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In diesem Beitrag wird mithilfe von Zengg und Bellowar das Verhältnis zwischen Militär und Zivilgesellschaft das jahrhundertelang die österreichische Militärgrenze kennzeichnete besprochen. Zengg und Bellowar waren die bevölkersten Städte des Karlstädter, bzw. Warasdiner Generalats. In beiden Städten waren nicht nur Garnisonen einquartiert, sondern sie erfüllten bis 1873. eine spezifische Schlüsselstellung in der Organisation der Militärgrenze. Der Beitrag wird versuchen sowohl die politische und sicherheitspolitische, als auch ökonomische und gesellschaftliche Aspekten in beiden Städten zur Sprache zu bringen.

This paper asks why modern finance theory and the efficient market hypothesis have failed to explain long-term carry trades; persistent asset bubbles or zero lower bounds; and financial crises. It extends Keen (Solving the Paradox of Monetary Profits, 2010) and the Theory of the Monetary Circuit to give a mathematical representation of Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis. In the extended model, the central bank rate is not neutral and the path is non-ergodic. The extended circuit has survival constraints that include a living wage, a zero interest rate and an upper interest rate. Inflation is everywhere. The possibility of a high interest rate, hedge economy emerges, where powerful banks invest surplus loan interest. With speculation, banks lobby to enter investment markets and the system is precariously liquid/illiquid. The paradox of a Ponzi economy, where loans never get repaid, is that private banks must speculate to increase reserves and rely on systemic crises to rebuild their balance sheets. Estimating model parameters for the US gives a scissor-graph like the The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011) with other nuances, namely i) a 'heart attack' in 1973-1974 that corresponds to the collapse of Bretton Woods ii) an accelerated decoupling of household wages and loans after the repeal of Glass-Steagall. Simulating bank bailouts, household bailouts and a Keynesian boost suggests that bank bailouts are the least effective intervention, with downward pressure on wages and household spending. Bailing out hedge households is a form of monetary contraction, and boosting hedge business loans is a form of monetary expansion. The appropriate policy choice would seem to depend on the external balance and inflation concerns. The paper concludes that, with international Ponzi sectors, viable resolution mechanisms include reparations (dL < 0), turning Ponzi debt into equity or 'junk' debt (dL → ∞), household bailouts and a Keynesian boost.

This paper asks why modern finance theory and the efficient market hypothesis have failed to explain long-term carry trades; persistent asset bubbles or zero lower bounds; and financial crises. It extends Keen (Solving the Paradox of Monetary Profits, 2010) and the Theory of the Monetary Circuit to give a mathematical representation of Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis. In the extended model, the central bank rate is not neutral and the path is non-ergodic. The extended circuit has survival constraints that include a living wage, a zero interest rate and an upper interest rate. Inflation is everywhere. The possibility of a high interest rate, hedge economy emerges, where powerful banks invest surplus loan interest. With speculation, banks lobby to enter investment markets and the system is precariously liquid/illiquid. The paradox of a Ponzi economy, where loans never get repaid, is that private banks must speculate to increase reserves and rely on systemic crises to rebuild their balance sheets. Estimating model parameters for the US gives a scissor-graph like the The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011) with other nuances, namely i) a heart attack in 1973-1974 that corresponds to the collapse of Bretton Woods ii) an accelerated decoupling of household wages and loans after the repeal of Glass-Steagall. Simulating bank bailouts, household bailouts and a Keynesian boost suggests that bank bailouts are the least effective intervention, with downward pressure on wages and household spending. Bailing out hedge households is a form of monetary contraction, and boosting hedge business loans is a form of monetary expansion. The appropriate policy choice would seem to depend on the external balance and inflation concerns. The paper concludes that, with international Ponzi sectors, viable resolution mechanisms include reparations (dL < 0), turning Ponzi debt into equity or junk debt (dL → ∞), household bailouts and a Keynesian boost.

We review existing estimates of the size of the Spanish underground economy, apply the Ahumada et al. (2007, RIW) correction procedure to some of them and calculate the size of the underground economy in Spain for the period 1960 through 2009 by using the modified-cash-deposits-ratio (MCDR) approach recently developed by Pickhardt and Sardà (2011, EJLE). We then extend the MCDR approach with respect to an analysis of the causes of the Spanish underground economy. Contrary to most other studies, we show that the latter is not predominantly caused by tax pressure, but by labor market aspects, macroeconomic influences and criminal activities. Based on these findings we derive some unprecedented policy recommendations.

