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Subsidy policies on public urban transport have been adopted ubiquitously. Both in developed and developing countries, subsidies are implemented under two major premises: (1) to increase public transport use and to reduce externalities, such as greenhouse gas emissions and congestion, and (2) to make transport more affordable, particularly for the poorest. This paper focuses on the latter. Despite the widespread implementation of subsidies, there are virtually no quantitative assessments of their distributional incidence, making it impossible to determine if these policy instruments are pro-poor. Using different tools to quantitatively evaluate the incidence and distributive impacts of subsidy policy options, this paper analyses the findings of a series of research papers that have studied urban public transport subsidy policies in developed and developing countries. Available evidence indicates that current public urban transport subsidy policies do not make the poorest better off. Supply side subsidies-provided to the operator-are, for the most part, neutral or regressive; while demand side subsidies-provided to the user-perform better, although many of them do not improve income distribution. Considering that the vast majority of developing countries justify public urban transport subsidies on social grounds, as a means to improve the mobility, and thus welfare, of the poorest, it is imperative to move away from supply side subsidies towards demand side subsidies and integrate transport social concerns into wider poverty alleviation efforts, which include the possibility of channelling subsidies through monetary transfer systems or through other welfare instruments (food subsidies, health services and education for the poor).

Analysis of two water subsidy schemes a means tested subsidy in Chile and a geographically targeted subsidy in Colombia shows that the means-tested system is better able to identify poor households than the geographically targeted scheme. However, the overall distributive impact of both schemes is quite similar, at least for the three lowest income deciles, because the amount of benefits per household in the geographically targeted Colombian scheme are differentiated by the socioeconomic classification of household. Despite the relative merits of the Chilean means tested scheme, targeting errors are still quite large. More than 60 percent of subsidies accrue to households that are above the third decile of the income distribution. If the policy objective in Chile is to benefit a significant proportion of households in the lowest income deciles, then either the targeting mechanism must be improved or the number of subsidies has to increase to take into account these targeting imperfections. In Colombia almost all households receive some kind of benefit, implying an unnecessarily high fiscal cost. An improvement in the targeting mechanism could lower this cost without jeopardizing benefits to lower-income households. Some suggestions for additional research and for improving both schemes are discussed.

In this paper we investigate the effects of different regulatory contracts on operational cost performance for Norwegian urban transport companies. Exploiting the panel nature of our data (11 years and 1136 company-year observations), we propose a method to estimate regional time varying inefficiency measures that overcomes some of the shortcomings of existing approaches. In particular, the proposed method does not restrict the time pattern of the inefficiency measure (as in Liu (1993)) and, unlike the method proposed by Coelli and Battese (1995) is robust to potential correlation between a firm’s inefficiency and input use (right hand side variables). In addition, unlike previous studies on the impact of regulatory contracts on performance, in this paper the potential endogeneity of the regulatory contract is addressed. The main result of this paper is that the contract type does not seem to affect efficiency across counties. This contradicts previous research on this subject. The interpretation of this negative result is an open question. Perhaps in practice, due to the bargaining power of firms, the power of the yardstick and subsidy-cap type of contracts is lower than one would expect from the formal analysis of the regulations. However, this negative result may explain why the authorities have been constantly searching for new regulatory instruments during the last decade. This paper also shows that a careful empirical analysis is required in order to infer the effects of contract types on firm performance, otherwise the results may be quite misleading.

Efforts to reform utilities can affect poor households in varied, often complex, ways, but it is by no means certain that such reform will hurt vulnerable households. Many myths have been perpetuated in discussions of utility reform - and in many cases poor households have benefited from reform. What is amazing is the extent to which governments, and their advisors - sometimes including multilateral organizations - fail to measure, anticipate, and monitor how the privatization of utilities actually affects the poor. Many questions must still be answered before good general guidelines can be drawn, but the authors offer many suggestions about how social, regulatory, and privatization policy, can increase the benefits of utility reform for poor households. The good news is that many measures can be taken to improve the chances that poor households will benefit from reform. Chief among these is promoting competition, where possible. Essentially what is needed is political commitment to doing the right thing. If policy is weak before privatization, it is going to be weak after privatization as well. Privatization is no substitute for responsible policy on redistribution.

