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Researchers and practitioners need robust measurement tools for evaluating knowledge of child development to better support parents and their children during pregnancy and the transition to parenthood. We addressed this need by evaluating the psychometric properties of the Domains of Development Instrument (DoDI) for measuring knowledge of developmental milestones from birth to 3 years. We evaluated four types of validity evidence for the DoDI: test content, response processes, internal structure, and relations to other variables. We convened an expert panel to evaluate test content and conducted cognitive interviews with mothers to evaluate response processes. We also collected responses from a sample of 418 English-speaking pregnant women to evaluate internal structure and relations to other variables. We observed content validity and response process validity, as well as the predicted internal structure, internal consistency, test–retest reliability, and convergent validity. We conclude with recommendations for future research with the DoDI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two experiments are reported that investigated the influence of linear spatial organization on transitive inference performance. RewardAio-reward relations between overlapping pairs of elements were presented in a context of linear spatial order or random spatial order. Participants in the linear arrangement condition showed evidence for visual reasoning: They systematically mapped spatial relations to conceptual relation and used the spatial relations to make inferences on a reasoning task in a new spatial context. We suggest that linear ordering may be a "good figure", by constituting a parsinuxiious representation for the integration of premises, as well as for the inferencing process. The late emergence of transitive inference in children may be the result of limited cognitive capacity, which -- unless an extemal spatial array is available -- constrains the construction of an internal spatial array.

Three experiments are reported that examine the impact of people's goals and conceptual understanding on graph interpretation, in order to determine how people use graphical representations to evaluate functional dependencies between continuous variables. Subjects made inferences about the relative rate of two continuous linear variables (altitude and temperature). We varied the assignments of variables to axes, the perceived cause effect relation between the variables, and the causal status of the variable being queried. The most striking finding was that accuracy was greater when the Slope-Mapping Constraint was honored, which requires that the variable being queried - usually the effect or dependent variable, but potentially the cause instead — is assigned to the vertical axis, so that steeper lines map to faster changes in the queried variable. This constraint dominates when it conflicts with others, such as preserving the low-level mapping of altitude onto the vertical axis. Our findings emphasize the basic conclusion that graphs are not pictures, but rather symbolic systems for representing higher-order relations. We propose that graphs provide external instantiations of intermediate mental representations, which enable people to move from pictorial representations to abstractions through the use of natural mappings between perceptual properties and conceptual relations.

We investigated the influence of being imitated on children's subsequent trust. Five- to six-year-olds interacted with one experimenter who mimicked their choices and another experimenter who made different choices. Children were then presented with two tests. In a preference test, the experimenters offered conflicting preferences for the contents of two opaque boxes, and children were asked to choose a box. In a factual claims test, the experimenters offered conflicting claims about the referent for a novel word, and children were asked to state which object the word referred to. Children were significantly more likely to endorse both the preferences and the factual claims of the experimenter who had mimicked them. These results demonstrate that imitation is a powerful means of social influence in development. (Contains 1 figure.)

Previous studies indicate that the acoustic features of speech discriminate between positive and negative communicative intentions, such as approval and prohibition. Two studies investigated whether acoustic features of speech can discriminate between two positive communicative intentions: humour and sweet-sincerity, where sweet-sincerity involved being sincere in a positive, warm-hearted way. In Study 1, 22 mothers read a book containing humorous, sweet-sincere, and neutral-sincere images to their 19-to-24-month-olds. In Study 2, 41 mothers read a book containing humorous or sweet-sincere sentences and images to their 18- to 24-month-olds. Mothers used a higher mean F0 to communicate visual humour as compared to visual sincerity. Mothers used greater F0 mean, range, and standard deviation; greater intensity mean, range, and standard deviation; and a slower speech rate to communicate verbal humour as compared to verbal sweet-sincerity. Mothers used a rising linear contour to communicate verbal humour, but used no specific contour to express verbal sweet-sincerity. We conclude that speakers provide acoustic cues enabling listeners to distinguish between positive communicative intentions. (Contains 2 tables and 2 figures.)

Two studies were conducted to examine infants' ability to discern intentions from lexical and prosodic cues. Two groups of 14-18-month-olds participated in these studies. In both studies, infants watched an adult perform a sequence of two-step actions on novel toys that produced an end-result. In the first study actions were marked intentionally with both lexical and prosodic cues. In the second study, the lexical markers of intention were presented in Greek, thus providing infants with prosodic but not lexical cues. In both studies, infants reproduced more intentional than accidental actions, suggesting that infants can infer intentions from prosodic cues. (Contains 4 tables and 3 figures.)

The control of social attention during early infancy was investigated in two studies. In both studies, an adult turned towards one of two targets within the infant's immediate visual field. We tested: (a) whether infants were able to follow the direction of the adult's head turn; and (b) whether following a head turn was accompanied by further gaze shifts between experimenter and target. In the first study, 1-month-olds did not demonstrate attention following at the group level. In addition, those infants who turned towards the same target remained fixed on it and did not shift attention again. In Study 2, we tested infants longitudinally at 2-4 months. At the group level, infants followed the adult's head turn at 3 and 4 months but not at 2 months. Those infants who turned towards the same target at 3 and 4 months also shifted gaze back and forth between experimenter and target. By 3 months, infants seem able to capitalize on the social environment to disengage and distribute attention more flexibly. The results support the claim that the control of social attention begins in early infancy, and are consistent with the hypothesis that following the attention of other people is dependent on the development of disengagement skills.

