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Am 1. Januar 2023 hat Deutschland den G7-Vorsitz an Japan übergeben. Für ihr Präsidentschaftsjahr hatte sich die Bundesregierung eine progressive Agenda vor­genommen, die jedoch früh vom Angriffskrieg Russlands gegen die Ukraine über­lagert wurde. Dennoch sind einige materielle Erträge zu verzeichnen, darunter der Klimaclub. Die Wirksamkeit dieser Maßnahmen lässt sich zwar noch nicht prüfen; sehr wohl kann aber die Kriseneffektivität der G7 beurteilt werden, ebenso wie die Frage, wie legitim sie regiert. Die Kritik an mangelnder Legitimität des globalen Regierens durch informelle Foren (Club Governance) ist nicht neu. Sie macht sich daran fest, dass die von wenigen Regierungen initiierten Vorhaben sich auf eine Viel­zahl von staatlichen und nichtstaatlichen Akteuren auswirken, die auf den Politikprozess kaum Einfluss nehmen können. Selektive Partizipation, mangelnde Trans­parenz und fehlende Rechenschaft sind Kritikpunkte, die häufig gegen Club Gover­nance vorgebracht werden. In diesen drei Dimensionen wie auch mit Blick auf die Kriseneffektivität schneidet die G7 recht gut ab. (Autorenreferat)

At the G7 summit in June 2022, the German government intends to promote inter­national climate cooperation by establishing a climate club. This club is envisioned to foster implementation of the Paris climate goals and, ideally, grow into a global alliance of ambitious countries. In light of Russia's attack on Ukraine, energy policy cooperation is now one of the most pressing issues at the G7 summit. Energy security as a short-term priority must be reconciled with accelerated decarbonisation and the international climate agenda. A climate club can certainly provide an impetus for this through agreements on joint regulatory approaches and climate action projects. In terms of the international political process, however, it is important to prevent the initiative from being perceived as a rich countries' club. The German government should carefully manage expectations: Strong signals are needed for COP27 in Egypt in autumn, first and foremost by way of increasing climate finance commitments. Moreover, it will be crucial to shape the G7 club as an ambitious but inclusive initiative. (author's abstract)

Beim G7-Gipfel im Juni 2022 auf Schloss Elmau will die Bundesregierung die inter­nationale Klimakooperation voranbringen und dazu einen Klimaclub gründen. Dieser soll die Umsetzung der Pariser Klimaziele fördern und bestenfalls zu einer breiten Allianz ambitionierter Länder wachsen. Angesichts des russischen Angriffs auf die Ukraine stellen sich nun aber drängende Fragen der energiepolitischen Zusammen­arbeit in der G7. Versorgungssicherheit als kurzfristige Priorität muss mit dem klima­politischen Ziel einer schnelleren Dekarbonisierung und der internationalen Klima­agenda in Ein­klang gebracht werden. Dazu kann ein Klimaclub Impulse setzen, und zwar mit Ver­abredungen über gemeinsame regulatorische Ansätze und Klimaprojekte. Mit Blick auf den internationalen Klimaprozess muss aber vermieden werden, dass die Ini­tia­ti­ve als Club der reichen Staaten aufgefasst wird. Die Bundesregierung sollte daher das Augenmerk auf die Erwartungen an ihren Vorstoß richten: Nötig sind Signale für die COP27 im Herbst in Ägypten, vor allem mittels steigender Klima­finanzierung. Ebenso gilt es, den G7-Club als ambitionierte, aber inklusive Initiative zu gestalten. (Autorenreferat)

The 2021 G7 Summit of the heads of state and government of the seven leading indus­trial nations (Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, United States, United Kingdom) will be held in Cornwall, UK, from 11 to 13 June. As host, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has placed future relations with China at the top of the agenda. That priori­tisation is reflected in the guest list: Australia, India, South Korea and South Africa. The Cornwall G7 has been set up to develop a broad alliance against an increasingly aggressive China. The German government tends to play up China's economic signifi­cance and risks slipping into an outsider role, enabling a totalitarian state for eco­nomic gain. (author's abstract)

Die globale digitale Ordnung ist seit vielen Jahren Gegenstand der Beratungen der G7. Das Themenspektrum reicht von der Digitalwirtschaft über Cybersecurity bis hin zu Künstlicher Intelligenz. Unter britischem Vorsitz wurden 2021 die Aktivitäten in diesem Feld noch einmal intensiviert. Für die neue Bundesregierung bietet sich die Chance, diesen Faden aufzugreifen und dabei eigene Akzente zu setzen: Denn der An­spruch einer liberalen Ausgestaltung der globalen digitalen Ordnung gerät zunehmend unter Druck und sollte daher proaktiv verteidigt werden. Einen konkreten An­satzpunkt bildet die Internet Governance als zentrales Element der globalen digitalen Ordnung. Hier wird technisch das Fundament für eine offene und inklusive Digitali­sierung gelegt - und bietet sich politisch eine Gelegenheit, neue Partner zu gewinnen. (Autorenreferat)

