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The COVID-19 pandemic in the United States has had a disproportionate impact on Black, low-income, and elderly individuals. We recruited 175 predominantly white children ages 5-12 and their parents (N = 112) and asked which of two individuals (differing in age, gender, race, social class, or personality) was more likely to get sick with either COVID-19 or the common cold and why. Children and parents reported that older adults were more likely to get sick than younger adults, but reported few differences based on gender, race, social class, or personality. Children predominantly used behavioral explanations, but older children used more biological and structural explanations. Thus, children have some understanding of health disparities, and their understanding increases with age.

Defining developmental progressions can be an important step in identifying developmental precursors and mechanisms of change, within and across areas of reasoning. In one exploratory study, we examine whether the development of children's thinking about ownership follows a systematic progression wherein some components emerge reliably before others. We examine this issue in a sample of 72 children: 40 older 2-year-olds, M[subscript age] = 2.78 (0.14); R = 2.50-3.00, and 32 older 4-year-olds, M[subscript age] = 4.77 (0.16); R = 4.50-5.00, living in Michigan in the United States. We use a battery of four established ownership tasks that tested different aspects of children's ownership thinking. A Guttman test revealed a reliable sequence that explained 81.9% of children's performance. Namely, we discovered that identifying familiar owned objects emerged first, control of permission as a cue to ownership second, understanding ownership transfers third, and the tracking of sets of identical objects last. This ordering suggests two foundational ownership abilities on which more complex reasoning may be built: the ability to include information about familiar owners in children's mental models of objects and recognizing that control is central to ownership. The observed progression is an important first step toward developing a formal ownership scale. This study paves the way for mapping the conceptual and information-processing demands (e.g., executive functioning, memory) that likely underlie change in ownership thinking across childhood.

A critical skill of childhood is learning social norms. We examine whether the generic pronouns "you" and "we," which frame information as applying to people in general rather than to a specific individual, facilitate this process. In one pre-registered experiment conducted online between 2020 and 2021, children 4- to 9-year-old primarily living in the midwestern U.S. (N = 146, 75 girls, 71 boys, Mage = 7.14, SD = 1.69, 82% White) interpreted actions described with generic pronouns (vs. "I") as normatively correct and selected the speaker who used generic pronouns as the rule-follower, particularly when generic pronouns were presented first. There were no significant effects of age. These results illustrate how generic pronouns influence how children discern unfamiliar norms and form interpersonal judgments.

How people conceptualize learning is related to real-world educational consequences across many domains of education. Despite its centrality to the educational system, we know little about how the public reasons about language acquisition, and the potential consequences for their thinking about real-world issues (e.g., policy endorsements). The current studies examined people's essentialist beliefs about language acquisition (e.g., that language is innate and biologically based), then investigated how individual differences in these beliefs related to the endorsement of educational myths and policies. We probed several dimensions of essentialist beliefs, including that language acquisition is innate, genetically based, and wired in the brain. In two studies, we tested specific hypotheses regarding the extent to which people use essentialist thinking when reasoning about: learning a specific language (e.g., Korean), learning a first language more generally, and learning two or more languages. Across studies, participants were more likely to essentialize the ability to learn multiple languages than one's first language, and more likely to essentialize the learning of multiple languages and one's first language than the learning of a particular language. We also found substantial individual differences in the degree to which participants essentialized language acquisition. In both studies, these individual differences correlated with an endorsement of language-related educational neuromyths (Study 1 and pre-registered Study 2), and rejection of educational policies that promote multilingual education (Study 2). Together, these studies reveal the complexity of how people reason about language acquisition and its corresponding educational consequences.

