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We provide new evidence on the level and probability distribution of consumers’ longterm expectations of inflation in the euro area and the Netherlands, using a representative Dutch survey. We find that consumers’ long-term (ten years ahead) euro area inflation expectations are not well anchored at the ECB’s inflation aim. First, median long-term euro area inflation expectations are 4%, 2pp above the ECB’s inflation aim of 2%. Second, individual probability distributions of long-term euro area inflation expectations show that expected probabilities of higher inflation (2pp or more above the ECB’s inflation aim) are much higher, at 28% on average, than those of lower inflation (2pp or more below the ECB’s inflation aim), at 12%. This suggest that the de-anchoring of Dutch consumers’ long-term euro area inflation expectations is mainly due to expected high inflation, rather than to expected low inflation (or deflation). This finding is in contrast to recent concerns by ECB monetary policymakers about a possible de-anchoring of long-term inflation expectations on the downside. Furthermore, we find that consumers’ long-term euro area inflation expectations are significantly higher if respondents have lower incomes. Based on measures of anchoring calculated directly from individual consumers’ probability distributions of expected long-term inflation, namely the probability of inflation being close to target, the probability of inflation being far above target, and the probability of deflation, we also find that long-term euro area inflation expectations are better anchored for consumers with higher net household income.

Credit restrictions were used as a monetary policy instrument in the Netherlands from the 1960s to the early 1990s. Since these restrictions were aimed at containing money rather than credit growth, their focus was on net credit creation by the financial sector. We document the rationale of these credit restrictions and how their implementation evolved in line with the evolution of the financial system. We study the impact on the balance sheet structure of banks and other financial institutions. We find that banks mainly responded to credit restrictions by making adjustments to the liability side of their balance sheets, particularly by increasing the proportion of long-term funding. Responses on the asset side were limited, while part of the banking sector even increased lending after the adoption of a restriction. These results suggest that banks and financial institutions responded by switching to long-term funding to meet the restriction and shield their lending business. Arguably, the credit restrictions were therefore still effective in reaching their main goal. Indeed, we do find evidence of a significant effect of credit restrictions on inflation.

This paper compares market reactions to forecasts of the policy rate path by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants with those to forward guidance from the FOMC post‐meeting statements. The forecasts are those by FOMC participants in the quarterly Summary of Economic Projections (SEP; the “dots”). We conduct the analysis during the period when the FOMC's policy rate was at the zero lower bound. We find that market expectations of the time to lift‐off from the zero lower bound are significantly affected in the expected direction by surprises in SEP dots and in forward guidance. We also find a significant impact of macroeconomic news on market participants' expectations of time to lift‐off. These results are consistent with forward guidance about policy rates and SEP forecasts each contributing to the public's understanding of future Federal Reserve monetary policy and with the conditionality of both forms of communication about future policy rates being understood. We also present evidence that market expectations concerning the time to lift‐off are influenced by the maximum time to lift‐off implied by forward guidance, the SEP, and the economic outlook. An appendix provides the FOMC's forward guidance after each meeting from January 2012 to September 2015 and our interpretation of the implied days to lift‐off.

This paper analyses the results from a new monthly survey of consumers’ euro area inflation expectations before and during the pandemic. We find that consumers’ longterm euro area inflation expectations have remained elevated above the ECB’s inflation aim throughout the pandemic. Moreover, their distributions have continuously shown a greater probability of high inflation (2pp above the ECB’s inflation aim of 2%) than of deflation during the pandemic. These results suggest that during the pandemic consumers’ long-term euro area inflation expectations have been de-anchored on the upside rather than on the downside. This is in contrast to concerns by ECB policymakers about a de-anchoring on the downside during the pandemic. We find that during the pandemic consumers’ expected probabilities in the long term of deflation in the euro area have been above those from the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters, and below those implied by options. We also find based on consumers’ point inflation expectations and on three measures calculated directly from their individual expected probability distribution, that consumers’ long-term euro area inflation expectations have been better anchored for higher education levels and for higher net household income.

Credit restrictions were used as a monetary policy instrument in the Netherlands from the 1960s to the early 1990s. We study the effects of credit restrictions being active on the balance sheet structure of banks and other financial institutions. We find that banks mainly responded to credit restrictions by making adjustments to the liability side of their balance sheets, particularly by increasing the proportion of long-term funding. Responses on the asset side were limited, while part of the banking sector even increased lending after the installment of a restriction. These results suggest that banks and financial institutions responded by switching to long-term funding to meet the restriction and shield their lending business. Arguably, the credit restrictions were therefore still effective in reaching their main goal, i.e. containing money growth.

