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Deliberate ignorance is the willful choice not to know the answer to a question of personal relevance. The question of whether a man is the biological father of his child is a sensitive issue in many cultures and can lead to litigation, divorce, and disinheritance. Thanks to DNA tests, men are easily able to resolve the uncertainty. Psychological theories that picture humans as informavores who are averse to ambiguity suggest men would do a DNA test, as does evolutionary theory, which considers investing in raising a rival’s offspring a mistake. We conducted two representative studies using computer-based face-to-face interviews in Germany (n = 969) and Spain (n = 1,002) to investigate whether men actually want to know and how women would react to this desire. As a base line, Germans (Spanish) estimated that 10% (20%) of fathers mistakenly believe that they are the biological father of their child. Nevertheless, in both countries, only 4% of fathers reported that they had performed a DNA paternity test, while 96% said they had not. In contrast, among men without children, 38% (33%) of Germans (Spanish) stated they would do a DNA test if they had children, mostly without telling their partners. Spanish women with children would more often disapprove of a paternity test or threaten their husbands with divorce (25%) than would German women (13%). We find that a simple test of risk aversion, measured also by the purchase of non-mandatory insurances, is correlated with not wanting to know.

Abstract This study provides the first representative analysis of error estimations and willingness to accept errors in a Western country (Germany) with regards to algorithmic decision-making systems (ADM). We examine people’s expectations about the accuracy of algorithms that predict credit default, recidivism of an offender, suitability of a job applicant, and health behavior. Also, we ask whether expectations about algorithm errors vary between these domains and how they differ from expectations about errors made by human experts. In a nationwide representative study (N = 3086) we find that most respondents underestimated the actual errors made by algorithms and are willing to accept even fewer errors than estimated. Error estimates and error acceptance did not differ consistently for predictions made by algorithms or human experts, but people’s living conditions (e.g. unemployment, household income) affected domain-specific acceptance (job suitability, credit defaulting) of misses and false alarms. We conclude that people have unwarranted expectations about the performance of ADM systems and evaluate errors in terms of potential personal consequences. Given the general public’s low willingness to accept errors, we further conclude that acceptance of ADM appears to be conditional to strict accuracy requirements.

Abstract Background To assess whether Swiss general ophthalmologists have the minimal keratoconus knowledge that corneal specialists would expect them to have. Methods Corneal specialists defined “minimal keratoconus knowledge” (MKK) with respect to definition, risk factors, symptoms and possible treatment options of keratoconus. A telephone interview survey was conducted among one hundred ophthalmologists (mean age 51.9 years (SD 9.5), 60 % male) from the German-speaking part of Switzerland. For each participant, years of work experience, number of keratoconus patients seen per year and access to a topography device were obtained. We calculated the proportion of MKK and examined in multivariate analyses whether ophthalmologists with access to topography and with greater work experience performed better than other groups. Results No single ophthalmologist had MKK. The mean MKK was 52.0 %, and the range was 28.6–81.0 %. Per 10 years of working in private practice, the MKK decreased by 8.1 % points (95 % CI: -14.2, -2.00; p = 0.01). Only 24 % of participants correctly recalled the definition of keratoconus, 9 % all risk factors, 5 % all symptoms and 20 % all treatment modalities. The MKK values were not associated with the number of keratoconus patients seen per year and the availability of topography to diagnose keratoconus. Conclusions There is a substantial mismatch between corneal specialist’ expectations and general ophthalmologists’ knowledge about keratoconus. The low recall of symptoms and risk factors may explain why ophthalmologists diagnose relatively few cases of keratoconus, resulting in inefficient care delivery and delayed intervention.

Intelligence evolved to cope with situations of uncertainty generated by nature, predators, and the behavior of conspecifics. To this end, humans and other animals acquired special abilities, including heuristics that allow for swift action in face of scarce information. In this article, I introduce the concept of embodied heuristics, that is, innate or learned rules of thumb that exploit evolved sensory and motor abilities in order to facilitate superior decisions. I provide a case study of the gaze heuristic, which solves coordination problems from intercepting prey to catching a fly ball. Various species have adapted this heuristic to their specific sensorimotor abilities, such as vision, echolocation, running, and flying. Humans have enlisted it for solving tasks beyond its original purpose, a process akin to exaptation. The gaze heuristic also made its way into rocket technology. I propose a systematic study of embodied heuristics as a research framework for situated cognition and embodied bounded rationality.

