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143 results on '"Graziano, MARIA GABRIELLA"'

11. A Measure of Social Loss for Production Economies with Externalities

Author

Graziano Maria Gabriella, Platino Vincenzo, Graziano, MARIA GABRIELLA, and Platino, Vincenzo

Subjects
production economy, core, social loss, externalities
Abstract

In this paper we consider a production economy and adopt a cooperative approach to equilibrium analysis which allows each individual to cooperate with others and to form a coalition whose members have access to the available technologies. Our definition of the core requires a blocking coalition to take account of the consequences of its blocking for the production of the counter-coalition. Following Montesano (2002), we introduce a measure of social loss with respect to the core of the economy which characterizes the corresponding core allocations. Our characterization holds in the presence of consumption externalities and an optimistic attitude of coalition agents with respect to the behavior of outsiders.

Published
2022

14. Two characterizations of cost share equilibria.

Author

Graziano, Maria Gabriella, Pesce, Marialaura, and Romaniello, Maria

Subjects
COST shifting, NASH equilibrium, PUBLIC goods, EQUILIBRIUM, GOVERNMENT policy
Abstract

We consider pure exchange economies with a finite number of private goods and the choice of non-Samuelsonian public goods. For this type of economies, [5] proposed the notion of cost share equilibrium with individual payments for public goods varying according to individual benefits. This situation arises naturally when a level of provision is interpreted as a whole configuration of public policies or when cost share functions are interpreted as voluntary contributions rather than predetermined tax systems (see [31]). We establish the equivalence of cost share equilibria with cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretic solutions: 1. we characterize cost share equilibria as those allocations which cannot be improved upon by society; 2. we characterize cost share equilibria as the Nash equilibria of a game with two players. The cooperative solutions analyzed in the paper are defined via a contribution scheme which captures the fraction of the total cost of collective goods that each coalition of agents is expected to cover. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2023
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25. ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC PROJECTS: EFFICIENCY AND DECENTRALIZATION

Author

Graziano, Maria Gabriella

Subjects
Business, Business, international, Economics
Abstract

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2007.00453.x Byline: Maria Gabriella Graziano (1) Abstract: The article deals with the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics for production economies with a finite set of agents, infinitely many private goods, and a set of public projects. The problem of efficiency and decentralization is addressed under the following very general assumptions: (a) the commodity-price duality is endowed with a consistent locally convex topology; (b) the set of public projects is without any mathematical structure. Moreover, any agent is characterized by a nonordered preference relation depending on consumption goods and public projects. Approximate and exact welfare theorems are discussed throughout the article. Author Affiliation: ([dagger])University of Napoli Federico II, Napoli, Italy

Published
2007

30. On the edgeworth's conjecture in finitely additive economies with restricted coalitions

Author

Basile, Achille and Graziano, Maria Gabriella

Subjects
Mathematical models, Competition (Economics) -- Models, Coalition (Social sciences) -- Models, Oligopolies -- Models, Economics, Mathematics
Abstract

Decentralizing prices indicate different core allocations based on different blocking coalitions. The model ranges from oligopolistic situations to perfect competition and represents finitely additive economies.

Published
2001

40. Stable Sets for Asymmetric Information Economies

Author

GRAZIANO, MARIA GABRIELLA, MEO, CLAUDIA, Yannelis, Nicholas, Graziano, MARIA GABRIELLA, Meo, Claudia, and Yannelis, Nicholas

Subjects
sets, asymmetric information, information sharing, Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory, jel:C71, jel:D51, jel:D82, stable sets, asymmetric information, information sharing
Abstract

An exchange economy with asymmetrically informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates the information sharing among agents. For it, the notion of stable sets à la Von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different frameworks are taken into account as regards preferences: a model without expectations and a model with expected utility. For the first one, it is shown that the set $V$ of all individually rational, Pareto optimal, symmetric allocations is the unique stable set of symmetric allocations. For the second one, an example is presented which shows that the same set $V$ is not externally stable and a weaker result is proved. Finally, the coalitional incentive compatibility of allocations belonging to the unique stable set is provided.

Published
2013

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