indicators of flow conditions during or shortly after deposition and are almost never interpreted to reflect post-depositional homogenization due to bioturbation. Deep-water deposits of the lower Rio Dell Formation (Pliocene), Eel River basin (NW California), however, reveal previously unrecognized cryptically bioturbated fabrics in massive sandstone and mudstone. This study represents the first detailed documentation of cryptically bioturbated massive-appearing sandstone in deep-water channelized environments. Although fluid escape contributed to some of the massive-appearing textures in the Rio Dell Formation, we present criteria for recognizing cryptic bioturbation fabrics: (1) tubes with lithologically distinctive concentric linings or infillings, (2) meniscate backfill in burrows, (3) lithologically distinctive spreite, (4) concentric grain orientations, and (5) grains realigned adjacent to tubular structures. Using biostratigraphic data, detailed stratigraphic descriptions, core photos, and photomicrographs, we document ichnofabrics associated with two main lithofacies and their bounding surfaces: (1) diffuse muddy siltstone lithofacies (e.g. Planolites, Phycosiphon, Schaubcylindrichnus), (2) massive sandstone lithofacies (e.g. cryptic bioturbation, Planolites), (3) lithofacies crossers, (4) burrows that prefer the top-of-sand/base-of-mud interface (e.g. Planolites, Skolithos), and (5) a Glossifungites-demarcated discontinuity at the base of the massive sand lithofacies. We also establish two main lithofacies associations with characteristic sedimentologic traits. We use relative percentages of the lithofacies associations to interpret slope-channel depositional facies: distal channel margin, proximal channel margin, and channel axis. By comparing ichnologic characteristics to depositional facies, we conclude that proximity to the channel axis appear to control the degree and type of bioturbation observed in the massive-appearing deposits. Distal channel margin deposits preserve the smallest burrows, highly developed cryptic bioturbation fabrics, and the most complete sequence of background bioturbation. Proximal channel margin and channel axis deposits record larger burrows but incomplete cryptic bioturbated fabrics and an overall smaller proportion of preserved background bioturbation.

Interest in and use of article-level metrics (ALMs) has grown rapidly amongst the research community, by researchers, publishers, funders, and research institutions. As this happens, it is critical to ensure secure and reliable data that is trustworthy and can be used by all. Two case studies are presented, which illustrate different approaches to establishing ALM data integrity., Article-level metric (ALM) data need to be secure and reliable if they are to be trusted and used by all. This Perspective explores the different approaches taken by two organizations to establish ALM data integrity.

Severe muscular dystrophy (MD) has historically led to death in early adulthood, due to mainly cardiopulmonary complications. However, with newer methods of cardiac and respiratory management, survival has improved, and patients with MD are more frequently undergoing procedures requiring deep sedation or anesthesia. Respiratory management of these patients during procedures is challenging; safe and effective options for respiratory support are needed. In this report, we describe our experience using the laryngeal mask airway (LMA) to provide respiratory support during deep sedation or anesthesia for eight patients with severe MD during the following medical procedures: eight percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) placements, three lithotripsies, and placement of an implantable cardioverter-defibrillator. We also review the benefits and risks of the LMA in the context of other respiratory support options for people with MD, and the integral role of non-invasive positive pressure ventilation (NPPV) during induction of and recovery from deep sedation or general anesthesia.

This paper considers whether "incitement to aggression" may be a viable crime. It concludes that it can but with certain limitations. In relation to incitement, aggression-related discourse can theoretically be bifurcated between what the paper refers to as “war-council” speech and “war-mongering” speech. Regarding the former, it is important to consider that aggression is a leadership-oriented crime with an in personam jurisdiction limited to an individual exercising control over the political or military action of a State. However, such an individual, even if the most powerful dictator, is not capable of carrying out himself the multitude of simultaneous and multi-level tasks necessary to plan and launch a modern aggressive war. He will operate within some sort of bureaucratic framework and/or military hierarchy that will necessarily require communication with other government/military officials as part of such an enterprise. Such communications essentially represent “councils of war” conducted in the relatively insular corridors of power. With respect to such “war-council" aggression speech, the utility of any corollary incitement provision is questionable -- those who would act -- the controllers of the government/military apparatus -- need no exhorting as they monopolize agency. Moreover, unlike the other core crimes, any theoretical “inciting” speech connected to war-council aggression conduct does not as directly entail dehumanization or marginalization of an out-group being targeted for violence or inhumane treatment. But the other variety of aggression-related discourse that a theoretical incitement crime implicates, “war-mongering,” is quite different. It implicates government leaders conditioning their citizens to support illegal war campaigns through speeches and mass media. It is not always a sine qua non for perpetrating the crime of aggression (as war-council conduct is) but, in cases of controversial war campaigns, it is sometimes needed to assure sufficient troop morale and civilian cooperation. And it empirically entails speech dehumanizing the enemy population. Further, it has historically been recognized as an offence. So criminalizing it via incitement makes more sense and, indeed, fills important gaps within the aggression offence’s definitional and operational framework. Thus, the crime of direct and public incitement to commit aggression, the public element implicitly excluding "war-council" communication, is certainly viable. Given aggression’s role as the breeding ground for the other core ICL crimes, qualifiedly including it within the envelope of incitement achieves the proper balance between sound policy and doctrinal coherence.

