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People sometimes criticize others for feeling sad, especially when they judge that person's sadness to be irrational. According to canonical models of blame, these reactions reflect attributions of control over the negative emotion. However, some scholars have recently suggested that blame reactions towards other's emotions ignore attributions of control, and instead, reflect negative reactions to the emotion itself. We present a study that adjudicates between these two competing views. Our results support control-based models of blame and criticism. We also identify two cues that people rely on when attributing control over emotions; namely, how well calibrated the emotion is to its eliciting circumstances and the sufferer’s capacity to think rationally. In sum: People will criticize others for their emotional suffering when they judge both that the suffering is irrational, and that the sufferer is sufficiently rational to recognize this fact, and so can choose to stop feeling upset.

Influential theories in social psychology, philosophy, andlinguistics assume that ordinary people judge many mentalstates as outside voluntary control, yet few studies have directlyinvestigated these claims. We report four studies suggestingthat, contrary to several prominent models, ordinary peopleattribute at least moderate intentional control to others over awide variety of mental states. Furthermore, it appears thatperceived control may vary systematically according to mentalstate type (e.g. emotions vs. desires vs. beliefs). These resultspoint to several important directions for future research inbehavior explanation and moral judgment.

Reasoners distinguish between different types of causalrelations, such as causes, enabling conditions, andpreventions. Psychologists disagree about the representationsthat give rise to the different relations, but agree that mentalsimulations play a central role in inferring them. We explorehow causal relations are extracted from mental simulations.The theory of mental models posits that people use akinematic simulation to infer possibilities. It predicts thatcauses should be easier to infer than enabling conditions, andthat the time it takes to infer a causal relation should correlatewith the number of moves in a mental simulation. To testthese two predictions, we adapted a railway domain designedto elicit mental simulations, and we devised problems inwhich reasoners had to infer causal relations from simulationsof the movements of cars in this domain. Two studiescorroborated the model theory's predictions. We discuss theresults in light of recent theories of causation and mentalsimulation.

Objective: What types of moral improvements do people wish to make? Do they hope to become more good, or less bad? Do they wish to be more caring? More honest? More loyal? And why exactly do they want to become more moral? Presumably, most people want to improve their morality because this would benefit others, but is this in fact their primary motivation? Here, we begin to investigate these questions. Method: Across two large, preregistered studies (N = 1818), participants provided open‐ended descriptions of one change they could make in order to become more moral; they then reported their beliefs about and motives for this change. Results: In both studies, people most frequently expressed desires to improve their compassion and more often framed their moral improvement goals in terms of amplifying good behaviors than curbing bad ones. The strongest predictor of moral motivation was the extent to which people believed that making the change would have positive consequences for their own well‐being. Conclusions: Together, these studies provide rich descriptive insights into how ordinary people want to be more moral, and show that they are particularly motivated to do so for their own sake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a recently prominent account of moral judgment, genuine moral disapprobation is a product of two convergent vectors of normative influence: a strong negative affect that arises from the mere consideration of a given piece of human conduct and a (socially acquired) belief that this conduct is wrong (Nichols, 2002). The existing evidence in favor of this "norms with feelings" proposal is rather mixed, with no obvious route to an empirical resolution. To help shed further light on the situation, we test a previously unexamined prediction that this account logically yields in a novel dilemmatic context: when individuals are faced with a moral dilemma that pits two or more "affectively-charged" moral norms against each other, the norm underwritten by the strongest feeling ought to determine the content of dilemmatic resolution. Across three studies, we find evidence that directly challenges this prediction, offering support for a Kolhberg-style "rationalist" alternative instead. More specifically, we find that it is not the participants' degree of norm-congruent emotion (whether situationally or dispositionally assessed) or its correlates, but rather their appraisal of the relative costs associated with various alternative courses of action that appears to be most predictive of how they resolve the experimentally induced moral conflict. We conclude by situating our studies within an overarching typology of moral encounters, which, we believe, can help guide future research as well as shed light on some current controversies within this literature. (Contains 4 tables.)

Negation, conjunction, and disjunction are major building blocks in the formation of concepts. This article presents a new model-based theory of these Boolean components. It predicts that individuals simplify the models of instances of concepts. Evidence corroborates the theory and challenges alternative accounts, such as those based on minimal descriptions, algebraic complexity, or structural invariance. A computer program implementing the theory yields more accurate predictions than these rival accounts. Two experiments showed that the numbers of models of a Boolean concept predict the difficulty of formulating a description of it. As mental models may also underlie deductive reasoning, the present theory integrates two hitherto separate areas of investigation. (Contains 5 tables and 1 figure.)

