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Generative AI systems like foundation models (FMs) must align well with human values to ensure their behavior is helpful and trustworthy. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has shown promise for optimizing model performance using human judgments, existing RLHF pipelines predominantly rely on immediate feedback, which can fail to accurately reflect the downstream impact of an interaction on users' utility. We demonstrate that feedback based on evaluators' foresight estimates of downstream consequences systematically induces Goodhart's Law dynamics, incentivizing misaligned behaviors like sycophancy and deception and ultimately degrading user outcomes. To alleviate this, we propose decoupling evaluation from prediction by refocusing RLHF on hindsight feedback. Our theoretical analysis reveals that conditioning evaluator feedback on downstream observations mitigates misalignment and improves expected human utility, even when these observations are simulated by the AI system itself. To leverage this insight in a practical alignment algorithm, we introduce Reinforcement Learning from Hindsight Simulation (RLHS), which first simulates plausible consequences and then elicits feedback to assess what behaviors were genuinely beneficial in hindsight. We apply RLHS to two widely-employed online and offline preference optimization methods -- Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) -- and show empirically that misalignment is significantly reduced with both methods. Through an online human user study, we show that RLHS consistently outperforms RLHF in helping users achieve their goals and earns higher satisfaction ratings, despite being trained solely with simulated hindsight feedback. These results underscore the importance of focusing on long-term consequences, even simulated ones, to mitigate misalignment in RLHF.

Recent work has documented striking heterogeneity in the performance of state-of-the-art vision language models (VLMs), including both multimodal language models and text-to-image models. These models are able to describe and generate a diverse array of complex, naturalistic images, yet they exhibit surprising failures on basic multi-object reasoning tasks -- such as counting, localization, and simple forms of visual analogy -- that humans perform with near perfect accuracy. To better understand this puzzling pattern of successes and failures, we turn to theoretical accounts of the binding problem in cognitive science and neuroscience, a fundamental problem that arises when a shared set of representational resources must be used to represent distinct entities (e.g., to represent multiple objects in an image), necessitating the use of serial processing to avoid interference. We find that many of the puzzling failures of state-of-the-art VLMs can be explained as arising due to the binding problem, and that these failure modes are strikingly similar to the limitations exhibited by rapid, feedforward processing in the human brain.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Establishing a unified theory of cognition has been a major goal of psychology. While there have been previous attempts to instantiate such theories by building computational models, we currently do not have one model that captures the human mind in its entirety. Here we introduce Centaur, a computational model that can predict and simulate human behavior in any experiment expressible in natural language. We derived Centaur by finetuning a state-of-the-art language model on a novel, large-scale data set called Psych-101. Psych-101 reaches an unprecedented scale, covering trial-by-trial data from over 60,000 participants performing over 10,000,000 choices in 160 experiments. Centaur not only captures the behavior of held-out participants better than existing cognitive models, but also generalizes to new cover stories, structural task modifications, and entirely new domains. Furthermore, we find that the model's internal representations become more aligned with human neural activity after finetuning. Taken together, Centaur is the first real candidate for a unified model of human cognition. We anticipate that it will have a disruptive impact on the cognitive sciences, challenging the existing paradigm for developing computational models.

Building a foundation model for 3D vision is a complex challenge that remains unsolved. Towards that goal, it is important to understand the 3D reasoning capabilities of current models as well as identify the gaps between these models and humans. Therefore, we construct a new 3D visual understanding benchmark named UniQA-3D. UniQA-3D covers fundamental 3D vision tasks in the Visual Question Answering (VQA) format. We evaluate state-of-the-art Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specialized models, and human subjects on it. Our results show that VLMs generally perform poorly, while the specialized models are accurate but not robust, failing under geometric perturbations. In contrast, human vision continues to be the most reliable 3D visual system. We further demonstrate that neural networks align more closely with human 3D vision mechanisms compared to classical computer vision methods, and Transformer-based networks such as ViT align more closely with human 3D vision mechanisms than CNNs. We hope our study will benefit the future development of foundation models for 3D vision. Code is available at https://github.com/princeton-vl/UniQA-3D ., Comment: Accepted to 3DV 2025. Update 12/09/24: Change the benchmark name to UniQA-3D, add link to code

Being prompted to engage in reasoning has emerged as a core technique for using large language models (LLMs), deploying additional inference-time compute to improve task performance. However, as LLMs increase in both size and adoption, inference costs are correspondingly becoming increasingly burdensome. How, then, might we optimize reasoning's cost-performance tradeoff? This work introduces a novel approach based on computational models of metareasoning used in cognitive science, training LLMs to selectively use intermediate reasoning steps only when necessary. We first develop a reward function that incorporates the Value of Computation by penalizing unnecessary reasoning, then use this reward function with Expert Iteration to train the LLM. Compared to few-shot chain-of-thought prompting and STaR, our method significantly reduces inference costs (20-37\% fewer tokens generated across three models) while maintaining task performance across diverse datasets.

