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I explore the roots of ontological thinking in the late thought of Georg Lukács via the development of the nature of praxis in German Idealism and the thought of Marx. I contend that the thesis of spontaneous, self-creation as well as social relatedness are both core themes in German Idealism that achieve definitive form in Marx’s thought. In effect, I argue that the human capacities for relatedness and the formation of relations with others paired with the teleological structure of human practical agency constitute a crucial ontological ground for critical theory. It is this that Lukács focuses on in his later ontological writings and which can be used to re-orient contemporary critical theory and critical philosophy which has been dominated by post-metaphysical and neo-Idealist currents in recent decades.

What remains of German Idealism? This essay sets out by proposing that in both Hegel and Schelling the answer is ultimately an ontology of remains: an unsystematic philosophy of divine abjection in which the waste of the One is exposed as its own condition of possibility. This sheds new light on Coleridge's uneasy relationship with German Idealism, especially his puzzlement over Hegel's Science of Logic and his scandalized fascination with Schelling's Freiheitsschrift. At the heart of Coleridge's disquiet is his detection in both philosophers of a form of transcendental ontology that redirects the Kantian concern with the epistemological conditions of possible knowledge into an enquiry into the ontological conditions of the subjectivization of being. The essay traces the implications of the ontologizing of transcendental idealism for Coleridge's philosophy, chief among which is the way in which an indivisible remainder or Abfall (waste, offal) of the Absolute presents an excess that refuses to be harmonized into the transcendental unity of Coleridge's Prothetic "One." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Friedrich Hölderlin argued that consciousness requires division and unity. Consciousness emerges through the fundamental distancing of the subject from its surroundings, without which the subject-object distinction would collapse and both objectivity and consciousness would be lost. Nevertheless, insofar as conscious knowledge is unitary, division demands a ground for unity. Hölderlin calls this ground 'Being [Seyn].' However, once Being is affirmed, the question of how it is accessed arises. Hölderlin's scholars disagreed on this issue. This disagreement gave rise to two camps: those who deny that Hölderlin accepts the idea of direct access to Being and believe that he proves Being through an act of reflection (Henrich); and those who argue that for Hölderlin, 'Being' is directly accessed. Those who hold the latter position can be further divided into those who conceive of this direct access as knowledge (Frank) and those who argue that this access does not have a cognoscitive character, but rather an aesthetic one (Waibel). This article considers these positions and shows that the direct apprehension of 'Being' is part of Hölderlin's argument aimed at solving a fundamental problem; an argument that differs both from the postulate of access to Being as knowledge of transcendence and from the affirmation of a purely aesthetic mode of access. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The academic and cultural events surrounding the 2024 tercentenary of Immanuel Kant's birth promise to be both extensive and diverse. Kant's enduring significance transcends mere philosophy, permeating the cultural fabric of the Western world. Thus, this milestone year presents a fitting occasion to delve into his manifold contributions across various domains of knowledge, notably within the realm of religious philosophy, and the themes and developments of greatest actuality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article revisits Feuerbach's "break with speculation" in the early 1840s in light of issues raised by the original Pantheism Controversy, initiated in 1785 by the publication of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza. The article first describes the concerns underlying Jacobi's repudiation of Spinozism, and rationalism more generally, in favor of a personalistic theism that disclaims the possibility of philosophical knowledge of God. It goes on to reconstruct Hegel's alternative to Jacobi's famous salto mortale before considering how Feuerbach's critique of Hegel's philosophy of religion, as well as the personalism of the so-called Positive Philosophy (inspired by the late Schelling), was influenced by both Spinoza and Jacobi in ways that have not yet received sufficient attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I interpret Antigone through the philosophical category of the sublime, which enables her to transcend the order of nature and her empirical self. Through a close textual analysis of the Greek word amechanos (impossible), I argue that Antigone manages to affirm a place for herself within the incoherent kinship legacy left her father Oedipus by resolutely honouring her brother as an end-in-himself. At the same time, this burial also affirms her natureas a “mother bird” opposed to the normative gender roles available withinKreon’s polis. Understanding Antigone as a sublime figure also helps to explain two otherwise inscrutable references in the text: the first when Antigone compares herself to Niobe, and the second when the chorus describe her as the only person to enter Hades “alive”.My argument that Antigone becomes a sublime Idea concludes with an analysis of her through the rhetorical figure of hypotyposis, or as an indeterminate analogy that exists concurrently between the realms of aesthetics (sublimity)and ethics (autonomy). