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RESUMEN ¿En qué medida la politización del orden mediático activada por gobiernos de “nueva izquierda” en América Latina, afectó la confianza ciudadana en los medios de comunicación? Utilizando datos a nivel individual en Argentina, donde el conflicto gobierno-medios fue intenso, este trabajo examina el impacto de tres variables políticas: preferencias, sofisticación y temas. La evidencia indica que los simpatizantes del kirchnerismo confían menos que las demás personas, mientras que los votantes evalúan los medios según el desempeño presidencial. Por otra parte, los individuos políticamente sofisticados expresan menores niveles de confianza, mientras que las víctimas de la delincuencia manifiestan mayores. Estos resultados tienen implicancias para el estudio de la política de medios y el papel de los encuadres de las elites sobre las percepciones individuales acerca de la prensa.

Fil: González, Lucas Isaac. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina Fil: González, Lucas Isaac. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Política y Gobierno; Argentina Fil: González, Lucas Isaac. Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Departamento de Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales; Argentina Abstract: This article analyses the relation between mineral rents and development outcomes at the subnational level. The classical literature suggests that natural resource abundance has negative effects on well-being, a situation referred to as the resource curse. However, a novel strand of research emphasizes that rentier states worldwide exhibit contrasting outcomes. To account for such variation, this investigation aligns with approaches stressing the significance of contextual (place and institutional) factors to studying the resource curse. The main claim in this work is that both structural and institutional factors related to the extractive industry help account for variation in development outcomes. It contends that mineral rents are positively associated with human development and economic industrialization when the extractive sector is not geographically concentrated in enclave economies, and subnational fiscal institutions redistribute enough rents from producing to non-producing districts. It empirically tests this argument using a time series cross-sectional analysis, a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimation, and two case studies in Argentina, a country where subnational territorial units collect mineral royalties and have exogenously created their own rent-sharing regimes. It finally provides some comparative implications that may contribute to current debates on the socioeconomic impact of natural resource wealth.

How do fiscal institutions shape the ability of presidents and state governors in a federation to manipulate federal money with coalition building goals? This article proposes a two-level theory of intergovernmental transfers based upon variation in the level of discretionality over the use of federal money that fiscal institutions grant to national and subnational executives. We use subnational level data in Argentina to show that not taking discretionality into account leads to wrong inferences about the electoral returns of intergovernmental transfers. We find that presidents extract different political utility from discretionary and nondiscretionary transfers. While discretionary transfers enable them to directly target voters bypassing opposition provincial governors, nondiscretionary transfers pay off more to co-partisan governors by guaranteeing security in the reception of transfer monies. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

"What forces shape the behavior of incumbent legislators in a federation? Do subnational political elites (particularly governors) influence legislators' decisions on national policies? Do legislators' own political backgrounds and office ambitions motivate their actions in the chamber? We address these questions by estimating the causal effect of gubernatorial influence and individual political careerism on the voting behavior of regionally based legislators (i.e., senators) in Argentina, where electoral and candidate nomination rules provide little room for individualistic behavior in Parliament. Taking advantage of roll call voting data, we calculate the distance between each senator and her or his national party leader in the chamber. We document evidence that, on average, senators from governors' parties systematically break party unity. This effect grows as gubernatorial power increases. Moreover, we find that senators with successful local level political careers are also more likely to behave autonomously from their national party leaders. Finally, we show that the impact of senators' office ambitions on their voting patterns is surprisingly small." (author's abstract)

Durante la ultima d6cada, la literatura sobre reformas de mercado en America Latina examin6 las condiciones que facilitaron la adopci6n de drcsticas politicas de ajuste econ6mico sin mayor oposici6n social (Acuia y Smith, 1994; Haggard y Kaufman, 1992; Nelson, 1990; Przerworski, 1991; Stokes, 2001; Torre, 1998; Weyland, 1998). Una interpretaci6n que gan6 cr6dito entre un grupo de acad6micos sostiene que buena parte de estas experiencias reformistas representaron una variante "liberal" o neopopulista del tradicional populismo latinoamericano1. SegOn esta lectura, la distribuci6n compensatoria de beneficios materiales a los perdedores del cambio econ6mico allan6 el camino del neoliberalismo en la regi6n. Concretamente, se afirma que el lanzamiento de politicas sociales focalizadas sirvi6 al doble prop6sito de galvanizar el apoyo electoral de los sectores populares y silenciar su oposici6n fragmentando a los pobres, impidiendo lazos horizontales entre los mismos y acentuando el clientelismo politico. El caso de la Argentina en los afos '90, sin embargo, ilustra un patron diferente del propuesto por la teoria neopopulista de las compensaciones. En efecto, aun