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Author(s): Axel Gelfert [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.6734.6, 0000 0001 2292 8254, Technische Universität Berlin, , Straße des 17. Juni 135, H72, 10623, Berlin, Germany As I am writing this [...]

In his influential 1960 paper "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences", Eugene P. Wigner raises the question of why something that was developed without concern for empirical facts--mathematics--should turn out to be so powerful in explaining facts about the natural world. Recent philosophy of science has developed "Wigner's puzzle" in two different directions: First, in relation to the supposed indispensability of mathematical facts to particular scientific explanations and, secondly, in connection with the idea that aesthetic criteria track theoretical desiderata such as empirical success. An important aspect of Wigner's article has, however, been overlooked in these debates: his worries about the underdetermination of physical theories by mathematical frameworks. The present paper argues that, by restoring this aspect of Wigner's argument to its proper place, Wigner's puzzle may become an instructive case study for the teaching of core issues in the philosophy of science and its history.

Edgar Allan Poe's standing as a literary figure, who drew on (and sometimes dabbled in) the scientific debates of his time, makes him an intriguing character for any exploration of the historical interrelationship between science, literature and philosophy. His sprawling "prose-poem" "Eureka" (1848), in particular, has sometimes been scrutinized for anticipations of later scientific developments. By contrast, the present paper argues that it should be understood as a contribution to the raging debates about scientific methodology at the time. This methodological interest, which is echoed in Poe's "tales of ratiocination", gives rise to a proposed new mode of--broadly abductive--inference, which Poe attributes to the hybrid figure of the "poet-mathematician". Without creative imagination and intuition, Science would necessarily remain incomplete, "even by its own standards". This concern with imaginative (abductive) inference ties in nicely with his coherentism, which grants pride of place to the twin virtues of Simplicity and Consistency, which must constrain imagination lest it degenerate into mere fancy.