Patterns in loss-ratio experience in the U.S. corn insurance market are investigated with a spatial econometric model. The results demonstrate systematic geographically related misratings and provide estimates of the impacts of several observable factors on the magnitude of misrating in the program. The model is used to estimate actuarial cross-subsidizations across the primary corn-producing states and counties. The impacts of the primary factors are substantial, resulting in net premium transfers of approximately 26 percent of total premiums annually. The misratings likely have important insurance demand, welfare, and land-use implications. ********** Insurance markets are typically best suited for risks that are uncorrelated, occur with high frequency, and have a large number of like participants--among a handful of other standard conditions. Systemic risks (such as in crop production) induce correlation in losses, violating the standard insurability conditions and potentially leading to market failures (Glauber, 2004). Complementary causes of market failures in such systemic risk markets may include capital market imperfections, inadequate reinsurance capacities, capital and information shocks due to unexpected events, fat-tailed distributions that prevent diversification, and agency problems (see, e.g., Froot, 2001; Brown, Kroszner, and Jenn, 2002; Jaffee, 2006; Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden, 2008). Private insurance firms typically respond to these risks by restricting the supply of insurance or simply not offering insurance at all (Froot, 2001; Cummins, 2006). In cases of private market failures, government is often persuaded to intervene. Historically, this has been observed to varying degrees in catastrophic and other systemic risk markets, including those for flood, multiperil crop, earthquake, hurricane, and terrorism insurance. Yet, governments tend to be ineffective in the dual roles of insurance provider and regulator (Priest, 1996; Cummins, 2006; Jaffee, 2006; Michel-Kerjan and Kousky, 2010). As a result, such markets often suffer from severe adverse selection problems (see, e.g., Makki and Somwaru, 2001) and, subsequently, low participation rates (see, e.g., Kriesel and Landry, 2004). Government intervention in insurance markets can also cause price distortions that interfere with the efficient allocation of resources and crowd out private market solutions (Brown, Kroszner, and Jenn, 2002). Agricultural crop production is characterized by a high degree of systemic risk, as spatially correlated weather events tend to induce correlation in production losses. With the exception of hail insurance (the risks of which are not generally systemic), virtually no private markets for agricultural insurance have historically existed in the United States. Rather, a significant government-sponsored crop insurance program has been in force since the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980. The Federal Crop Insurance Program is a unique arrangement between the government and private insurers and has several notable features. First, premiums are heavily subsidized by the government to encourage broad participation. On the delivery side, all policies are serviced and underwritten by private insurers. To induce private insurers to participate in the program, operating expenses are subsidized and losses are reinsured by the federal government. Importantly, insurance rates are set noncompetitively by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Risk Management Agency (RMA)--the agency charged with administering the program--and market competition through differentiated rates is expressly illegal. The program has experienced rapid growth in participation in recent years and is also sizable program with total premium in 2008 of approximately $9.85 billion and total liabilities of $89.91 billion. Throughout much of its history the program has been plagued by the perception of problems including the failure of crop insurance to replace other forms of disaster assistance (Glauber, 2004), low perceived operating efficiency (Paulson and Babcock, 2008), concerns about market distorting effects of subsidization (Glauber and Collins, 2002), the perception that the insurance industry is overly rewarded for the risks in which they share (Glauber, 2004), and the need for high premium subsidization to induce participation. …