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This work was supported by the European Investment Bank [EIBURS-JEDI grant].

The implementation of European Union (EU) policies has been investigated for several policy areas, but Decisions made under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) have rarely been considered. While many CFSP measures are applicable throughout the EU without the need for further action on the domestic level, some Decisions must be implemented by Council Regulations. These Council Regulations adopted with the intent to implement CFSP Decisions have qualities of Directives, which delegate implementing tasks to member states and require transposition. The aim of this article is to investigate whether restrictive measures imposed by the EU are uniformly implemented across the member states, and, if not, to what extent implementation performance varies. We observe significant differences in implementation performance across member states. The findings of this article are twofold. First, we claim that implementation and compliance studies should involve CFSP decisions more systematically. Second, empirical confirmation is provided of how uneven transposition and application occurs also in CFSP matters. This study is based on empirical work that consisted of desk research and semi-structured interviews with national competent authorities of 21 EU member states taking place between March 2020 and January 2021.

This chapter begins by discussing the role of the WHO in the politics of global health, its mandate, authority and funding, with particular emphasis on the governance of emerging infectious diseases. As an intergovernmental organisation, the WHO derives its legitimacy and authority from its member base, and this has influenced its ability to act in the field of global health insofar as individual state interests often forestalled an international cooperative response. On the other hand, since the end of the Cold War, emerging infectious diseases have increasingly been identified as posing a serious global risk, which triggered a discourse of global (public) health security, promoted especially by some Western WHO members and the organisation itself. This discourse has motivated new institutional developments in the WHO and in global health governance more generally. Specifically, it elevated the WHO to be the main actor in coordinating global disease surveillance and containment in global health emergencies. The chapter then shows how the governance of emerging infectious diseases over the past two decades has been plagued by the ceaseless discursive struggles between state sovereignty and global health security, and this despite the WHO’s new central role and relative autonomy. The chapter traces this tension in the global response to three consecutive international infectious disease outbreaks preceding the Covid-19 pandemic. The conclusion discusses the dynamics of international collaboration in response to the current, still unfolding, pandemic as well as the challenges faced by the multilateral WHO moving forward.

This chapter seeks to analyse new forms of climate change cooperation involving the US, the EU and China, and the challenges influencing their competition in renewables following the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement under the four-year presidency of Donald Trump (2017–2021). By rethinking traditional multilateralism, it is argued that a new dynamic of climate cooperation that involves not only states but also sub-state and non-state actors is emerging. The EU-China partnership in mitigating climate change can be better understood through operationalisation of the concept of multilevel multilateralism. More precisely, this multilevel partnership incorporates entities above the state level (engaging the EU as a supranational institution), EU member states (intergovernmental level) and sub-state actors (city, company, NGO). On the basis of these different levels of analysis, the chapter proposes sets of favourable and disadvantageous factors that impact the implementation of the global climate obligations. The four-year de facto withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on the part of the United States has pushed a variety of actors to try to bridge this gap and thereby strengthened the multilateral setting of climate talks, in which China and the EU emerged as global leaders with aligned interests in fighting climate change and advancing energy transition.

As epitomised by the 2016 Communication outlining a ‘Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats’, the European Union (EU) is increasingly involved in tackling destabilisation challenges ranging from disinformation to energy disruptions and cyberattacks. This chapter examines EU response to hybrid threats by looking at two types of policy instruments. The first one, the fight against disinformation, is a ‘soft’ type of response that the EU has increasingly adopted since 2015 as an answer to misinformation campaigns that have targeted it by a variety of actors, including Russia and the self-proclaimed Islamic State. The second one is a more traditional, ‘hard’ form of action, namely, the planning and implementation of sanctions and restrictive measures. Not only are strategic communication and sanctions key to countering hybrid threats. As this chapter illustrates, both policy instruments require especially close cooperation across military and civilian public actors and between the public and the private sector. Hence, strategic communications and sanctions are crucial cases in the study of EU responses to hybrid threats and the importance of a comprehensive approach in effectively countering them.

The evolution of sanctions from comprehensive to targeted has favored the inclusion of for-profit actors in the policy process. Sanctions are used to deal with security challenges and while the role of for-profit actors in the provision of public goods has been investigated, less has been said about their role in the provision of security. This chapter investigates the role of for-profit actors in the implementation of sanctions. More specifically, this chapter suggests a typology of regulatory environments that facilitates explaining and understanding the behavior of for-profit actors in implementing targeted sanctions. By looking at the quality of instructions provided by state authorities and their capacity to monitor the implementation of such decisions, the chapter argues that overcompliance, uneven and lack of compliance are more likely in certain regulatory environments rather than in others. The theoretical framework is tested on the case study of the restrictive measures of the EU. The data for this research was collected through semi-opened interviews and focus groups held in Brussels from 2013 to 2015.

The evolution of sanctions from comprehensive to targeted has favored the inclusion of for-profit actors in the policy process. Sanctions are used to deal with security challenges and while the role of for-profit actors in the provision of public goods has been investigated, less has been said about their role in the provision of security. This chapter investigates the role of for-profit actors in the implementation of sanctions. More specifically, this chapter suggests a typology of regulatory environments that facilitates explaining and understanding the behavior of for-profit actors in implementing targeted sanctions. By looking at the quality of instructions provided by state authorities and their capacity to monitor the implementation of such decisions, the chapter argues that overcompliance, uneven and lack of compliance are more likely in certain regulatory environments rather than in others. The theoretical framework is tested on the case study of the restrictive measures of the EU. The data for this research was collected through semi-opened interviews and focus groups held in Brussels from 2013 to 2015.