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781–1832) left for posterity an impressive and astonishingly contemporary corpus of philosophical creativity. Not only does it cover numerous topics of theoretical and practical philosophy, from a panentheistic-cosmopolitan point of view, but, in terms of the history of philosophy, it may be seen as one of the first works from a European pen which also appreciates the Indian roots of European thinking in their systematic importance. It combines them with Platonic metaphysics and Kant's transcendental philosophy to form a system of philosophy that is truly intercultural. In what follows, Krause's fundamental argument for panentheism is presented before it is argued that Krause's panentheism entails a cosmopolitan theory of human society according to which it is a postulate of practical reason to realize a cosmopolitan global league of humanity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the scope and limits of Hegel as an interpreter and interlocutor of the history of ancient philosophy. The importance of reading and understanding Hegelian interpretations of the classics is highlighted, as well as the hermeneutical criteria used by Hegel. Although Hegel has had a significant impact on philosophy, doubts are raised about his role as a historian and the possibility of distorting classical thought to adapt it to his own philosophical system. The text talks about the writer Johann Joachim Winckelmann and his study of the Greek language to read works by authors such as Sophocles, Euripides, Livy, Cicero, Longinus, and Epictetus. Additionally, it is mentioned that Hegel fully expressed his late philosophy in his Principles of the Philosophy of Right. Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy are considered an important source for understanding his thought and address topics such as the philosophy of art and the philosophy of religion. The text discusses the importance of the philosophical tradition and progress in the history of philosophy from Hegel's perspective. In this text, the idea that one cannot go back to the past and adopt ancient philosophies as one's own in the present is discussed. Hegel defends private property, the importance of the family, and individual freedom in civil society. The article analyzes the scope and limits of Hegel as an interpreter and interlocutor of classical thought. It is emphasized that Hegel considers Greek and Latin thinkers as living and valuable references, unlike many modern thinkers who dismiss them. Additionally, Hegel was the first modern philosopher to be a detailed historian of ancient philosophy, although his approach is not as rigorous as contemporary scholarship. The author suggests that Hegel's Lectures may be confusing for inexperienced readers, but they are valuable for those familiar with classical sources and Hegelian thought. [Extracted from the article]

This article discusses Schelling's contribution to the definition of the concept of religion in post-Kantian philosophy. In three lines of argument, it is shown that Schelling's late lectures on the philosophy of mythology and revelation place religion in a history of development in which religion is successively understood as religion. Schelling assumes that religion is independent of reason and is based on a real relationship with God that is connected to the nature of man. This makes the philosophy of religion an independent academic discipline. Schelling links the historical development of religion and the history of God in his concept of monotheism. This is the content of Schelling's formula that God is the Lord of being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent attention has turned to Herman Bavinck's discussion of theosis, with some arguing that he supported such a theology. I will challenge this, arguing instead that he misunderstood the nature of deification and rejected it on false grounds. Bavinck's objections to theosis will be addressed to show how a Reformed doctrine of theosis can avoid the sorts of dualistic mysticism Bavinck rightly opposed. Bavinck's criticisms of theosis are brought into dialogue with Thomas F. Torrance's endorsement of theosis to see why Bavinck could not endorse a doctrine of theosis even if the mysticism he opposed were removed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica (1575-6866) is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The present article considers Heidegger's thinking about the concept of "system" in Schelling's treatise on Freedom (1809). Heidegger's thoughtful reference to Schelling's treatise is research on the principle of system formation and the question of the possibility of a system of freedom as a question about the essence of being. In his interpretation, the necessity of establishing freedom in the system, is raised in the framework of this basic principle of idealism, which is necessary for the establishment of a system, the search for the shaping principle of being, and the research on how it is possible to have a connection in the ground of being. Therefore, the guiding questions of this article are, why does the system become the main point of controversy and the most necessary demand in German idealism? And according to Heidegger's interpretation, to what extent was Schelling successful in establishing a system compatible with freedom?

