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SARS-CoV-2 infection in children and young people (CYP) can lead to lifethreatening COVID-19, transmission within households and schools, and the development of long COVID. Using linked health and administrative data, we investigated vaccine uptake among 3,433,483 CYP aged 5–17 years across all UK nations between 4th August 2021 and 31st May 2022. We constructed national cohorts and undertook multi-state modelling and meta-analysis to identify associations between demographic variables and vaccine uptake. We found that uptake of the first COVID-19 vaccine among CYP was low across all four nations compared to other age groups and diminished with subsequent doses. Age and vaccination status of adults living in the same household were identified as important risk factors associated with vaccine uptake in CYP. For example, 5–11 year-olds were less likely to receive their first vaccine compared to 16–17 year-olds (adjusted Hazard Ratio [aHR]: 0.10 (95%CI: 0.06–0.19)), and CYP in unvaccinated households were less likely to receive their first vaccine compared to CYP in partially vaccinated households (aHR: 0.19, 95%CI 0.13–0.29). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose To evaluate the effect of aprotinin withdrawal in 2008 on patient outcomes, to assess the likely risks and benefits of its re-introduction, and to consider the relevance of existing evidence from clinical trials to 'real-world' practice. Methods We performed a nested case-control study of two cohorts undergoing adult cardiac surgery in a single tertiary centre. The first group underwent surgery between 1 January 2005 and 30 July 2007 (n = 3,578), prior to aprotinin withdrawal; the second group underwent surgery between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2010 (n = 3,030), after aprotinin withdrawal. Propensity matching was used to select patients matched for 24 covariates in both groups (n = 3,508). We also estimated the effect of aprotinin withdrawal on a subgroup of high-risk patients (n = 1,002). Results were expressed as adjusted odds ratios (OR) and 95 % confidence intervals (CI) for categorical data and hazard ratios (HR) for time-to-event data. Results In propensity-matched cohorts, the withdrawal of aprotinin from clinical use was associated with more bleeding, higher rates of emergency re-sternotomy, OR 2.10 (1.04-4.25), and acute kidney injury (AKI), OR 1.86 (1.53-2.25). In high-risk patients, the increases in bleeding and AKI following aprotinin withdrawal were of a greater magnitude. Aprotinin withdrawal was also associated with a significant increase in 30-day mortality, HR 2.51 (1.00-6.29), in the high-risk group. The results were not altered by sensitivity analyses that adjusted for potential selection bias, time series bias and unmeasured confounders. Conclusions Aprotinin withdrawal was associated with increased complication rates and patient deaths following cardiac surgery. These real-world findings are at odds with those of randomised trials and cohort studies that have considered the clinical role of aprotinin., Author(s): Graham J. Walkden [sup.1], Veerle Verheyden [sup.2] [sup.4], Rosalind Goudie [sup.3], Gavin J. Murphy [sup.1] [sup.4] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.5337.2, 0000000419367603, Bristol Heart Institute, University of Bristol, , BS8 [...]

Background: Prepandemic sentinel surveillance focused on improved management of winter pressures, with influenza-like illness (ILI) being the key clinical indicator. The World Health Organization (WHO) global standards for influenza surveillance include monitoring acute respiratory infection (ARI) and ILI. The WHO's mosaic framework recommends that the surveillance strategies of countries include the virological monitoring of respiratory viruses with pandemic potential such as influenza. The Oxford-Royal College of General Practitioner Research and Surveillance Centre (RSC) in collaboration with the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) has provided sentinel surveillance since 1967, including virology since 1993., Objective: We aim to describe the RSC's plans for sentinel surveillance in the 2023-2024 season and evaluate these plans against the WHO mosaic framework., Methods: Our approach, which includes patient and public involvement, contributes to surveillance objectives across all 3 domains of the mosaic framework. We will generate an ARI phenotype to enable reporting of this indicator in addition to ILI. These data will support UKHSA's sentinel surveillance, including vaccine effectiveness and burden of disease studies. The panel of virology tests analyzed in UKHSA's reference laboratory will remain unchanged, with additional plans for point-of-care testing, pneumococcus testing, and asymptomatic screening. Our sampling framework for serological surveillance will provide greater representativeness and more samples from younger people. We will create a biomedical resource that enables linkage between clinical data held in the RSC and virology data, including sequencing data, held by the UKHSA. We describe the governance framework for the RSC., Results: We are co-designing our communication about data sharing and sampling, contextualized by the mosaic framework, with national and general practice patient and public involvement groups. We present our ARI digital phenotype and the key data RSC network members are requested to include in computerized medical records. We will share data with the UKHSA to report