In "Embers of Autoregression" (McCoy et al., 2023), we showed that several large language models (LLMs) have some important limitations that are attributable to their origins in next-word prediction. Here we investigate whether these issues persist with o1, a new system from OpenAI that differs from previous LLMs in that it is optimized for reasoning. We find that o1 substantially outperforms previous LLMs in many cases, with particularly large improvements on rare variants of common tasks (e.g., forming acronyms from the second letter of each word in a list, rather than the first letter). Despite these quantitative improvements, however, o1 still displays the same qualitative trends that we observed in previous systems. Specifically, o1 -- like previous LLMs -- is sensitive to the probability of examples and tasks, performing better and requiring fewer "thinking tokens" in high-probability settings than in low-probability ones. These results show that optimizing a language model for reasoning can mitigate but might not fully overcome the language model's probability sensitivity., Comment: 6 pages; updated to fix typo in Fig 4 caption

Automation transformed various aspects of our human civilization, revolutionizing industries and streamlining processes. In the domain of scientific inquiry, automated approaches emerged as powerful tools, holding promise for accelerating discovery, enhancing reproducibility, and overcoming the traditional impediments to scientific progress. This article evaluates the scope of automation within scientific practice and assesses recent approaches. Furthermore, it discusses different perspectives to the following questions: Where do the greatest opportunities lie for automation in scientific practice?; What are the current bottlenecks of automating scientific practice?; and What are significant ethical and practical consequences of automating scientific practice? By discussing the motivations behind automated science, analyzing the hurdles encountered, and examining its implications, this article invites researchers, policymakers, and stakeholders to navigate the rapidly evolving frontier of automated scientific practice.

Understanding how people behave in strategic settings--where they make decisions based on their expectations about the behavior of others--is a long-standing problem in the behavioral sciences. We conduct the largest study to date of strategic decision-making in the context of initial play in two-player matrix games, analyzing over 90,000 human decisions across more than 2,400 procedurally generated games that span a much wider space than previous datasets. We show that a deep neural network trained on these data predicts people's choices better than leading theories of strategic behavior, indicating that there is systematic variation that is not explained by those theories. We then modify the network to produce a new, interpretable behavioral model, revealing what the original network learned about people: their ability to optimally respond and their capacity to reason about others are dependent on the complexity of individual games. This context-dependence is critical in explaining deviations from the rational Nash equilibrium, response times, and uncertainty in strategic decisions. More broadly, our results demonstrate how machine learning can be applied beyond prediction to further help generate novel explanations of complex human behavior.

What do we want from machine intelligence? We envision machines that are not just tools for thought, but partners in thought: reasonable, insightful, knowledgeable, reliable, and trustworthy systems that think with us. Current artificial intelligence (AI) systems satisfy some of these criteria, some of the time. In this Perspective, we show how the science of collaborative cognition can be put to work to engineer systems that really can be called ``thought partners,'' systems built to meet our expectations and complement our limitations. We lay out several modes of collaborative thought in which humans and AI thought partners can engage and propose desiderata for human-compatible thought partnerships. Drawing on motifs from computational cognitive science, we motivate an alternative scaling path for the design of thought partners and ecosystems around their use through a Bayesian lens, whereby the partners we construct actively build and reason over models of the human and world.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has been shown to enhance the multi-step reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, debates persist about whether LLMs exhibit abstract generalization or rely on shallow heuristics when given CoT prompts. To understand the factors influencing CoT reasoning we provide a detailed case study of the symbolic reasoning task of decoding shift ciphers, where letters are shifted forward some number of steps in the alphabet. We analyze the pattern of results produced by three LLMs -- GPT-4, Claude 3, and Llama 3.1 -- performing this task using CoT prompting. By focusing on a single relatively simple task, we are able to identify three factors that systematically affect CoT performance: the probability of the task's expected output (probability), what the model has implicitly learned during pre-training (memorization), and the number of intermediate operations involved in reasoning (noisy reasoning). We show that these factors can drastically influence task accuracy across all three LLMs; e.g., when tested with GPT-4, varying the output's probability of occurrence shifts accuracy from 26% to 70%. Overall, we conclude that CoT prompting performance reflects both memorization and a probabilistic version of genuine reasoning. Code and data at this https://github.com/aksh555/deciphering_cot, Comment: EMNLP 2024 Findings; 9 pages plus references and appendices

