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Background If untreated, Lyme disease can lead to long-term sequelae and post-treatment Lyme disease syndrome (PTLDS), resulting in reduced health-related quality of life. The objective of this study was to develop a microsimulation model to estimate the population-level health burden of Lyme disease in Ontario, Canada. Methods We developed a Lyme disease history model using microsimulation, simulating 100 000 people (mean age 37.6 yr, 51% female) from 2017 in Ontario over a lifetime risk of infection and time horizon. We extracted the sensitivity and specificity of the 2-tier testing recommended by the Canadian Public Health Laboratory Network, probabilities and health state utility values from the published literature and health administrative data. Our reported outcomes from our stochastic analysis include diagnosed cases of Lyme disease (stratified by stage), undiagnosed infections, sequelae, individuals with PTLDS and quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) lost. Results Our model estimated 333 (95% confidence interval [CI] 329-337) infections over the lifetime of 100 000 simulated people (mean age 37.6 yr, 51% female), with 92% (95% CI 91%-93%) of infections diagnosed. Of those 308 people with Lyme Disease diagnoses, 67 (95% CI 65-69) developed sequelae (e.g., arthritic, cardiac, neurologic sequelae), and 34 (95% CI 33-35) developed PTLDS. Lyme disease resulted in a loss of 84.5 QALYs (95% CI 82.9-86.2) over the lifetime of the simulated cohort. Sensitivity and scenario analysis showed that increasing incidence rates of Lyme disease, potential underreporting, duration of PTLDS and quality of life (health state utility) associated with PTLDS had the greatest impact on health burden. Interpretation Lyme disease contributes considerable health burden in terms of QALYs lost. Our analysis provides evidence to understand the disease burden and lays the foundation to assess the cost-effectiveness of pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical interventions.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has placed significant burden on healthcare systems. We compared

The novel coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has severely impacted the training of health care professional students because of concerns of potential asymptomatic transmission to colleagues and vulnerable patients. From May 27th, 2020, to June 23rd 2021; at a time when B.1.1.7 (alpha) and B.1.617.2 (delta) were the dominant circulating variants, PCR testing was conducted on 1,237 nasopharyngeal swabs collected from 457 asymptomatic health care professional students as they returned to their studies from across Canada to Kingston, ON, a low prevalence area during that period for COVID-19. Despite 46.7% of COVID-19 infections occurring in the 18–29 age group in Kingston, severe-acute-respiratory coronavirus-2 was not detected in any of the samples suggesting that negligible asymptomatic infection occurred in this group and that PCR testing in this setting may not be warranted as a screening tool.

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of chlorhexidine and essential oils containing mouth rinses on oral wound healing after periodontal flap surgery. Eighty subjects participated in the study and were randomly assigned to use water, 0.12% chlorhexidine (CHX), essential oils (EO), 5% CHX, and 10% EO. Subjects were examined at 1, 2, and 3 weeks postoperatively. Plaque index (PI) and the modified gingival index (GI) were recorded, while wound epithelialization was measured to evaluate the healing process. Numerical data were analyzed with parametric test for multiple comparisons (ANOVA) with Bonferroni correction. Categorical data were analyzed using Chi-square test/fisher exact test. All groups demonstrated a gradual GI reduction from first to third visit. Patients in the CHX group presented statistically significant lower PI scores than patients in the water group at the all-time points of the study. Wound epithelialization analysis demonstrated that 100% of the sites in the CHX group were healing by secondary intention at visit 1. This finding was statistically significant. Full strength concentrations of CHX and EO did not show any detrimental effects on healing after traditional periodontal surgery at the end of the observation period. The use of chlorhexidine and EO containing mouthwashes does not appear to delay wound healing. Diluting these commercial mouthwashes may present an approach that could possibly reduce the adverse effects (such as tooth staining) associated with their use, while maintaining their antibacterial properties.