Objectives Cochrane reviews are currently of limited use as many healthcare professionals and patients have no access to them. Most member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) choose not to pay for nationwide access to the reviews, possibly uncertain whether there is enough demand to warrant the costs of a national subscription. This study estimates the demand for review downloads and summary views under free access across all OECD countries.Design The study employs a retrospective design in analysing observational data of web traffic to Cochrane websites in 2014. Specifically, we model for each country downloads of Cochrane reviews and views of online summaries as a function of free access status and alternative sources of variation across countries. The model is then used to estimate demand if a country with restricted access were to purchase free access. We use these estimates to perform a cost-benefit analysis.Results For one group of eight OECD countries, the additional downloads under free access are estimated to cost between US$4 and more than US$20 each. Three countries are expected to save money under free access, as existing institutional subscriptions would no longer be needed. For the largest group of 17 member states, free access is estimated to cost US$0.05–US$2 per additional review download. On average, the increase in review downloads does not appear to be associated with a decrease in the number of summary views. Instead, translations of plain-language summaries into national languages can serve as an additional strategy for dissemination.Conclusions We estimate that free access would cost less than US$2 per additional download for 20 of the 28 OECD countries without national subscriptions, including Canada, Germany and Israel. These countries may be encouraged by our findings to provide free access to their citizens.

Numerous health insurers offer bonus programmes that score customers' health behaviour, and car insurers offer telematics tariffs that score driving behaviour. In many countries, however, only a minority of customers participate in these programmes. In a population-representative survey of private households in Germany (N = 2,215), we study the acceptance of the criteria (features) on which the scoring programmes are based: the features for driver scoring (speed, texting while driving, time of driving, area of driving, accelerating and braking behaviour, respectively) and for health scoring (walking distance per day, sleeping hours per night, alcohol consumption, weight, participation in recommended cancer screenings, smoking status). In a second step, we model participants' acceptance of both programmes with regard to the underlying feature acceptance. We find that insurers in Germany rarely use the features which the participants consider to be the most relevant and justifiable, that is, smoking status for health scoring and smartphone use for driver scoring. Heuristic models (fast-and-frugal trees) show that programme acceptance depends on the acceptance of a few features. These models can help to understand customers' preferences and to design scoring programmes that are based on scientific evidence regarding behaviours and factors associated with good health and safe driving and are thus more likely to be accepted.

Abstract Defensive decision making occurs when a manager ranks an option as the best for the organization yet deliberately chooses a second-best option that protects him or herself against negative consequences. We study 950 managers in a public administration to analyze the frequency and causes of defensive decisions. We find that at each hierarchy level defensive decisions are widespread. On average, 2.5 out of the 10 most important decisions respondents made within the last 12 months were defensive. Overall, 80% of managers indicated that they made at least one defensive decision and 17% even stated that at least half of their decisions were defensive. We identify as a major cause a team’s approach to failure, that is, whether the reaction to failure is to seek someone to blame as opposed to identifying the underlying causes in order to learn how to prevent similar failures in the future. Given that managers are often confronted with an uncertain environment where a positive outcome cannot be ascertained, such an approach to failure can lead to a severe decline in the performance of the organization.

Informed decision making in medicine, defined as basing one's decision on the best current medical evidence, requires both informed physicians and informed patients. In cancer screening, however, studies document that these prerequisites are not yet met. Many physicians do not know or understand the medical evidence behind screening tests, do not adequately counsel (asymptomatic) people on screening, and make recommendations that conflict with existing guidelines on informed choice. Consistent with this situation, nation-wide studies showed that the general public misperceives the contribution of cancer screening but that understanding considerably improves when evidence-based information is provided. However, can evidence-based patient information about cancer screening make people also less likely to simply follow a physician's non-evidence-based advice? A national sample of 897 German citizens, surveyed in face-to-face computer-assisted personal interviews, received either evidence-based (e.g., absolute risks on benefits and harms; n = 451) or non-evidence-based (e.g., relative risks on benefits only; n = 446) patient information about a cancer screening test and were then asked to make their initial cancer screening choice. Thereafter, participants received a hypothetical physician's recommendation, which was non-evidence-based in terms of existing guidelines on informed decision making (i.e., reporting either benefits or harms but not both; no provision of numbers). When provided with non-evidence-based patient information (n = 446), a mean of 33.1% of 235 participants whose initial screening choice contradicted the hypothetical physician's non-evidence-based recommendation adjusted their choice in deference to that recommendation (95% CI: 27.4 to 39.4%), whereas with evidence-based patient information (n = 451), only half as many, a mean of 16.0% of 225 (95% CI: 11.8 to 21.4%), modified their choice. Thus, evidence-based patient information makes people less likely to simply follow non-evidence-based recommendations of physicians and supports people in making evidence-based decisions even when not adequately counseled on cancer screening.