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

A good teacher should not only be knowledgeable; but should be able to communicate in a way that the student understands -- to share the student's representation of the world. In this work, we integrate insights from machine teaching and pragmatic communication with the burgeoning literature on representational alignment to characterize a utility curve defining a relationship between representational alignment and teacher capability for promoting student learning. To explore the characteristics of this utility curve, we design a supervised learning environment that disentangles representational alignment from teacher accuracy. We conduct extensive computational experiments with machines teaching machines, complemented by a series of experiments in which machines teach humans. Drawing on our findings that improved representational alignment with a student improves student learning outcomes (i.e., task accuracy), we design a classroom matching procedure that assigns students to teachers based on the utility curve. If we are to design effective machine teachers, it is not enough to build teachers that are accurate -- we want teachers that can align, representationally, to their students too., Comment: Preprint

Autoregressive language models have demonstrated a remarkable ability to extract latent structure from text. The embeddings from large language models have been shown to capture aspects of the syntax and semantics of language. But what {\em should} embeddings represent? We connect the autoregressive prediction objective to the idea of constructing predictive sufficient statistics to summarize the information contained in a sequence of observations, and use this connection to identify three settings where the optimal content of embeddings can be identified: independent identically distributed data, where the embedding should capture the sufficient statistics of the data; latent state models, where the embedding should encode the posterior distribution over states given the data; and discrete hypothesis spaces, where the embedding should reflect the posterior distribution over hypotheses given the data. We then conduct empirical probing studies to show that transformers encode these three kinds of latent generating distributions, and that they perform well in out-of-distribution cases and without token memorization in these settings., Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures

Categories can be represented at different levels of abstraction, from prototypes focused on the most typical members to remembering all observed exemplars of the category. These representations have been explored in the context of supervised learning, where stimuli are presented with known category labels. We examine the benefits of prototype-based representations in a less-studied domain: semi-supervised learning, where agents must form unsupervised representations of stimuli before receiving category labels. We study this problem in a Bayesian unsupervised learning model called a variational auto-encoder, and we draw on recent advances in machine learning to implement a prior that encourages the model to use abstract prototypes to represent data. We apply this approach to image datasets and show that forming prototypes can improve semi-supervised category learning. Additionally, we study the latent embeddings of the models and show that these prototypes allow the models to form clustered representations without supervision, contributing to their success in downstream categorization performance., Comment: 7 pages, 3 figures

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world settings, understanding the knowledge they implicitly use when making decisions is critical. One way to capture this knowledge is in the form of Bayesian prior distributions. We develop a prompt-based workflow for eliciting prior distributions from LLMs. Our approach is based on iterated learning, a Markov chain Monte Carlo method in which successive inferences are chained in a way that supports sampling from the prior distribution. We validated our method in settings where iterated learning has previously been used to estimate the priors of human participants -- causal learning, proportion estimation, and predicting everyday quantities. We found that priors elicited from GPT-4 qualitatively align with human priors in these settings. We then used the same method to elicit priors from GPT-4 for a variety of speculative events, such as the timing of the development of superhuman AI.

Humans rely on strong inductive biases to learn from few examples and abstract useful information from sensory data. Instilling such biases in machine learning models has been shown to improve their performance on various benchmarks including few-shot learning, robustness, and alignment. However, finding effective training procedures to achieve that goal can be challenging as psychologically-rich training data such as human similarity judgments are expensive to scale, and Bayesian models of human inductive biases are often intractable for complex, realistic domains. Here, we address this challenge by introducing a Bayesian notion of generative similarity whereby two datapoints are considered similar if they are likely to have been sampled from the same distribution. This measure can be applied to complex generative processes, including probabilistic programs. We show that generative similarity can be used to define a contrastive learning objective even when its exact form is intractable, enabling learning of spatial embeddings that express specific inductive biases. We demonstrate the utility of our approach by showing that it can be used to capture human inductive biases for geometric shapes, distinguish different abstract drawing styles that are parameterized by probabilistic programs, and capture abstract high-level categories that enable generalization.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as integral tools for reasoning, planning, and decision-making, drawing upon their extensive world knowledge and proficiency in language-related tasks. LLMs thus hold tremendous potential for natural language interaction within multi-agent systems to foster cooperation. However, LLM agents tend to over-report and comply with any instruction, which may result in information redundancy and confusion in multi-agent cooperation. Inspired by human organizations, this paper introduces a framework that imposes prompt-based organization structures on LLM agents to mitigate these problems. Through a series of experiments with embodied LLM agents and human-agent collaboration, our results highlight the impact of designated leadership on team efficiency, shedding light on the leadership qualities displayed by LLM agents and their spontaneous cooperative behaviors. Further, we harness the potential of LLMs to propose enhanced organizational prompts, via a Criticize-Reflect process, resulting in novel organization structures that reduce communication costs and enhance team efficiency.

