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Item does not contain fulltext The question of this paper is ‘what affects people’s willingness to trade-off individual liberty for security?’ We assess who agrees with the statement that restriction of personal freedom by governmental means is allowed in order to increase security. We further investigate the support for concrete security measures which encroach on individual liberty and privacy. Various hypotheses are tested using the Dutch National Freedom Survey 2005 (NVO2005). We find that characteristics of vulnerability have a stronger influence on the support for concrete measures than on the general willingness of people to trade-off liberty for security. Contrary to our predictions this also holds for factors related to social conservatism. Furthermore, we found that social groups subscribing to conservative norms are more likely to support freedom limiting security measures. Remarkably, the same also applies to people holding liberal political views. 23 p.

Contains fulltext : 112060_a.pdf (author's version ) (Open Access) Contains fulltext : 112060.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) Studies that explain class voting have often focused on ‘bottom-up” social factors, but paid little attention to ‘top-down’ political factors. In this chapter, we argue that party positions on left-right ideology affect the strength of class voting. We test this thesis by estimating the impact of Left-Right party positions on the class-vote association through a Two-Step Hierarchical analysis of pooled data from Australia, the United States and 13 countries in Western-Europe (1960-2005) supplemented with data from the Comparative Manifesto Project. Although there is a general trend for class voting to decline over time, partially accounted for by the impact of education, we find that most variation in class voting does not take the form of a linear decline. The ideological positions of left-wing parties alone do not have any effect, but the polarization of parties along the left-right dimension is associated with substantially higher levels of class voting.

Contains fulltext : 55958pub.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) Religion is gradually losing its influence in Dutch society, which is one aspect of ‘secularization’. In this study we focus on individual secularization, namely the increasing number of non-religious people in the Netherlands. More specifically, traditional Christian faith and belief in the supernatural are examined. First, the trends in these forms of belief are described for the period 1979-2000. Second, explanations for the trends are formulated and tested using OLS regression analyses accompanied by a simulation technique. During the 1979-2000 period, both traditional Christian faith and belief in the supernatural declined. The decline of Christian belief and belief in the supernatural is mainly caused by compositional effects, namely the slow but continuous replacement of older religious cohorts by younger non-religious cohorts. 16 p.

Contains fulltext : 64231.pdf (Author’s version postprint ) (Open Access) 4 p.

Contains fulltext : 63542.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) In this article, we study trends in self-reported health (general health and chronic conditions) and health inequality in the Netherlands between 1974 and 1998 using an age-period-cohort framework. We answer two questions: (1) to what extent can trends in self-reported health be explained by the current macro-context (period effect) and by infant mortality in year of birth (cohort effect)? And (2) do the effects of period and cohort differ for educational groups? Health indicators are self-reported poor health and chronic conditions. The use of 26 Dutch cross-sectional surveys makes it possible to estimate largely unbiased effects of period and cohort simultaneously (controlled for age effects) and thus to adequately describe trends in social inequality in health. Our results give rise to four conclusions. First, for men poor health has been more or less stable, for women there has been an increase. The prevalence of chronic conditions has increased for both sexes. Second, adding cohort specific experiences to a model including age and period effects is only relevant for women's poor health. Decreasing infant mortality in year of birth leads to better health and consequently the period effect initially found for women appears to be slightly underestimated. Third, we found no trends in social inequalities in self-reported health due to period effects. Fourth, our analyses do show socially unequal trends in health as a result of cohort specific experiences. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found that decreased infant mortality in year of birth makes for a stronger impact of educational differences on self-reported poor health. Concerning chronic conditions no trends for educational groups were found.

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Contains fulltext : 62325pub.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) Why has the massive decline of religious involvement in The Netherlands since World War II not led to a decline of participation in voluntary associations? Religious involvement has always been the most important predictor of participation in voluntary associations. In the last four decades, secular associations (environmental and human rights organizations, sports clubs and cultural expression groups) compensated for the decline in membership in traditional, pillarized associations (labor unions, political parties). Data from the Family Survey of the Dutch Population (2000), show that some secular organizations have grown because they offer more selective incentives to members, while others have grown because of the increase in postmaterialism. Furthermore, the rise of the average level of education and extraversion has ensured a stable supply of members and volunteers. 23 p.

Contains fulltext : 62324pub.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) 'Culture' is a popular concept for the explanation of various kinds of behavior in various contributions in the social sciences. Anthropologists and sociologists who use the holistic approach are particularly prone to stress the importance of culture. I argue that popular holistic explanations have little explanatory power and occasionally are based on an elementary methodological error. I do this for three examples: differences in culture as an explanation for (a) the failure of communism, (b) the use of excessive violence in crime, and (c) the war between Ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia. Several alternative explanations are elaborated for a variety of topics that share: (a) the distinction between the micro- and macro-level, (b) methodological individualism, (c) and information about individuals acting in a specific context. The survey-method, often used in sociology, is a very fruitful approach for the latter. 16 p.