We review the anesthetic implications of Joubert syndrome and report that spinal anesthesia under intravenous propofol sedation proved satisfactory for repair of an inguinal hernia in a spontaneously ventilating infant with this syndrome. We caution that anatomical peculiarities may complicate performance of a caudal epidural block and suggest consideration of the use of caffeine to ameliorate the apneic episodes seen in early infancy in this syndrome.

Background This phase I study investigated the maximum tolerated dose (MTD), safety, pharmacokinetics and antitumor activity of ganetespib in patients with solid malignancies. Methods Patients were enrolled in cohorts of escalating ganetespib doses, given as 1 hour IV infusion, once weekly for 3 weeks, followed by a 1-week rest until disease progression or unacceptable toxicity. Endpoints included safety, pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic parameters and preliminary clinical activity. Results Fifty-three patients were treated at doses escalating from 7 to 259 mg/m2. The most common adverse events were Grade 1 and 2 diarrhea, fatigue, nausea or vomiting. Dose-limiting toxicities (DLT) observed were: one Grade 3 amylase elevation (150 mg/m2), one Grade 3 diarrhea and one Grade 3 and one Grade 4 asthenia (259 mg/m2). The MTD was 216 mg/m2 and the recommended phase 2 dose was established at 200 mg/m2 given IV at Days 1, 8, and 15 every 4 weeks. There was a linear relationship between dose and exposure. Plasma HSP70 protein levels remained elevated for over a week post treatment. Disease control rate (objective response and stable disease at ≥ 16 weeks) was 24.4%. Conclusions Ganetespib is well tolerated as a weekly infusion for 3 of every 4 weeks cycle. The recommended phase II dose is 200 mg/m2, and is associated with an acceptable tolerability profile. Trial registration NCT00687934

In the case of Samantar v. Yousuf, the United States Supreme Court had to decide whether a former Somali Prime Minister, accused of torturing his own people while in office, should be immune from liability in U.S. courts on grounds of sovereign immunity (in particular, pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). The sovereign immunity defense featured prominently in cases brought against former Nazi officials in the wake of the Holocaust, including the landmark Nuremberg and Eichmann trials. Modern international criminal tribunals have also relied on this precedent to reject the sovereign immunity defense for gross human rights violations committed in Rwanda, Darfur and the former Yugoslavia. This amicus brief illuminates the connection between the defense as asserted in the Samantar case and its treatment and rejection in the Holocaust and modern cases.