We describe a framework for using natural language to design state abstractions for imitation learning. Generalizable policy learning in high-dimensional observation spaces is facilitated by well-designed state representations, which can surface important features of an environment and hide irrelevant ones. These state representations are typically manually specified, or derived from other labor-intensive labeling procedures. Our method, LGA (language-guided abstraction), uses a combination of natural language supervision and background knowledge from language models (LMs) to automatically build state representations tailored to unseen tasks. In LGA, a user first provides a (possibly incomplete) description of a target task in natural language; next, a pre-trained LM translates this task description into a state abstraction function that masks out irrelevant features; finally, an imitation policy is trained using a small number of demonstrations and LGA-generated abstract states. Experiments on simulated robotic tasks show that LGA yields state abstractions similar to those designed by humans, but in a fraction of the time, and that these abstractions improve generalization and robustness in the presence of spurious correlations and ambiguous specifications. We illustrate the utility of the learned abstractions on mobile manipulation tasks with a Spot robot., Comment: ICLR 2024

Typical models of learning assume incremental estimation of continuously-varying decision variables like expected rewards. However, this class of models fails to capture more idiosyncratic, discrete heuristics and strategies that people and animals appear to exhibit. Despite recent advances in strategy discovery using tools like recurrent networks that generalize the classic models, the resulting strategies are often onerous to interpret, making connections to cognition difficult to establish. We use Bayesian program induction to discover strategies implemented by programs, letting the simplicity of strategies trade off against their effectiveness. Focusing on bandit tasks, we find strategies that are difficult or unexpected with classical incremental learning, like asymmetric learning from rewarded and unrewarded trials, adaptive horizon-dependent random exploration, and discrete state switching.

Does language help make sense of the visual world? How important is it to actually see the world rather than having it described with words? These basic questions about the nature of intelligence have been difficult to answer because we only had one example of an intelligent system -- humans -- and limited access to cases that isolated language or vision. However, the development of sophisticated Vision-Language Models (VLMs) by artificial intelligence researchers offers us new opportunities to explore the contributions that language and vision make to learning about the world. We ablate components from the cognitive architecture of these models to identify their contributions to learning new tasks from limited data. We find that a language model leveraging all components recovers a majority of a VLM's performance, despite its lack of visual input, and that language seems to allow this by providing access to prior knowledge and reasoning., Comment: 8 pages, 4 figures

In day-to-day communication, people often approximate the truth - for example, rounding the time or omitting details - in order to be maximally helpful to the listener. How do large language models (LLMs) handle such nuanced trade-offs? To address this question, we use psychological models and experiments designed to characterize human behavior to analyze LLMs. We test a range of LLMs and explore how optimization for human preferences or inference-time reasoning affects these trade-offs. We find that reinforcement learning from human feedback improves both honesty and helpfulness, while chain-of-thought prompting skews LLMs towards helpfulness over honesty. Finally, GPT-4 Turbo demonstrates human-like response patterns including sensitivity to the conversational framing and listener's decision context. Our findings reveal the conversational values internalized by LLMs and suggest that even these abstract values can, to a degree, be steered by zero-shot prompting.

Humans can learn new concepts from a small number of examples by drawing on their inductive biases. These inductive biases have previously been captured by using Bayesian models defined over symbolic hypothesis spaces. Is it possible to create a neural network that displays the same inductive biases? We show that inductive biases that enable rapid concept learning can be instantiated in artificial neural networks by distilling a prior distribution from a symbolic Bayesian model via meta-learning, an approach for extracting the common structure from a set of tasks. By generating the set of tasks used in meta-learning from the prior distribution of a Bayesian model, we are able to transfer that prior into a neural network. We use this approach to create a neural network with an inductive bias towards concepts expressed as short logical formulas. Analyzing results from previous behavioral experiments in which people learned logical concepts from a few examples, we find that our meta-trained models are highly aligned with human performance., Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures, 4 tables

The speech-to-song illusion is a robust psychological phenomenon whereby a spoken sentence sounds increasingly more musical as it is repeated. Despite decades of research, a complete formal account of this transformation is still lacking, and some of its nuanced characteristics, namely, that certain phrases appear to transform while others do not, is not well understood. Here we provide a formal account of this phenomenon, by recasting it as a statistical inference whereby a rational agent attempts to decide whether a sequence of utterances is more likely to have been produced in a song or speech. Using this approach and analyzing song and speech corpora, we further introduce a novel prose-to-lyrics illusion that is purely text-based. In this illusion, simply duplicating written sentences makes them appear more like song lyrics. We provide robust evidence for this new illusion in both human participants and large language models., Comment: 7 pages, 5 figures