One of the major hurdles to promoting informed decision making in health is the continued use of poor risk presentation formats. This article offers a guide to develop a Fact Box, a simple decision tool to present data about the benefits and harms of treatments that has been demonstrated to improve understanding of health risks, an important part of risk literacy. The article offers guidance about how to determine the evidence basis for a health topic, select outcomes to report, extract and present numbers or outcomes, and design the layout. The guide also addresses potential challenges for summarizing evidence and provides alternatives for addressing issues related to missing, insufficient, imprecise, or conflicting evidence and for dealing with issues related to statistical and clinical significance. The guide concludes with details on how to document the development of the Fact Box for the purpose of transparency and reproducibility. Fact Boxes are an efficient tool to promote risk literacy and should be available in every physician’s office.

The advantage of models that do not use flexible parameters is that one can precisely show to what degree they predict behavior, and in what situations. In three issues of this journal, the recognition heuristic has been examined carefully from many points of view. We comment here on four themes, the use of optimization models to understand the rationality of heuristics, the generalization of the recognition input beyond a binary judgment, new conditions for less-is-more effects, and the importance of specifying boundary conditions for cognitive heuristics.

The recognition heuristic exploits the basic psychological capacity for recognition in order to make inferences about unknown quantities in the world. In this article, we review and clarify issues that emerged from our initial work (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002), including the distinction between a recognition and an evaluation process. There is now considerable evidence that (i) the recognition heuristic predicts the inferences of a substantial proportion of individuals consistently, even in the presence of one or more contradicting cues, (ii) people are adaptive decision makers in that accordance increases with larger recognition validity and decreases in situations when the validity is low or wholly indeterminable, and (iii) in the presence of contradicting cues, some individuals appear to select different strategies. Little is known about these individual differences, or how to precisely model the alternative strategies. Although some researchers have attributed judgments inconsistent with the use of the recognition heuristic to compensatory processing, little research on such compensatory models has been reported. We discuss extensions of the recognition model, open questions, unanticipated results, and the surprising predictive power of recognition in forecasting.

Can traces of rapid socio-economic changes within a society be reflected in experimental games? The post-Mao reforms in China provide a unique natural quasi-experiment to study people from the same society who were raised with radically different values about distribution of wealth and altruistic behavior. We tested whether the size of offers in the ultimatum and dictator games are an increasing function of the number of years Chinese citizens experienced of the Mao era ("planned economy"). For the cohort that lived throughout the entire Mao era, we found that mean offers in the two games were substantially higher than what is typically offered in laboratory studies. These offers were also higher than those of two younger Chinese cohorts. In general, the amount offered decreased with less time spent under Mao, while in the oldest group in which every member spent the same amount of time under Mao, the younger members tended to offer more, suggesting an additional effect of early education under Mao and contradicting the alternative hypothesis that generosity increases with age. These results suggest that some of the observed individual differences in the offers made in experimental games can be traced back to the values of the socio-economic era in which individuals grew up.

Algunos instrumentos han jugado un papel tan importante en la investigación psicológica que se han convertido en metáforas para el contenido mismo de la investigación, o han conducido a la generación de nuevos conceptos y teorías en psicología. Este capítulo proporciona dos casos prácticos relacionados que apoyan esta afirmación. Desde la llamada "revolución cognitiva" de la década de 1960, la mente humana ha sido descrita teóricamente como un "estadístico intuitivo" (una persona que piensa de forma intuitiva en términos estadísticos) o como un programa de ordenador. Estas teorías han sido fuertemente inspiradas por las herramientas introducidas en la investigación psicológica antes de la difusión de tales teorías en la comunidad psicológica: la estadística inferencial y el ordenador digital. Aquí discutimos los pros y los contras de las metáforas. Las metáforas pueden ser ventajosas, pues abren nuevas áreas de investigación, llevan a nuevas preguntas y datos; pero las metáforas pueden también incluir pérdidas, ya que siempre recalcan algunos aspectos y dejan otros fuera. Además, en lugar de teorías que son evaluadas por datos recogidos mediante herramientas de investigación aparentemente neutrales, hay una tendencia hacia teorías que se ajustan al funcionamiento o a los usos de herramientas específicas de investigación. Tal tendencia se ve en ocasiones reforzada por los datos que sólo pueden ser producidos por las nuevas herramientas. Los científicos deberían ser conscientes de esta dinámica para evitar circularidades en su teorización.