In certain domains, people represent some of an individual's properties (e.g., a tiger's ferocity), but not others (e.g., a tiger's being in the zoo), as stemming from the assumed "essence" of the individual's category. How do children identify which properties of an individual are essentialized and which are not? Here, we examine whether formal explanations--that is, explanations that appeal to category membership (e.g., "That's ferocious 'because it's a tiger'")--help children to identify which properties are essentialized. We investigated this question in two domains: animal kinds (Study 1) and social categories (specifically, gender; Studies 2 and 3). Across studies, we introduced children to novel behaviors and preferences of individuals using either a formal explanation or closely matched wording that did not express a formal explanation. To measure the extent to which children essentialized the novel properties, we assessed their inferences about the stability, innateness, and generalizability of these properties. In Study 1 (N = 104; 61 girls, 43 boys; predominantly White and multiracial children from high-income backgrounds), we found that formal explanations led 5- and 6-year-old children to view novel properties of individual animals as more stable across time. In Studies 2 and 3 (total N = 163; 84 girls, 79 boys; predominantly White, Asian, and multiracial children from high-income backgrounds), we found that formal explanations led 6-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, to view novel properties of individual girls and boys as more stable across contexts. These studies highlight an important mechanism by which formal explanations guide conceptual development.

Although children frequently engage in creative activities (in which they make foods and objects by hand), the development and scope of children's thinking about handmade items is largely unexplored. In the present studies, we examined whether 4- to 12-year-old children at a local children's museum (54% girls, 46% boys; 51% White, 11% Asian/Asian American, 10% more than 1 group, 4% Latinx, 3% Black/African American, 18% did not report race/ethnicity) would expect other people to prefer handmade over factory-made items, including foods and nonfoods. In Experiments 1 (n = 124) and 2 (n = 122), participants expected a child character to prefer items the character made themselves and items made by the character's parent or a local person. However, this expectation did not persist at all costs: When considering imperfect handmade items in Experiment 3 (n = 122), children demonstrated a handmade preference when considering "nonfoods" made by a parent but demonstrated a factory-made preference when considering "foods" made by a parent. Children's explanations were associated with their choices: When children's explanations referred to emotions or relationships, they were more likely to select handmade items. When children referred to item features, they were more likely to select factory-made items. Across studies, we observed persistent age and gender effects: Children's handmade preference increased with child age and girls demonstrated a more robust handmade preference than boys. These findings highlight children's developing and nuanced reasoning about object value. At an early age, children consider who made an object as a contributor to its value.

All societies have resource inequality, wherein some possess more resources than others. How should one respond to such inequality? We tested how children 4-13 years (N= 298) balance concerns about equity and ownership rights, when the two are at odds, in both individual (Study 1) and group (Study 2) contexts. Across these studies, children evaluated individuals who consumed their own or another's resources, and who themselves had similar or differing amounts of resources, which provided a comprehensive examination of children's competing concerns for ownership rights and equity. Overall, children evaluated the poor consuming resources of the rich as more acceptable than the rich consuming resources from the poor, suggesting that attention to redistributive justice is heightened in group-based contexts.

The learning style myth is a commonly held myth that matching instruction to a student's "learning style" will result in improved learning, while providing mismatched instruction will result in suboptimal learning. The present study used a short online reasoning exercise about the efficacy of multimodal instruction to investigate the nature of learning styles beliefs. We aimed to: understand how learning style beliefs interact with beliefs about multimodal learning; characterize the potential complexity of learning style beliefs and understand how this short exercise might influence endorsements of learning styles. Many participants who believed in the learning style myth supported the efficacy of multimodal learning, and many were willing to revise their belief in the myth after the exercise. Personal experiences and worldviews were commonly cited as reasons for maintaining beliefs in learning styles. Findings reveal the complexity of learning style beliefs, and how they interact with evidence in previously undocumented ways.