We study the use of US dollar central bank swap lines as a tool for addressing dislocations in the foreign currency swap market against the USD since the global financial crisis. We find that the use of the Federal Reserve’s USD central bank swap lines was mainly related to tensions in US money markets during times of financial crisis, and less to tensions which were confined to foreign exchange swap markets. In particular, we find that the use of USD central bank swap lines did not react significantly to the recent period of persistent deviations of covered interest parity (CIP) since 2014. These results are consistent with the view that the Federal Reserve was guided by enlightened self-interest when providing swap lines to foreign central banks, in order to reduce dislocations in US financial markets and support financial stability. In recent years foreign exchange swap markets have not functioned properly, but it appears that now that the crisis is over, the Federal Reserve and other central banks have decided against trying permanently to fill the gap left by the dysfunction in the commercial foreign exchange swap market.

We analyze a new option-based indicator of market perceptions of euro area deflation risks. We find that during 2010–2015, long-term deflation risks became slightly more sensitive to oil price changes and inflation surprises, suggesting a subtle weakening in anchoring.

We study the effects of quantitative policy rate forecasts by the Federal Reserve on real yields and inflation expectations at the zero lower bound (ZLB). We study the effects of surprises in policy rate forecasts from the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) on real yields and breakeven inflation rates derived from government bonds for forward rates across the yield curve. We find that surprises in the SEP policy rate forecasts significantly affect real yields in the expected direction across the yield curve. By contrast, breakeven inflation rates are little affected across the yield curve. In particular, five-year breakeven inflation rates five years ahead, a common measure of monetary policy credibility, are not significantly affected by surprises in SEP policy rate forecasts. This suggests that policy rate forecasts by the Fed at the ZLB managed to affect real yields without adversely affecting monetary policy credibility.

We adopt an unobserved components time series model to extract financial cycles for the United States and the five largest euro area countries over the period 1970-2014. We find that financial cycles can parsimoniously be estimated by house prices and total credit or the credit-to-GDP ratio. We show that these medium-term cycles are longer and have larger amplitudes than business cycles, and that their length and amplitude vary over time and across countries.

This paper investigates how the perceived risk that the euro area will experience deflation has evolved over time, and what this risk implies for the credibility of the ECB. We use a novel data set on market participants’ perceptions of short- to long-term deflation risk implied by year-on-year options on forward inflation swaps. We investigate whether long-term inflation expectations have become de-anchored, by studying whether long-term deflation risk has been affected by changes in oil prices and by short-term deflation risk. Our analysis suggests that the anchoring properties of euro area inflation expectations have weakened, albeit in a still subtle way.

The financial cycle captures systematic patterns in the financial system and is closely related to the concept of procyclicality of systemic risk. This paper investigates the characteristics of financial cycles using a multivariate model-based filter. We extract cycles using an unobserved components time series model and applying state space methods. We estimate financial cycles for the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands, using data from 1970 to 2014. For these countries, we find that the individual financial variables we examine have medium-term cycles which share a few common statistical properties. We therefore refer to these cycles as 'similar'. We find that overall financial cycles are longer than business cycles and have a higher amplitude. Moreover, such behavior varies over time and across countries. Our results suggest that estimates of the financial cycle can be a useful monitoring tool for policymakers as they may provide a broad indication about when risks to financial stability increase, remain stable, or decrease.

We adopt an unobserved components time series model to extract financial cycles for the United States and the five largest euro area countries over the period 1970 to 2014. We find that credit, the credit-to-GDP ratio and house prices have medium-term cycles which share a few common statistical properties. We show that financial cycles are longer and more ample than business cycles, and that their length and amplitude vary over time and across countries.

