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The European market for the settlement of international commercial disputes is currently dominated by London. According to official statistics, about 80% of the cases brought before the London Commercial Court involve at least one foreign party. And in about 50% of the cases both parties are foreign. Obviously, the London Commercial Court is a popular forum for the settlement of international commercial disputes. And, obviously, it has an international appeal that is – at least in Europe and at least thus far – second to none. The remaining EU Member States, however, are not sleeping. In fact, over the course of the last years the prospect of Brexit has induced some of them to take measures designed to make their civil justice systems more attractive for international commercial parties: Germany, for example, established two first instance, international commercial chambers at the Regional Courts in Frankfurt and Hamburg in 2018 which offer to conduct proceedings in English. France created an English language chambre internationale at the Paris Court of Appeal in March 2018 which complements and adds a second instance to the English language chamber at the Paris Commercial Court that has been operating since November 2010. The Netherlands inaugurated the English language Netherlands Commercial Court and the Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal in January 2019. And other countries, notably Belgium and Switzerland are contemplating the establishment of one or more specialized courts to deal with international disputes. Quite clearly: the European market for international commercial litigation is on the move. And while some of the above mentioned chambers and courts were in the making before the UK decided to leave the EU in 2016, there can be little doubt that the prospect of Brexit has fuelled the development. The interesting question, however, is whether the recent trend to establish international commercial chambers and courts will actually yield any success? Will companies decide to come to the continent – rather than to London – to settle their disputes after Brexit? As a matter of principle, the odds are not too bad: After all the UK will lose its access to the European Judicial Area once Brexit becomes fully effective, namely when the transition period provided for in the Withdrawal Agreement expires. English court proceedings will then no longer benefit from the many European Regulations that ease the settlement of international disputes and judicial cooperation in cross-border civil matters. At least for companies which seek access to the European Judicial Area, Brexit will, therefore, make it less attractive to settle a dispute in London. The following chapter takes this observation as an occasion to explore the consequences of Brexit for the settlement of international commercial disputes in more detail. It argues that no court in the remaining Member State seems in a position to present itself as a serious alternative to the London Commercial Court. It is, therefore, suggested that the EU should step in and create a European Commercial Court. This Court would provide European companies with an international forum in the European Judicial Area after Brexit and would also attract disputes that would otherwise be settled before other international commercial courts or international arbitration tribunals.

The law applicable to smart contracts is a neglected topic. At times it is even discarded as irrelevant or unnecessary. In fact, many authors claim that smart contracts especially when stored and executed with the help of blockchain technology make contract law and, in fact, the entire legal system obsolete. “Code is law” is the frequently cited catchphrase. In the following chapter I will challenge this view and argue, first, that smart contracts need contract law just as other, traditional contracts, and, second, that the applicable contract law can—at least in most cases—be determined with the help of the traditional rules of private international law.

Judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is generally perceived to be of a rather ‘specialist and technical nature’. However, for the many UK and EU citizens, families and businesses who work, live, travel and do business abroad, the current European framework for choice of law, jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement is of paramount importance. The article, therefore, explores how that framework might look like after Brexit and explores the merits and demerits of the various ways forward. It argues that the best option for both the UK and the EU would be to agree on the continued application of the existing EU instruments or to strive for conclusion of a new agreement that closely replicates these instruments. If no such agreement can be reached the UK should decide to apply the Rome I and Rome II Regulations unilaterally and sign the Lugano Convention of 2007 as well as the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of 2005.

Private international law and comparative have a particularly intimate relationship. This is because comparative law is both a method of studying choice of law rules as well as an essential instrument for their interpretation and application. However, the recent large-scale unification of European private international law has jammed a wedge between the former ‘allies’. In fact, when analysing current court practice and academic discourse relating to European private international law one cannot help but notice a striking lack of interest in comparative analyses. The following article sheds light on this development and argues that courts and scholars should resort to comparative analyses more often and more consistently in order to avoid the pitfalls of unification. At the same time the article provides insights into the (side) effects of the large-scale unification of an entire legal field. Résumé: Le droit international privé et le droit comparé sont traditionellement très spécialement liés. C’est comme cela car le droit comparé est une méthode d’étudier des règles de conflit ainsi qu’un moyen essentiel pour leur interprétation et application. Cependant, la récente unification massive du droit international privé européen a semé la zizanie entre les anciens « alliés ». En fait, dans l’analyse de la pratique actuelle des tribunaux et du discours académique concernant le droit international privé européen, on ne peut s’empêcher de noter un manque d’intérêt d’une analyse comparative. L’article suivant se focalise sur ce développement et propose que les tribunaux et les juristes universitaires doivent avoir recours aux analyses comparatives plus souvent et plus systématiquement pour que des pièges de l’unification soient évités. En même temps, l’article fournit un aperçu des effets (secondaires) de l’unification à grande échelle d’un domaine juridique entier.

