Search

In recent years, Russia has significantly altered the global landscape through its aggressive conduct in various conflicts. Employing hybrid warfare tactics, Russia has merged conventional military operations with psychological warfare strategies, recognizing the potent influence of psychological manipulation. This study delves into Russia's utilization of psychological warfare tactics preceding conflict, focusing specifically on the cases of Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. The objective is to enrich the broader academic discourse by enhancing comprehension of Russia's behavioral patterns and facilitating the early detection of Russian psychological operations. The findings reveal that Russia extensively employed psychological warfare strategies before the conflict, primarily targeting the adversary's populace to instill doubt and foster division between the people and their leadership. Furthermore, Russia directs substantial efforts toward neutral parties to legitimize its actions and dissuade them from supporting the opposing side.

The Russian term maskirovka can be translated as deception. Maskirovka has been part of Russian military doctrine since at least WWII and is considered to be a central part of their warfare. Maskirovka has been broadly researched since WWII, although not specifically in two of Russia’s most recent wars in Georgia and Ukraine from 2022. The Russo-Georgian war and the Russo-Ukrainian war share common ground considering the conventional sphere; the use of regular units and the methods used. This study has aimed to research how Russia applied deception in these wars, and finally compared its application between 2008 and 2022, all through the theoretical framework for this study that was drawn from Barton Whaley’s theory of deception. The study identified many similarities in utilization of strategic maskirovka; the most vital one perhaps a military exercise north of the border to both Georgia and Ukraine, disguised as an exercise but functioning to mobilize troops. The study also showed similarities in Russian attempts to control the narrative and portray the enemy as bandits, both leading up to the invasion and ongoing throughout the war. Notable is that the attempts in Georgia had effects that caused confusion and made important factors of their success. In Ukraine and the attack against Kiev, the attempts of strategic maskirovka were predicted and seen through by both west and Ukraine. Russia used maskirovka on a tactical level in Georgia and Ukraine as well, which may had effect on individual battles rather than the warfare in general.

Männertreffen gehören fest zum Stadtbild in Tbilisi, der Hauptstadt der Republik Georgien. Sie dominieren das soziale Leben der Nachbarschaften. Männer treffen sich fast täglich auf den Straßen ihres Viertels, um Neuigkeiten auszutauschen, Kontakte zu pflegen und ihren sozialen Status auszuhandeln. Hier entstehen starke soziale Netzwerke. Die Männertreffen auf den Straßen sind ein Raum, an dem Männlichkeitsideale verhandelt werden und sich Möglichkeiten für kurzzeitige informelle Beschäftigungsverhältnisse ergeben. Meistens heuern lokale Handwerker hier Gehilfen an, die gleichzeitig auch Freunde, Bekannte und Nachbarn sind. Anhand der Männertreffen in einem Altstadtviertel zeige ich, wie Männer ihren sozialen Status aushandeln und Arbeit beziehungsweise Gehilfen suchen. Die hier etablierten Netzwerke sorgen für Sicherheit auf einem unregulierten Arbeitsmarkt., Male meetings are an integral part of the cityscape in Tbilisi, the capital of the Republic of Georgia. They dominate the social life of most neighbourhoods. During everyday meetings, men spread news, maintain social contacts and negotiate their social status. Strong social networks are established here. The meetings are furthermore a place to establish male ideals and sometimes informal employment is offered. Usually, local craftsmen hire friends, acquaintances, or neighbours. Throughout the analysis of male meetings in an historic neighbourhood I show how men negotiate social status and look out for employment and employees. The networks established during male gatherings provide a certain social security on an unregulated labour market.

One of the military’s main purposes is to act as a deterrent force. There is a lot of research on deterrence that mainly deals with how great powers should use deterrence, but not as much research on how small states can deter great powers. How can a small state with less resources deter a great power? The purpose of the essay is to understand how a small state successfully can deter a great power and the research question is “what leads to successful deterrence for small states?”. To answer the question, a theory-testing comparative case study with a most similar design has been conducted. The theory that has been tested is Freedman’s (2004) theory of deterrence. The results show that there is a certain connection between successful deterrence and the factor broad deterrence, but no connection between successful deterrence and extended deterrence or deterrence through denial.

