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Summary This study presents survey evidence about managerial views on how the processes of globalization affect managers’ strategic decisions regarding a firm's international and product market scope. Our purpose is to assess whether managerial behaviors are consistent with theoretical predictions and whether managerial decisions about firm scope are consistent with the findings of recent empirical research. Our findings generally support those of academic research on the impacts of globalization on managerial decisions concerning firms’ strategic scope, but raise questions about findings to date on the nature of a relationship between product and international diversification and their impacts on firm performance. Our findings serve as a check on the results of extant research and offer guidance for future research.

PurposeThis study aims to survey managers of dividend‐paying firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) to learn their views about the factors influencing dividend policy, dividend issues, and explanations for paying dividends. The study also aims to focus on Indonesia, the largest national economy in Southeast Asia, because relatively few studies examine why Indonesian firms pay dividends.Design/methodology/approachThe primary means of gathering data is a mail survey. The two‐page survey instrument consists of three main sections: 22 factors for determining a firm's dividend policy; six questions that provide background information about the respondents and their firms; and 27 statements about dividend policy in general. Of the 163 firms surveyed, 52 firms responded, resulting in a response rate of 31.9 per cent.FindingsThe evidence shows that managers view the most important determinants of dividends as the stability of earnings and the level of current and expected future earnings. They also believe that the effects of dividends on stock prices and needs of current shareholders are important determinants. The evidence shows that managers of Indonesian firms perceive that dividend policy affects firm value. Managers seem to agree that multiple theories including signaling, catering, and life cycle explanations help to explain why their firms pay dividends.Research limitations/implicationsThe study focuses on a limited number of factors and issues involving dividend policy. While non‐response bias could potentially limit making generalizations to the population of IDX firms, statistical tests show no significant differences between respondents and non‐respondents on various firm characteristics.Practical implicationsThe evidence suggests that no universal set of factors is likely to be applicable to all firms when setting dividend policy.Originality/valueThis study presents new evidence on the perceptions of managers of dividend‐paying IDX‐listed firms about the factors influencing dividend policy, dividend issues, and explanations for paying dividends.

We survey 642 top financial executives to learn their views about their firm’s share repurchases from January 1998 to September 1999. Based on 194 responses from managers of firms engaging in open-market repurchases, the results show that the most highly cited reasons for repurchasing shares of common stock are consistent with the signaling hypothesis, specifically the undervaluation version of this hypothesis. When compared to the results of previous surveys, our findings suggest that the importance management attaches to certain reasons for repurchasing shares of common stock may have changed over the past few decades. Reasons such as repurchasing shares to provide shares for incentive plans and to remove large blocks of stocks appear less important while reasons such as repurchasing shares to adjust the firm’s capital structure and to avoid dividend taxation appear more important.

We survey managers of Nasdaq firms that consistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about dividend policy, the relationship between dividend policy and value, and four common explanations for paying dividends. The evidence shows that managers stress the importance of maintaining dividend continuity and widely agree that changes in dividends affect firm value. Managers give the strongest support to a signaling explanation for paying dividends, weak to little support for the tax-preference and agency cost explanations, and no support to the bird-in-the-hand explanation. The study provides new evidence about how managers view dividend life cycles and residual dividend policy.

This paper revisits the dividend puzzle, described here as questions about the relevance of dividend policy and how managers should (and do) determine dividend policy. We examine theoretical and empirical research on dividends and share repurchases because they are the principal mechanisms by which corporations disburse cash to their shareholders. Despite a voluminous amount of study, researchers still do not have all the answers to the dividend puzzle. However, we are closer to its resolution. We also do not have definitive answers to why managers choose one method of cash distribution over the other. Solving the dividend puzzle may depend on understanding the effects of various market imperfections or frictions. Because various imperfections affect firms differently, dividend policy may vary substantially from one firm to another. Models that consider the competing frictions on a firm-specific basis offer promise for resolving the dividend puzzle.

This study reports the results of a 1999 survey of Nasdaq-listed firms. Respondents provided information about the importance of 22 different factors that influence their dividend policy. Our results suggest that many managers of Nasdaq firms make dividend decisions consistent with Lintner's (1956) survey results and model. The results also show significant differences between the manager responses of financial and non-financial firms on nine of the 22 factors. This finding implies the presence of industry effects on dividend policy decisions. In general, the same factors that are important to Nasdaq firms are also important to NYSE firms.