Background Antimicrobial resistance is a growing threat to the world’s ability to prevent and treat infections. Links between quantitative antibiotic use and the emergence of bacterial resistance are well documented. This study presents benchmark antimicrobial use (AMU) rates for inpatient adult populations in acute-care hospitals across Canada. Methods In this retrospective surveillance study, acute-care adult hospitals participating in the Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program (CNISP) submitted annual AMU data on all systemic antimicrobials from 2009 to 2016. Information specific to intensive care units (ICUs) and non-ICU wards were available for 2014–2016. Data were analyzed using defined daily doses (DDD) per 1000 patient days (DDD/1000pd). Results Between 2009 and 2016, 16–18 CNISP adult hospitals participated each year and provided their AMU data (22 hospitals participated in ≥1 year of surveillance; 11 in all years). From 2009 to 2016, there was a significant reduction in use (12%) (from 654 to 573 DDD/1000pd, p = 0.03). Fluoroquinolones accounted for the majority of this decrease (47% reduction in combined oral and intravenous use, from 129 to 68 DDD/1000pd, p p = 0.002) and 26% (p = 0.002) respectively. Ceftriaxone (85% increase, p = 0.0008) and oral amoxicillin-clavulanate (140% increase, p Conclusions This study represents the largest collection of dispensed antimicrobial use data among inpatients in Canada to date. Between 2009 and 2016, there was a significant 12% decrease in AMU, driven primarily by a 47% decrease in fluoroquinolone use. Modest absolute increases in parenteral ceftriaxone and oral amoxicillin-clavulanate use were noted but contributed a small amount of total AMU. Ongoing national surveillance is crucial for establishing benchmarks and antimicrobial stewardship guidelines.

POINTS CLES Pour tenter de limiter la transmission galopante du coronavirus du syndrome respiratoire aigu severe 2 (SRAS-CoV-2), les hopitaux canadiens ont adopte des politiques d’interdiction des visites durant la premiere vague de la pandemie. Des politiques systematiques et quasi compl

KEY POINTS In an attempt to mitigate excess transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), Canadian hospitals adopted “no visitor” policies during the first wave of the pandemic. A reflexive and almost complete restriction of visitors occurred across all hospitals

During the COVID-19 global pandemic, the cancer community faces many difficult questions. We will first discuss safety considerations for patients with cancer requiring treatment in SARS-CoV-2 endemic areas. We will then discuss a general framework for prioritizing cancer care, emphasizing the precautionary principle in decision making.

Lyme disease (LD) is the most commonly reported vector-borne disease, but its clinical consequences remain uncertain. We conducted a systematic review of the long-term sequelae and health-related quality of life (HRQoL) associated with LD in North America and Europe. We performed searches in 6 electronic databases up to December 2018 following Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses guidelines, including observational studies reporting long-term sequelae, HRQoL, and prognostic factors. We included 46 studies, published between 1994 and 2019. Based on 21 studies reporting attributable outcomes, higher proportions of sequelae reported from exposed patients were: neck pain, myalgia, arthralgia, paresthesia, sleep disorder, poor appetite, and concentration difficulties. Patients with PTLDS reported impaired HRQoL compared to the general US population. Included studies were highly heterogeneous in terms of study design, settings, patient characteristics, and quality. Patients with LD are more likely to report nonspecific long-term sequelae, especially those experiencing persistent symptoms posttreatment. Opportunities exist for prospective longitudinal studies to better understand LD outcomes.

This document updates the previous AMMI Canada Foundation Guidance (2013) on the use of antiviral therapy for influenza.Le présent document est une mise à jour des précédentes directives d’AMMI Canada (2013) sur l’utilisation des antiviraux contre la grippe.

The science of getting people to start something new is different from the science of getting them to continue positive behaviours. Amid rising rates of new SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern, Ontario needs a refreshed approach to maintaining and enhancing adherence to public health measures. Promising strategies to increase effective masking and physical distancing include persuasion, enablement, modelling the behaviour, and clear education.

New variants of concern (VOCs) now account for 67% of all Ontario SARS-CoV-2 infections. Compared with early variants of SARS-CoV-2, VOCs are associated with a 63% increased risk of hospitalization, a 103% increased risk of intensive care unit (ICU) admission and a 56% increased risk of death due to COVID-19. VOCs are having a substantial impact on Ontario’s healthcare system. On March 28, 2021, the daily number of new SARS-CoV-2 infections in Ontario reached the daily number of cases observed near the height of the second wave, at the start of the province-wide lockdown, on December 26, 2020. The number of people hospitalized with COVID-19 is now 21% higher than at the start of the province-wide lockdown, while ICU occupancy is 28% higher (Figure 1). The percentage of COVID-19 patients in ICUs who are younger than 60 years is about 50% higher now than it was prior to the start of the province-wide lockdown. Because the increased risk of COVID-19 hospitalization, ICU admission and death with VOCs is most pronounced 14 to 28 days after diagnosis, there will be significant delays until the full burden to the health care system becomes apparent.

SARS-CoV-2 screen testing is routine serial testing of asymptomatic individuals outside of outbreak or known exposure settings to identify staff infectious with SARS-CoV-2 and exclude them from work. Routine asymptomatic screen testing of staff has been proposed as a potential mitigating strategy to reduce SARS-CoV-2 introduction and transmission in long-term care (LTC) homes. A rapid review of the literature found no real-world evidence to either support or refute screen testing in preventing LTC home COVID-19 outbreaks. There are several direct harms associated with screen testing, as well as opportunity costs, including exacerbating LTC staffing shortages. On the basis of the evidence reviewed, and given the high rates of protection of COVID-19 vaccines against symptomatic and asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infection, the potential harms and costs of screen testing among vaccinated LTC home staff likely outweigh the benefits.