Well-developed financial markets are a necessary condition for a currency to play a role as a reserve currency. The introduction of the euro greatly improved the functioning of euro financial markets. This paper investigates whether euro financial markets have developed sufficiently to facilitate the emergence of the euro as a reserve currency on par with the US dollar. We find that the liquidity and breadth of euro financial markets are fast approaching those of dollar markets, and as a result the euro is eroding some of the advantages that have historically supported the pre-eminence of the US dollar as a reserve currency. This strengthens the incentive for monetary authorities to reconsider the currency composition of their reserves. Nevertheless, the introduction of the euro has not yet resulted in a significant change in the currency composition of official reserve holdings. The US dollar has maintained its place as the dominant reserve currency, supported perhaps by the edge that dollar financial markets still have over euro markets in terms of size, credit quality, and liquidity, as well as inertia in the use of international currencies. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

We survey the literature on the efficacy of foreign exchange market intervention in emerging market countries, emphasising the differences with the literature on industrial countries. We then use official statistics on central bank intervention by the Czech National Bank in conjunction with options market data to study the impact of intervention during 2001–2002. We find that central bank intervention had some (weakly) statistically significant impact on the spot rate and the risk reversal but that this impact was small. We do not find evidence that intervention had an influence on short-term exchange rate volatility. We also find that, in our sample period, Czech authorities appeared to intervene mainly in response to an acceleration of the speed of koruna appreciation.

A vast literature on the effects of sterilized intervention by the monetary authorities in the foreign exchange markets concludes that intervention systematically moves the spot exchange rate only if it is publicly announced, coordinated across countries, and consistent with the underlying stance of fiscal and monetary policy. Over the past 15 years, researchers have also attempted to determine if intervention has any effects on the dispersion and directionality of market views concerning the future exchange rate. These studies usually focus on the variance around the expected future exchange rate}the second moment. In this paper we demonstrate how to use over-the-counter option prices to recover the risk-neutral probability density function (PDF) for the future exchange rate. Using the yen/dollar exchange rate as an example, we calculate measures of dispersion and directionality, such as variance and skewness, from estimated PDFs to test whether intervention by the Japanese Ministry of Finance during the period 1996–2004 had any impact on the higher moments of the exchange rate. We find little or no systematic effect, consistent with the findings of the literature on the spot rate as: Japanese intervention was not publicly announced prior to August 2000, and since that time only publicly announced after the fact, over the past 10 years rarely coordinated across countries and, in hindsight, probably inconsistent with the underlying stance of monetary policy. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Using press reports and official statistics on central bank intervention in conjunction with options market data, we find that central bank intervention had no statistically significant systematic impact on the mean or higher moments of the exchange rate during 1993–2000. We also find that Japanese authorities appeared to intervene mainly in response to deviations of the exchange rate from some implicit target levels and to a rise in market uncertainty. U.S. monetary authorities intervened only in cooperation with the Japanese authorities.

This paper investigates to what extent daily movements in the euro/dollar rate were driven by news about the macroeconomic situation in the USA and the euro area during the first two years of EMU. We examine whether market participants reacted to news in different ways depending on whether the news came from the USA or from the euro area, and whether the news was good or bad. Furthermore, we investigate whether traders’ reaction to news has changed over time. We find that macroeconomic news has a statistically significant correlation with daily movements of the euro against the dollar. However, this relationship exhibits considerable time variation. There are indications of asymmetric response, but to different extents at different times. Our results also provide evidence that the market seemed to ignore good news and remain fixated on bad news from the euro area, as often claimed in market commentaries, but only for some time. Finally, we find evidence that the impact of macroeconomic news on the euro/dollar rate was stronger when news switches from good to bad or vice versa. (J.E.L.: F31).

This paper presents an overview of the impact of the introduction of the euro on Europe's financial structure over the first four years since the start of EMU. It analyzes changes in money markets, bond markets, equity markets and foreign exchange markets. Euro's role in originating or catalyzing trends has been uneven across the spectrum of financial markets. From the supply side, banks and investors in fixed income markets have become more focused on the characteristics of individual borrowers rather than the nationality of the issuer and have built up expertise to evaluate credit risk. European equity markets have also been affected by the enhanced ability of investors to build strategies with a pan-European perspective as prices increasingly reflected risk factors specific to industrial sectors rather than individual countries. On the borrower side, EMU has increased the attractiveness of market-based financing methods by allowing debt issuers to tap institutional portfolios across the euro area. Lower barriers to cross-border financial transactions have also increased the contestability of the market for financial services, be it at the wholesale or the retail level. The introduction of the euro has also highlighted the shortcomings of existing institutional structures and areas where excessive focus on narrowly defined interests may stand in the way of realizing the full potential benefits from the new environment. Diverging legal and institutional infrastructures and market practices can impede further financial market development and deepening. Hence, the euro has put a premium on cooperation between national authorities and institution as a means of achieving a more harmonized financial environment. The impact of EMU on depth in foreign exchange markets has been less clear-cut, as volatility, spreads, trading volumes and liquidity appear not to have changed in a substantial way. Overall, it seems that the new currency has made some progress towards the goal of becoming a currency of international stature that would rival that of the US dollar. However, a number of the necessary next steps towards achieving this goal are also among the trickiest to implement.

