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Italian Constitution and European Convention on Human Rights provide for the reasonable length of proceedings, although they use different expressions. First of all the Author examines this principle as objective and subjective guarantee, as well as its relations with the other constitutional guarantees of fair trial. Then he analyses the main difficulties of the current legislation to realize a speedy and fair justice, by means of official data about number and duration of criminal proceedings. In light of the practical situation, the Author formulates some reform proposals.

Attraverso la disamina delle approfondite trattazioni che Joaquín Llobell dedica al diritto processuale penale se ne disegna, con grande chiarezza, la parabola evolutiva all’interno dell’ordinamento giuridico della Chiesa: fino agli ultimi approdi. L’Autore, pure convinto sostenitore della priorità e della preferibilità della via giudiziaria, constata come si sia recentemente affermata una progressiva ‘amministrativizzazione’ del processo penale: soprattutto per affrontare celermente ed efficacemente gli abusi sessuali commessi dai chierici. Tuttavia non cessa, nei suoi sapienti scritti, di suggerire quanto possa essere emendato per rendere le procedure amministrative coerenti ai postulati irrinunciabili del giusto processo. Through the examination of Joaquín Llobell’s extensive treatises regarding Criminal procedure, its evolutionary parable within the legal system of the Church is outlined with great clarity up to the latest outcomes. Though a staunch supporter of the priority and preferabili- ty of the judicial way, the Author ascertain that a gradual ‘admini- strationalization’ of the penal trial has been recently asserted: especially in order to deal quickly and effectively with sexual abuses that were committed by clerics. In his wise writings, however, He does not cease to point out what could be improved so that administrative procedures can be consistent with the essential postulates of due process. Through the examination of Joaquín Llobell’s extensive treatises regarding Criminal procedure, its evolutionary parable within the legal system of the Church is outlined with great clarity up to the latest outcomes. Though a staunch supporter of the priority and preferability of the judicial way, the Author ascertain that a gradual ‘administrationalization’ of the penal trial has been recently asserted: especially in order to deal quickly and effectively with sexual abuses that were committed by clerics. In his wise writings, however, He does not cease to point out what could be improved so that administrative procedures can be consistent with the essential postulates of due process.

L'art. 603 c.p.p. può ancora considerarsi la bussola normativa della piattaforma probatoria funzionale a sorreggere, in seconde cure, la conferma o la riforma della sentenza gravata, assicurando, al contempo, il rispetto dei canoni del due process of law? È questo il tema sul quale ci s'interroga, dopo sei interventi delle Sezioni Unite, racchiusi in un sessennio di "nomofilachia senza fine". Il Consesso allargato ha compiuto un'opera d'ingegneria giuridica che necessita, anzitutto, di riordino, al fine di misurare il grado di coerenza interna dello statuto giurisprudenziale della rinnovazione istruttoria e di valorizzarne gli approdi più significativi e attuali. Quel lavorio incessante, che dalla funzione nomofilattica è progressivamente trasmutato in attività nomopoietica, rimarca, per contrappunto, l'assenza del legislatore: la riforma Orlando e la riforma Cartabia, polarizzati i rispettivi interventi su uno sparuto alinea, celebrano, in subiecta materia, l'abdicazione della legge al ruolo che, a' sensi dell'art. 111 comma 1° Cost., le spetterebbe. Sicché, descrivendo i tratti fondamentali della "law in action" della rinnovazione dell'istruzione dibattimentale in appello, si ha la sensazione che l'art. 603 c.p.p. sia ormai ridotto a mero simulacro.

Nel saggio viene ripercorsa sinteticamente l’evoluzione dell’ampia riflessione giuridica dell’autorevole canonista Joaquín Llobell in materia di giudizio penale e diritto al giusto processo. Da essa traspaiono, oltre alla profondità, raffinatezza e acutezza del pensiero dell’Autore, la sua lucida capacità di comprendere le esigenze via via emergenti dalla realtà ecclesiale e la sua appassionata aspirazione a contribuire al bonum commune Ecclesiae. The protection of rights and penal judgment in the church. The essay briefly retraces the development of authoritative Canon law scholar Joaquín Llobell’s broad juridical reflection about the penal process and the right to due process. In addition to the Author’s depth of thought, refinement and sharpness, it reveals his ability to lucidly comprehend the needs that from time to time emerge from ecclesial reality, as well as his passionate desire to contribute to the bonum commune Ecclesiae.

