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Gordon L. Bowen* In June 1954 the elected Guatemalan government of President Jacobo Arbenz was overthrown, ushering in thirty years of dictatorial and pseudodemocratic government. How did the "Guatemalan affair" happen? What was behind the U.S. role in the coup? These are immediate concerns of this and other new research on the subject. At a rudimentary level, both internal and external forces were involved in the overthrow of the Arbenz regime. The pivotal role of the Guatemalan armed forces in that event can be attributed to their growing alienation from the governments of President Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-1951) and Arbenz. The initial resistance of the more traditional group within the armed forces, the line officers, to the institution of popular democratic government in 1944 was mollified under President Arevalo by the continuation of a leading older line officer, Colonel Francisco Xavier Arana, as chief of staff of the armed forces. But when Colonel Jacobo Arbenz succeeded Arevalo in 1951 (following a campaign in which Arbenz' opponent, Colonel Arana, was assassinated and a rebellion by Arana's supporters suppressed), he favored a group of younger, technically trained officers with rapid promotion into political and government positions. This not only antagonized the older professional officers, but also, ironically, diluted the military effectiveness of officers loyal to him by placing them in essentially civilian positions. At the same time, a growing body of scholarship (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1982; Immerman, 1980-1981; Cook, 1981; Blasier, 1976; Jonas, 1974b) has documented that a significant role also was played by the government of the United States in the fall of Arbenz. But beyond the shared perceptions that the "Guatemalan affair" deeply influenced Guatemala and that international politics in the Caribbean-Central American region were affected, little consensus exists among scholars regarding the U.S. role. Much of the controversy in the new research concerns the degree of importance of the United States in the coup and the degree to which United States should be seen primarily as a capitalist actor, riding roughshod to

The Reagan-Bush Administration vigorously pursued a “Reagan Doctrine” of aiding anti-communist freedom fighters worldwide, in no place with more controversy than toward the anti-US Sandinista Government of Nicaragua. Why, then, would the new presidency of George Bush quickly have agreed to defer asking Congress for military aid to the Contras, have agreed to send only humanitarian aid instead, and have agreed to permit four separate congressional committees each to determine whether any aid at all should be continued? Unravelling this odd turn of events can help us better to understand the under-rated influence of public opinion on American foreign policy.Most of us assume the public usually to follow presidential leadership when it comes to foreign affairs. Indeed, though very few truths are undisputed when political scientists discuss Americans' opinions on questions of public importance, one accepted inference—borne out by much scientifically-verified evidence—is the “rally ‘round the flag” syndrome. The syndrome is simple: presidential popularity in public opinion polls rises when a president acts decisively toward an international crisis. These changes in Americans' stated opinions have been measured in international crises for several decades.“Rallies” occur only when special “crisis” conditions are met. These crisis situations usually involve threats to America which are (1) remote from the everyday experience of Americans, and (2) involve threats about which the president personally informs the public, usually over the dramatically effective medium of television, and (3) involve decisive—and usually military—response at the president's direction.