The aim of the present paper is to show Novalis' complete belonging to the history of transcendental philosophy by bringing out the connection between his conception of poetry and the issue of transcendental imagination in Kant and Fichte. Given that solving this problem is the main issue around which Novalisian thought is structured, an attempt is made to consider the writing style adopted by the author as necessary to fulfill this task, and not as an arbitrary rhetorical choice. The connection between poetry and philosophy is then explored in the practical role it has to play among human beings, namely, that of revealing the meaning of the whole reality as a manifestation of the absolute. Thus, life itself is properly displayed by the singular existences as absolute creativity, such as that of poetical creations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant's account of natural teleology has recently garnered significant interest, though there is little consensus regarding either Kant's aim or whether this account coheres with the rest of his critical project. I argue that Kant's position on natural teleology is only intelligible against the backdrop of his account of conceptual synthesis in the B-Edition of the Transcendental Deduction, in the Critique of Pure Reason, and, more generally, his account of 'transcendental logic'. Viewed in this light, I argue that we must see Kant as committed to the seemingly implausible claim that there can be no objective ground for the distinction between the living and the non-living, and that, consequently, there could be no possible occasion for the—even regulative—deployment of natural teleological judgment. I argue, further, that this suggests that Kant's discussion of natural teleology plays a far more significant role in his larger critical project than is commonly understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article considers Heidegger's thinking about the concept of "system" in Schelling's treatise on Freedom (1809). Heidegger's thoughtful reference to Schelling's treatise is research on the principle of system formation and the question of the possibility of a system of freedom as a question about the essence of being. In his interpretation, the necessity of establishing freedom in the system, is raised in the framework of this basic principle of idealism, which is necessary for the establishment of a system, the search for the shaping principle of being, and the research on how it is possible to have a connection in the ground of being. Therefore, the guiding questions of this article are, why does the system become the main point of controversy and the most necessary demand in German idealism? And according to Heidegger's interpretation, to what extent was Schelling successful in establishing a system compatible with freedom? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay intervenes in the contemporary debate surrounding the Bildungsroman and its roots in German Idealism through a new reading of the idea of "life" in two major modern texts: G. W. F. Hegel's Lectures on Fine Art and the famous "Research" chapter of Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain. I establish three key points: 1) Hegel pioneers a bio-aesthetics that grasps the work of art as a distinctly social and historical, reflective manifestation of organic life; 2) Mann's novel achieves a kind of selfconscious knowledge of the Bildungsroman in particular as such a manifestation; and 3) Karl Marx's analysis of the alienation of humanity from its "species-being" under capitalism accounts for the opposition between nature and culture, animality and rationality, that drives Mann's modernist experiment with genre: his innovation of what I call "the novel of deformation.". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers an interpretation of the thesis developed by Fichte in the Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre following "the philosophy one chooses depends on the man one is" as a deepening of symbolic practices and dispositions that philosophy shares with ordinary consciousness. To support this interpretation, the paper describes how Fichte defines individual character formation and how it relates to a historical determinate is presented through a quick excursion in the Nicolaischrift of 1801 (§2). Through a critical and synthetic view of the process of initiation into philosophy, the paper shows how the choice of philosophy is a choice for philosophy (§ 3) and invests a certain "skill" that is produced in the pre-philosophical dimension (§ 4). Through discussion of the Fichtian concepts of "instinct of reason" and "new sensory," how the choice for philosophy, interpretable as the production of a new habitus, the fichtean doctrine of Science realizes itself fully as 'critique' (§ 5). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article revisits Feuerbach’s “break with speculation” in the early 1840s in light of issues raised by the original Pantheism Controversy, initiated in 1785 by the publication of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza. The article first describes the concerns underlying Jacobi’s repudiation of Spinozism, and rationalism more generally, in favor of a personalistic theism that disclaims the possibility of philosophical knowledge of God. It goes on to reconstruct Hegel’s alternative to Jacobi’s famous salto mortale before considering how Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of religion, as well as the personalism of the so-called Positive Philosophy (inspired by the late Schelling), was influenced by both Spinoza and Jacobi in ways that have not yet received sufficient attention.