This study examines whether visibility changes for companies moving from Nasdaq to the Amex. A control sample of companies that did not leave the Nasdaq Stock Market serves as a basis for comparing changes in visibility. Four proxies are used to measure visibility: (1) the number of analysts estimating the company’s next fiscal year’s earnings (NOA), (2) the number of institutional shareholders (NOI), (3) the number of shares held by institutions (NOS), and (4) the number of citations in The Wall Street Journal (NOC). The initial evidence supports a relationship between Amex listing and visibility gains when measured by NOI, NOS, and NOC. Small companies show significant visibility gains in NOA. The findings contain evidence that companies seeking Amex listing are generally neglected by analysts and institutions. Regression analysis provides additional evidence that Amex listing, not earnings growth, helps to explain visibility gains in NOI, NOS, and NOC.

Concern over soil erosion and high production costs in conventional tillage systems has led to interest in reduced tillage systems for navy bean (Phaseolus vulgaris L.). Research was conducted for 2 yr at two sites with different soil textures to develop weed management strategies in reduced tillage systems for navy bean. Twelve weed management strategies were evaluated in conventional tillage, no-till, and zone-till systems in 1995 and 1996 in Michigan. Weed management strategies included hand-weeding, cultivation-only, preemergence herbicides, preemergence followed by postemergence herbicides, and postemergence herbicide treatments. Glyphosate was applied to control existing vegetation in the no-till and zone-till systems. Redroot pigweed (Amaranthus retroflexus L.) and common lambsquarters (Chenopodium album L.) populations were lower in the no-till and zone-till systems than in the moldboard plow and chisel plow systems. Imazethapyr plus pendimethalin preemergence provided less weed control than preemergence followed by postemergence and total postemergence treatments in two of four site years. Preemergence followed by postemergence herbicides controlled annual broadleaf weeds better than postemergence herbicides alone. Navy bean seed yield at the sandy clay loam site was 50% higher in moldboard plow and chisel plow tillage systems than in the no-tillage system. The highest average gross margin was in the chisel plow system. There was no difference in navy bean seed yield due to tillage system at the sandy loam site and the no-tillage and zone-tillage systems had the highest gross margins. These data suggest that weeds can be controlled in reduced tillage systems and the success of reduced tillage systems in dry bean production varies by soil texture.

Field studies were conducted for 3 yr to determine weed and potato response to pre- emergence (PRE) and postemergence (POST) applications of rimsulfuron, metribuzin, and rimsul- furon plus metribuzin. Preemergence applications of rimsulfuron at 27 g ai/ha and POST applications at 18 g/ha controlled barnyardgrass, redroot pigweed, and wild buckwheat. Common lambsquarters was controlled by PRE or POST applications of metribuzin or a tank mixture of 18 g/ha rimsulfuron plus 140 g ai/ha of metribuzin. 'Russet Burbank' potato was relatively tolerant to all rimsulfuron, metribuzin, and rimsulfuron plus metribuzin applications, and potato yield was not reduced compared to the hand-weeded control. Nomenclature: Metribuzin, 4-amino-6-( ,1 -dimethylethyl)-3-(methylthio)- 1 ,2,4-triazin-5(4H)-one; rimsulfuron, N-(((4,6-dimethoxy-2-pyrimidinyl)amino)carbonyl)-3-(ethylsulfonyl)-2-pyridinesulfon- amide; barnyardgrass, Echinochloa crus-galli (L.) Beauv. #3 ECHCG; common lambsquarters, Che- nopodium album L. # CHEAL; redroot pigweed, Amaranthus retroflexus L. # AMARE; wild buck- wheat, Polygonum convolvulus L. # POLCO; potato, Solanum tuberosum L. 'Russet Burbank.' Additional index words: Amaranthus retroflexus, Chenopodium album, Echinochloa crus-galli, Po- lygonum convolvulus, AMARE, CHEAL, ECHCG, POLCO. Abbreviations: POST, postemergence; PRE, preemergence.

The most frequently cited reason by corporate managers for switching their firm’s trading location from Nasdaq to the NYSE is to improve visibility. This study examines whether these perceptions about listing are real or illusory and whether firm size affects media visibility. Based on a large sample of firms that listed on the NYSE compared with a matched sample of firms remaining on Nasdaq, the results show that NYSE listing does not lead to gains in media visibility during the period immediately after listing. Over a longer period, small- and medium-sized firms experience significant gains in media visibility compared with large firms. Additional tests show that increased media coverage is attributable much more to the rapid earnings growth before listing than to listing. Therefore, managers erroneously attribute the visibility gains to NYSE listing.