Item does not contain fulltext Comments on Dick Houtman's "Cultureel kapitaal, sociale stratificatie en onderwijsorientatie" ([Cultural Capital, Social Stratification, and Orientation toward Education] 1996 [see abstract 9710679]). Houtman's interpretation of Pierre Bourdieu's (1973) cultural capital theory as meaning that education is of cultural importance rather than of economic value is ridiculed, as is his discussion of other literature on the topic. Moreover, the methodology of his study is flawed, because he selected on the dependent variable (ie, cultural captial established by students' backgrounds) & neglected first-order effects in his modeling of second-order interaction effects; moreover, the lack of longitudinal data severely limits the value of his results. 6 p.

Contains fulltext : 129193pub.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access)

Contains fulltext : 90022.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) 6 p.

Contains fulltext : 77166.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) Parental criminal behaviour exerts a substantial impact on offspring criminal behaviour. Unfortunately however, the explanation for the intergenerational transmission of crime remains unclear. To compare and contrast two possible explanations, we address the question of whether the timing of a father’s criminal acts predicts the likelihood that his children commit crime. According to static theories, the total number of criminal acts rather than the exact timing influences the likelihood of offspring criminal behaviour. According to dynamic theories, timing is crucial and children are more likely to engage in criminal behaviour after fathers have committed criminal acts. Results show that the total number of delinquent acts is an important predictor, and also that the exact timing plays an important role. In the year the father has been convicted, the likelihood that the child commits crime increases substantially and decays in the following years at a slower rate the more crimes the father has committed. Our results show that the rigorous assumptions of static theories require nuancing. 26 p.

Contains fulltext : 76934.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) Up till now, no study satisfactorily addressed the effect of social mobility on antagonistic attitudes toward ethnic minorities. In this contribution, we investigate the effect of educational and class intergenerational mobility on ethnic stereotypes, ethnic threat, and opposition to ethnic intermarriage by using diagonal mobility models. We test several hypotheses derived from ethnic competition theory and socialization theory with data from the Social and Cultural Developments in The Netherlands surveys (SOCON, waves 1995, 2000, and 2005) and The Netherlands Kinship and Panel Study (NKPS, wave 2002). We find that the relative influence of social origin and social destination depends on the specific origin and destination combination. If one moves to a more tolerant social destination position, the influence of the social origin position is negligible. If on the other hand, one is socially mobile to a less tolerant social position, the impact of the origin on antagonistic attitudes is substantial and may even exceed the impact of the destination category. This confirms our hypothesis that adaptation to more tolerant norms is easier than adaptation to less tolerant norms. We find only meagre evidence for the hypothesis that downward mobility leads to frustration and consequently to more antagonistic attitudes. 21 p.

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Contains fulltext : 55172.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) Onderzoek binnen de traditie van de ontwikkelings- en levensloopcriminologie richt zich zowel op intragenerationele ontwikkelingen van crimineel gedrag – het verloop van criminele carrières van individuen - als op intergenerationele ontwikkelingen - overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen ouders en hun kinderen in crimineel gedrag (Blokland & Nieuwbeerta, 2006). De intragenerationele ontwikkelingen zijn de afgelopen jaren veelvuldig onderzocht in empirische studies (Sampson & Laub, 2002; Blokland e.a., 2005; Blokland & Nieuwbeerta, 2004; 2005). De bestaande kennis over deze intragenerationele ontwikkeling van criminele levenslopen is voortgekomen uit een aantal grootschalige longitudinale studies naar individueel crimineel gedrag. Het gebruik van dergelijke data met een prospectief design (waarbij twee opeenvolgende generaties worden bekeken) is noodzakelijk om individuele criminele carrières adequaat te kunnen onderzoeken. 16 p.

Onderzoek binnen de traditie van de ontwikkelings- en levensloopcriminologie richt zich zowel op intragenerationele ontwikkelingen van crimineel gedrag – het verloop van criminele carrières van individuen – als op intergenerationele ontwikkelingen – overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen ouders en hun kinderen in crimineel gedrag (Blokland & Nieuwbeerta, 2006). De intragenerationele ontwikkelingen zijn de afgelopen jaren veelvuldig onderzocht in empirische studies ( Sampson & Laub, 2002; Blokland e.a., 2005; Blokland & Nieuwbeerta, 2004; 2005). De bestaande kennis over deze intragenerationele ontwikkeling van criminele levenslopen is voortgekomen uit een aantal grootschalige longitudinale studies naar individueel crimineel gedrag. Het gebruik van dergelijke data met een prospectief design (waarbij twee opeenvolgende generaties worden bekeken) is noodzakelijk om individuele criminele carrières adequaat te kunnen onderzoeken.

