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With the notable exception of the Ukraine crisis, Berlin has pursued a cooperative policy vis-à-vis Moscow, demonstrating a unique measure of understanding. This policy is consistent with the two roles that Germany has played in the international system since World War II—as a 'civilian power' and as a 'trading state'. Both have proven successful in foreign policy and economic terms, but have also created a path dependency that complicated adaptability to changed conditions: indecisiveness and a propensity for the middle ground have proven to be its questionable side-effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

National heritage, and particularly "difficult" heritage, does not exist in isolation from the heritage of other countries. Russia's relationship to Germany is a salient case in point in the Putin era, in which a more cosmopolitan approach to the history of the Second World War in many European states has been challenged by a reversion to nationalist approaches to this period in Russian memory politics. On the basis of the German-Russian Museum Berlin-Karlshorst, this article explores the possibilities of and limitations to international projects for the development of shared narratives about the past as a phenomenon of cultural diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the role of Germany in resolving the conflict between Ukraine and Russia from Kyiv’s perspective. After the Russian aggression, Ukrainian decision-makers appeared to be suffering dramatically challenging conditions, no longer able to rely on international law, and with all the multilateral security frameworks invalidated. Germany became a crucial mediator between the Ukrainian and Russian leaderships during the conflict, demonstrating decisive efforts to maintain unity among the European partners in supporting Ukraine after the Russian intervention. Germany sought to defend the normative power of the European Union as an alliance of states based not only on interests but on values. However, there is also a prevailing view in the public discourse about Ukraine which questions whether Germany used its full potential. One may argue that Germany became an occasional leader in Europe and was forced to react to the situation in Ukraine due to obstacles and external conditions, but not with strategic willingness. At the same time, there are enormous expectations in Ukraine with regard to the German role in the transformative processes in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the way in which German policies are portrayed in the Russian mainstream narrative. It concentrates on the ‘real sovereignty’ theory, which seems to have captured the mainstream thinking of world politics in Russia. Three aspects of this theory are discussed: first, whether it withstands the test of the Ukraine crisis; second, whether it can provide the Russian political establishment with an appropriate explanation of the current state of relations with Germany, at its lowest since reunification; and finally, if it gives the Russian political establishment a pretext to believe that the strategic partnership is not terminated but only temporarily suspended. The mainstream Russian narrative provides grounds for Moscow to believe that a strategic partnership with Germany is still feasible. However, the underlying purposes of such a partnership, as seen in Berlin and Moscow, are rather different and can hardly be reconciled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Germany emerged as the leader of EU crisis management efforts during the Ukraine conflict in 2014 and 2015. Traditional conceptualisations of German foreign policy - from civilian to hegemonic and geo-economic power - have not been able to sufficiently explain this new German leadership role. By applying a comprehensive taxonomy of power, this analysis aims at untangling the different ‘shades’ of German power, arguing that German ‘Machtpolitik’ is much more nuanced and subtle than previous conceptualisations and theoretical schools suggest. Taking Germany and EU foreign policy during the Ukraine conflict as a case study, this article contributes a new theoretically grounded perspective to the question of German power and influence within the European Union. The aim is to bring back power as a category into the analysis of member states’ relations within the EU since power politics have only been tamed, but not excluded from the European project. By combining and applying different ‘shades’ of power, Germany has become the central axis of policy-making between the European Union and Russia during the Ukraine conflict, decisively shaping discourse and content of EU policy towards Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More than any other country in Europe, Germany has been the main beneficiary of the post-cold war order in the Euro-Atlantic area, becoming Europe’s main status quo power. But with Russia’s foreign policy revisionism, the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ turn and Brexit, pressure on Germany to maintain or reshape the existing order is likely to increase. Ever since the role it exerted as a leader in the management of the eurozone crisis, Germany has been under growing pressure to become also a more effective foreign policy actor and security provider. The article discusses these changing dynamics in Germany’s foreign and security policy and assesses the extent to which a transformation of Germany’s role as a shaper of the Euro-Atlantic order has occurred since Berlin’s political elite jointly addressed the issue in early 2014. It makes the argument that in the wake of the end of the post-war Euro-Atlantic peace and security order, Germany’s foreign and security policy is undergoing an unprecedented and substantial change. Germany seems to be on a path as Europe’s emerging strategic leader since the Ukraine crisis. This change will be closely examined in Germany’s changing bilateral relationships with Russia and the United States and the possible implications for the Euro-Atlantic order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2014, Germany's foreign policy has been subject to international pressures to engage more actively in restoring the peace and security order in Europe. Particularly in its eastern policy, Berlin has had to redefine its traditional foreign policy, towards what could be termed a ‘hybrid Ostpolitik’. The introduction sets the context of German-Russian relations before 2014, and discusses the elements of continuity and change regarding Germany's role in Europe and transatlantic relations thereafter. It then presents an overview of the contributions to the special issue which are grouped around three themes: the question of the nature of German power and leadership; the effects of the Ukraine crisis on the Euro-Atlantic order and its impact on German foreign policy; and Germany's changing bilateral relations with the United States and its eastern neighbours in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article analyses the role of Germany in resolving the conflict between Ukraine and Russia from Kyiv’s perspective. After the Russian aggression, Ukrainian decision-makers appeared to be suffering dramatically challenging conditions, no longer able to rely on international law, and with all the multilateral security frameworks invalidated. Germany became a crucial mediator between the Ukrainian and Russian leaderships during the conflict, demonstrating decisive efforts to maintain unity among the European partners in supporting Ukraine after the Russian intervention. Germany sought to defend the normative power of the European Union as an alliance of states based not only on interests but on values. However, there is also a prevailing view in the public discourse about Ukraine which questions whether Germany used its full potential. One may argue that Germany became an occasional leader in Europe and was forced to react to the situation in Ukraine due to obstacles and external conditions, but not with strategic willingness. At the same time, there are enormous expectations in Ukraine with regard to the German role in the transformative processes in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments of Western democracies responded quickly to the poisoning—allegedly by agents of the Russian state—of former Soviet spy, Sergei Skripal, and his daughter in Salisbury, UK in March 2018. Germany's response was not as categorically reproachful and drew attention to its relationship with Vladimir Putin's Russia more generally. It expelled four Russian diplomats and has applied sanctions since Russia's annexation of Crimea, yet continues with other bilateral trade and investment, significantly in the energy sector, and it has been hesitant about unconditionally rebuking aggressive Russian behaviour. A complex mix of domestic politics and international relations, historical memory, economic incentives, and political psychology in the age of the internet and 'fake news' serve to influence German attitudes toward Russia. A contest between Putin critics and sympathisers sharpens in a polity in which the majority are ambivalent. In the aftermath of the Skripal affair, some rethinking of an ambiguous policy is occurring at high levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia has been both a divisive and a unifying force in the German-American relationship. It has been the focal point in this relationship since the end of World