Humans possess a remarkable capacity to recognize and manipulate abstract structure, which is especially apparent in the domain of geometry. Recent research in cognitive science suggests neural networks do not share this capacity, concluding that human geometric abilities come from discrete symbolic structure in human mental representations. However, progress in artificial intelligence (AI) suggests that neural networks begin to demonstrate more human-like reasoning after scaling up standard architectures in both model size and amount of training data. In this study, we revisit empirical results in cognitive science on geometric visual processing and identify three key biases in geometric visual processing: a sensitivity towards complexity, regularity, and the perception of parts and relations. We test tasks from the literature that probe these biases in humans and find that large pre-trained neural network models used in AI demonstrate more human-like abstract geometric processing.

Large language models (LLMs) can pass explicit social bias tests but still harbor implicit biases, similar to humans who endorse egalitarian beliefs yet exhibit subtle biases. Measuring such implicit biases can be a challenge: as LLMs become increasingly proprietary, it may not be possible to access their embeddings and apply existing bias measures; furthermore, implicit biases are primarily a concern if they affect the actual decisions that these systems make. We address both challenges by introducing two new measures of bias: LLM Implicit Bias, a prompt-based method for revealing implicit bias; and LLM Decision Bias, a strategy to detect subtle discrimination in decision-making tasks. Both measures are based on psychological research: LLM Implicit Bias adapts the Implicit Association Test, widely used to study the automatic associations between concepts held in human minds; and LLM Decision Bias operationalizes psychological results indicating that relative evaluations between two candidates, not absolute evaluations assessing each independently, are more diagnostic of implicit biases. Using these measures, we found pervasive stereotype biases mirroring those in society in 8 value-aligned models across 4 social categories (race, gender, religion, health) in 21 stereotypes (such as race and criminality, race and weapons, gender and science, age and negativity). Our prompt-based LLM Implicit Bias measure correlates with existing language model embedding-based bias methods, but better predicts downstream behaviors measured by LLM Decision Bias. These new prompt-based measures draw from psychology's long history of research into measuring stereotype biases based on purely observable behavior; they expose nuanced biases in proprietary value-aligned LLMs that appear unbiased according to standard benchmarks.

Humans extract useful abstractions of the world from noisy sensory data. Serial reproduction allows us to study how people construe the world through a paradigm similar to the game of telephone, where one person observes a stimulus and reproduces it for the next to form a chain of reproductions. Past serial reproduction experiments typically employ a single sensory modality, but humans often communicate abstractions of the world to each other through language. To investigate the effect language on the formation of abstractions, we implement a novel multimodal serial reproduction framework by asking people who receive a visual stimulus to reproduce it in a linguistic format, and vice versa. We ran unimodal and multimodal chains with both humans and GPT-4 and find that adding language as a modality has a larger effect on human reproductions than GPT-4's. This suggests human visual and linguistic representations are more dissociable than those of GPT-4.

Learning from demonstrations is a common way for users to teach robots, but it is prone to spurious feature correlations. Recent work constructs state abstractions, i.e. visual representations containing task-relevant features, from language as a way to perform more generalizable learning. However, these abstractions also depend on a user's preference for what matters in a task, which may be hard to describe or infeasible to exhaustively specify using language alone. How do we construct abstractions to capture these latent preferences? We observe that how humans behave reveals how they see the world. Our key insight is that changes in human behavior inform us that there are differences in preferences for how humans see the world, i.e. their state abstractions. In this work, we propose using language models (LMs) to query for those preferences directly given knowledge that a change in behavior has occurred. In our framework, we use the LM in two ways: first, given a text description of the task and knowledge of behavioral change between states, we query the LM for possible hidden preferences; second, given the most likely preference, we query the LM to construct the state abstraction. In this framework, the LM is also able to ask the human directly when uncertain about its own estimate. We demonstrate our framework's ability to construct effective preference-conditioned abstractions in simulated experiments, a user study, as well as on a real Spot robot performing mobile manipulation tasks., Comment: HRI 2024

Simulating sampling algorithms with people has proven a useful method for efficiently probing and understanding their mental representations. We propose that the same methods can be used to study the representations of Large Language Models (LLMs). While one can always directly prompt either humans or LLMs to disclose their mental representations introspectively, we show that increased efficiency can be achieved by using LLMs as elements of a sampling algorithm. We explore the extent to which we recover human-like representations when LLMs are interrogated with Direct Sampling and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). We found a significant increase in efficiency and performance using adaptive sampling algorithms based on MCMC. We also highlight the potential of our method to yield a more general method of conducting Bayesian inference \textit{with} LLMs.

Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) trained for next-word prediction have demonstrated remarkable proficiency at producing coherent text. But are they equally adept at forming coherent probability judgments? We use probabilistic identities and repeated judgments to assess the coherence of probability judgments made by LLMs. Our results show that the judgments produced by these models are often incoherent, displaying human-like systematic deviations from the rules of probability theory. Moreover, when prompted to judge the same event, the mean-variance relationship of probability judgments produced by LLMs shows an inverted-U-shaped like that seen in humans. We propose that these deviations from rationality can be explained by linking autoregressive LLMs to implicit Bayesian inference and drawing parallels with the Bayesian Sampler model of human probability judgments.

Large language models (LLMs) can produce long, coherent passages of text, suggesting that LLMs, although trained on next-word prediction, must represent the latent structure that characterizes a document. Prior work has found that internal representations of LLMs encode one aspect of latent structure, namely syntax; here we investigate a complementary aspect, namely the document's topic structure. We motivate the hypothesis that LLMs capture topic structure by connecting LLM optimization to implicit Bayesian inference. De Finetti's theorem shows that exchangeable probability distributions can be represented as a mixture with respect to a latent generating distribution. Although text is not exchangeable at the level of syntax, exchangeability is a reasonable starting assumption for topic structure. We thus hypothesize that predicting the next token in text will lead LLMs to recover latent topic distributions. We examine this hypothesis using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), an exchangeable probabilistic topic model, as a target, and we show that the representations formed by LLMs encode both the topics used to generate synthetic data and those used to explain natural corpus data., Comment: 13 pages, 4 figures

How can we build AI systems that can learn any set of individual human values both quickly and safely, avoiding causing harm or violating societal standards for acceptable behavior during the learning process? We explore the effects of representational alignment between humans and AI agents on learning human values. Making AI systems learn human-like representations of the world has many known benefits, including improving generalization, robustness to domain shifts, and few-shot learning performance. We demonstrate that this kind of representational alignment can also support safely learning and exploring human values in the context of personalization. We begin with a theoretical prediction, show that it applies to learning human morality judgments, then show that our results generalize to ten different aspects of human values -- including ethics, honesty, and fairness -- training AI agents on each set of values in a multi-armed bandit setting, where rewards reflect human value judgments over the chosen action. Using a set of textual action descriptions, we collect value judgments from humans, as well as similarity judgments from both humans and multiple language models, and demonstrate that representational alignment enables both safe exploration and improved generalization when learning human values., Comment: NeurIPS 2024

It has been proposed that, when processing a stream of events, humans divide their experiences in terms of inferred latent causes (LCs) to support context-dependent learning. However, when shared structure is present across contexts, it is still unclear how the "splitting" of LCs and learning of shared structure can be simultaneously achieved. Here, we present the Latent Cause Network (LCNet), a neural network model of LC inference. Through learning, it naturally stores structure that is shared across tasks in the network weights. Additionally, it represents context-specific structure using a context module, controlled by a Bayesian nonparametric inference algorithm, which assigns a unique context vector for each inferred LC. Across three simulations, we found that LCNet could 1) extract shared structure across LCs in a function learning task while avoiding catastrophic interference, 2) capture human data on curriculum effects in schema learning, and 3) infer the underlying event structure when processing naturalistic videos of daily events. Overall, these results demonstrate a computationally feasible approach to reconciling shared structure and context-specific structure in a model of LCs that is scalable from laboratory experiment settings to naturalistic settings.

Human behavior is often assumed to be hierarchically structured, made up of abstract actions that can be decomposed into concrete actions. However, behavior is typically measured as a sequence of actions, which makes it difficult to infer its hierarchical structure. In this paper, we explore how people form hierarchically structured plans, using an experimental paradigm with observable hierarchical representations: participants create programs that produce sequences of actions in a language with explicit hierarchical structure. This task lets us test two well-established principles of human behavior: utility maximization (i.e. using fewer actions) and minimum description length (MDL; i.e. having a shorter program). We find that humans are sensitive to both metrics, but that both accounts fail to predict a qualitative feature of human-created programs, namely that people prefer programs with reuse over and above the predictions of MDL. We formalize this preference for reuse by extending the MDL account into a generative model over programs, modeling hierarchy choice as the induction of a grammar over actions. Our account can explain the preference for reuse and provides better predictions of human behavior, going beyond simple accounts of compressibility to highlight a principle that guides hierarchical planning.