Health Care Workers (HCWs) are the backbone of Ontario’s COVID-19 pandemic response and are a key vaccination priority group. About 80% of Ontario HCWs intend to receive COVID-19 vaccine.1 Challenges include the logistics of delivering the vaccine to this mobile and diverse group and improving vaccine confidence in the remaining 20%. These challenges can be overcome by allaying safety concerns and highlighting personal benefits; tailoring messages to factors associated with lower intention (e.g. age, gender, ethnicity and work setting); employing trusted leaders to set the tone and peers to build social norms; and leveraging public health organizations and health institutions as existing channels of influence.

The emergence and rapid global spread of SARS-CoV-2 demonstrates the importance of infectious disease surveillance, particularly during the early stages. Viral genomes can provide key insights into transmission chains and pathogenicity. Nasopharyngeal swabs were obtained from thirty-two of the first SARS-CoV-2 positive cases (March 18–30) in Kingston Ontario, Canada. Viral genomes were sequenced using Ion Torrent (n = 24) and MinION (n = 27) sequencing platforms. SARS-CoV-2 genomes carried forty-six polymorphic sites including two missense and three synonymous variants in the spike protein gene. The D614G point mutation was the predominate viral strain in our cohort (92.6%). A heterozygous variant (C9994A) was detected by both sequencing platforms but filtered by the ARTIC network bioinformatic pipeline suggesting that heterozygous variants may be underreported in the SARS-CoV-2 literature. Phylogenetic analysis with 87,738 genomes in the GISAID database identified global origins and transmission events including multiple, international introductions as well as community spread. Reported travel history validated viral introduction and transmission inferred by phylogenetic analysis. Molecular epidemiology and evolutionary phylogenetics may complement contact tracing and help reconstruct transmission chains of emerging diseases. Earlier detection and screening in this way could improve the effectiveness of regional public health interventions to limit future pandemics.

As Ontario expands access to the COVID-19 vaccine beyond the Phase 1 priority populations, strategic planning and execution of mass vaccine rollout will have a significant impact on the health and safety of Ontario’s 14.5 million residents. There are six key elements of Israel’s successful COVID-19 vaccine campaign that can be readily applied to Ontario to expedite and expand the province’s vaccine rollout strategy: a simple vaccine prioritization process; modification to the transport, storage, and distribution of the vaccines; effective communication to promote vaccine confidence; decentralization of vaccination sites; centralized organization through Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) using a fully integrated information technology (IT) system in a universal health care system; and the engagement of community-based personnel, infrastructure, and resources.

Key Message Accelerating the rollout of Ontario’s COVID-19 vaccine such that all LTC residents receive the first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by January 31, 2021, would prevent a projected 600 COVID-19 cases and 115 deaths by March 31, 2021 when compared with the province’s current plan to vaccinate all LTC residents by February 15, 2021. Projections indicate that further acceleration of the rollout would prevent even more COVID-19 cases and deaths. If vaccine supply is limited, the early provision of first doses of a COVID-19 vaccine to LTC home residents is likely to be more beneficial than the on-schedule provision of second doses to health care workers outside of LTC homes. All LTC residents should receive the second dose according to approved vaccination schedules.