We use monthly reported firm share ownership by institutions to provide direct evidence that portfolio rebalancing exists in the U.S. We find rebalancing exists in sufficient size to affect prices around the turn-of-the-year and conclude that portfolio rebalancing may be a substantial part of the small firm-January effect in the U.S. The findings are more important than simply evidence leading to the resolution of an anomaly since they cast doubt on our current asset pricing models and on previous efficient markets studies. The findings also suggest that investor's asset allocations may not be optimally determined without the inclusion of a portfolio rebalancing parameter.

In the past few decades society has placed increasing demands on managers of firms to change corporate policy and to make decisions in ways that are deemed socially responsible by society. The scope of activities under the corporate social responsibility umbrella has in cluded environmental issues, the involvement of women and minorities in management, investing in South Africa, pollution control, ethical treatment of animals, nuclear testing and other related issues. Society's demands in these areas have inspired (and in some cases even coerced) both managers of corporations and portfolio managers of investment funds to respond. Many of the leading mutual fund investment companies now offer funds that are ethically screened. The Society Investment Forum reports that the value of socially responsible investment funds exceeded $600 billion by the end of 1991. A new stock index, the Domini 400 Social Index, has been constructed to measure the performance of the stocks of 400 corporations that have passed multiple social screens. Coupled with the demand for increasing corporate social re sponsibility, there has been a move away from the traditional view that managers make decisions that are in their common shareholders' best interests to a stakeholder concept where managers make decisions for and serve a much broader group of claim-holders than just share holders. Joichi Aoi, Chairman of the Board at Toshiba Corporation, has argued that today's managers need to broaden their perspective beyond the traditional shareholder thinking

Each year many firms repurchase shares of their common stock. Research evidence shows that when firms announce the repurchase of common stock, their share prices typically rise. Numerous studies attribute these increases to a signaling effect. But some firms that announce their intention of repurchasing shares of common stock either repurchase no shares at all or repurchase fewer shares than initially announced. Although the practice of firms intentionally announcing the repurchase of more shares than they expect to repurchase is illegal, the expected increase in share prices may give firms an incentive to make such false announcements.This study surveys top financial executives to learn the extent that firms repurchase fewer shares than announced, identify the reasons for this activity, and learn how managers view this activity. We surveyed 642 firms that conducted common stock repurchases from January 1998 to September 1999. Based on 218 responses, we find that while managers are uncertain about the legality of this activity, they believe that the intentional repurchase of fewer shares than announced is unethical, sends a false signal to the market, and damages the firm’s credibility with its stockholders. Managers also believe that firms repurchasing fewer shares than announced should publicly reveal both the reason for not repurchasing all shares and the amount by which the repurchase fell short of the firm’s announced intentions. Despite these beliefs, managers report that repurchasing fewer shares than announced is a common practice.

The response of 'C-20' navy bean and 'Franken- muth' soft white winter wheat grown in rotation to clomazone, imazethapyr, bentazon, and acifluorfen was examined. Clomazone at 560 and 430 g ai ha-1 plus 800 g ai ha71 pendimethalin and 2000 g ai ha-1 chloramben visibly injured navy bean in 1 of 2 yr. However, navy bean seed moisture at harvest and yield was not reduced compared to the weed-free control. PPI and PRE treatments of 70 g ai ha-1 imazethapyr did not injure navy bean or reduce yield. Imazethapyr applied POST at 70 g ha-l plus nonionic surfactant visibly injured navy bean. The addition of urea ammonium nitrate to imazethapyr enhanced visible injury and seed moisture compared to nonionic surfactant alone in 1 of 2 yr. However, seed yield was not reduced. Seed moisture at harvest was greater following treatment with 430 g ai ha-1 acifluorfen plus nonionic surfactant or urea ammonium nitrate and 140 and 280 g ha1 acifluorfen plus 840 g ai ha-1 bentazon in 1 of 2 yr compared to the weed-free control, but yield was not reduced. Wheat yield was reduced in 2 of 2 and 1 of 2 yr by 560 g ha-1 and 430 g ha-1 clomazone, respectively, plus pendimethalin plus chloramben compared to the weed-free control. Wheat yield was not reduced by imazethapyr, bentazon, or acifluorfen. Nomenclature: Acifluorfen, 5-(2-chloro-4- (trifluoromethyl)phenoxy)-2-nitrobenzoic acid; bentazon, 3-(1-methylethyl)-(lH)-2,1,3-benzothiadiazin-4(3H)-one 2,2-dioxide; chloramben, 3-amino-2,5-dichlorobenzoic acid; clomazone, 2-((2-chlorophenyl)methyl)-4,4-dimethyl- 3-isoxazolidinone; EPTC, S-ethyl dipropylcarbamothio- ate; imazethapyr, (?)-2-(4,5-dihydro-4-methyl-4-(1-meth- ylethyl)-5-oxo-lH-imidazol-2-yl)-5-ethyl-3-pyridinecarbox- ylic acid; metolachlor, 2-chloro-N-(2-ethyl-6- methylphenyl)-N-(2-methoxy-1-methylethyl)acetamide; pendimethalin, N-(1-ethylpropyl)-3,4-dimethyl-2,6- dinitrobenzenamine; navy bean, Phaseolus vulgaris L. var. navy 'C-20'; wheat, Triticum aestivum L. 'Frankenmuth'. Additional index words. Bioactivity, bioavailability, car- ryover, crop rotation, dry beans, persistence, residues.