War II. During the cold war, the Soviet threat held Washington and Bonn together despite some important divergences in interests and policies. During the 1950s Adenauer's ‘policy of strength’ emphasised western solidarity and a strong military approach based on NATO and the European Community (EC), reinforced by the stationing of over 200,000 American military personnel in West Germany and West Berlin. Adenauer believed this policy of western solidarity would allow West Germany to draw East Germany (DDR) toward unification through the magnetism of western economic success combined with its military resolve. A corollary to this was the Hallstein Doctrine which barred the Federal Republic from having diplomatic relations with any country which recognised the DDR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article shows that national constructions of the Other are not fixed, but evolve as a result of policy makers’ agency, the domestic contestation among different identity narratives and their interaction with international structures. This is illustrated through an interpretive Social Constructivist approach and the Discourse-Historical Analysis (DHA) of narratives of Russia as an Other in German national identity. The article investigates the paradoxes of identity/difference and of continuity/change, which constitute the theoretical core of this Special Issue. It is argued that, in a longue durée perspective, narratives of Russia as an antagonistic Other have evolved and allowed for the emergence of less oppositional forms of difference. This change had an impact on German foreign policy, notably through the emergence of the cooperative Ostpolitik towards Russia. From the 1960s, Germany’s genocidal past was constructed as the main Other in national identity, whereas Soviet Russia was reconceptualised as an economic partner. I argue that this conceptualisation has proven remarkably resilient and has not disappeared in the context of the 2008 Georgian war and the current Ukraine crisis. While the Ostpolitik narrative temporarily lost momentum at the height of the crisis, it is ready to resurface as soon as structural conditions change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the process of interaction between Germany and Russia in the context of legal mechanism creation for mutual copyright protection. Features of the creativity protection regime of both states are studied through the musical and dramatic works. The process of interaction between states in making international agreements on copyright protection is reconstructed, and its features are determined. We have used complementary research methods, including historical legal method and system analysis. Based on archive documents and other sources, we have determined the various ways of interaction between Russian and German participants in the music copyright market (authors, publishers, governmentowned theaters, private enterprises, gramophone companies, collective copyright management organizations), as well as the measures they used for copyright protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The German and Russian nations share a long relationship. They fought the largest part of the world’s largest ever war. Resonances of that conflict and the Cold War that followed it still permeate their contemporary relationship. Under very different political systems, however, “history” is interpreted and responded to very differently. Concern for status and image, as well as geostrategic factors, motivate Russian officialdom’s disputing of the “post-Cold War order.” Germany is viewed as the pivotal state and nation in Europe. Russia seeks to influence Germany’s civil society and political elite in the attempt to obtain favourable policy outcomes. Sympathy for the Russian position within Germany is outweighed by disquiet regarding Russian foreign policy adventurism and its authoritarian regime more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If a declining state has incentives for preventive war, the rising state should have incentives to delay a confrontation until it is stronger. We develop the theoretical paradox and examine the July 1914 crisis. Why did Russia, rising relative to Germany, not adopt a buying-time strategy? We argue that although most Russian leaders hoped to avoid a confrontation, they feared that the failure to support Serbia would lead to a loss of Russian credibility and a significant setback to Russia’s position in the Balkans, one that could not easily be reversed, even with Russia’s expected increase in relative military power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can we understand German-Russian relations since German reunification? Both the geopolitical positions of the two states and the political and economic ties between them have been transformed over the past twentyfive years. This paper will argue, however, that the role of the two countries' leaders in shaping these relations has been surprisingly important. Building on the tradition of "first image" analysis in international relations, this paper shows that, along with larger political and economic trends, personal relations between these leaders have helped to set the tenor of bilateral ties. When the leaders were able to build trust and personal friendships, relations improved. Yet more recently, since 2012, relations have soured sharply. While there are obviously larger reasons for this, more negative personal ties between leaders have also played an important role. In short, just as issues of trust and friendship matter in personal ties, they also matter in International Relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sports historians are created in many ways. My path combined both personal experience and academic passion in tracing the development of equestrianism throughout history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the difficult search for identity in modern Russia amid debate over its future development. It explores practices in such countries as China and Germany, which have successfully adapted national identity to the need for modernisation and effective development in a new historical environment. The article analyses the risks that stem from Russia’s inclination towards focusing on the past and absolutising the factor of space. Finally, the piece offers suggestions on how to forge Russia’s new identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia’s armies suffered high levels of casualties in the first months of war in 1914. Although the Russian General Staff had foreseen this in their pre-war planning, the army had failed to take practical steps to implement its plans. The obvious inability of the Russian state to care for its wounded provided an opportunity for local government — zemstva and city councils — to step in and form national organizations to provide medical and other care for the wounded. By the end of 1914 rivalry and suspicion between central and local government was already firmly entrenched as care of the wounded became a crucial political issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the economic context behind Germany's decision to impose sanctions on Russia in 2014 in response to the Ukraine crisis, through the lens of energy and natural gas. It does so by comparing 2014 with another moment in German-Russian relations when questions of energy, economics, sanctions, and transatlantic politics converged--the Yamal natural gas pipeline in 1982. Then, West Germany had little economic latitude to disrupt trade with Russia because of its high unemployment rate, its balance of payments problems, and the large investments major German corporations had made in Yamal. Consequently, Bonn broke with the United States over the question of sanctions. In 2014, by contrast, Germany's strong economy, robust balance of payments, and the absence of a united business front opposing sanctions gave Berlin the space to pursue a non-economic agenda and support the United States in imposing sanctions. The article concludes that these cases illustrate how Germany should not be characterized as a "geo-economic power," insofar as Berlin still has the space to prioritize goals such as the advancement of democracy and human rights over its need to promote exports and secure imports of raw materials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay investigates the shift in Germany’sOstpolitikapproach to Russia as a result of the latter’s increasing domestic authoritarianism and assertive foreign policy, particularly its violations of international law in the Ukraine crisis. This prompted Germany to take the initiative in formulating EU sanctions against Russia. However, Germany has attempted to reconcile the sanctions policy with a diplomatic approach to resolving the Ukraine crisis by seeking ways of engaging Moscow on broader security and economic issues, as Russia is considered an essential factor in European and global security and a key energy supplier. Thus,Ostpolitikhas not been abandoned altogether; it continues to play a role and shapes the long-term objectives of Germany’s Russia policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstracts for articles on international relations for articles within this issue are presented on topics including U.S. foreign policy under U.S. President Barack Obama toward the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, a study of German Russian foreign relations, and food aid during the Syrian Civil War of 2012-2015.

