9 results on '"Giorgio Rodano"'
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2. Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Sequential versus Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games
- Author
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Giorgio Rodano and Marco Marini
- Subjects
Article Subject ,Symmetric game ,ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING ,TheoryofComputation_GENERAL ,follower ,collusion ,oligopoly ,stackelberg equilibrium ,Outcome (game theory) ,Variable (computer science) ,Ranking ,Complementarity (molecular biology) ,Economics ,Stackelberg competition ,Repeated game ,Mathematical economics ,Duopoly - Abstract
In many strategic settings comparing the payoffs obtained by players under full cooperation to those obtainable at a sequential (Stackelberg) equilibrium can be crucial to determine the outcome of the game. This happens, for instance, in repeated games in which players can break cooperation by acting sequentially, as well as in merger games in which firms are allowed to sequence their actions. Despite the relevance of these and other applications, no full-fledged comparisons between collusive and sequential payoffs have been performed so far. In this paper we show that even in symmetric duopoly games the ranking of cooperative and sequential payoffs can be extremely variable, particularly when the usual linear demand assumption is relaxed. Not surprisingly, the degree of strategic complementarity and substitutability of players’ actions (and, hence, the slope of their best replies) appears decisive to determine the ranking of collusive and sequential payoffs. Some applications to endogenous timing are discussed.
- Published
- 2013
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
3. Sequential vs Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games
- Author
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Marco Marini and Giorgio Rodano
- Subjects
ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING ,Sequential Payoffs ,Collusion ,Duopoly Games - Abstract
In many strategic settings comparing the payo§s obtained by players under full cooperation to those obtainable at a sequential (Stackelberg) equilibrium can be crucial to determine the final outcome of the game. This happens, for instance, in repeated games in which players can break cooperation by acting sequentially, as well as in merger games in which rms are allowed to sequence their actions. Despite the relevance of these and other applications, no fully-edged comparisons betwen collusive and sequential payo§s have been performed so far. In this paper we show that even in symmetric duopoly games the ranking of cooperative and sequential payo§s can be extremely variable, particularly when the consuete linear demand assumption is relaxed. Not surprisingly, the degree of strategic complementarity and substitutability of players actions (and, hence, the slope of their best-replies) appears decisive to determine the ranking of collusive and sequential payo§s. Some applications to endogenous timing are discussed.
- Published
- 2012
4. Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games
- Author
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Marco Marini and Giorgio Rodano
- Subjects
jel:C70 ,jel:C71 ,ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING ,jel:D23 ,jel:D43 ,Endogenous Timing, Cooperation - Abstract
The aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing game by including the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate or not with their rival. The cooperation and timing formation rule is rather simple: when both players agree to cooperate and play with a given timing, they end up playing their actions coordinately and simultaneously. Otherwise, they play as singletons with the timing as prescribed by their own announcement. We check for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of such a cooperation-timing duopoly game. Two main results on the emergence of cooperation are provided. If players' actions in the symmetric duopoly game are strategic substitutes and there is no discount, cooperating early is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended timing-cooperation game. Conversely, cooperating late (at period two) represents an equilibrium when players' strategies are strategic complements. Other equilibria are also possible. Most importantly, our model shows that, in general, the success of cooperation is a¤ected by the endogenous timing of the game. Moreover, the slope of players' best-replies appears crucial both for the success of cooperation as well as for the players' choice of sequencing their market actions.
- Published
- 2011
5. Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games
- Author
-
Giorgio Rodano and Marco Marini
- Subjects
Microeconomics ,Non-cooperative game ,Subgame ,Equilibrium selection ,Symmetric game ,ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING ,Economics ,Repeated game ,TheoryofComputation_GENERAL ,Mathematical economics ,Extensive-form game ,Subgame perfect equilibrium ,Centipede game - Abstract
The aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky's (1990) endogenous timing game by including the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate or not with their rival. The cooperation and timing formation rule is rather simple: when both players agree to cooperate and play with a given timing, they end up playing their actions coordinately and simultaneously. Otherwise, they play as singletons with the timing as prescribed by their own announcement. We check for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of such a cooperation-timing duopoly game. Two main results on the emergence of cooperation are provided. If players' actions in the symmetric duopoly game are strategic substitutes and there is no discount, cooperating early (as a grand coalition) is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended timing-cooperation game. Conversely, cooperating late (at period two) represents an equilibrium when players' strategies are strategic complements. Other equilibria are also possible. Most importantly, our model shows that, in general, the success of cooperation is affected by the endogenous timing of the game. Moreover, the slope of players' best-replies appears crucial both for the success of cooperation as well as for the players' choice of sequencing their market actions.