Most applications of machine learning to classification assume a closed set of balanced classes. This is at odds with the real world, where class occurrence statistics often follow a long-tailed power-law distribution and it is unlikely that all classes are seen in a single sample. Nonparametric Bayesian models naturally capture this phenomenon, but have significant practical barriers to widespread adoption, namely implementation complexity and computational inefficiency. To address this, we present a method for extracting the inductive bias from a nonparametric Bayesian model and transferring it to an artificial neural network. By simulating data with a nonparametric Bayesian prior, we can metalearn a sequence model that performs inference over an unlimited set of classes. After training, this "neural circuit" has distilled the corresponding inductive bias and can successfully perform sequential inference over an open set of classes. Our experimental results show that the metalearned neural circuit achieves comparable or better performance than particle filter-based methods for inference in these models while being faster and simpler to use than methods that explicitly incorporate Bayesian nonparametric inference., Comment: 13 pages, 3 figures. Code available at https://github.com/jakesnell/neural-circuits

The ability of humans to create and disseminate culture is often credited as the single most important factor of our success as a species. In this Perspective, we explore the notion of machine culture, culture mediated or generated by machines. We argue that intelligent machines simultaneously transform the cultural evolutionary processes of variation, transmission, and selection. Recommender algorithms are altering social learning dynamics. Chatbots are forming a new mode of cultural transmission, serving as cultural models. Furthermore, intelligent machines are evolving as contributors in generating cultural traits--from game strategies and visual art to scientific results. We provide a conceptual framework for studying the present and anticipated future impact of machines on cultural evolution, and present a research agenda for the study of machine culture.

Bayesian filtering approximates the true underlying behavior of a time-varying system by inverting an explicit generative model to convert noisy measurements into state estimates. This process typically requires either storage, inversion, and multiplication of large matrices or Monte Carlo estimation, neither of which are practical in high-dimensional state spaces such as the weight spaces of artificial neural networks. Here, we frame the standard Bayesian filtering problem as optimization over a time-varying objective. Instead of maintaining matrices for the filtering equations or simulating particles, we specify an optimizer that defines the Bayesian filter implicitly. In the linear-Gaussian setting, we show that every Kalman filter has an equivalent formulation using K steps of gradient descent. In the nonlinear setting, our experiments demonstrate that our framework results in filters that are effective, robust, and scalable to high-dimensional systems, comparing well against the standard toolbox of Bayesian filtering solutions. We suggest that it is easier to fine-tune an optimizer than it is to specify the correct filtering equations, making our framework an attractive option for high-dimensional filtering problems., Comment: Under review at ICLR 2024

We explore the creative problem-solving capabilities of modern LLMs in a novel constrained setting. To this end, we create MACGYVER, an automatically generated dataset consisting of over 1,600 real-world problems deliberately designed to trigger innovative usage of objects and necessitate out-of-the-box thinking. We then present our collection to both LLMs and humans to compare and contrast their problem-solving abilities. MACGYVER is challenging for both groups, but in unique and complementary ways. For instance, humans excel in tasks they are familiar with but struggle with domain-specific knowledge, leading to a higher variance. In contrast, LLMs, exposed to a variety of specialized knowledge, attempt broader problems but fail by proposing physically-infeasible actions. Finally, we provide a detailed error analysis of LLMs, and demonstrate the potential of enhancing their problem-solving ability with novel prompting techniques such as iterative step-wise reflection and divergent-convergent thinking. This work (1) introduces a fresh arena for intelligent agents focusing on intricate aspects of physical reasoning, planning, and unconventional thinking, which supplements the existing spectrum of machine intelligence; and (2) provides insight into the constrained problem-solving capabilities of both humans and AI., Comment: NAACL 2024

The success of methods based on artificial neural networks in creating intelligent machines seems like it might pose a challenge to explanations of human cognition in terms of Bayesian inference. We argue that this is not the case, and that in fact these systems offer new opportunities for Bayesian modeling. Specifically, we argue that Bayesian models of cognition and artificial neural networks lie at different levels of analysis and are complementary modeling approaches, together offering a way to understand human cognition that spans these levels. We also argue that the same perspective can be applied to intelligent machines, where a Bayesian approach may be uniquely valuable in understanding the behavior of large, opaque artificial neural networks that are trained on proprietary data.