The protection of human rights in global supply chains has become one of the most hotly debated issues in public and private (international) law. In a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands, these debates have led to the introduction of domestic human rights legislation. In other countries reform plans are under way. In Germany, for example, the federal government recently announced plans to adopt a German Supply Chain Act, which, if passed as suggested, will introduce both mandatory human rights due diligence obligations and mandatory corporate liability provisions. The following article takes this announcement as an opportunity to look at the idea of a German Supply Chain Act from both a choice of law and from a comparative perspective. It argues that that any such Act will necessarily be limited in both its spatial and in its substantive reach and, therefore, recommends that Germany refrains from passing national legislation—and supports the adoption of a European instrument instead.

During the last three to four decades the ‘correct’ comparative method has become the object of an intensive debate. This debate by now also covers empirical methods that have started to ‘infiltrate’ comparative law ever since the turn of the century. Behavioural analysis, however, has not yet come into the picture. The following chapter, therefore, explores how behavioural research can be put to comparative use and sheds light on recent attempts to do so. It concludes that combining comparative and behavioural insights may further our understanding of consumers’ needs and improve our ability to design legal responses. In particular, it may help to understand why legal systems are differently designed in different countries and why the same rules may trigger different reactions in different countries. The chapter, therefore, suggests that behavioural scientists and comparative lawyers should work closely together to better understand cross-cultural consumer behaviour and the complex relationship between consumer behaviour and consumer law.

In May 2013, the European legislature enacted two measures relating to Alternative Dispute Resolution in consumer matters: the Directive on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR-Directive) and the Regulation on Online Dispute Resolution (ODR-Regulation). Both measures are intended to support the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes with a view to ensure that consumers have straight-forward and low-cost access to justice. This article analyses whether and to what extent the ADR-Directive and the ODR-Regulation manage to achieve this aim in the field of cross-border consumer contracts. It sheds light on the European legislature’s competence to regulate ADR, analyses the potential benefits of cross-border ADR, details the specific problems of cross-border ADR, and determines whether and to what extent the ADR-Directive and the ODR-Regulation resolve these problems. The article concludes that the ADR-Directive and the ODR-Regulation—while providing relief for some of the problems associated with cross-border ADR—fail to resolve the two core problems of competence and language. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the ADR-Directive and the ODR-Regulation will significantly promote cross-border ADR and enhance cross-border consumer access to justice.

The principle of party autonomy is one of the “cornerstones” of European private international law including the law of international civil procedure. It is deeply embedded in most of the regulations that have been adopted by the European legislator over the last 15 years: the Brussels I Regulation, the Rome I and II Regulations, the Maintenance Regulation as well as the Succession Regulation. However, in enacting the pertaining provisions the European legislator has opted for a sectoral approach focusing on individual legal fields. It has, thereby, lost sight of the regulation of party autonomy in other legal fields and adopted different rules to deal with the same problem. The following article sheds light on the coherence of European private international law taking the protection of weaker parties from the dangers of party autonomy as an example. It analyses which parties are perceived to be weaker in the European Private International Law of contractual and non-contractual obligations, family as well as succession law and sheds light on the various regulatory approaches applied to protect these parties. The article demonstrates that the European legislator does not follow a coherent conceptual path and argues that there is – in general – a need for a more holistic analysis of European private international law that encompasses the legal field and its underlying regulatory problems as such and across the board.

The problems and challenges of international transactions and insights of economic theory in order to determine the effects of legal differences on individual and firm behavior are discussed. All strategies to overcome the international transaction dilemma and the border effect display strengths and weaknesses, and thus warrant further research.