As an alternative to traditional subsidy schemes in utility sectors, direct subsidy programs have several advantages: they are transparent, they are explicit, and they minimize distortions of the behavior of both the utility, and the customers. At the same time, defining practical eligibility criteria for direct subsidy schemes is difficult, and identifying eligible households may entail substantial administrative costs. The authors, using a case study from Panama, discuss some of the issues associated with the design of direct subsidy systems for water services. The conclude that: 1) There is a need to assess - rather than assume - the need for a subsidy. A key test of affordability, and thus of the need for a subsidy, is to compare the cost of the service, with some measure of household willingness to pay. 2) The initial assessment must consider the affordability of connection costs as well as the affordability of the service itself. Connection costs may be prohibitive for poor households with no credit, suggesting a need to focus subsidies on providing access, rather than ongoing water consumption. 3) A key issue in designing a direct subsidy scheme is its targeting properties. Poverty is a complex phenomenon, and difficult to measure. Eligibility must therefore be based on easily measurable proxy variables, and good proxies are hard to find. In choosing eligibility criteria for a subsidy, it is essential to verify what proportion of the target group fails to meet the criteria (errors of exclusion) and what proportion of non-target groups is inadvertently eligible for the benefits (errors of inclusion). 4) administrative costs are roughly the same no matter what the level of individual subsidies, so a scheme that pays beneficiaries very little, will tend not to be cost-effective. It is important to determine what proportion of total program costs will be absorbed by administrative expenses. 5) Subsidies should not cover the full cost of the service, and should be contingent on beneficiaries paying their share of the bill. Subsidies for consumption above a minimum subsistence level, should be avoided. Subsidies should be provided long enough before eligibility is reassessed to avoid"poverty trap"problems. 6) The utility or concessionaire can be helpful in identifying eligible candidates, because of its superior information on the payment histories of customers. It will also have an incentive to do so, since it has an interest in improving poor payment records. Thought should therefore be given at the design stage to the role of the service provider in the implementation of the subsidy scheme. 7) The administrative agency's responsibilities, the sources of funding, and the general principles guiding the subsidy system should have a clear legal basis, backed by regulations governing administrative procedures. 8) To reduce administrative costs, and avoid duplication of effort, it would be desirable for a single set of institutional arrangements to be used to determine eligibility for all welfare, and subsidy programs in a given jurisdiction, whether sub-national, or national.

In designing a rational scheme for subsidizing water services, it is important to support the choice of design parameters with empirical analysis that stimulates the impact of subsidy options on the target population. Otherwise, there is little guarantee that the subsidy program will meet its objectives. But such analysis is informationally demanding. Ideally, researchers should have access to a single, consistent data set containing household-level information on consumption, willingness to pay, and a range of socioeconomic characteristics. Such a comprehensive data set will rarely exist. The authors suggest overcoming this data deficiency by collating, and imaginatevily manipulating different sources of data to generate estimates of the missing variables. The most valuable sources of information, they explain, are likely to be the following: 1) Customer databases of the water company, which provide robust information on the measured consumption of formal customers, but little information on unmeasured consumption, informal customers, willingness to pay, or socioeconomic variables. 2) General socioeconomic household surveys, which are an excellent source of socioeconomic information, but tend to record water expenditure rather than physical consumption. 3) Willingness-to-pay surveys, which are generally tailored to a specific project, are very flexible, and may be the only source of willingness-to-pay data. However, they are expensive to undertake, and the information collected is based on hypothetical rather than real behavior. Where such surveys are unavailable, international benchmark values on willingness to pay may be used. Combining data sets requires some effort and creativity, and creates difficulties of its own. But once a suitable data set has been constructed, a simulation model can be created using simple spreadsheet software. The model used to design Panama's water subsidy proposal addressed these questions: a) What are the targeting properties of different eligibility criteria for the subsidy? b) How large should the subsidy be? c) How much will the subsidy scheme cost, including administrative costs? Armed with the above information, policymakers should be in a position to design a subsidy program that reaches the intended beneficiaries, provides them with the level of financial support that is strictly necessary, meets the overall budget restrictions, and does not waste an excessive amount of funding on administrative costs.

To increase investment in infrastructure, in the early 1990s Chile's government introduced private capital into the transport infrastructure sector, covering roads and highways, bridges, tunnels, and airports. The chosen mechanism: a concession scheme through which private firms would finance and build a given project and then operate the infrastructure for a set of number of years, recovering their investment by collecting tolls from users. Among the lessons learned from the experience: 1) As much as possible, avoid concessioning roads for which there are convenient alternative freeways nearby. 2) Choose the right variable for awarding a concession. Avoid mechanisms that (by promoting large payments to the state or short-term concession periods) encourage high tolls, and if you choose to award a concession to the firm charging the lowest tolls, place a floor and ceiling on possible bids. The floor is to guarantee the concession's financial viability; the ceiling is to prevent inefficient traffic diversions. Ties at either end should be resolved by a second variable, such as the level of transfers between the state and the firm. 3) Allow downward toll flexibility so that the concessionaire can react to unexpectedly low traffic flows, especially for certain types of vehicles. 4) Pay special attention to the tendering mechanism and to the general incentive structure. There are limits to the pure least-present-value-of-revenue (LPVR) auction, but income guarantees do enhance liquidity. In fact, a minimum-income guarantee through an LPVR auction is an instrument for credit enhancement, not income support. Alternatively, some form of financial innovation should be encouraged to make debt service commitments more flexible. 5) If concessions are tendered by traditional methods and income guarantees will be given, cover only a fraction of the concessionaire's expected income stream, to reduce the state's financial exposure and to improve the incentives to the concessionaire. 6) Make the contracts as complete as possible but allow for later modifications or renegotiations, and include a well-designed dispute resolution mechanism.

DOCTOR EN ECONOMIA FONDECYT FONDECYT