The present study investigated children's understanding that an object's history may increase its significance, an appreciation that underpins the concept of historical authenticity (i.e., the idea that an item's history determines its true identity, beyond its functional or material qualities, leading people to value real items over copies or fakes). We examined the development of historical significance through the lens of parent–child conversations, and children's performance on an authenticity assessment. The final sample was American, 79.2% monoracial White, and mid‐high socio‐economic status (SES) and included 48 parent–child pairs: 24 with younger children (R = 3.5 to 4.5 years) and 24 with older children (R = 5.5 to 6.5 years). Parent–child pairs discussed three books we created, with three storylines: a museum (culturally authentic) storyline, a clean‐up (personally authentic) storyline, and a control storyline. Across measures, conversations suggested that authenticity may begin as a "placeholder concept" that is initially rooted in a broad appreciation for the significance of old objects and only later filled in with specifics. This placeholder initially directs children's learning about authenticity by linking, in an unspecified way, the value and significance of objects to their past. For example, we found that young children appropriately appealed to history (vs. perceptual or functional features of objects) in contexts regarding authentic objects but struggled in determining which objects were more significant on the post‐test assessment, suggesting that they attend to object history but are not yet sure how histories matter for making authenticity judgments. We also found some evidence that directing children's attention toward conceptual information related to object history may in turn direct them away from material or perceptual considerations, as seen in trade‐offs in parents' and children's conversations. Together, this exploratory report offers many new avenues for work on the development of authenticity concepts in childhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mind-body dualism conceptualizes mind and body as distinct, but there are different ways that dualism may be instantiated. In this study, we examined how Hierarchical Dualism (the belief that mind and body are distinct, and the mind is superior) and Mutual-Influence Dualism (the belief that mind and body are separate but interrelate) related to health behaviors and mental health in three student samples: exclusively queer, exclusively straight, and a mixed university subject pool (N = 535). Participants in each sample endorsed Mutual-Influence Dualism at a higher rate than Hierarchical Dualism. Mutual-Influence dualism was consistently associated with greater engagement in health-promoting behaviors and greater well-being, whereas Hierarchical Dualism differed by sample. These results suggest that dualist beliefs do not uniformly shape the lives of those who hold them: rather, the relation between dualist beliefs and health differs as a function of the type of dualism and the identities we hold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although children's use of speech registers such as Baby Talk is well documented, little is known about their understanding of Foreigner Talk, a register addressed to non-native speakers. In Study 1, 4- to 8-year-old children and adults (N = 125) heard 4 registers (Foreigner Talk, Baby Talk, Peer Talk, and Teacher Talk) and predicted who would receive each. By 5 years, children selected the target addressee of Foreigner Talk above chance. In Study 2, 5- to 8-year-old children and adults (N = 94) completed a register match task manipulating 3 addressee cues: language, appearance, and origin. Prior to 7-8 years of age, children did not use the language cue alone when identifying the addressee of Foreigner Talk, and at no age did children use one cue more than another. In contrast, adults made use of language and appearance more than the origin cue. These findings suggest that an understanding of Foreigner Talk emerges by school age yet also undergoes developmental change.

Decades of research suggest that learning styles, or the belief that people learn better when they receive instruction in their dominant way of learning, may be one of the most pervasive myths about cognition. Nonetheless, little is known about what it means to believe in learning styles. The present investigation uses one theoretical framework--psychological essentialism--to explore the content and consistency of people's learning style beliefs. Psychological essentialism is a belief that certain categories (such as dogs, girls, or visual learners) have an underlying reality or true nature that is biologically based and highly predictive of many other features (Gelman, 2003). We tested the prevalence of erroneous essentialist beliefs regarding learning styles in both educators and noneducators, including that learning styles are innate, unchanging, discrete, and wired into the brain. In each of two experiments, we identified two groups of learning style believers, with one group holding an essentialist interpretation of learning styles, and the other group holding a nonessentialist interpretation of learning styles. No differences were found between educators' and noneducators' beliefs. In fact, only one factor was found to be a significant predictor of learning style beliefs for educators: the age of the population with whom they work. Specifically, those who worked with younger children were more likely to interpret learning styles in an essentialist way. Together the findings demonstrate that learning style beliefs are far more complex and variable than previously recognized.