We survey top managers of Fortune 1000 companies to learn if industry practitioners agree with the findings of academic research on specific corporate governance issues. We focus on board composition and size, executive/director compensation and ownership, firm performance, and other issues. The results suggest that the views of responding managers appear at odds with other empirical evidence provided in the literature on the majority of the issues examined. In addition, respondents are often unable to offer an opinion about whether they agree or disagree with specific corporate governance issues.

Herbicides can persist in the soil and injure sensitive crops planted in the years following herbicide application. The response of sugarbeet to clomazone, imazaquin, imazethapyr, and chlorimuron residues in soil was examined. Clomazone at 1.1 or 2.2 kg ai ha-1did not reduce yield of sugarbeet planted 1 or 2 yr after application. Imazaquin at 0.07 to 0.28 kg ai ha-1, and imazethapyr at 0.09 to 0.14 kg ai ha-1, can reduce yield of sugarbeet planted 1 yr after application. Imazaquin at 0.07 to 0.14 kg ha-1caused 28 to 47% sugarbeet injury and imazethapyr at 0.09 kg ha-1caused 54% injury 2 yr after application in soybean. A 25% yield loss occurred from the imazethapyr treatment. Sugarbeet injury 2 yr after application was greatest when sugarbeet also was planted the year following soybean. Chlorimuron at 0.02 to 0.08 kg ai ha-1plus linuron at 0.4 to 0.9 kg ai ha-1reduced yield of sugarbeet planted 1 yr after application when compared with linuron alone, regardless of soil pH. Visible sugarbeet injury of 38 to 66% was still evident from chlorimuron plus linuron treatments 2 yr after application. Sugarbeet should not be planted less than 25 mo following imazaquin, imazethapyr, or chlorimuron application.

Velvetleaf control in sugarbeet by clomazone and commercially available sugarbeet herbicides was investigated in greenhouse and field studies. In greenhouse studies, clomazone at 0.07 and 0.04 kg ai ha-1controlled 97 and 69% of velvetleaf, respectively, with little visible sugarbeet injury. Adding clomazone to pyrazon, TCA, ethofumesate, pyrazon plus TCA, or TCA plus ethofumesate increased velvetleaf control but increased visible sugarbeet injury. In field studies, clomazone at 0.07 kg ha-1did not enhance sugarbeet injury. However, velvetleaf was not controlled by clomazone alone or clomazone plus pyrazon, ethofumesate, combinations of pyrazon plus TCA, pyrazon plus ethofumesate, or pyrazon plus TCA plus ethofumesate. Cycloate preplant incorporated plus pyrazon preemergence followed by postemergence herbicides controlled velvetleaf in all 3 yr of research. Postemergence herbicides increased velvetleaf control from soil-applied herbicides in 1987 and 1988.

Corporate managers often cite improved firm visibility as a motive for listing on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). We use three proxies to test this motive: the number of analysts following a firm, the number of institutional shareholders, and the number of shares held by institutions. We compare visibility changes over successive six-month periods for a sample of firms that listed on the NYSE and find that the changes in the post-listing period are less than the changes for the two pre-listing periods. Further tests suggest that increased visibility for a firm is primarily associated with changes in market capitalization, not with listing itself.