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Contains fulltext : 54542pub.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) In this article, we examine why people in the Netherlands switch between religious denominations or become a convert. To do so, we use 21 representative surveys held between 1966 and 2003. We derive hypotheses from the integration theory, modernization theory (secularisation theory) and the supply side theory (version of rational choice theory). Becoming a convert or religious switching are rare phenomena in the Netherlands: 4.5 percent of the population switches between denominations and 2.6 percent becomes a convert. In line with secularisation theory, people who are raised non-religious almost always stay non-religious while people who were raised in a certain denomination are more likely to leave the church or to switch denominations. Also in line with this theory is the finding that over time, less people convert to religion and more and more people leave the church of their parents. In line with the social capital hypotheses, we find that Protestants more often switch between denominations than Catholics. More specifically, orthodox Protestants switch more often than liberal Protestants. Of all factors that influence religious mobility, the denomination of the spouse is most important: people in a religiously mixed marriage switch significantly more often than people in a religiously homogeneous marriage. Switching and converting are almost all towards the denomination of the spouse. 17 p.

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Contains fulltext : 63952.pdf ( ) (Closed access)

Contains fulltext : 63000pub.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) Changes in neighbourhood status primarily result from the selective in- and out-migration of income groups. In turn, these changes are related to the chance of becoming the victim of a crime in the local community. Drawing from Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social disorganization theory, we argue that victimization is not only more likely in disadvantaged neighbourhoods but also in neighbourhoods where improvements are taking place. These neighbourhoods are assumed to suffer from social instability caused by the strong influx of new residents, and from social heterogeneity that is caused by the simultaneous presence of high-income and low-income groups. Indeed, results from multilevel analyses on victimization survey data from the Politiemonitor Bevolking 1999 for over seventy thousand respondents show that strong socio-economic improvement of neighbourhoods is related to higher victimization risk for theft, violence and vandalism. City-level characteristics (e.g. population size) were also associated with victimization, independent of individual and neighbourhood characteristics. This study thereby adds to social disorganization theory in two ways: 1) Social disorganization is not only dependent upon socio-economic composition of neighbourhoods, but also upon socio-economic dynamics. 2) To understand differentiation in victimization, social processes within neighbourhoods as well as the larger social context are relevant. 25 p.

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Contains fulltext : 63586.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) Sociologists are interested in societies, the shape they have and the changes in their profile. For instance, societies consist of privileged and disadvantaged classes. This stratification is indicated by the extent to which at one point in time resources like income are distributed unequally among the members of a society. This phenomenon has been studied extensively and intensively by economists and sociologists. Independent of income disparities, benefits and handicaps may be transmitted to a smaller or larger extent from parents to their children. This is the question of intergenerational social mobility or reproduction of inequalities. That question has been studied primarily by sociologists.

Contains fulltext : 63137.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)

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Contains fulltext : 62482.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) In this paper we address three questions related to Bourdieu's cultural capital theory. First, which aspects of parental cultural capital foster the educational attainment of children? Second, have cultural resources become more important and economic resources less important in the past half a century? Third, do only higher status groups benefit from these resources or are they especially beneficial for children with a low status background? Data from the repeated cross-sectional retrospective life-course Family Surveys Dutch Population collected in 1992, 1998, and 2000 offer appropriate and accurate family background measurements. The results show that in sharp contrast to what cultural capital theory predicts, in the highest status groups parental cultural resources do not affect educational attainment. Parental beaux-arts participation and parental popular reading only affect the educational performance of children with a low status background. Parental literary reading is not relevant to either higher or lower status groups. As regards the general impact of cultural and economic resources, no clear trend between the cohorts could be detected

Item does not contain fulltext *0ntbrkt; K.M.T.C. Dobbelaere Verloren zekerheid: De Belgen en hun waarden, overtuigingen en houdingen Tielt:Lannoo ,2000 90-209-4097-X

Item does not contain fulltext D. Houtman Een blinde vlek voor cultuur: Sociologen over cultureel conservatisme, klassen en moderniteit Assen:Van Gorcum ,2000 90-232-3544-4

Contains fulltext : 141280.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Closed access) Classic studies in political sociology argued that differences in countries' patterns of mobility are responsible for variations in levels of class voting in these countries. In this paper the tenability of this classic claim is examined using survey data from 14 long-standing Western democracies over the period 1964–1990 (N=54 478). When testing this claim, we improved over earlier studies by employing detailed measures of class, by using multivariate statistical models that measure relative levels of class voting and by employing diagonal reference models that deal adequately with the effects of individual intergenerational class mobility. Our results show significant effects of individual intergenerational mobility. The longer mobile persons are members of a certain class the more they are apt to show the typical voting behaviour of their destination class. However, our results do not support the claim for the effects of intergenerational mobility at the macro level. Variation in levels of mobility can only to a very modest extent – if at all – be held responsible for cross-national and over-time variation in levels of class voting.

Contains fulltext : 141278.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access) 19 p.