Germany's relationship with Russia has historically been one of the most crucial in shaping Europe's fate. Despite radical transformation in the nature of European Great Power politics, it continues to be pertinent from the perspective of today's world. Germany's willingness to establish good relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s-its emphasis on economic relations and cooperation instead of political disagreements-prepared the ground for the end of the Cold War and German unification twenty years later. Germany's basic policy towards Russia remained broadly unchanged despite German unification and changes in the domestic political coalitions and leadership, sometimes against political expectations. In the European context, Germany's attitude towards Russia created the backbone of EU-Russia relations. During 2012-13, however, the continuity in Germany's policy towards Russia was seen as having come to an end. Political twists came to the fore and the atmosphere was loaded with tensions, made worse by the Ukrainian crisis. This article reviews the recent, alleged changes in Germany's policy towards Russia during the Merkel era. It asks two basic questions: first, whether Germany's policy really has changed and if it has, what are the theoretical tools that give us the best potential understanding of these changes? The article argues that the policy has changed, but not as dramatically as made out by some headlines. Moreover, the article suggests that a key element in analysing the degree of change in Germany's policy towards Russia is neither the external power relations nor domestic politics and related changes in the prevailing interpretation of national interest, though these are important too, but the interaction between the leaders and foreign policy elites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article mentions the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The problem of restitution, of returning illicitly exported items of cultural value, is examined in the context of Russo-German relations of the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, with analysis of the respective stance of both states on the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Well before the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the bilateral relationship between Germany and Russia began to deteriorate. This article traces German-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War in order to identify the reasons for the deterioration of the bilateral relationship. It examines the key debates inside Germany about its Russia policy, suggesting when and why the terms of the debates changed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