It is an article of faith among transnational penal experts that Sir Peter von Hagenbach's 1474 prosecution in Breisach for atrocities committed serving the Duke of Burgundy constitutes the first international war crimes trial in history. Hagenbach was tried before an ad hoc tribunal of twenty-eight judges from various regional city-states for misdeeds, including murder and rape, he allegedly perpetrated as governor of the Duke's Alsatian territories from 1469 to 1474. Though it remains obscure in the popular imagination, most legal scholars perceive the trial as a landmark event. Some value it for formulating an embryonic version of crimes against humanity. Others praise it for ostensibly charging rape as a war crime. And all are in agreement that it is the first recorded case in history to reject the defense of superior orders. Such a perspective has arguably helped invest the Nuremberg trials with greater historical legitimacy and lent subtle sanction to the development of international criminal law in the post-Cold War world. But the legal literature typically deals with the trial in very cursory fashion and its stature as pre-Nuremberg precedent may hinge on faulty assumptions. As the 1990s explosion of ad hoc tribunal activity is nearing its end and the legal academy is taking stock of its accomplishments and failures, it is perhaps time to look more closely at the Hagenbach trial. This piece does that by digging below the surface and revisiting some of the historical and legal premises underlying the trial's perception by legal academics. In the main, international law specialists have relied on older historical accounts to conclude that Hagenbach's service as Burgundy's Alsatian bailiff constituted a five-year reign of terror that culminated in a legitimate and ground-breaking atrocity conviction. But revisionist historians tend to see Hagenbach's ordeal not as a good-faith justice enterprise but rather as a show trial meant to rebuff the territorial ambitions of Sir Peter's master, Charles the Bold. They emphasize that liability was grounded on confessions obtained through torture. And while they concede that Hagenbach may have been boorish and autocratic, they note that the first few years of his rule were relatively pacific and the 1474 uprising against Sir Peter was primarily a reaction to attempted Burgundian regional encroachments and perceived feudal suppression of growing urban and bourgeois prerogatives. The trial itself, they point out, was not international at all as the men who sat in judgment of Hagenbach were all subjects of the Holy Roman Empire. Nor was it a war crimes trial, since there was no armed conflict at the time the alleged atrocities took place. But there are shortcomings in the revisionist analysis as well. The high level of animosity shown Hagenbach, as demonstrated by the severity of the torture and the stripping of his knighthood, indicate that the atrocity allegations may not be unfounded. Moreover, there is evidence that Burgundy's occupation of the territory was hostile and so the charges against Hagenbach may very well be considered war crimes. Finally, by 1474, the Holy Roman Empire was no longer a viable political entity and so the ad hoc tribunal may indeed have been international in nature. It is no coincidence that such a unique event took place between the erosion of medieval hegemony and the imminent establishment of Westphalian sovereignty. Not until the Westphalian veil was pierced by the Nuremberg trials nearly five hundred years later, did the subject of the Hagenbach trial take on contemporary relevance in the legal literature. In the end, the piece concludes that while some of its details may be lost in the mists of time and its legal status may remain muddled in theoretic gray zones, the Hagenbach trial should continue to play an important role as an historic and conceptual pillar of international criminal law's "pre-history."

These are the slides from my presentation at the AACSB meeting on 30 April 2011 in New York, NY. The session was titled "The Impact of Research" and my co-presenters were John Peters, President, GSE Research Limited and Howard Thomas, Dean and LKCSB Chair in Strategic Management, Singapore Management University.

In this paper, we show how the Eigenfactor(R) score, originally designed for ranking scholarly journals, can be adapted to rank the scholarly output of authors, institutions, and countries based on authorlevel citation data. Using the methods described herein, we provide Eigenfactor rankings for 84,808 disambiguated authors of 240,804 papers in the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) — a pre and post-print archive devoted to the rapid dissemination of scholarly research in the social sciences and humanities. As an additive metric, the Eigenfactor scores are readily computed for collectives such as departments or institutions as well. We show that a collective’s Eigenfactor score can be computed either by summing the Eigenfactor scores of its members, or by working directly with a collective-level cross-citation matrix. To illustrate, we provide Eigenfactor rankings for institutions and countries in the SSRN repository. With a network-wide comparison of Eigenfactor scores and download tallies, we demonstrate that Eigenfactor scores provide information that is both different from and complementary to that provided by download counts. We see author-level ranking as one filter for navigating the scholarly literature, and note that such rankings generate incentives for more open scholarship, as authors are rewarded for making their work available to the community as early as possible and prior to formal publication. NOTE: Because of the incompleteness of the SSRN CiteReader data at this time, please check back at this URL for updated versions of this paper for updated results over the next 2 years. In addition, when citing this paper please include the following: Data as of March 14, 2011.

Do you read everything in your field today? Do you even know what everything means any more? Readers of scholarly research are faced with an overabundance of information due to interdisciplinary subject areas, access to research at earlier and multiple stages, and simply more research from more scholars. My simple definition of innovation is the ability to create new things by being exposed to a broader and deeper set of existing things, but broader and deeper have their limits. There is no substitute for reading and truly comprehending a specific article, but there aren’t enough hours in the day to read everything. We need better tools to know what research we need to read. We need to know what we don’t know.