Key Message Ontario long-term care (LTC) home residents have experienced disproportionately high morbidity and mortality, both from COVID-19 and from the conditions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. There are several measures that could be effective in preventing COVID-19 outbreaks, hospitalizations, and deaths in Ontario’s LTC homes, if implemented. First, temporary staffing could be minimized by improving staff working conditions. Second, homes could be further decrowded by a continued disallowance of three- and four-resident rooms and additional temporary housing for the most crowded homes. Third, the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection in staff could be minimized by approaches that reduce the risk of transmission in communities with a high burden of COVID-19. Summary Background The Province of Ontario has 626 licensed LTC homes and 77,257 long-stay beds; 58% of homes are privately owned, 24% are non-profit/charitable, 16% are municipal. LTC homes were strongly affected during Ontario’s first and second waves of the COVID-19 pandemic. Questions What do we know about the first and second waves of COVID-19 in Ontario LTC homes? Which risk factors are associated with COVID-19 outbreaks in Ontario LTC homes and the extent and death rates associated with outbreaks? What has been the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the general health and wellbeing of LTC residents? How has the existing Ontario evidence on COVID-19 in LTC settings been used to support public health interventions and policy changes in these settings? What are the further measures that could be effective in preventing COVID-19 outbreaks, hospitalizations, and deaths in Ontario’s LTC homes? Findings As of January 14, 2021, a total of 3,211 Ontario LTC home residents have died of COVID-19, totaling 60.7% of all 5,289 COVID-19 deaths in Ontario to date. There have now been more cumulative LTC home outbreaks during the second wave as compared with the first wave. The infection and death rates among LTC residents have been lower during the second wave, as compared with the first wave, and a greater number of LTC outbreaks have involved only staff infections. The growth rate of SARS-CoV-2 infections among LTC residents was slower during the first two months of the second wave in September and October 2020, as compared with the first wave. However, the growth rate after the two-month mark is comparatively faster during the second wave. The majority of second wave infections and deaths in LTC homes have occurred between December 1, 2020, and January 14, 2021 (most recent date of data extraction prior to publication). This highlights the recent intensification of the COVID-19 pandemic in LTC homes that has mirrored the recent increase in community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 across Ontario. Evidence from Ontario demonstrates that the risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks and subsequent deaths in LTC are distinct from the risk factors for outbreaks and deaths in the community (Figure 1). The most important risk factors for whether a LTC home will experience an outbreak is the daily incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infections in the communities surrounding the home and the occurrence of staff infections. The most important risk factors for the magnitude of an outbreak and the number of resulting resident deaths are older design, chain ownership, and crowding. Figure 1. Anatomy of Outbreaks and Spread of COVID-19 in LTC Homes and Among Residents Figure from Peter Hamilton, personal communication. Many Ontario LTC home residents have experienced severe and potentially irreversible physical, cognitive, psychological, and functional declines as a result of precautionary public health interventions imposed on homes, such as limiting access to general visitors and essential caregivers, resident absences, and group activities. There has also been an increase in the prescribing of psychoactive drugs to Ontario LTC residents. The accumulating evidence on COVID-19 in Ontario’s LTC homes has been leveraged in several ways to support public health interventions and policy during the pandemic. Ontario evidence showed that SARS-CoV-2 infections among LTC staff was associated with subsequent COVID-19 deaths among LTC residents, which motivated a public order to restrict LTC staff from working in more than one LTC home in the first wave. Emerging Ontario evidence on risk factors for LTC home outbreaks and deaths has been incorporated into provincial pandemic surveillance tools. Public health directives now attempt to limit crowding in LTC homes by restricting occupancy to two residents per room. The LTC visitor policy was also revised to designate a maximum of two essential caregivers who can visit residents without time limits, including when a home is experiencing an outbreak. Several further measures could be effective in preventing COVID-19 outbreaks, hospitalizations, and deaths in Ontario’s LTC homes. First, temporary staffing could be minimized by improving staff working conditions. Second, the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection in staff could be minimized by measures that reduce the risk of transmission in communities with a high burden of COVID-19. Third, LTC homes could be further decrowded by a continued disallowance of three- and four-resident rooms and additional temporary housing for the most crowded homes. Other important issues include improved prevention and detection of SARS-CoV-2 infection in LTC staff, enhanced infection prevention and control (IPAC) capacity within the LTC homes, a more balanced and nuanced approach to public health measures and IPAC strategies in LTC homes, strategies to promote vaccine acceptance amongst residents and staff, and further improving data collection on LTC homes, residents, staff, visitors and essential caregivers for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic. Interpretation Comparisons of the first and second waves of the COVID-19 pandemic in the LTC setting reveal improvement in some but not all epidemiological indicators. Despite this, the second wave is now intensifying within LTC homes and without action we will likely experience a substantial additional loss of life before the widespread administration and time-dependent maximal effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines. The predictors of outbreaks, the spread of infection, and deaths in Ontario’s LTC homes are well documented and have remained unchanged between the first and the second wave. Some of the evidence on COVID-19 in Ontario’s LTC homes has been effectively leveraged to support public health interventions and policies. Several further measures, if implemented, have the potential to prevent additional LTC home COVID-19 outbreaks and deaths.

Administering Pfizer-BioNTech’s COVID-19 vaccine during the early stage of the vaccine rollout (January/February 2021) to as many individuals as possible would prevent more COVID-19 cases in Ontario as compared to reserving half of the initial allotments as second booster doses (Figure 1). On-label use of the vaccine with the administration of two doses is important, as the second dose significantly boosts the immune response and results in a substantial increase in neutralizing antibodies. However, using 100% of the initial allotments immediately to vaccinate as many individuals as possible does not preclude on-label use with two doses, even though the interval between first and second booster dose may become longer than 21 days.