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AbstractDefault positions, predetermined starting points that aid in complex decision-making, are common in clinical medicine. In this article, we identify and critically examine common default positions in clinical ethics practice. Whether default positions ought to be held is an important normative question, but here we are primarily interested in the descriptive, rather than normative, properties of default positions. We argue that default positions in clinical ethics function to protect and promote important values in medicine-respect for persons, utility, and justice. Further, default positions in clinical ethics may also guard against harm. Where default positions exist, there are epistemic burdens to overturn them. The person wishing to reject the default position, rather than the person endorsing it, bears this burden. The person who bears the burden of meeting the epistemic requirements must provide evidence proportional to the degree of harm the default position protects against. Default positions that protect against significant harm impose significant epistemic requirements to overturn. This asymmetry not only makes medical decision-making more economical but also serves to promote and protect certain values. The identification and analysis of common and recognizable default positions can help to identify other default positions and the conditions under which their associated epistemic requirements are met. The article concludes with considerations of potential problems with the use of default positions in clinical ethics.

The field of clinical bioethics strongly advocates for the use of advance directives to promote patient autonomy, particularly at the end of life. This paper reports a study of clinical bioethicists' perceptions of the professional consensus about advance directives, as well as their personal advance care planning practices. We find that clinical bioethicists are often sceptical about the value of advance directives, and their personal choices about advance directives often deviate from what clinical ethicists acknowledge to be their profession's recommendations. Moreover, our respondents identified a pluralistic set of justifications for completing treatment directives and designating surrogates, even while the consensus view focuses on patient autonomy. Our results suggest important revisions to academic discussion and public-facing advocacy about advance care planning., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2022. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Integrated behavioral health models of care offer many benefits for patient experience and outcomes. However, multidisciplinary teams are comprised of professionals who each may have different professional norms and ethical obligations, which may at times be in conflict. This article offers a framework for negotiating potential conflicts between professional norms and expectations across disciplines involved in integrated behavioral health teams., Competing Interests: Disclosure No financial or relationship conflicts of interest relevant to this publication., (Copyright © 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

Guidance regarding the decision to remove an adolescent from athletic competition immediately following an acute concussive injury and the safe return of play in the short term is widely accepted and supported by clinical evidence, local institutional policies, and state and federal laws. There is considerably less guidance regarding the decision to permanently retire an adolescent athlete for medical reasons due to concussive injuries. In this article, we discuss the clinical and non-clinical considerations that should guide clinicians in discussions regarding the adolescent athlete's permanent retirement by emphasizing the ethical obligation to protect the child's right to an open future as possibly determinative in otherwise ambiguous cases.

Background: The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic has or threatens to overwhelm health care systems. Many institutions are developing ventilator triage policies., Objective: To characterize the development of ventilator triage policies and compare policy content., Design: Survey and mixed-methods content analysis., Setting: North American hospitals associated with members of the Association of Bioethics Program Directors., Participants: Program directors., Measurements: Characteristics of institutions and policies, including triage criteria and triage committee membership., Results: Sixty-seven program directors responded (response rate, 91.8%); 36 (53.7%) hospitals did not yet have a policy, and 7 (10.4%) hospitals' policies could not be shared. The 29 institutions providing policies were relatively evenly distributed among the 4 U.S. geographic regions (range, 5 to 9 policies per region). Among the 26 unique policies analyzed, 3 (11.3%) were produced by state health departments. The most frequently cited triage criteria were benefit (25 policies [96.2%]), need (14 [53.8%]), age (13 [50.0%]), conservation of resources (10 [38.5%]), and lottery (9 [34.6%]). Twenty-one (80.8%) policies use scoring systems, and 20 of these (95.2%) use a version of the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment score. Among the policies that specify the triage team's composition (23 [88.5%]), all require or recommend a physician member, 20 (87.0%) a nurse, 16 (69.6%) an ethicist, 8 (34.8%) a chaplain, and 8 (34.8%) a respiratory therapist. Thirteen (50.0% of all policies) require or recommend that those making triage decisions not be involved in direct patient care, but only 2 (7.7%) require that their decisions be blinded to ethically irrelevant considerations., Limitation: The results may not be generalizable to institutions without academic bioethics programs., Conclusion: Over one half of respondents did not have ventilator triage policies. Policies have substantial heterogeneity, and many omit guidance on fair implementation., Primary Funding Source: None.

One of the more draining aspects of being a clinical ethicist is dealing with the emotions of patients, family members, as well as healthcare providers. Generally, by the time a clinical ethicist is called into a case, stress levels are running high, patience is low, and interpersonal communication is strained. Management of this emotional burden of clinical ethics is an underexamined aspect of the profession and academic literature. The emotional nature of doing clinical ethics consultation may be better addressed by utilizing concepts and tools from clinical psychology. Management of countertransference, the natural emotional reaction by the therapist toward the patient, is a widely discussed topic in the psychotherapeutic literature. This concept can be adapted to the clinical ethics encounter by broadening it beyond the patient-therapist relationship to refer to the ethics consultant's emotional response toward the patient, the family, or other members the healthcare team. Further, it may aid the consultant because a recognition of the source and nature of these reactions can help maintain 'critical distance' and minimize bias in the same way that a psychologist maintains neutrality in psychotherapy. This paper will offer suggestions on how to manage these emotional responses and their burden in the clinical ethics encounter, drawing upon techniques and strategies recommended in the psychotherapeutic literature. Using these techniques may improve consultation outcomes and reduce the emotional burden on the clinical ethicist.

Despite the lack of evidence for the effectiveness of physical restraints, their use in patients is widespread. The best ethical justification for restraining patients is that it prevents them from harming themselves. We argue that even if the empirical evidence supported their effectiveness in achieving this aim, the use of restraints would nevertheless be unethical, so long as well-known exceptions to informed consent fail to apply. Specifically, we argue that ethically justifiable restraint use demands certain necessary and sufficient conditions. These conditions are that the physician obtained informed consent for their application, that their application be medically appropriate, and that restraints be the least liberty-restricting way of achieving the intended benefit. It is a further question whether their application is ever medically appropriate, given the dearth of evidence for their effectiveness., (Copyright © 2018 American College of Chest Physicians. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

In its simplest interpretation, this is a case about goals of care and appropriate code status. At the outset, we must confess that we found this case to be extremely interesting-not for the novelty of the issues or its ethical complexity but because it is truly a case of the ordinary. Too often when teaching or discussing clinical ethics cases, we are distracted by the exotic and the unusual and ignore the mundane cases that every practicing clinical ethicist must be able to competently manage. 1,2,3.