This study argues that the early philosophy of Semyon Liudvigovich Frank (1877–1950) exhibits significant intellectual correlations with nineteenth century German Idealist philosophy. The idealists in question are Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879), G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) and F.W.J. Schelling (1775–1854). It will be suggested that the critical tension of Frank's early philosophy is precisely a tension between his Hegelian and Schellingian tendencies. The paper will first introduce Frank's theory of a "personal absolute", exploring its surprising parallels with the religious philosophy of I. H. Fichte. The analysis then addresses the self-dispersal of Hegel's absolute, before finally turning to Schelling's immediate intuition of subject-object identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fichte’s Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre 1794 is one of the most fundamental books in classical German philosophy. The use of laws of thought to establish foundational principles of transcendental philosophy was groundbreaking in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and is still crucial for many areas of theoretical philosophy and logic in general today. Nevertheless, contemporaries have already noted that Fichte’s derivation of foundational principles from the law of identity is problematic, since Fichte lacked the tools to correctly present the formal parts of Foundations. In this paper, however, we argue that Fichte’s approach intuitively offers an important contribution to transcendental philosophy, and especially to philosophy of logic. We first point out the difficulties of Fichte’s logic in the Foundations and improve it in a second part on the basis of a formal system in which both propositional logic and syllogistic are combined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses Schelling’s contribution to the definition of the concept of religion in post-Kantian philosophy. In three lines of argument, it is shown that Schelling’s late lectures on the philosophy of mythology and revelation place religion in a history of development in which religion is successively understood as religion. Schelling assumes that religion is independent of reason and is based on a real relationship with God that is connected to the nature of man. This makes the philosophy of religion an independent academic discipline. Schelling links the historical development of religion and the history of God in his concept of monotheism. This is the content of Schelling’s formula that God is the Lord of being.

Friedrich Hölderlin's Hyperion oder der Eremit in Griechenland (1797–1799) plays with the Bildungsroman as a literary form. As a story of the coming-of-age of the novel itself, it is a Künstlerroman as well. When the narrator fails in his worldly aspirations, he chooses the life of a hermit. His book becomes his cloister. This essay will study Hölderlin's novel as a response to Friedrich Schiller's philosophy of freedom in and through art. In his letters Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (1795), Schiller posits a two-fold relationship between art and freedom. Art is freedom in the ideal and allows for freedom in history. In other words, moral freedom requires aesthetic freedom as a pledge to its possibility. But in Hyperion, aesthetic freedom appears as freedom itself, absolutely and without any 'and'. History may have yet to separate itself out from life, but art does so, making a prophet of Hölderlin's Hyperion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Hegel's discussion of the 'speculative sentence' occurs in the 'Preface' to the Phenomenology of Spirit, commentators rarely link it to the larger program of this text. Instead, this discussion has typically been received as a guide to the Science of Logic's presentation, as an independent theory of judgment, or as a reflection on the constraints and capacities of language generally. In this paper I argue that the speculative sentence can and should be linked to the Phenomenology itself. Specifically, I show that Hegel's discussion both mirrors and supplements the 'Introduction's' explication of immanent phenomenological method. Establishing this parallel in turn allows us to identify a class of sentences throughout the Phenomenology as properly speculative and methodologically substantive. At the same time, this interpretation helps clarify several characteristics that Hegel ascribes to the speculative sentence, but which have gone unaddressed by commentators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did nineteenth‐century German historians and physicists habitually warn against vices that they believed philosophers in particular embodied: speculation, absence of common sense, and excessive systematizing? Drawing on a rich array of sources, this article interprets this vice‐charging as a rhetorical practice aimed at delineating empirical research from Naturphilosophie and Geschichtsphilosophie as practiced in the heyday of German Idealism. The strawman of "the philosopher" as invoked by historians and physicists served as a negative model for strongly empiricist scholars committed to virtues like precision, thoroughness, and conscientiousness. In their historical narratives, historians and physicists consistently depicted philosophy either as a relic from the past or as a phase that they had virtuously left behind. This boundary work was central to the self‐positioning of both history and physics, which makes clear that the persona of the philosopher mattered not only to philosophers but also to scholars in adjacent disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I would like to use the case of Rudolf Eucken to examine how the historiography