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Kant failed to unify his doctrines of space in the Critique. Space is either prior to the manifold of sense:- in which case, it is not determined by any kind of synthesis; or space is determined by synthesis which begins with the prior existing manifold cf sense. The first is the teaching of Diss. 15. A., and Aes.1., the second is the teaching of the Aₙₐ. Either space remains after the objects of sense have been abstracted, or nothing remains after they have been abstracted. The first is the view of Diss. 15. A., and Aes. 11; the second is the view of the Aₙₐ. Either the whole of space determines the parts:- in which case there is no synthesis; or the parts precede the whole, and it is determined by a synthesis of then. If the whole (aggregate) has been reached by a synthesis, then it cannot precede the parts, but is preceded and determined by them. If the synthesis is carried further, a new whole results, and what had been previously considered as the whole, is found to have been merely an aggregate, determined by the extent of the previous synthesis of the parts. Space cannot presuppose an activity of the understanding (even in pure Geometry) unless the parts determine the whole. This contradicts Diss. 15. C. n. and 15. cor. (first -paragraph). Space cannot presuppose an activity of the understanding unless particular representations cf space are under "space" and not in it. This contradicts Aes. B. IV. Kant was trying t o hunt with the hounds and run with the hare. He was trying to show that space is prior to the sensuous manifold, and yet that space presupposes a synthesis. He was trying to show that the parts of space are dependent upon the whole, and yet to say that the whole of space is determined by a synthesis cf the parts. It cannot be done. His attempt to combine these views failed. His only alternative was the view of the Diss. that the conditions of synthesis can be entirely intellectual, and that the conditions of the resulting whole can be entirely sensitive. On such a view, sense and intellect are dogmatically assumed to be separate and complete in themselves. But in the Aₙₐ. where they are bound inseparably together, the assumption is false. These conflicting views of space in theCritique make clearer the two views of space in Diss. 15. In 1770, Kant could answer Euler s Question in two ways . Space is not abstracted from sensation; in reference to the sensible world, it is not abstracted at all. There is, however, an intellectual synthesis which yields it. It is determined by this synthesis. Kant reconciled these two answers by means of the dualism of 1770. To know the sensible world, the mind requires only intuitions. Knowledge of the sensible world is synthetic, and not analytic. On the other hand, to know the intelligible, real world, the mind requires only concepts . Knowledge of the intelligible world is analytic and not synthetic. These two kinds of knowledge do not overlap. In every section of Diss. 15. save two Kant treated the pure intuition of space as presented or contemplated, and not constructed. In two parts he treated it as yielded by an activity of the mind. By following out this assumption, he discovered the weakness in his dualism. At the end of the Corollary, he suggested that the concepts of space and time, which are not abstracted from sense, and which are not gained by reflection (like the usual general concepts) are abstracted. from an activity of the mind on the occasion of sensation. He assumed that an intellectual activity can yield a sensitive whole. After 1770, he realized that this is impossible. He realized, however, that the fault lay not in the assumption of an activity of the mind, but in the deeper assumption of a thoroughgoing dualism. The assumption of an activity of the mind must -- he realized -- be retained, but the dualism rejected. He could not isolate conception and intuition. There is an activity of t'he understanding which begins with the manifold of sense and which determines space. The understanding represents space as a pure manifold (in pure Mathematics) in contrast to the sensuous manifold; and as a pure form of the sensuous manifold (in applied Mathematics.) . At the end cf the Corollary to Diss. 15., Kant was correct in saying that there is an activity of the mind. He was wrong Only in regard to its nature. The rest of Diss. 15. is based upon the false assumption that there is no activity of the mini. Diss. 15., as a whole, is based upon the false assumption that conception and intuition can be isolated. The doctrine that space is prior to sensation is based also upon this false assumption. The doctrine that the whole of space determines the parts is based also upon it. The same is true of the doctrine that an infinite number of representations are in space instead of under it. Once Kant corrected this assumption, and joined conceptions and intuitions, the representations cf space and time are subjected to the conditions of conception as well as to the conditions of sense. He could preserve the doctrines of space in the Aes . only by reverting to the point of view of the Dissertation and separating conception from intuition. He would never have done this. He retained the views of the Aes., either because he did not realize that he had contradicted them; or because, realizing it, he knew that the alteration required was too far-reaching to be undertaken.