In diesem kurzen Beitrag möchte ich das verdächtig in Vergessenheit geratene Thema Klasse – und soziale Differenz im weiteren Sinne – wieder in die Diskussion über Widerstand einbringen. Ausgehend von über zehn Jahren der Forschung zu verschiedenen urbanen wie auch ländlichen Widerstandsbewegungen gegen die neoliberale Vermarktlichung und die damit einhergehende autoritäre Politik in der kleinen Kaukasusrepublik Georgien, entwickle ich hierfür drei kurze Argumente: Ich behaupte erstens, dass unterschiedliche soziale Klassen zu unterschiedlichen Formen des Widerstands greifen beziehungsweise sich unterschiedliche Mittel und Wege leisten können. Zweitens behaupte ich, dass die Frage nach Klassenunterschieden empirisch und konzeptionell auch entscheidende Fragen nach Allianzen und Solidarität zwischen verschiedenen Widerstandsbewegungen aufwirft. Mein drittes Argument ist, dass die Erforschung der komplizierten Allianzen zwischen Widerstand aus den Reihen der urbanen Mittelschicht und subalternem Widerstand in und jenseits der Stadt ein anderes Licht auf die Rolle der Stadt als Bollwerk gegen Autoritarismus wirft oder vielleicht sogar deren dunklere Seite offenbart., In this brief article I try to reintroduce suspiciously forgotten topic of class and more broadly social difference when discussing resistance. I develop three brief arguments drawing on an over a decade long research on various urban and rural resistances to neoliberal marketisation and accompanying authoritarian politics in a small Caucasian state of Georgia. First, I argue that different classes pursue or afford to pursue different forms of resistances. Second, I argue that inquiring into class difference opens empirically and conceptually significant questions about alliances and solidarities across various resistances. Finally, I argue that inquiring into complicated alliances between urban middle-class based resistances and subaltern resistances in and beyond cities, recasts a different light, or perhaps even reveals a darker side of the role of cities in serving as strongholds against authoritarianism.

Die Sowjetunion unter Stalin war ein Ort, an dem Terror und Gewalt herrschten, in der öffentlichen Propaganda aber wurde sie zeitgleich als Hort der "Brüderlichkeit" und "Völkerfreundschaft" inszeniert. Die Kulturpolitik jener Jahre zielte auf eine sowjetweite Repräsentation der nationalen Kulturen und die Etablierung einer "multinationalen" Sowjetliteratur bzw. Sowjetkultur. Ungeachtet der ideologischen Gleichschaltung war das Arsenal von Figuren des Nationalen keineswegs für alle gleich, sondern hing von den jeweiligen geschichtlichen und (religions-)kulturellen Traditionen der einzelnen Völker ab. Am Beispiel Georgiens lassen sich kulturelle Phänomene - wie etwa die Kolchis, das georgische Pantheon nationaler Heroen oder die Figur des mittelalterlichen Dichters Šota Rust'aveli - als "Figuren des Nationalen im Sowjetimperium" untersuchen. Georgien ist nicht nur deshalb ein interessantes Beispiel, weil Stalins Heimat in den offiziellen Diskursen viel Aufmerksamkeit erhielt. Die georgische Kultur - und damit gleichsam die Sowjetkultur generell - ließ sich auch durch ihre weit in die Vergangenheit zurückreichende kulturelle Tradition als eine besonders alte Kultur inszenieren.

This essay focuses on the effects that regional conflicts may have on rearmament in the affected region and its neighbors. To this end the two conflicts we will be discussing are the Russo-Georgian war and the invasion of Crimea from the perspective of Kenneth Waltz realism in international relationships theory due our hypothesis being that in a matter of self preservation countries would be more inclined to invest more into their defense as the perceived risk of war increases due to conflicts in their surrounding area. The countries in question that we’ve decided to include in this paper are Latvia, Poland, Lithuania and Finland mainly due to their historic relation to Russia but also because of the fact that they all share borders with Russia as well. The timeframe of which we study is the period of 2006-2016, as it gives us an ample chance of studying not only the time before the conflict but also the aftermath.

On February 24, 2022, Ukraine was invaded by Russia. This provoked strong reactions from the world and Sweden. In Sweden's perspective, this was the first time since 1939 that Sweden has sent weapons to a state in an ongoing conflict. The conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008 did not receive the same reactions. In these two conflicts, the reactions differed from each other. Based on geopolitical narratives and ontological certainty, this thesis will examine how the Swedish Parliament's foreign policy has developed and the picture of the conflict in Georgia has changed with the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The results of the analysis show that ontological certainty and geopolitical narrative are intertwined and the construction of us and them is central in creating a threat. This we and them also create a security dilemma where Sweden's search for security through approaching NATO contributes to Russia's insecurity due to their alleged expansion to the east. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has also contributed to a reassessment of the view of the conflict in Georgia, where the lukewarm reaction from the world and Sweden to the invasion led Russia to believe that it was possible to invade Ukraine as well.