Il contributo esamina punti di forza e di debolezza del principio di legalità processuale consacrato nell'art. 111 della costituzione

Italian Constitution and European Convention on Human Rights provide for the reasonable length of proceedings, although they use different expressions. First of all the Author examines this principle as objective and subjective guarantee, as well as its relations with the other constitutional guarantees of fair trial. Then he analyses the main difficulties of the current legislation to realize a speedy and fair justice, by means of official data about number and duration of criminal proceedings. In light of the practical situation, the Author formulates some reform proposals., La Costituzione italiana e la Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo sanciscono, benché con formulazioni diverse, la ragionevole durata del processo. Dopo aver esaminato tale principio nei suoi significati di garanzia oggettiva e soggettiva, nonché i suoi rapporti con le altre garanzie costituzionali del giusto processo, l’Autore, utilizzando i dati ufficiali sul numero e sulla durata dei procedimenti penali, analizza le principali difficoltà dell’attuale assetto legislativo nel realizzare una giustizia veloce e giusta. Alla luce della situazione concreta così delineata, si formulano alcune proposte de iure condendo.

This paper analyzes the complicated scenario that, starting with the promulgation of the current Italian criminal procedure code, in 1999 resulted in the constitutional reform of the "giusto processo". Inspired by an accusatory logic, the 1988 Code had introduced the contradictory "golden rule" in the formation of evidence, establishing the irrelevance of declarations secretly collected by the preliminary investigation actors. Unhappily received by the majority of the judiciary, the accusatory principles were suppressed in 1992 by the "inquisitorial revolution" caused by three constitutional court decisions (No. 24, 254, 255). Assuming that the contradictory in evidence production violates the search for the truth, the Constitutional Court has demolished the "golden rule," attributing probative value to all (or almost) statements unilaterally collected in the preliminary investigation by the prosecutor or the police. In fact, the mistake of the Constitutional Court was not figuring that the function of the criminal process is the revelation of the truth, which must be sought by any process that aspire the confidence of the citizens. The mistake was actually considering the contradictory as an obstacle to the pursuit of truth, causing an unfortunate opposition between two values that should be closely related. Essential to the cognitive function of the process is, in fact, the contradictory, the method which, as science clarifies, consists in subjecting the hypotheses to be proved to the most severe attempts of confrontation and falsification; while, on the other hand, it seems entirely reasonable to distrust what has been formed in secrecy, and especially the declarations that inevitably take preference to influence those who, in a position of authority, have unilaterally collected them. A reticent and partial attempt to recover the contradictory was later operated by Law 267 of 1997, which denied the probative value of previous statements on the responsibility of other co-defendants who afterwards exercised their right to silence. The law, however, even by reason of its objective inconsistencies, has been declared illegitimate once more by the Constitutional Court, with sentence 361 of 1998. But this time, together with the Union of Criminal Chambers, also appear the political forces, wounded by the censorship of a law that had been adopted almost unanimously shortly before. After that, promptly was approved the constitutional reform of the "giusto processo" (Constitutional Law No. 2 of November 23, 1999), which affirms that "criminal proceedings are regulated by the contradictory principle in the production of evidence (Article 111, paragraph 4, Const)., Este escrito analisa o complicado cenário que, a partir da promulgação do vigente código de processo penal italiano, em 1999 resultou na reforma constitucional do “giusto processo”. Inspirado em uma lógica acusatória, o código de 1988 tinha introduzido a “regra de ouro” do contraditório na formação da prova, estabelecendo a irrelevância probatória das declarações secretamente recolhidas pelos órgãos de investigação preliminar. Mal recebidos pela maioria da magistratura, os princípios acusatórios foram suprimidos em 1992 pela “revolução inquisitória” ocasionada por três sentenças da Corte constitucional (n. 24, 254, 255). Partindo do pressuposto de que o contraditório na formação da prova viola o accertamento da verdade, a Corte constitucional demoliu a “regra de ouro”, atribuindo valor probatório a todas (ou quase) declarações unilateralmente recolhidas na investigação preliminar pelo MP ou pela polícia. De fato, o erro da Corte constitucional não foi ter colocado como finalidade do processo penal o accertamento da verdade, o que precisa ser almejado por qualquer processo que aspire a confiança dos cidadãos. Ele foi, na verdade, ter considerado que o contraditório como um obstáculo à busca da verdade, ocasionando uma infeliz oposição entre dois valores que deveriam se relacionar intimamente. Essencial para a função cognitiva do processo é, de fato, exatamente o contraditório, ou seja, o método que, como ensina a ciência, consiste em submeter as hipóteses a serem provadas às mais severas tentativas de confrontação e falsificação; enquanto, por outro lado, parece totalmente razoável desconfiar daquilo que foi formado em segredo e, especialmente, das declarações que inevitavelmente tomam primazia na influência de quem, em posição de autoridade, as tenha unilateralmente recolhido. Uma tímida e parcial tentativa de recuperação do contraditório foi posteriormente operada pela lei 267 de 1997, que negou valor probatório às anteriores declarações sobre a responsabilidade de outros coimputados que depois em juízo tenham exercido o direito ao silêncio. A lei, todavia, até mesmo em razão das suas objetivas incongruências, acaba novamente declarada ilegítima pela Corte constitucional com a sentença 361 de 1998. Dessa vez, porém, surgem, junto com a União das Câmeras penais, também as forças políticas, feridas pela censura a uma lei que pouco antes tinha sido aprovada quase que unanimemente. Rapidamente acaba aprovada a reforma constitucional do “giusto processo” (lei constitucional n. 2 de 23 de novembro de 1999), com a qual se afirma textualmente que “o processo penal é regulado pelo princípio do contraditório na formação da prova” (tradução livre, art. 111, inciso 4° Const).