The euro in international financial markets : where do we stand ? In evaluating the international role of the euro, this article adopts a portfolio balance framework. The international weight of a currency is measured by the extent to which it inspires the trust of international asset managers as a store of value. As a consequence, medium to longer-term fluctuations in the value of the currency will be determined by the balance between the demand for assets and the supply of liabilities denominated in that currency. The note examines first the international issuance patterns in the euro and compares them to those of the US dollar. It then focuses on the patterns of international portfolio flows between the euro area, the United States and Japan. The final section examines the role of the euro in international currency markets. It uses the results of the most recent BIS triennial foreign exchange rate survey to compare the role of the single currency to that of its predecessors and the other major world currencies. JEL classification : F3, F36., Pour mesurer le rôle international de l'euro, le présent article adopte un cadre qui, dans son essence se fonde sur l'équilibre des portefeuilles, autour d'un concept selon lequel le poids international d'une monnaie est fonction de la confiance qu'elle inspire aux gestionnaires d'actifs comme réserve de valeur. Il s'ensuit que les fluctuations à moyen et long terme du cours de cette monnaie seront déterminées par l'équilibre entre la demande d'actifs et l'offre de passifs. Dans cet esprit, l'article examine d'abord les modes d'émission internationaux en euros et les compare à ceux du dollar. Il aborde ensuite les flux de portefeuille entre la zone euro, les États-Unis et le Japon, puis le rôle de l'euro sur les changes. Il utilise les résultats de l'enquête triennale la plus récente de la BRI sur les marchés des changes pour comparer le rôle de la monnaie unique à celui de ses prédécesseurs et des autres grandes monnaies. Classification JEL : F3, F36, White William R., Galati Gabriele, Tsatsaronis Kostas. L’euro sur les marchés financiers internationaux : bilan . In: Revue d'économie financière, n°68, 2002. Le financement de la retraite. pp. 329-342.

The Dollar-Mark Axis. — Over the last two decades, most European currencies have tended to weaken against the mark as the latter strengthened against the dollar. Moreover, the strength of the response of European cross rates has tended to remain in the same order over time. The paper first sets out the stylised facts of this phenomenon, referred to as the dollar-mark axis, and then tries to identify its determinants. In addition to exchange rate policy, the paper examines the correlation of cyclical fluctuations and trade links and the bias of international investors in the currency composition of their portfolios.

To what extent do house price dynamics differ across market segments? And what determines this heterogeneity? We address these questions by analysing a data set of individual houses and mortgages, based on a survey of about 2,000 Dutch households over the period 2003-2011. We estimate a dynamic panel data model of house price dynamics by means of the Arellano-Bond estimator. Three main empirical results emerge. First, we generally find that house price dynamics imply a convergence towards their long-run equilibrium value, as indicated by a negative serial correlation coefficient and a positive estimated mean reversion coefficient. Second, there is evidence that the housing market in the Netherlands is inefficient. Third, there is important heterogeneity across different market segments. We document that the speed of convergence of house price dynamics and the efficiency of housing markets depends on the geographical location and degree of urbanization, the type and year of construction of a house, the type of mortgage financing and households' sentiment about the medium-term outlook for income.

To what extent do house price dynamics differ across market segments? And what determines this heterogeneity? We address these questions by analysing a data set of individual houses and mortgages, based on a survey of about 2,000 Dutch households over the period 2003-2011. We estimate a dynamic panel data model of house price dynamics by means of the Arellano-Bond estimator. Three main empirical results emerge. First, we generally find that house price dynamics imply a convergence towards their long-run equilibrium value, as indicated by a negative serial correlation coefficient and a positive estimated mean reversion coefficient. Second, there is evidence that the housing market in the Netherlands is inefficient. Third, there is important heterogeneity across different market segments. We document that the speed of convergence of house price dynamics and the efficiency of housing markets depends on the geographical location and degree of urbanization, the type and year of construction of a house, the type of mortgage financing and households’ sentiment about the medium-term outlook for income.

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the need to go beyond a purely micro approach to financial regulation and supervision. As a consequence, the number of policy speeches, research papers and conferences that discuss a macro perspective on financial regulation has grown considerably. The policy debate is focusing in particular on macroprudential tools and their usage, their relationship with monetary policy, their implementation and their effectiveness. Macroprudential policy has recently also attracted considerable attention among researchers. This paper provides an overview of research on this topic. We also identify important future research questions that emerge from both the literature and the current policy debate.