of philosophy, and especially the interpretation of German Idealism, became a medium of national self-assurance. By referring to the philosophical classics of German Idealism, Eucken, at the end of the 19th century, develops a model of a publicly effective philosophy to which he ascribes the task of contributing to the recovery of unity and strength. My aim is to work out the social background and the social function of this characterisation of the history of philosophy. The thesis I would like to develop is that Eucken, in reaction to his perception of social crises and the inner-scientific questioning of the role of philosophy, attempts to establish philosophy as a fundamental element of the historical discourse and practices of the new German nation state. This historical discourse, into which philosophy attempts to inscribe itself, can be interpreted, following Durkheim's sociological reflections on religion, as an attempt to sacralise the nation. This reveals the social function of this form of philosophical historiography: it becomes the theology of the new German nation state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to explore and lay out crucial aspects of the interpretation of the Hegelian philosophy offered by the American thinker Richard Dien Winfield. Winfield works out an innovative line of interpretation that decisively ties Hegel to a non-foundational type of philosophical epistemology with significant consequences concerning the concept of objectivity in both theoretical and practical philosophical investigation. The article attempts to reconstruct this line of interpretation and assess its argumentative force, in view of an array of epistemological problems regarding theory construction in political philosophy. On this account, the principal question is whether the special brand of epistemological non-foundationalism ascribed by Winfield to Hegel is actually in a favorable position to successfully tackle with these problems.

In the present article we try to trace back what we call the "hegemony of silence" in some of Molavi's verses and poems. The advocates of the "hegemony of silence" over-value silence at the cost of a devaluation of language and take it to have a special kind of intuition, a special kind of insight into the Thing beyond language. This attitude towards silence and language has a long-lasting history and has only been questioned recently. We will try to read this hegemonic attitude against the background of a Hegelian-Lacanian attitude, a modern attitude which highly esteems both language and silence and ultimately considers silence as a linguistic phenomenon. We will argue that these two attitudes have two different logics as their ground: the first attitude, the hegemony of silence, is grounded on Sohravardi's "Imkan-e Ashraf" and the second one, on the retroactive logic of German Idealism. After examining the epistemological and ontological consequences of these two attitudes, we will come to the conclusion that the position of the "hegemony of silence" is a contradictory and impossible position.

Although Gołuchowski was inspired mainly by Schelling, he was well acquainted with the views of other German idealist thinkers, including Hegel. Referring to Gołuchowski's early works, as well as to his last book Dumania nad najwyższemi zagadnieniami człowieka ("Thoughts about the highest human issues", published posthumously in 1861), I will discuss the main Hegelian motifs in his philosophy and their relationship to the Schellingian "basis" of his thought. I will also consider the main motifs of Gołuchowski's critique of Hegel's system which can be treated – at least to some extent – as belonging to the revision of the assumptions of Hegelian absolute idealism made by such Polish adherents of Hegel's philosophy as Trentowski, Libelt or Cieszkowski. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay re-examines the origins of Herman Bavinck's organic motif. Contending with a central claim of the new interpretative paradigm in Bavinck studies, this article problematises the claim that Bavinck's organic motif does not draw on German idealism but derives solely from a classical western doctrine of the Trinity. This essay argues that the denial of Schelling's influence on Bavinck's organicism misconstrues the terms on which Bavinck forges his synthesis of orthodoxy and modernity, and cloaks the degree to which Bavinck allows philosophical constructs to determine the material content of his theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the legal principles of German idealism in the long nineteenth century; and what conception(s) of international law do they offer? Opposing Kantian rationalism and its formalist law, two idealist reactions do emerge in the early decades of the nineteenth century. The first is offered by Hegel whose conception of state law will make him the principal representative of the future deniers of an objective international law. The second reaction comes from the German Historical School, whose moral and legal understanding of the people(s) does – on the contrary – develop a positive conception of international law based on a 'society' of nations. How, and to what extent, were these two idealistic approaches reflected in the international law textbooks of the age? This article investigates this question and finds that it is unquestionably the Historical School that came to dominate international law thinking in the long nineteenth century – and that not just in Germany but also in Italy and Great Britain. The nineteenth century is thus decidedly, under the influence of Savigny and the Historical School, a metaphysical century centred on an intrinsic connection between morality and law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)