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We present a thorough empirical study on real interest rates by also including risk aversion through the introduction of the market price of risk. With the view of complex systems science and its multidisciplinary approach, we use the theory of bond pricing to study the long term discount rate. Century-long historical records of 3 month bonds, 10 year bonds, and inflation allow us to estimate real interest rates for the UK and the US. Real interest rates are negative about a third of the time and the real yield curves are inverted more than a third of the time, sometimes by substantial amounts. This rules out most of the standard bond pricing models, which are designed for nominal rates that are assumed to be positive. We therefore use the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model which allows negative rates and gives a good match to inversions of the yield curve. We derive the discount function using the method of Fourier transforms and fit it to the historical data. The estimated long term discount rate is $1.7$ \% for the UK and $2.2$ \% for the US. The value of $1.4$ \% used by Stern is less than a standard deviation from our estimated long run return rate for the UK, and less than two standard deviations of the estimated value for the US. All of this once more reinforces the support for immediate and substantial spending to combat climate change., Comment: 27 pages, 6 figures

Any finite conversation can be rationalized.

High future discounting rates favor inaction on present expending while lower rates advise for a more immediate political action. A possible approach to this key issue in global economy is to take historical time series for nominal interest rates and inflation, and to construct then real interest rates and finally obtaining the resulting discount rate according to a specific stochastic model. Extended periods of negative real interest rates, in which inflation dominates over nominal rates, are commonly observed, occurring in many epochs and in all countries. This feature leads us to choose a well-known model in statistical physics, the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model, as a basic dynamical tool in which real interest rates randomly fluctuate and can become negative, even if they tend to revert to a positive mean value. By covering 14 countries over hundreds of years we suggest different scenarios and include an error analysis in order to consider the impact of statistical uncertainty in our results. We find that only 4 of the countries have positive long-run discount rates while the other ten countries have negative rates. Even if one rejects the countries where hyperinflation has occurred, our results support the need to consider low discounting rates. The results provided by these fourteen countries significantly increase the priority of confronting global actions such as climate change mitigation. We finally extend the analysis by first allowing for fluctuations of the mean level in the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model and secondly by considering modified versions of the Feller and lognormal models. In both cases, results remain basically unchanged thus demonstrating the robustness of the results presented., Comment: 29 pages, 5 figures, 5 tables. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1311.4068

For environmental problems such as global warming future costs must be balanced against present costs. This is traditionally done using an exponential function with a constant discount rate, which reduces the present value of future costs. The result is highly sensitive to the choice of discount rate and has generated a major controversy as to the urgency for immediate action. We study analytically several standard interest rate models from finance and compare their properties to empirical data. From historical time series for nominal interest rates and inflation covering 14 countries over hundreds of years, we find that extended periods of negative real interest rates are common, occurring in many epochs in all countries. This leads us to choose the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model, in which real short run interest rates fluctuate stochastically and can become negative, even if they revert to a positive mean value. We solve the model in closed form and prove that the long-run discount rate is always less than the mean; indeed it can be zero or even negative, despite the fact that the mean short term interest rate is positive. We fit the parameters of the model to the data, and find that nine of the countries have positive long run discount rates while five have negative long-run discount rates. Even if one rejects the countries where hyperinflation has occurred, our results support the low discounting rate used in the Stern report over higher rates advocated by others., Comment: 8 pages, 4 figures

We use a simple agent based model of value investors in financial markets to test three credit regulation policies. The first is the unregulated case, which only imposes limits on maximum leverage. The second is Basle II and the third is a hypothetical alternative in which banks perfectly hedge all of their leverage-induced risk with options. When compared to the unregulated case both Basle II and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when leverage is low but increase it when leverage is high. This is because both regulation policies increase the amount of synchronized buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging, which can destabilize the market. None of these policies are optimal for everyone: Risk neutral investors prefer the unregulated case with low maximum leverage, banks prefer the perfect hedge policy, and fund managers prefer the unregulated case with high maximum leverage. No one prefers Basle II., Comment: 27 pages, 8 figures

We build a simple model of leveraged asset purchases with margin calls. Investment funds use what is perhaps the most basic financial strategy, called "value investing", i.e. systematically attempting to buy underpriced assets. When funds do not borrow, the price fluctuations of the asset are normally distributed and uncorrelated across time. All this changes when the funds are allowed to leverage, i.e. borrow from a bank, to purchase more assets than their wealth would otherwise permit. During good times competition drives investors to funds that use more leverage, because they have higher profits. As leverage increases price fluctuations become heavy tailed and display clustered volatility, similar to what is observed in real markets. Previous explanations of fat tails and clustered volatility depended on "irrational behavior", such as trend following. Here instead this comes from the fact that leverage limits cause funds to sell into a falling market: A prudent bank makes itself locally safer by putting a limit to leverage, so when a fund exceeds its leverage limit, it must partially repay its loan by selling the asset. Unfortunately this sometimes happens to all the funds simultaneously when the price is already falling. The resulting nonlinear feedback amplifies large downward price movements. At the extreme this causes crashes, but the effect is seen at every time scale, producing a power law of price disturbances. A standard (supposedly more sophisticated) risk control policy in which individual banks base leverage limits on volatility causes leverage to rise during periods of low volatility, and to contract more quickly when volatility gets high, making these extreme fluctuations even worse., Comment: 19 pages, 8 figures

The use of equilibrium models in economics springs from the desire for parsimonious models of economic phenomena that take human reasoning into account. This approach has been the cornerstone of modern economic theory. We explain why this is so, extolling the virtues of equilibrium theory; then we present a critique and describe why this approach is inherently limited, and why economics needs to move in new directions if it is to continue to make progress. We stress that this shouldn't be a question of dogma, but should be resolved empirically. There are situations where equilibrium models provide useful predictions and there are situations where they can never provide useful predictions. There are also many situations where the jury is still out, i.e., where so far they fail to provide a good description of the world, but where proper extensions might change this. Our goal is to convince the skeptics that equilibrium models can be useful, but also to make traditional economists more aware of the limitations of equilibrium models. We sketch some alternative approaches and discuss why they should play an important role in future research in economics., Comment: 68 pages, one figure