Using an elicited imitation paradigm, we investigated whether young children imitate the communicative intentions behind speech. Previous research using elicited imitation has shown that children tend to correct ungrammatical sentences. This finding is usually interpreted as evidence that children, like adults, remember and reproduce the gist of linguistic information. In three studies, we tested whether this tendency is also a product of their intention understanding. Replicating and extending previous research by Meltzoff [Meltzoff A. N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children. "Developmental Psychology, 31", 838-850], our first two experiments showed that children tend to correct ungrammatical sentences. A critical third experiment showed that children correct ungrammatical sentences only when they believe the model to be an intentional agent. These results complement previous findings from the action domain and strongly support the claim that imitation is based on understanding the intentions of others. (Contains 2 figures.)

We investigated humor as a context for learning about abstraction and disbelief. More specifically, we investigated how parents support humor understanding during book sharing with their toddlers. In Study 1, a corpus analysis revealed that in books aimed at 1- to 2-year-olds, humor is found more often than other forms of doing the wrong thing including mistakes, pretense, lying, false beliefs, and metaphors. In Study 2, 20 parents read a book containing humorous and non-humorous pages to their 19- to 26-month-olds. Parents used a significantly higher percentage of high abstraction extra-textual utterances (ETUs) when reading the humorous pages. In Study 3, 41 parents read either a humorous or non-humorous book to their 18- to 24-month-olds. Parents reading the humorous book made significantly more ETUs coded for a specific form of high abstraction: those encouraging disbelief of prior utterances. Sharing humorous books thus increases toddlers' exposure to high abstraction and belief-based language. (Contains 6 figures and 2 notes.)

This study investigated two hypotheses regarding the mapping of perception to action during imitation. The first hypothesis predicted that as children's cognitive capacities increase the tendency to map one goal and disregard others during imitation should decrease. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the performances of 168 4- to 7-year-olds in a gestural imitation task developed by Bekkering, Wohlschlager, and Gattis. The second hypothesis predicted that reducing the mapping between perception and action should reduce the demands on the cognitive resources of the child. This hypothesis was tested by creating a condition in which perception and action overlapped by sharing objects between experimenter and child. In three experimental conditions, an adult modelled four gestures, directed at either: 1) one of two sets of round stickers (proprietary objects); 2) the same location on the table, without any sticker (no objects); or 3) one set of round stickers, which were shared with the child (shared objects). The results confirmed both hypotheses. Four- and five-year-olds imitated less accurately when imitation involved mapping of both objects and movements (proprietary and shared objects) than when imitation involved mapping movements only (no objects). Seven-year-olds imitated accurately in all three conditions, demonstrating that increased cognitive capacity allowed them to map multiple goals from perception to action. Most importantly, reducing the mapping between perception and action in the shared objects condition facilitated imitation, specifically for the transitional group, 6-year-olds. We conclude that mapping between perception and action is not direct, but resembles mapping relations in analogical reasoning: cognitive processes mediate mapping from perception to action.

We investigated whether 19-36-month-olds (1) differentiate mistakes from jokes, and (2) understand humorous intentions. The experimenter demonstrated unambiguous jokes accompanied by laughter, unambiguous mistakes accompanied by the experimenter saying, "Woops!", and ambiguous actions that could either be a mistake or a joke, accompanied by either laughter or, "Woops!" Toddlers were asked to try. Nineteen- to 36-month-olds differentiated jokes and mistakes by copying unambiguous jokes and correcting unambiguous mistakes. Only 25-36-month-olds differentiated mistakes and humorous intentions by copying ambiguous actions marked by laughter, and correcting those marked by, ""Woops!" Understanding humorous intentions precedes understanding intentions behind pretense, lying, and false beliefs, thus may be a first step in understanding that others can intend to do the wrong thing.

Three experiments investigated whether the similarity of relational structures influences the interpretation of spatial representations. Adults were shown diagrams of hand gestures paired with simple statements and asked to judge the meaning of new gestures. In Experiment 1 the gestures were paired with active declarative statements. In Experiment 2, the gestures were paired with conjunctive and disjunctive relations. Experiment 3 used statements similar to those used in Experiment 1, but eliminated the initial object-to-object mapping provided in Experiments 1 and 2. In all three experiments, most participants chose an interpretation that set up a parallel relational structure between the gesture and its meaning: spatial elements were paired with conceptual elements and spatial relations were paired with conceptual relations. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that similarity of relational structures influences spatial reasoning, and have implications for analogical reasoning, diagrammatic reasoning, and language processing.

We investigated humor as a context for learning about abstraction and disbelief. More specifically, we investigated how parents support humor understanding during book sharing with their toddlers. In Study 1, a corpus analysis revealed that in books aimed at 1- to 2-year-olds, humor is found more often than other forms of doing the wrong thing including mistakes, pretense, lying, false beliefs, and metaphors. In Study 2, 20 parents read a book containing humorous and non-humorous pages to their 19- to 26-month-olds. Parents used a significantly higher percentage of high abstraction extratextual utterances (ETUs) when reading the humorous pages. In Study 3, 41 parents read either a humorous or non-humorous book to their 18- to 24-month-olds. Parents reading the humorous book made significantly more ETUs coded for a specific form of high abstraction: those encouraging disbelief of prior utterances. Sharing humorous books thus increases toddlers' exposure to high abstraction and belief-based language. Keywords: Humor; Abstract language; Beliefs; Parent-child communication

A goal representation appears to mediate imitation in children, according to results of experiments focusing on errors of reproduction in pre-school children. The saliency of possible goals was manipulated experimentally while maintaining similarity of the hand movement to be imitated.