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DoD manages the nation's defense satellites, which are worth at least $13.7 billion, via ground stations located around the world. These ground stations and supporting infrastructure perform three primary functions: monitoring the health of the satellite; ensuring it stays in its proper orbit (activities collectively known as satellite control operations); and planning, monitoring, and controlling the execution of the overall mission of the satellite. Based on the House Armed Services Committee Report and discussions with defense committee staff, GAO did the following: (1) reviewed the Air Force's satellite control operations to assess the potential for fragmentation or duplication, (2) assessed the status of modernization efforts, (3) identified any commercial practices that could improve the Air Force's satellite control operations, and (4) identified any barriers to implementing them. GAO reviewed modernization funding documents and related studies and interviewed DoD and 7 commercial satellite companies that had satellite capabilities. GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct future DoD satellite acquisition programs to determine a business case for proceeding with either a dedicated or shared network for that program's satellite control operations, develop a department-wide long-term plan for modernizing its Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) and any future shared networks, and implement commercial practices to improve DoD satellite control networks. DoD concurred with our recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

This is GAO's ninth annual assessment of Department of Defense (DOD) weapon system acquisitions, an area that is on GAO's high-risk list. The report is in response to the mandate in the joint explanatory statement to the DOD Appropriations Act, 2009. It includes observations on the performance of DOD's 2010 portfolio of 98 major defense acquisition programs; data on selected factors that can affect program outcomes; an assessment of the knowledge attained by key junctures in the acquisition process for a subset of 40 programs, which were selected because they were in development or early production; and observations on the implementation of acquisition reforms. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and quantity data from DOD's Selected Acquisition Reports and collected data from program offices on performance requirements and software development; technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge; and the implementation of DOD's acquisition policy and acquisition reforms. GAO also compiled one- or two-page assessments of 71 weapon programs. These programs were selected based on their cost, stage in the acquisition process, and congressional interest., Report to Congressional Committees.

Since fiscal year 2000, DOD has significantly increased the number of major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. Major Unfortunately, during this same time period, acquisition outcomes did not improve. Based on our analysis, total acquisition costs for the fiscal year 2007 portfolio of major defense acquisition programs increased 26 percent from first estimates, whereas the 2000 portfolio increased by 6 percent. Likewise, development costs for fiscal year 2007 programs increased by 40 percent from first estimates, compared to 27 percent for fiscal year 2000 programs. In most cases, programs also failed to deliver capabilities when promised often forcing warfighters to spend additional funds on maintaining legacy systems. Our analysis shows that current programs are experiencing an average delay of 21-months in delivering initial capabilities to the warfighter, a 5-month increase over fiscal year 2000 programs. Of the 72 weapon programs we assessed this year, no program had proceeded through system development meeting the best practices standards for mature technologies, stable design, and mature production processes all prerequisites for achieving planned cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. Eighty-eight percent of the programs in this assessment began system development without fully maturing critical technologies according to best practices. Ninety-six percent of the programs had not met best practice standards for demonstrating mature technologies and design stability before entering the more costly system demonstration phase. Finally, no programs we assessed had all of their critical manufacturing processes in statistical control when they entered production, and most programs were not even collecting data to do so. Also, programs assessed this year did not improve on the level of knowledge attained at critical junctures from those assessed in 2005.