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Humans, while not wholly altruistic, will often come together to selflessly support and provide aid to others in need. To date, little attention has been paid to how memory for such positive events in the aftermath of a traumatic event can influence subsequent behavior. The current study examined how the way in which people represent and remember helping events immediately following the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing related to their tendency to support Boston-related charities in the following months. People who recalled helping-related events in greater detail reported engaging in more helping behaviors in the following months. The relation between memory narratives and reports of helping behavior six months later has important implications for future work investigating the role of memory-based mechanisms in citizens' decisions to provide aid in times of collective need.

According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 2007), both remembered past and imagined future events rely heavily on episodic memory. An alternative hypothesis is that observed similarities between remembering and imagining reflect the influence of broader factors such as descriptive ability, narrative style, or inhibitory control. We attempted to distinguish between these 2 hypotheses by examining the impact of an episodic specificity induction on memory, imagination, and picture description in young and older adults. In Experiment 1, participants received the specificity induction or a control induction prior to the memory, imagination, and description tasks. Older adults provided fewer internal (i.e., episodic) and more external (i.e., semantic) details than young adults across the 3 tasks irrespective of induction. Critically, however, the specificity induction selectively increased internal but not external details for memory and imagination in both age groups compared with the control induction. By contrast, the induction did not affect internal (or external) details for picture description. Experiment 2 replicated these results in young adults using a different control induction. Our findings point to a dissociation between episodic processes involved in memory and imagination and nonepisodic processes involved in picture description.

Is altruism always morally good, or is the morality of altruism fundamentally shaped by the social opportunity costs that often accompany helping decisions? Across four studies, we reveal that in cases of realistic tradeoffs in social distance for gains in welfare where helping socially distant others necessitates not helping socially closer others with the same resources, helping is deemed as less morally acceptable. Making helping decisions at a cost to socially closer others also negatively affects judgments of relationship quality (Study 2) and in turn, decreases cooperative behavior with the helper (Study 3). Ruling out an alternative explanation of physical distance accounting for the effects in Studies 1 to 3, social distance continued to impact moral acceptability when physical distance across social targets was matched (Study 4). These findings reveal that attempts to decrease biases in helping may have previously unconsidered consequences for moral judgments, relationships, and cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are we willing to help others? Recent behavioral work on episodic processes (i.e. the ability to represent an event that is specific in time and place) suggests that imagining and remembering scenes of helping a person in need increases intentions to help. Here, we provide insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms that enhance prosocial intentions via episodic simulation and memory. In Experiment 1, we scanned participants using functional neuroimaging as they imagined and remembered helping episodes, and completed non-episodic control conditions accounting for exposure to the story of need and conceptual priming of helping. Analyses revealed that activity in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem, as well as the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) predicted the effect of conditions on the strength of prosocial intentions. In Experiment 2, we used transcranial magnetic stimulation to disrupt activity in the RTPJ, and better isolate the contribution of MTL subsystem to prosocial intentions. The effect of conditions on willingness to help remained even when activity in the RTPJ was disrupted, suggesting that activity in the MTL subsystem may primarily support this prosocial effect. It seems our willingness to help may be guided, in part, by how easily we can construct imagined and remembered helping episodes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prospection and prosociality are hallmarks of our species. Little is known, however, about how our ability to imagine or simulate specific future events contributes to our capacity for prosociality. Here, we investigated this relationship, revealing how the affective response that arises from a simulated prosocial event motivates a willingness to help a person in need. Across two experiments, people reported being more willing to help in specific situations after simulating future helping events that elicited positive (versus negative or neutral) affect. Positive affect increased engagement of theory of mind for the person in need, which in turn informed prosocial responses. Moreover, the subjective experience of scene imagery and theory of mind systematically couple together depending on the affective valence of future simulations, providing new insight into how affective valence guides a prosocial function of episodic simulation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Episodic simulation, the ability to imagine the self in a specific time and place, can be used to imagine future prosocial events. Recent work on episodic simulation indicates that imagining scenes of helping a person in need increases one's own intent to help. This work, however, leaves open the question of underlying mechanisms. While research on imagination points to the sensory quality of the imagined event as critical to the effect, research on moral cognition suggests that self-referential processing-imagining oneself versus another person-may be a key feature. Across three experiments, we investigated the role of self-referential processing and sensory quality on enhancing prosocial intentions via episodic simulation. The findings suggest that we are willing to help others, in part, because we can vividly imagine ourselves-or someone else-doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research has demonstrated commonalities between remembering past events and imagining future events. Behavioral studies have revealed that remembering the past and imagining the future depend on shared cognitive processes, whereas neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies have shown that many of the same brain regions are involved in both remembering the past and imagining the future. Here, we review recent cognitive and neuroimaging studies that examine remembering the past and imagining the future in elderly adults. These studies document significant changes in elderly adults' capacities to imagine future events that are correlated with their memory deficits; most strikingly, older adults tend to remember the past and imagine the future with less episodic detail than younger adults. These findings are in line with the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis [Schacter and Addis: Phil Trans R Soc B 2007;362:773-786], which holds that past and future events draw on similar information and rely on similar underlying processes, and that episodic memory supports the construction of future events by extracting and recombining stored information into a simulation of a novel event. At the same time, however, recent data indicate that non-episodic factors also contribute to age-related changes in remembering the past and imagining the future. We conclude by considering a number of questions and challenges concerning the interpretation of age-related changes in remembering and imagining, as well as functional implications of this research for everyday concerns of older adults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]