During the Great Crisis, most governments in industrial countries supported their domestic financial sector under stress and responded to strong declines in output growth with fiscal stimulus packages. Starting in 2010, attention focused on the sustainability of the resulting debt burdens. We conduct an empirical study to test whether in the United States, the euro area and the United Kingdom, views on the sustainability of fiscal burdens have influenced markets' assessment of central banks' commitment to price stability. Using a daily measure of inflation expectations extracted from nominal and indexed-linked government bonds, or inflation swaps, we test whether these react to alternative measures of fiscal burdens. These include rescue package announcements, credit default swap (CDS) spreads and changes in either the outlook or the credit rating of governments. We find no evidence of a significant effect of market participants' perceptions of fiscal burdens on long-term inflation expectations in the United States, the euro area and the United Kingdom. These results are broadly consistent with the view that long term inflation expectations have remained well anchored.

What is the role of micro and macro factors in determining house prices? We address this question empirically by analysing survey data on housing and mortgages from the DNB Household Survey for the period 1993-2009. We focus on the determinants of house owners' subjective assessment of the value of their house. We highlight three main findings. First, subjective house prices are strongly related to household-specific and house-specific factors, including year of construction, cohort, education level, income and wealth. Financing conditions - in particular the presence of a mortgage as well as the mortgage type, and the mortgage rate - play an important role. Second, we find that macro variables such as the long-term interest rate also influence to an important extent how households value their home. Third, there is evidence of "well behaved" dynamics of subjective house prices, both in terms of persistence and in terms of mean reversion, indicating that house prices tend to converge to their long run equilibrium value. Finally, our findings support a certain degree of heterogeneity and segmentation in subjective house prices, especially along the dimensions of geographical region and degree of urbanization, funding conditions, and income expectations.

We investigate whether the anchoring properties of longrun inflation expectations in the United States, the euro area, and the United Kingdom have changed around the economic crisis that erupted in mid-2007. We document that surveybased measures of long-run inflation expectations remained fairly stable around 2 percent in the euro area, fluctuated above 2 percent in the United States, and drifted up to about 2.5 percent in the United Kingdom. Expectations measures extracted from inflation-indexed bonds and inflation swaps became much more volatile in 2007. Moreover, structural break tests show that their sensitivity to news about inflation and other domestic macroeconomic variables-a measure of anchoring-increased during the crisis, and in particular during the heightened turmoil triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. While liquidity premia and technical factors have significantly influenced the behavior of inflation-indexed markets since the outburst of the crisis, we show that these factors did not contaminate the relationship between macroeconomic news and financial market-based inflation expectations at the daily frequency. While our evidence is consistent with the idea that long-run inflation expectations may have become less firmly anchored during the crisis, problems in measuring expectations accurately make it difficult to draw definitive conclusions.

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the need to go beyond a purely micro approach to financial regulation and supervision. In recent months, the number of policy speeches, research papers and conferences that discuss a macro perspective on financial regulation has grown considerably. The policy debate is focusing in particular on macroprudential tools and their usage, their relationship with monetary policy, their implementation and their effectiveness. Macroprudential policy has recently also attracted considerable attention among researchers. This paper provides an overview of research on this topic. We also identify important future research questions that emerge from both the literature and the current policy debate.

We provide new insights on the formation of inflation expectations - in particular at a time of great financial and economic turmoil - by evaluating results from a survey conducted from July 2009 through July 2010. Participants in this survey answered a weekly questionnaire about their short-, medium- and long-term inflation expectations. Participants received common information sets with data relevant to euro area inflation. Our analysis of survey responses reveals several interesting results. First, our evidence is consistent with long-term expectations having remained well anchored to the ECB's definition of price stability, which acted as a focal point for long-term expectations. Second, the turmoil in euro area bond markets triggered by the Greek fiscal crisis influenced short- and mediumterm inflation expectations but had only a very small impact on long-term expectations. By contrast, long-term expectations did not react to developments of the euro area wide fiscal burden. Third, participants changed their expectations fairly frequently. The longer the horizon, the less frequent but larger these changes were. Fourth, expectations exhibit a large degree of time-variant non-normality. Fifth, inflation expectations appear fairly homogenous across groups of agents at the shorter horizon but less so at the medium- and long-term horizons.