- Published
- 2011
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
6. Public Debt, Distortionary Taxation, and Monetary Policy
- Author
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Alessandro Piergallini and Giorgio Rodano
- Subjects
Inflation ,Inflation targeting ,media_common.quotation_subject ,Monetary policy ,jel:H63 ,Monetary economics ,jel:E63 ,jel:H31 ,Fiscal policy ,Inflation tax ,Nominal interest rate ,Public Debt ,Distortionary Taxation ,Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules ,Fiscal theory of the price level ,Economics ,Public Debt, Distortionary Taxation, Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules ,Real interest rate ,Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica ,media_common - Abstract
Since Leeper's (1991, Journal of Monetary Economics, 27, pp. 129-147) seminal paper, an extensive literature has argued that if fiscal policy is passive, i.e., guarantees public debt stabilization irrespectively of the inflation path, monetary policy can independently be committed to inflation targeting. This can be pursued by following the Taylor principle, i.e., responding to upward perturbations in inflation with a more than one-for-one increase in the nominal interest rate. This paper analyzes an optimizing framework in which the government can only finance public expenditures by levying distortionary taxes. It is demonstrated that households' market participation constraints and Laffer-type effects can render passive fiscal policies unfeasible. For any given target inflation rate, there exists a threshold level of public debt beyond which monetary policy independence is no longer possible. In such circumstances, the dynamics of public debt can be controlled only by means of higher inflation tax revenues: inflation dynamics in line with the fiscal theory of the price level must take place in order for macroeconomic stability to be guaranteed. Otherwise, to preserve inflation control around the steady-state by following the Taylor principle, monetary policy must target a higher inflation rate.
- Published
- 2010
7. Consumption and fiscal policies: medium-run non-Keynesian effects
- Author
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Giorgio Rodano and Enrico Saltari
- Subjects
jel:E62 ,jel:E21 ,consumption function, fiscal policy, public debt - Abstract
In this paper we study the effects of fiscal policies on current consumption, distinguishing between Keynesian effects (KE), due to changes in current disposable income, and non-Keynesian effects (NE), due to expected changes in future disposable income. The literature has argued that permanent changes in fiscal policies affect current consumption. We show that the size and sign of such NE effects depend crucially on the expected lifetime of the representative consumer and on the timing of policy changes. In particular we investigate the effects on current consumption of medium run changes in fiscal policy. Using a consumption function based on a perpetual youth model, formulated in discrete time, we show the possibility of reversed NE effects where sign (KE) = sign (NE). All that is required for such reversed NE effects is the satisfaction of a simple and realistic condition depending on the expected lifetime of the consumer and the starting date for the offsetting fiscal measures needed to satisfy the intertemporal public sector budget constraint. We propose a number of exercises showing the importance of the level and dynamics of public debt. The results help to explain anomalous trends in consumption during 90s, as Italy prepared to join the EMU.
- Published
- 2001
8. Multiple attractors and global bifurcations in a Kaldor-type business cycle model
- Author
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Gian Italo Bischi, Enrico Saltari, Giorgio Rodano, and Roberto Dieci
- Subjects
Economics and Econometrics ,Dynamical systems theory ,Boundary (topology) ,bifurcations ,business cycle ,dynamical systems ,stability ,General Business, Management and Accounting ,Stability (probability) ,Nonlinear system ,Limit cycle ,Attractor ,Business cycle - Dynamical systems - Stability - Bifurcations ,Business cycle ,Economics ,Statistical physics ,Mathematical economics ,Multistability - Abstract
We consider a Kaldor-type discrete-time nonlinear business cycle model in income and capital, where investment is assumed to depend both on the difference between normal and current levels of capital stock, and on the difference between the current income and its normal level, through a nonlinear S-shaped increasing function. As usual in Kaldor business cycle models, one or three steady states exist, and the standard analysis of the local stability and bifurcations suggests that endogenous oscillations occur in the presence of only one unstable equilibrium, whereas the coexistence of three equilibria is characterized by bi-stability, the central equilibrium being on the boundary which separates the basins of the two stable ones. However, a deeper analysis of the global dynamic properties of the model in the parameter ranges where three steady states exist, reveals the existence of an attracting limit cycle surrounding the three steady states, leading to a situation of multistability, with a rich and complex dynamic structure.
- Published
- 2001
9. WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS: A DIFFICULT COEXISTENCE
- Author
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Giorgio Rodano
- Subjects
Economics and Econometrics ,Rational expectations ,General equilibrium theory ,Economics ,Neoclassical economics ,Edgeworth conjecture ,Mathematical economics - Published
- 1984
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
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