Die Menschenrechte und die Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention garantieren einen Anspruch auf Zugang zu einem Verfahren, in dem das Schutzgesuch eines Menschen individuell und unvoreingenommen zu prüfen ist. Das Konzept sicherer Herkunftsstaaten ist daher grundsätzlich rechtstaatlich problematisch, da es einer individuellen und unvoreingenommenen Prüfung des Schutzgesuchs zuwider läuft: Danach wird per Gesetz generell vermutet, dass Menschen aus Herkunftsstaaten, die als sicher eingestuft werden, weder Verfolgung noch unmenschlicher Behandlung oder Bestrafung ausgesetzt sind. Nach der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts wie auch der EU-Richtlinie 2013/32/EU können Herkunftsstaaten zwar unter bestimmten (engen) Voraussetzungen als sicher eingestuft werden. Mit Blick auf die Situation in Algerien, Marokko, Tunesien und Georgien liegen die Voraussetzungen für keinen der vier Staaten vor.

Ende 2021 fand ein erstes Treffen im Rahmen der sogenannten "3+3-Kooperations­plattform" statt. Die Initiative strebt an, die südkaukasischen Länder Armenien, Aser­baidschan und Georgien - das indes seine Nichtteilnahme verkündet hat und fern­blieb - sowie die Regionalmächte Iran, Russland und Tür­kei zusammenzubringen. Ziel ist, die multilaterale Kooperation auszubauen; weitere Treffen sollen in regel­mäßi­gem Turnus folgen. Die Plattform ist Ausdruck von Dynamiken regio­naler Neu­ordnung im Südkaukasus infolge des Krieges in und um Berg-Karabach im Herbst 2020 und damit verbunden dem Gestaltungsanspruch Russlands und der Türkei. Sie ist zudem ein Beispiel dafür, wie diese Neuordnungsprozesse bereits vor den tekto­nischen Verschiebungen im Kontext des gegenwärtigen Krieges in der Ukraine die Spiel­räume für die EU in der Region verschoben haben. (Autorenreferat)

The formation of a favourable business environment and the intensification of entrepreneurial activity on this basis is one of the priorities of economic policy of governments around the world. The aim of this article is to conduct a comparative analysis of some of the characteristics of the business environment of Georgia and Ukraine. The theoretical basis of the study is the understanding of the business environment as a necessary prerequisite for the implementation of entrepreneurial initiatives in a particular country. In the process of our research, the following methods were used: comparative analysis, generalisation, content analysis, correlation, and regression analysis. The authors studied the business environment of Georgia and Ukraine on the basis of an analysis of the following components; that of general economic, political and legal, financial, and fiscal. The results of the study show that Georgia’s business environment is more favourable than Ukraine's. It is noted that between 2011-2020, Georgia made significant progress in the fi ght against corruption, in simplifying the procedures for starting a business, and bettering access to finance. Both countries are reforming their tax systems towards liberalisation and democratisation, and they declare the functioning of special tax regimes. According to the Paying Taxes indicator, which is culated within the Doing Business rating, Georgia improved its result from 61st position in the ranking in 2011 to 14th position in 2020, while Ukraine improved its result from 181st place in 2011 to 65th place in 2020. It is indicated that between 2011-2020, Ukraine showed significant positive dynamics in inflation targeting. The authors note that the weakest elements of the business environment in Ukraine are its efforts to ensure the independence of the judiciary and the fi ght against corruption. In conclusion, the authors note that the policy of the governments of Georgia and Ukraine should be aimed at the further

Most studies of technocratic populism have focused on democracies under stress (e.g., Italy, Czech Republic). This article builds on and extends these studies by analyzing a hybrid regime - post-Soviet Georgia - and argues that technocratic populism in this context is utilized as a façade to cover authoritarian and oligarchic tendencies, while suspending (or reversing) democratization efforts. The state apparatus is weaponized against current and potential political opponents. Ideology is irrelevant, loyalty is key, and passivity is encouraged. The government aims to chip away at institutional checks and balances, and to demobilize the public by undermining confidence in the country's representative institutions while increasing dependence on experienced personalities, the 'can do experts.' The result is most often a stable partial-reform equilibrium. We illustrate this argument with evidence from Georgia, where Bidzina Ivanishvili, the richest man in the country, came to power in 2012 and, despite not holding any official position in the government since 2013, has run the state as a firm.

Post-Soviet nations exhibit a variety of regime types, from democracy, as in Estonia, to dictatorship, as in Belarus. Some nations have undergone transitions from democracy to dictatorship, while others the reverse. New time series data on regime institutions reveal in more detail the post-Soviet dynamics of these transitions and the way in which the Soviet legacies and the geopolitical dominance of Russia remain critical. In this chapter we study the evolution of governmental institutions in post-Soviet former republics and compare their transitions and institutional sequences from Soviet times, relying primarily on the unique data set MaxRange on political institutions in nations of the world. In pioneering analyses it is shown how improved methods of comparative politics and use of categorical data in evolutionary tree analyses can help us understand why and how post-Soviet nations differ in transitional dynamics.