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The authors use the Fisherman's Game to reach four benchmarks. It is possible that further research on cooperation could explain the research results.

The result of three experiments regarding the impact of strong and mild evidences are discussed. It was proven that individuals who are asked to ignore a strong testimony correct their judgments more than those who are asked to ignore a mild testimony. To make a judgment, the participants tried to remember and weigh the pertinent informations. It is suggested that more researches should focus on the importance of to-be-used and to-be-ignored information, and the accessibility of request to discount when making a judgment.

Using the real-time protocol of play—a relatively new experimental mechanism in which the order of play and timing of decisions are determined endogenously—we investigate voluntary contributions to the provision of pure public goods. We consider the case where the good is binary, players are asymmetric, communication is prohibited, and all-or-none contributions to the public good can be withdrawn at any time during the round of play. Our results: (1) support an equilibrium in which contributors maximize the sum of their own payoffs; (2) show considerably higher levels of contribution than under the more commonly used simultaneous protocol of play; and (3) exhibit no decrease in level of contribution across multiple iterations of the stage game. On comparing our results to those of Goren et al. (2003), we conclude that modifying the mechanism so that contributions once made cannot be revoked yields significantly higher levels of contribution over the course of the game. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]