This paper analyzes the complicated scenario that, starting with the promulgation of the current Italian criminal procedure code, in 1999 resulted in the constitutional reform of the "giusto processo". Inspired by an accusatory logic, the 1988 Code had introduced the contradictory "golden rule" in the formation of evidence, establishing the irrelevance of declarations secretly collected by the preliminary investigation actors. Unhappily received by the majority of the judiciary, the accusatory principles were suppressed in 1992 by the "inquisitorial revolution" caused by three constitutional court decisions (No. 24, 254, 255). Assuming that the contradictory in evidence production violates the search for the truth, the Constitutional Court has demolished the "golden rule," attributing probative value to all (or almost) statements unilaterally collected in the preliminary investigation by the prosecutor or the police. In fact, the mistake of the Constitutional Court was not figuring that the function of the criminal process is the revelation of the truth, which must be sought by any process that aspire the confidence of the citizens. The mistake was actually considering the contradictory as an obstacle to the pursuit of truth, causing an unfortunate opposition between two values that should be closely related. Essential to the cognitive function of the process is, in fact, the contradictory, the method which, as science clarifies, consists in subjecting the hypotheses to be proved to the most severe attempts of confrontation and falsification; while, on the other hand, it seems entirely reasonable to distrust what has been formed in secrecy, and especially the declarations that inevitably take preference to influence those who, in a position of authority, have unilaterally collected them. A reticent and partial attempt to recover the contradictory was later operated by Law 267 of 1997, which denied the probative value of previous statements on the responsibility of other co-defendants who afterwards exercised their right to silence. The law, however, even by reason of its objective inconsistencies, has been declared illegitimate once more by the Constitutional Court, with sentence 361 of 1998. But this time, together with the Union of Criminal Chambers, also appear the political forces, wounded by the censorship of a law that had been adopted almost unanimously shortly before. After that, promptly was approved the constitutional reform of the "giusto processo" (Constitutional Law No. 2 of November 23, 1999), which affirms that "criminal proceedings are regulated by the contradictory principle in the production of evidence (Article 111, paragraph 4, Const).