vaccine effectiveness for COVID-19 and influenza, assess the disease burden of respiratory syncytial virus, and perform syndromic surveillance. Virological surveillance will include COVID-19, influenza, respiratory syncytial virus, and other common respiratory viruses. We plan to pilot point-of-care testing for group A streptococcus, urine tests for pneumococcus, and asymptomatic testing. We will integrate test requests and results with the laboratory-computerized medical record system. A biomedical resource will enable research linking clinical data to virology data. The legal basis for the RSC's pseudonymized data extract is The Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations 2002, and all nonsurveillance uses require research ethics approval., Conclusions: The RSC extended its surveillance activities to meet more but not all of the mosaic framework's objectives. We have introduced an ARI indicator. We seek to expand our surveillance scope and could do more around transmissibility and the benefits and risks of nonvaccine therapies., (©Xinchun Gu, Conall Watson, Utkarsh Agrawal, Heather Whitaker, William H. Elson, Sneha Anand, Ray Borrow, Anna Buckingham, Elizabeth Button, Lottie Curtis, Dominic Dunn, Alex J. Elliot, Filipa Ferreira, Rosalind Goudie, Uy Hoang, Katja Hoschler, Gavin Jamie, Debasish Kar, Beatrix Kele, Meredith Leston, Ezra Linley, Jack Macartney, Gemma L Marsden, Cecilia Okusi, Omid Parvizi, Catherine Quinot, Praveen Sebastianpillai, Vanashree Sexton, Gillian Smith, Timea Suli, Nicholas P B Thomas, Catherine Thompson, Daniel Todkill, Rashmi Wimalaratna, Matthew Inada-Kim, Nick Andrews, Victoria Tzortziou-Brown, Rachel Byford, Maria Zambon, Jamie Lopez-Bernal, Simon de Lusignan. Originally published in JMIR Public Health and Surveillance (https://publichealth.jmir.org), 03.04.2024.)

Background: UK COVID-19 vaccination policy has evolved to offering COVID-19 booster doses to individuals at increased risk of severe Illness from COVID-19. Building on our analyses of vaccine effectiveness of first, second and initial booster doses, we aimed to identify individuals at increased risk of severe outcomes (i.e., COVID-19 related hospitalisation or death) post the autumn 2022 booster dose., Methods: We undertook a national population-based cohort analysis across all four UK nations through linked primary care, vaccination, hospitalisation and mortality data. We included individuals who received autumn 2022 booster doses of BNT162b2 (Comirnaty) or mRNA-1273 (Spikevax) during the period September 1, 2022 to December 31, 2022 to investigate the risk of severe COVID-19 outcomes. Cox proportional hazard models were used to estimate adjusted hazard ratios (aHR) and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for the association between demographic and clinical factors and severe COVID-19 outcomes after the autumn booster dose. Analyses were adjusted for age, sex, body mass index (BMI), deprivation, urban/rural areas and comorbidities. Stratified analyses were conducted by vaccine type. We then conducted a fixed-effect meta-analysis to combine results across the four UK nations., Findings: Between September 1, 2022 and December 31, 2022, 7,451,890 individuals ≥18 years received an autumn booster dose. 3500 had severe COVID-19 outcomes (2.9 events per 1000 person-years). Being male (male vs female, aHR 1.41 (1.32-1.51)), older adults (≥80 years vs 18-49 years; 10.43 (8.06-13.50)), underweight (BMI <18.5 vs BMI 25.0-29.9; 2.94 (2.51-3.44)), those with comorbidities (≥5 comorbidities vs none; 9.45 (8.15-10.96)) had a higher risk of COVID-19 hospitalisation or death after the autumn booster dose. Those with a larger household size (≥11 people within household vs 2 people; 1.56 (1.23-1.98)) and from more deprived areas (most deprived vs least deprived quintile; 1.35 (1.21-1.51)) had modestly higher risks. We also observed at least a two-fold increase in risk for those with various chronic neurological conditions, including Down's syndrome, immunodeficiency, chronic kidney disease, cancer, chronic respiratory disease, or cardiovascular disease., Interpretation: Males, older individuals, underweight individuals, those with an increasing number of comorbidities, from a larger household or more deprived areas, and those with specific underlying health conditions remained at increased risk of COVID-19 hospitalisation and death after the autumn 2022 vaccine booster dose. There is now a need to focus on these risk groups for investigating immunogenicity and efficacy of further booster doses or therapeutics., Funding: National Core Studies-Immunity, UK Research and Innovation (Medical Research Council and Economic and Social Research Council), Health Data Research UK, the Scottish Government, and the University of Edinburgh., Competing Interests: AS and CR are members of the Scottish Government's CMO COVID-19 Advisory Group. AS and CR are members of NERVTAG's risk stratification subgroup. CR is a member of SPI-M. AS is a member of AstraZeneca's Thrombotic Thrombocytopenic Advisory Group and the Scottish Government's Standing Committee on Pandemics. All roles are unremunerated. RAL is a member of the Welsh Government COVID-19 Technical Advisory Group. All other co-authors report no conflict of interests. SdeL is Director of the RSC, through his university he has received vaccine related research funding from AstraZeneca, GSK, Sanofi, Seqirus, MSD and Takeda, and been member of advisory boards for AstraZeneca, GSK, Sanofi and Seqirus., (© 2023 The Authors.)