Abstract: In the judgment discussed below, the Appeals Court of Munich (OLG München) deals with the question whether jurisdiction and arbitration clauses have to be set aside in the light of the Ingmar decision of the European Court of Justice where they cause a derogation from Articles 17 and 18 of the Commercial Agents Directive. The Court concludes that this question should be answered in the affirmative if it is ‘likely’ that the designated court or arbitral tribunal will neither apply Articles 17 and 18 nor compensate the commercial agent on different grounds. Thus, the Court advocates that Articles 17 and 18 be given extensive protection. This is, however, problematic because such extensive protection imposes serious restrictions on party autonomy, whereas these restrictions are not required by Community law in general or by the principle of effectiveness in particular. Therefore, it is very much open to doubt whether this decision is in the best interests of the Internal Market. Résumé: Dans l’arrêt étudiéci-dessous la Cour d’appel de Munich (OLG München) s’occupe de la question si l’arrêt Ingmar de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes demande la nullitédes conventions d’élection de for et d’arbitrage si elles ont pour conséquence la dérogation des Articles 17 et 18 de la directive sur l’agence commerciale. La Cour conclut que cette question doit être répondue par l’affirmative s’il est ‘vraisemblable’ que le tribunal choisi va ni appliquer les Articles 17 et 18 ni compenser l’agent commercial sur une autre base. En jugeant ainsi, la Cour se prononce pour une protection considérable des Articles 17 et 18. Ceci est problématique, cependant, parce qu’une telle protection impose des restrictions graves à l’autonomie de la volonté, sans que celles soient exigées par le droit communautaire en général ou par le principe d’effectivitéen particulier. Par conséquent, il faut douter du fait que la décision de la Cour d’appel de Munich soit dans l’intérêt du MarchéCommun. Zusammenfassung: In der besprochenen Entscheidung setzt sich das Oberlandesgericht München (OLG München) mit der Frage auseinander, ob Gerichtsstands- und Schiedsvereinbarungen im Lichte der Ingmar-Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs unwirksam sind, wenn sie dazu führen, dass die international zwingenden Bestimmungen der Artikel 17 und 18 der Handelsvertreterrichtlinie keine Anwendung finden. Das Gericht kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass diese Frage zu bejahen ist, wenn die ‘nahe liegende Gefahr’ besteht, dass das gewählte (Schieds-) Gericht weder Artikel 17 und 18 anwenden noch dem Handelsvertreter auf anderer Grundlage einen Ausgleichs- oder Entschädigungsanspruch gewähren wird. Es setzt sich damit für einen sehr weitgehenden Schutz der Artikel 17 und 18 ein. Dies ist allerdings problematisch, weil ein derartig weitgehender Schutz zu massiven Einschränkungen der Parteiautonomie führt, ohne dass diese vom Gemeinschaftsrecht im Allgemeinen oder vom Effektivitätsgrundsatz im Besonderen gefordert würden. Es muss deshalb bezweifelt werden, dass das Gericht dem Gemeinsamen Markt mit seiner Entscheidung einen Gefallen getan hat.

Fifty years after the foundation of the European Communities, the single market for insurances has not yet become a reality. Despite the harmonization of insurance supervision law, insurance companies still essentially refrain from cross-border activity when it comes to small commercial and consumer risks. Since this finding is usually attributed to the lack of common rules on insurance contracts, this article sets out to lay the foundation for the harmonization of the corresponding national laws. By providing a comparative analysis of two of the most pervasive issues in consumer insurance contract law, the article proves that common law and civil law are not as far apart as commonly assumed. It thus refutes the widely held belief that the insurance contract laws of common law and civil law countries are too different to be harmonized.

Die vor Abschluss des Vertrags zu erfullende Anzeigepflicht gehort in allen europaischen Rechtsordnungen zu den wichtigsten Pflichten des Versicherungsnehmers. Aus diesem Grund steht sie auch im Mittelpunkt der Bestrebungen zur Harmonisierung des Versicherungsvertragsrechts in Europa. Da diese in jungster Zeit wieder an Fahrt gewonnen haben, gibt der vorliegende Beitrag einen rechtsvergleichenden Uberblick uber die Regelung der vorvertraglichen Anzeigepflicht in verschiedenen europaischen Rechtsordnungen und unterbreitet darauf aufbauend Empfehlungen fur ihre Ausgestaltung in einem europaischen Regelwerk. Im Einzelnen wird vorgeschlagen, den Versicherungsnehmer zur Anzeige aller erheblichen Umstande zu verpflichten, die er kennt oder kennen musste. Fur den Fall der Verletzung wird empfohlen, dem Versicherer in Abhangigkeit vom Verschulden des Versicherungsnehmers sowie der Kausalitat des nicht angezeigten Umstandes fur den Abschluss des Vertrags und den Eintritt des Versicherungsfalls ein Recht zur Auflosung des Vertrags mit Wirkung von Anfang an, ein Recht zur Kundigung des Vertrags mit Wirkung fur die Zukunft oder einen Anspruch auf Schadensersatz einzuraumen.

One of the most important dates in German legal history is 1 October 1879. On this day the four Imperial Judiciary Laws (Reichsjustizgesetze) became effective: the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung), the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung), the Law on the Organization of Courts (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) and the Bankruptcy Code (Konkursordnung). They replaced a large number of different organizational and procedural provisions in the existing German states and effectively established legal uniformity in civil and criminal procedure in the German Empire. More specifically, the Court Organization Law created a national system of courts for civil and criminal matters consisting of Local Courts (Amtsgericht), District Courts (Landgericht), Appeals Courts (Oberlandesgericht) and the Imperial Court of Justice (Reichsgericht). The Code of Civil Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Bankruptcy Code provided the procedural framework for all these courts thereby bringing procedural unity to the German Empire for the first time.

The article analyses three basic models that can be applied to determine the relationship between the proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL) and the rules of private international law: the ‘28th regime-model’, the ‘2nd regimemodel’, and the '1st regime-model’. It argues that both the '28th regime-model’ and the model favoured by the European Commission, the ‘2nd regime-model’, endanger the overall objective of the CESL because Article 6 Rome IRegulation will continue to apply. The '1st regime-model', in contrast, avoids application of Article 6 Rome I-Regulation because it classifies the CESL as a uniform law that takes precedence over the rules of private international law. The article, therefore, concludes that the European Commission should rethink its position and apply the '1st regime-model’ instead of the ‘2nd regime-model’.