When reasoning about a representation (e.g., a toy lion), children often engage in "iconic realism," whereby representations are reported to have properties of their real-life referents. The present studies examined an inverse difficulty that we dub "representational disregard": overlooking (i.e., disregarding) a representation's objective, non-symbolic features. In three experiments (N=302), children (3-6 years) and adults saw a series of representations (pictures and toys) and were tested on how often they endorsed a property that was true of the real-world referent (e.g., reporting that a toy lion is dangerous; iconic realism) or rejected a property that was true of the representation (e.g., denying that a toy elephant can be lifted with one hand; representational disregard). We found that representational disregard and realism were separable tendencies. Children (and to a lesser extent, adults) displayed both, but at different rates for pictures than for toys. We conclude that children's reasoning about representations includes a bias to overlook the features of the representation itself. Further, although pictures and toys are both representations, they provoke ontologically distinct interpretations. We discuss the implications of these results for a variety of important conceptual tasks, including learning to read, draw, or objectively evaluate scientific evidence.

A striking characteristic of human thought is that we form representations about abstract kinds (Giraffes have purple tongues), despite experiencing only particular individuals (This giraffe has a purple tongue). These generic generalizations have been hypothesized to be a cognitive default, that is, more basic and automatic than other forms of generalization, including those involving quantifiers such as "all" or "most." In support of this hypothesis, children often recall quantified statements (e.g., "All/many/most bears climb trees") as generic ("Bears climb trees"), and do so more frequently than the reverse error of recalling generics as quantified. The present study provides a strong test of the generics-as-default position by testing whether even numerically quantified statements (e.g., "Five giraffes have purple tongues") are recalled as generic. Two groups of three-year-old children (N = 74) were tested: those who held a correct numerical interpretation of five ("5-knowers"), and those who did not ("non-5-knowers"). Results indicate that non-5-knowers often defaulted to the generic in recall after hearing a number (e.g., recalling "Five giraffes." as "Giraffes."), whereas 5-knowers did not. Thus, consistent with the generic-as-default hypothesis, before children have a specific numerosity assigned to "five," they display a tendency to recall numerically quantified phrases as generic.

Latinos are the largest minority group in the United States (U.S. Census, 2014), yet this term comprises individuals from multiple ethnicities who speak distinct varieties of Spanish. We investigated whether Spanish-English bilingual children (N = 140, ages 4-17) use Spanish varieties in their social judgments. The findings revealed that children distinguished varieties of Spanish but did not use Spanish dialects to make third-person friendship judgments until 10-12 years; this effect became stronger in adolescence. In contrast, young children (4-6 years) made friendship judgments based on a speaker's language (English, Spanish). Thus, using language varieties as a social category and as a basis for making social inferences is a complex result of multiple influences for Spanish-speaking children growing up bilingual in the United States.

Linguistic practices allow individuals to build conceptions of experience that are culture specific and community shared. We examine this process in relation to a metalinguistic convention for describing vocal sounds in upland central Laos. We argue that linguistic practices are moorings, in two ways. First, for individuals, a linguistic practice is a public fixture to which action, status, and experience are conceptually tied. Second, for communities, the category serves as a communal fixture that associates may coordinate around. We elaborate a model of the community calibration of experience, proposing mechanisms that motivate and guide people in constructing effectively shared representations. This results in intersubjectively shared moorings for action, status, and experience. Such moorings play a fundamental role in coordinating human society and culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inductive generalizations about the properties of kinds arebased on evidence. But evidence can come either from ourobservations, or from the testimony of knowledgeableinformants. The current study explores how we combineinformation from these two sources to make inductiveinferences. Participants learned about a novel object category,and observed the property occur with some frequency in asample of category members. Different groups of participantsalso heard an informant making either Generic, Quantified, orSpecific claims about the prevalence of the property.Participants who heard generic claims were more resistant toa straightforward use of statistical evidence in theirgeneralizations. Moreover, participants who rated theinformant as more knowledgeable (across conditions) gavehigher prevalence estimates. The results suggest twopathways through which testimony translates into evidencefor category learning, and raise questions on how to bestcombine evidence from these different sources into acommon representational form.