Can singing a song constitute incitement to genocide? A 2009 decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the case of Hutu extremist pop singer Simon Bikindi said it can. But in convicting Bikindi, it failed to apply, much less develop, the incitement law framework it had established, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, through a string of prior opinions (most notably in the famous 'Media Case'). That framework asks judges to consider the purpose, text, context, and relationship between the speaker and subject to determine if a speech constitutes criminal incitement. Critics have pointed to the test's piecemeal development, its supple contours, and the Tribunal's desultory application of it and proposed replacing it with an entirely new test. As African dictators have supposedly cited the ICTR framework to justify stifling legitimate dissent, such a drastic solution is necessary, they argue, to promote freedom of speech and prevent genocide. This Article acknowledges these concerns but proposes a middle-ground approach instead. Given doctrinal glitches in the proposed new tests, the existing framework should be preserved but elements of the new tests should be incorporated as 'evaluative factors' within the 'context' analysis. At the same time, additional contextual reference points (such as the outbreak of war and the personal history of the speaker) should be appended to the existing test. An entirely new element, 'channels of communication,' should be tacked on as well to help distinguish between written versus broadcast media (given that the latter is more effective at provoking imminent lawless violence). Similarly, as suggested by the Bikindi decision, two additional elements - temporality (was the speech uttered within the proper contextual time frame?) and instrumentality (was the speaker responsible for the speech's dissemination) - should be appended to the existing framework. Finally, an incitement-technique typology, which would explicitly recognize various indirect incitement methods (such as 'accusation in a mirror' and 'victim-sympathizer conflation'), should also be integrated into the analysis. This compromise approach will provide the necessary flexibility to permit nuanced incitement analysis while insuring greater degrees of normative coherence, free expression and, most importantly, effective genocide prevention.

Polyanilines containing sulphonic groups covalently bonded to the back bone were synthesized from parent polyaniline via sulphonation of the polymer utilizing differing sulphonation agents and differing means. The sulphonation conditions were studied as a function of several parameters including sulphonation time, starting forms of the precursor polymer, presence of oxidizer [(NH 4 ) 2 S 2 O 8 ] and temperature. The sulphonated polyanilines were characterized by FT i.r., elemental analyses, d.c. conductivity and electrochemical methods. It was found that using fuming sulphuric acid as the sulphonation agent gave both higher conductivity and higher sulphonation level for sulphonated polyaniline than implementation of other sulphonation agents and means.

Since 1998, 5.4 million citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been killed in what many refer to as "Africa's First World War" -- the deadliest armed conflict since World War II. Despite a 2003 peace deal and the country's first elections in 2006, a staggering 45,000 people continue to die each month and as many as 4,000 women per year are being raped. As Western Europe needed a massive infusion of American assistance to lift itself from misery after World War II, this article contends that the DRC needs such an infusion now. It posits that ending DRC atrocities will require launching an "African Marshall Plan" -- a gargantuan influx of aid and expertise that will stabilize the country and promote the rule of law. This will entail a series of suggested procedural and substantive changes to U.S. policy. The procedural changes involve greater agency inclusion and coordination, use of human rights benchmarks and an ombudsman, and establishment of a team of law and negotiation experts on the ground. The substantive changes focus on large-scale humanitarian assistance efforts supporting judicial and security sector reform that will eliminate the culture of impunity. Such reform would include: (1) setting up programs to curb and punish sexual violence and corruption; (2) preventing illegal resource exploitation through, inter alia, corporate sanctions; (3) backing the International Criminal Court and DRC domestic war crimes prosecution efforts; (4) possible establishment of a hybrid tribunal for crimes outside DRC and ICC jurisdiction; and (5) creating a "National Human Rights Office" with branches in Kinshasa and outlying provinces (especially in the troubled eastern DRC).

On October 25, 2005, at an anti-Zionism conference in Tehran, Iran's President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, called for Israel to "be wiped off the face of the map" -- the first in a series of incendiary speeches arguably advocating liquidation of the Jewish state. Certain commentators contend that these statements constitute direct and public incitement to commit genocide. This Article analyzes this assertion by examining the nature and scope of recent groundbreaking developments in incitement law arising from the Rwandan genocide prosecutions. It pieces together an analytical framework based on principles derived from these cases, including the Canadian Supreme Court's opinion in the Leon Mugesera matter. Using this framework, it demonstrates that while a successful prosecution would entail clearing significant substantive and procedural hurdles, it could include both incitement and crimes against humanity charges in light of the incitement's nexus with Iran's sponsorship of terrorist attacks against Israel. However, to take the case, the International Criminal Court would have to put aside political pressures related to the Middle East's toxic political environment and the absence of causation. The odds of this happening are long. As a result, the Article proposes that incitement law shift its focus from post-atrocity punishment to deterrence. This would permit early intervention and center incitement on its core mission of atrocity prevention. The Article also suggests that euphemisms employed to disguise incitement, such as "predictions" of destruction, when anchored to direct calls for violence, should also be considered acts of direct incitement. Finally, with respect to crimes against humanity, the Article explains that attacks on a civilian population carried out by a proxy at the insistence of the inciter, rather than directly by the actual inciter himself, should be sufficient to establish liability. At the same time, in the interest of protecting free speech, the crime should not be charged absent evidence of calls for protected-group violence, as opposed to mere hatred.