How do we communicate with others to achieve our goals? We use our prior experience or advice from others, or construct a candidate utterance by predicting how it will be received. However, our experiences are limited and biased, and reasoning about potential outcomes can be difficult and cognitively challenging. In this paper, we explore how we can leverage Large Language Model (LLM) simulations to help us communicate better. We propose the Explore-Generate-Simulate (EGS) framework, which takes as input any scenario where an individual is communicating to an audience with a goal they want to achieve. EGS (1) explores the solution space by producing a diverse set of advice relevant to the scenario, (2) generates communication candidates conditioned on subsets of the advice, and (3) simulates the reactions from various audiences to determine both the best candidate and advice to use. We evaluate the framework on eight scenarios spanning the ten fundamental processes of interpersonal communication. For each scenario, we collect a dataset of human evaluations across candidates and baselines, and showcase that our framework's chosen candidate is preferred over popular generation mechanisms including Chain-of-Thought. We also find that audience simulations achieve reasonably high agreement with human raters across 5 of the 8 scenarios. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of our framework by applying it to real-world scenarios described by users on web forums. Through evaluations and demonstrations, we show that EGS enhances the effectiveness and outcomes of goal-oriented communication across a variety of situations, thus opening up new possibilities for the application of large language models in revolutionizing communication and decision-making processes., Comment: 16 pages (main paper), 7 tables and figures (main)

Value alignment is essential for building AI systems that can safely and reliably interact with people. However, what a person values -- and is even capable of valuing -- depends on the concepts that they are currently using to understand and evaluate what happens in the world. The dependence of values on concepts means that concept alignment is a prerequisite for value alignment -- agents need to align their representation of a situation with that of humans in order to successfully align their values. Here, we formally analyze the concept alignment problem in the inverse reinforcement learning setting, show how neglecting concept alignment can lead to systematic value mis-alignment, and describe an approach that helps minimize such failure modes by jointly reasoning about a person's concepts and values. Additionally, we report experimental results with human participants showing that humans reason about the concepts used by an agent when acting intentionally, in line with our joint reasoning model.

Biological and artificial information processing systems form representations of the world that they can use to categorize, reason, plan, navigate, and make decisions. How can we measure the similarity between the representations formed by these diverse systems? Do similarities in representations then translate into similar behavior? If so, then how can a system's representations be modified to better match those of another system? These questions pertaining to the study of representational alignment are at the heart of some of the most promising research areas in contemporary cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. In this Perspective, we survey the exciting recent developments in representational alignment research in the fields of cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. Despite their overlapping interests, there is limited knowledge transfer between these fields, so work in one field ends up duplicated in another, and useful innovations are not shared effectively. To improve communication, we propose a unifying framework that can serve as a common language for research on representational alignment, and map several streams of existing work across fields within our framework. We also lay out open problems in representational alignment where progress can benefit all three of these fields. We hope that this paper will catalyze cross-disciplinary collaboration and accelerate progress for all communities studying and developing information processing systems., Comment: 51 pages; Working paper (changes to be made in upcoming revisions)

The increasing prevalence of artificial agents creates a correspondingly increasing need to manage disagreements between humans and artificial agents, as well as between artificial agents themselves. Considering this larger space of possible agents exposes an opportunity for furthering our understanding of the nature of disagreement: past studies in psychology have often cast disagreement as two agents forming diverging evaluations of the same object, but disagreement can also arise from differences in how agents represent that object. AI research on human-machine alignment and recent work in computational cognitive science have focused on this latter kind of disagreement, and have developed tools that can be used to quantify the extent of representational overlap between agents. Understanding how divergence and misalignment interact to produce disagreement, and how resolution strategies depend on this interaction, is key to promoting effective collaboration between diverse types of agents., Comment: Currently under review

How are people able to plan so efficiently despite limited cognitive resources? We aimed to answer this question by extending an existing model of human task decomposition that can explain a wide range of simple planning problems by adding structure information to the task to facilitate planning in more complex tasks. The extended model was then applied to a more complex planning domain of spatial navigation. Our results suggest that our framework can correctly predict the navigation strategies of the majority of the participants in an online experiment.

Uniquely among primates, humans possess a remarkable capacity to recognize and manipulate abstract structure in the service of task goals across a broad range of behaviors. One illustration of this is in the visual perception of geometric forms. Studies have shown a uniquely human bias toward geometric regularity, with task performance enhanced for more regular and symmetric forms compared to their geometrically irregular counterparts. Such studies conclude that this behavior implies the existence of discrete symbolic structure in human mental representations, and that replicating such behavior in neural network architectures will require mechanisms for symbolic processing. In this study, we argue that human biases towards geometric regularity can be reproduced in neural networks, without explicitly providing them with symbolic machinery, by augmenting them with an architectural constraint that enables the system to discover and manipulate relational structure. When trained with the appropriate curriculum, this model exhibits human-like biases towards symmetry and regularity in two distinct tasks involving abstract geometric reasoning. Our findings indicate that neural networks, when equipped with the necessary training objectives and architectural elements, can exhibit human-like regularity biases and generalization. This approach provides insights into the neural mechanisms underlying geometric reasoning and offers an alternative to prevailing symbolic "Language of Thought" models in this domain.