During the Great Crisis, most governments in industrial countries supported their domestic financial sector under stress and responded to strong declines in output growth with fiscal stimulus packages. Starting in 2010, attention focused on the sustainability of the resulting debt burdens. We conduct an empirical study to test whether in the United States, the euro area and the United Kingdom, views on the sustainability of fiscal burdens have influenced markets’ assessment of central banks’ commitment to price stability. Using a daily measure of inflation expectations extracted from nominal and indexed-linked government bonds, or inflation swaps, we test whether these react to alternative measures of fiscal burdens. These include rescue package announcements, credit default swap (CDS) spreads and changes in either the outlook or the credit rating of governments. We find no evidence of a significant effect of market participants’ perceptions of fiscal burdens on long-term inflation expectations in the United States, the euro area and the United Kingdom. These results are broadly consistent with the view that long term inflation expectations have remained well anchored.

Survey evidence indicates that inflation expectations increased after HICP inflation rose markedly in the course of 2007 and the first half of 2008, underpinning a general view that inflation expectations may have become unanchored from the ECB's target. However, until now there has been no formal test of whether this has in fact been the case. We fill this gap by testing the reaction of financial market-based measures of long-term expectations inflation expectations to news about inflation and other macroeconomic variables in the main euro area economies. If long-term inflation expectations are anchored, they should not react to the arrival of news. We find evidence that long-term inflation expectations have started to drift away from the ECB's anchor in the course of 2007.

The increasing size and concentration of official foreign exchange reserves after years of continued expansion, especially since the Asian crisis, have led to renewed interest in the way reserve management decisions are taken and in their possible impact on financial markets. Reserve management practices have evolved substantially over the past decade or so, reflecting changes in both the economic and the broader institutional environment. While some of these changes have been remarked upon, others have attracted less attention. This paper documents some of the main changes in foreign exchange reserve management practices, considers the main drivers behind them, and explores some of the challenges ahead. We focus, in particular, on those challenges that could have a more significant impact on financial markets. These include the choice of an appropriate balance between risk and return, of the numeraire currency and of the degree of public disclosure, from which some conclusions are drawn concerning the future of the US dollar as a reserve currency and volatility in financial markets. The discussion relies extensively on a survey of central banks and monetary authorities representing in total about 80% of global foreign exchange reserves at end-2006.

In recent years, issues related to the management of foreign exchange reserves have gained prominence, and reserve management practices have evolved rapidly. Against this background, the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank for International Settlements organised an ad hoc meeting of senior central bankers from both industrial and emerging market countries responsible for the management of reserves, which took place on 1-2 March 2007. The meeting covered key issues in foreign exchange reserve management, including the broad framework in which it is conducted, asset allocation at the strategic, tactical and portfolio management levels, risk measurement and management, organisational structures and disclosure. This paper was prepared as background and provides a general framework to help organise the various issues that arise in the context of FX reserve management.

The most recent BIS triennial survey shows that turnover in foreign exchange markets increased by more than 70% over the three years to April 2007. Two specific findings stand out. First, the growth in transactions between banks and other financial institutions was particularly strong, consistent with the increasing importance of hedge funds, as well as portfolio diversification by institutional investors with a longer-term horizon, such as pension funds. Second, there has been a marked increase in turnover involving emerging market currencies.

Interest rate differentials have been a driving force behind exchange rate movements in recent years. This has focused market attention on the role of currency carry trade positions, and on the possibility that a sudden unwinding might adversely affect financial stability. However, carry trades are notoriously difficult to track in the available data. This special feature first outlines the investor base and trading strategies used in carry trades, and then explores various sources of data to gauge activity.

Well developed financial markets are a necessary condition for a currency to play a role as a reserve currency. The introduction of the euro greatly improved the functioning of euro financial markets. This paper investigates whether euro financial markets have developed sufficiently to facilitate the emergence of the euro as a reserve currency on par with the US dollar. We find that the liquidity and breadth of euro financial markets are fast approaching those of dollar markets, and as a result the euro is eroding some of the advantages that have historically supported the pre-eminence of the US dollar as a reserve currency. This strengthens the incentive for monetary authorities to reconsider the currency composition of their reserves. Nevertheless, the introduction of the euro has not yet resulted in a significant change in the currency composition of official reserve holdings. The US dollar has maintained its place as the dominant reserve currency, supported perhaps by the edge that dollar financial markets still have over euro markets in terms of size, credit quality and liquidity, as well as inertia in the use of international currencies.