German foreign policy did adapt its principled beliefs as far as German‐Russian relationship is concerned and was successful in integrating EU and NATO over the crisis, but did not manage to adapt decisively causal beliefs at the tactical level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In late autumn of the year 1914 and the spring of the following year, the Germans tried to defeat the Russian armies in and around Eastern Prussia, while also having to heavily support the Austro-Hungarian armies in Galicia. The aim was to knock Russia out of the war and in- flict very heavy casualties on its armies. The battles of Tannenberg and especially the battles of the Masurian lakes liberated Eastern Prussia from Russian troops, but also showed that the Tsarist armies cannot be defeated so easily. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An interview with Union of Oil and Gas of Russia Board Chairman Yuri Konstantinovich is presented. Topics mentioned include the impact of sanctions pursued by Europe and the U.S. on the economic development in Russia, the failure of the Russian-European Union economic cooperation, and the proposal of the U.S., Russia, and China to form special relationships with Germany.

The article examines the decision of the administration of German Chancellor Angela Merkel to turn to the U.S. and suddenly freeze its relations with Russia. Topics discussed include the foreign economic relationship between the U.S. and Germany and direct German investments in Russia. Also cited is a criticism of Merkel's decision to favor a strong relationship with the U.S. and the possibility of economic collapse and mounting ethnic tension in Europe.

The article examines the Eastern policy of former West Germany Chancellor Willy Brandt in an attempt to understand the crisis in relations between Germany and Russia as of March 2015. Topics discussed include the evolution of Germany's relations with Russia from Brandt's administration to the current administration of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Also discussed are several causes of the strained Russian-German relations.

The article discusses Russia's foreign relations with Germany. Information on the increase of competition in the global market, Germany's foreign investments, and a comparison of German the success of business in Germany and abroad is presented. Also included is information on Russia's political crisis with the Ukraine in 2014.

The article discusses Germany's role in international affairs, with a particular focus on its potential role in combating Russian influence in Eastern Europe. According to the author, Germany's commercial interests, its economic and political ties with Russia, and its lack of a well-developed strategic class of military officers are the chief obstacles to its taking a stronger role in world politics. The author also suggests ways in which the U.S. can extend its own influence in world affairs, including reinforcing transatlantic political ties with a focus on Central and East Europeans and reinvesting in information policies.