Many concepts depend on negation and on relations such as conjunction and disjunction, as in the concept: "rich or not democratic". This article reports studies that elucidate the mental representation of such concepts from descriptions of them. It proposes a theory based on mental models, which represent only instances of a concept, and for each instance only those properties, affirmative or negative, that the description asserts as holding in the instance. This representation lightens the demands on working memory, but it also leads to predictable conceptual "illusions" in which individuals envisage as instances of a concept some cases that in fact are non-instances, and vice versa. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated the occurrence of these illusions. Experiment 3 corroborated their results, and showed that the illusions can be alleviated in a predictable way by predicates with certain meanings. These findings cannot be easily explained by alternative theories. (Contains 4 tables and 2 figures.)

The present experiment tested the hypothesis that discrepancies in processing fluency influence the perceived wrongness of moral violations. Participants were presented with numerous moral violations in easy or difficult to read fonts. For some violations, experienced perceptual fluency was consistent with the fluency associated with previous violations, whereas for others it was more fluent or more disfluent. Results show that, across multiple vignettes, participants rated moral violations that were processed with discrepant fluency as less morally wrong than those processed with discrepant disfluency. The current work highlights the importance of metacognitive experiences in moral judgment and contributes to the emerging literature on the role of experiential factors in moral judgment. (Contains 1 figure.)

Given that A is longer than B, and that B is longer than C, even 5-year-old children can infer that A is longer than C. Theories of reasoning based on formal rules of inference invoke simple axioms ("meaning postulates") to capture such transitive inferences. An alternative theory proposes instead that reasoners construct mental models of the situation described by the premises in order to draw such inferences. An unexpected consequence of the model theory is that if adult reasoners construct simple models of typical situations, then they should infer transitive relations where, in certain cases, none exists. We report four studies corroborating the occurrence of these "pseudo-transitive" fallacies. Experiment 1 established that individuals' diagrams of certain non-transitive relations yield transitive conclusions. Experiment 2 showed that these premises also give rise to fallacious transitive inferences. Experiment 3 established that when the context suggested alternatives to the simple models, the participants made fewer errors. Experiment 4 showed that tense is an important aspect of meaning which affects whether individuals draw transitive conclusions. We discuss the implications of these results for various theories of reasoning. (Contains 3 figures and 2 tables.)

How do lay individuals think about the objectivity of their ethical beliefs? Do they regard them as factual and objective, or as more subjective and opinion-based, and what might predict such differences? In three experiments, we set out a methodology for assessing the perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs, and use it to document several novel findings. Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objective than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals. The extent to which individuals treat ethical beliefs as objective was predicted by the way they grounded their ethical systems. Groundings which emphasize the religious, pragmatic, and self-identity underpinnings of ethical belief each independently predicted greater ethical objectivity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings with a refined measure of ethical objectivism. Experiment 3 demonstrated the robustness of the religious grounding of ethics, and differentiates it from mere religious belief and from political orientation. The results shed light on the nature of ethical belief, and have implications for the resolution of ethical disputes.

Inferences about spatial, temporal, and other relations are ubiquitous. This article presents a novel model-based theory of such reasoning. The theory depends on 5 principles. (a) The structure of mental models is iconic as far as possible. (b) The logical consequences of relations emerge from models constructed from the meanings of the relations and from knowledge. (c) Individuals tend to construct only a single, typical model. (d) They spontaneously develop their own strategies for relational reasoning. (e) Regardless of strategy, the difficulty of an inference depends on the process of integration of the information from separate premises, the number of entities that have to be integrated to form a model, and the depth of the relation. The article describes computer implementations of the theory and presents experimental results corroborating its main principle.

Relations can hold between relations, as in assertions such as: Cordelia loves Lear more than Goneril does. Naive reasoners can make inferences that depend on these higher order relations, which are vital for science and mathematics, but no existing theory explains such inferences. The present paper presents a theory based on mental models of the situations under description, and it reports four experiments corroborating the theory. Experiment la showed that the difficulty of such inferences from two premises depends on the integration of the information from the premises into a single model. The same result held in Experiment 1b, even when individuals were not permitted to make written workings. Experiment 2 required the participants to think aloud, and their protocols revealed that they developed three main strategies. Experiment 3 biased the development of these strategies, showing that individuals assemble them 'bottom up' from various tactical steps.

Tackling climate change presents an intergenerational dilemma: People must make sacrifices today, to benefit future generations. What causes people to feel an obligation to benefit future generations? Past research has suggested "intergenerational reciprocity" as a potential driver, but this research is quite domain specific, and it is unknown how well it applies to climate change. We explored a novel means of invoking a sense of intergenerational reciprocity: inducing reflection on the sacrifices made by previous generations. Our studies revealed that such reflection predicts and causes a heightened sense of moral obligation towards future generations, mediated by gratitude. However, there are also some downsides (e.g., feelings of unworthiness), and perceptions of obligation do not substantially affect pro-environmental attitudes or motivations. Thus, while reflecting on past generations' sacrifices can generate a sense of intergenerational obligation, it is limited in the extent to which it can increase pro-environmental concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]