Building on new behavioral and institutional theories, using a data set of about 450 variables and augmenting the Sala-i-Martin definition of robustness, we find evidence in support of the hypothesis that the standard causes of the shadow economy (SE), taxes, the administrative burden and labor market regulations, are not per se crucial in determining the size of the SE. There are many other influences with a consistently estimated plausible sign and whose quantitative impact appears to be even larger and more significant than that of the standard causes. Many of the robust influences emanate from relatively new theories such as elements of direct democracy, social interaction effects, moral aspects, and happiness, and from the institutional literature on the relative importance of specific institutions for economic performance. Most of them can well be influenced by governments. Hence, in order to reduce the SE and tax avoidance, a coordinated international strategy of using incentives to work, save, and invest in the official economy, including the behavior of the government, could be more successful than a strategy built on more government control, increased punishment and less freedom. The latter strategy would contradict the new theories and our evidence but appears to have been adopted by some OECD countries. Simulations of the size of the SE demonstrate their sensitivity to required velocity assumptions and show that previous estimates, including those of the so-called Mimic model, appear to be based on the very high end of possible velocity assumptions. Relatively low velocity assumptions can be defended much better and yield macro estimates of the SE consistent with the micro evidence. Finally, for the first time we separate the relatively large criminal shadow activity from the non-criminal one.

Germans are still very fond of using cash. Of all direct payment transactions, cash accounts for an astounding 82% in terms of number, and for 58% in terms of value. With a new and unique dataset that combines transaction information with survey data on payment behaviour of German consumers, we shed light on how individuals choose payment instruments and why cash remains so important. We propose a two-stage empirical framework which jointly explains credit card ownership and the use of cash. Our results indicate that the pattern of cash usage is compatible with systematic economic decision making. Consumers decide upon the adoption of payment cards and then use available payment media according to their transaction and personal characteristics, the relative costs of cash and card usage, and their assessment of payment instruments' characteristics. Whereas older consumers use significantly more cash, the comparison with younger consumers shows that the difference in payment behaviour is not explained by age as such but to a large extent by differences in the characteristics of these two groups. It is interesting that the possession of a credit card, especially alongside a debit card, does not significantly affect the use of cash in Germany.

Complementarity of money mean that two or more kinds of monies together fulfil the demand of the users better than they would without the existence of the other(-s). In this paper we study complementarity between paper monies in Sweden. We address four questions: 1) What was used as money on a macro level (money supply) and on a micro level (monetary remittances)? 2) What was the relative value of different monies in parallel circulation? 3) Was there seasonal variations in use and/or value? 4) Was there geographical variations in use and value? What we find is that the complementarity helped to solve the problem of providing sufficient liquidity domestically over time and space and thus and to keep a stable value of the currency.

The main purpose of this study is to measure the level of the shadow economy in Norway following the demand for currency approach. The question analysed is how well does this approach capture the level of shadow economy in front of a decreasing level of currency in circulation and an increasing use of electronic payment system. In this study is found a decreasing level of the shadow economy in Norway since mid 1990s starting with 8,8 percent of the shadow economy relative to GDP in 1991, up to 10.2 percent in 1995 and there after declining to a level of 5.6 percent of GDP in 2002. The explanation for the decline of the level of shadow economy relative to GDP could be the fact of a decreasing demand for currency for transaction going along with an increase of electronic payments instruments. Also, in Norway, a broad tax reform was implemented in 1992 with the purpose of reducing tax-induced distortions by lowering the tax rates and broadening the tax base. One of the main causes of the shadow economy, is considered to be the burden of direct and indirect tax to the individuals, but the complexity of the tax system is also an important factor that may have an impact on the level of shadow economy.

Die Wechselkurseffekte, die von der Einführung des Euro-Bargeldes ausgehen und im Beitrag von Hans-Werner Sinn und Frank Westermann dargestellt wurden, werden von Francis Breedon und Francesca Fomasri, Lehmann Brothers, empirisch untermauert. Sie zeigen, dass der Rückgang der DM-Bargeldnachfrage eine bemerkenswerte Korrelation mit der Abwertung des Euro ausweist.