Der britische Premierminister Boris Johnson ist vom 11. bis 13. Juni Gastgeber der Staats- und Regierungschefs sechs anderer führender Industrieländer (Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien, Japan, Kanada, die USA). Brisanz hat dieser G7-Gipfel im eng­lischen Cornwall insofern, als Johnson die Frage der künftigen Zusammenarbeit mit China zu einem der Kernthemen gemacht hat. Die Schwerpunktsetzung zeigt sich schon an der Liste der zusätzlich eingeladenen Länder: Australien, Indien, Südkorea und Südafrika. Die Bildung einer breiten Allianz gegen das zunehmend aggressiv auf­tretende China gewinnt mit dem G7-Gipfel an Dynamik. Die deutsche Außenpolitik hat in dessen Vorfeld mehrfach auf die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Chinas hingewiesen und gerät zusehends in die Rolle eines Außenseiters, der aus ökonomischen Inter­essen an der Zusammenarbeit mit einem totalitären Staat festhält. (Autorenreferat)

The effect of globalisation on inflation is modelled and simulated for ten countries from G10 during the Great Moderation period. The results are supportive of the globalisation hypothesis. In particular, the results show that dynamic channels and magnitudes of globalisation to domestic inflation are highly heterogeneous from country to country, that increases in trade openness could be either inflationary or deflationary, while increased imports from low-cost emerging-market economies have been mostly deflationary, and that there has been almost no direct globalisation impact as far as inflation persistence is concerned while the impact on inflation variability can be positive as well as negative. Overall, globalisation is shown to have contributed positively to the aspect of low inflation rather than that of stable inflation during the Great Moderation era.

This paper employs a Markov regime-switching approach to investigate whether the Great Moderation is over since the start of the late 2000s recession. The results confirm that the recent financial crisis did cause a simultaneous high-volatility period among the G7 countries. However, the financial crisis may not mark the end of the Great Moderation. There is strong evidence that each G7 country has again returned to the low-variance state since 2009 or the beginning of 2010.

This paper studies the dynamics of international consumption risk sharing among the G7 countries. Based on the dynamic conditional correlation model due to Engle (2002), we construct a time-varying, consumption-based measure of risk sharing. We find that although the exposure to country-specific shocks has declined in the G7 countries, with Japan being an exception, the evolution of risk sharing is rather heterogeneous across countries.

Using the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model due to Engle (2002), we estimate time varying correlations of quarterly real GDP growth among the G7 countries. In general, we find that rather heterogeneous patterns of international synchronization exist during U.S. recessions. During the 2007 - 2009 recession, however, international co-movement increased substantially.

This article proposes a multivariate model of inflation with conditionally heteroskedastic common and country-specific components. The model is estimated in one-step via Quasi-Maximum Likelihood for the G7 countries for the period Q1-1960 to Q4-2009. It is found that various model specifications considered fit well the first and second order dynamics of inflation in the G7. The estimated volatility of the common inflation component captures the international effects of the 'Great Moderation' and of the 'Great Recession'. The model also shows promising capabilities for forecasting inflation in several countries.

In this paper, we use survey data to analyze the accuracy, unbiasedness, and the efficiency of professional macroeconomic forecasts. We analyze a large panel of individual forecasts that has not been analyzed in the literature so far. We provide evidence on the properties of forecasts for all G7 counties and for four diffierent macroeconomic variables. Our results show a high degree of dispersion of forecast accuracy across forecasters. We also find that there are large diffierences in the performance of forecasters not only across countries but also across diffierent macroeconomic variables. In general, forecasts tend to be biased in situations where forecasters have to respond to large structural shocks or gradual changes in the trend of a variable. Furthermore, while a sizable fraction of forecasters seem to smooth their GDP forecasts significantly, this does not apply to forecasts made for other macroeconomic variables.

The study analyses the business cycles of the G7 countries in a structural vector autoregression(SVAR) framework comprising output, nominal interest rate and inflation. Common and country-specific supply, demand and nominal shocks of each G7 country are identified, and the corresponding shock propagation channels are computed. We establish the statistical properties of the cyclical fluctuations and investigate the role of each structural common and country-specific shock in the cyclical fluctuations of the variables of interest as well as the business cycle co-movement in the G7 group of countries.

The paper examines the informational content of a series of macroeconomic indicator variables with the intention to predict stock market downturns - colloquially also referred to as 'bear markets' - for G7 countries. The sample consists of monthly stock market indices and a set of exogenous indicator variables that are subject to examination, ranging from January 1970 to September 2008. The methodical approach is twofold. In the first step, a modified version of the Bry-Boschan business cycle dating algorithm is used to identify bull and bear markets from the data by creating dummy variable series. In the second step, a substantial number of probit estimations is carried out, by regressing the newly identified dummy variable series on different specifications of indicator variables. By applying widely used in- and out-of-sample measures, the specifications are evaluated and the forecasting performance of the indicators is assessed. The results are mixed. While industrial production, and money stock measures seem to have no predictive power, short and long term interest rates, term spreads as well as unemployment rate exhibit some. Here, it is clearly possible to extract some informational content even three months in advance and so to beat the predictions made by a recursively estimated constant.

This paper considers factor forecasting with national versus factor forecasting withinternational data. We forecast German GDP based on a large set of about 500 time series, consisting of German data as well as data from Euro-area and G7 countries. For factor estimation, we consider standard principal components as well as variable preselection prior to factor estimation using targeted predictors following Bai and Ng [Forecasting economic time series using targeted predictors, Journal of Econometrics 146 (2008), 304-317]. The results are as follows: Forecasting without data preselection favours the use of German data only, and no additional information content can be extracted from international data. However, when using targeted predictors for variable selection, international data generally improves the forecastability of German GDP.

In this paper we re-investigate the comovements of interest rates in the G7-countries. We propose a structured modus operandi to analyze the time series characteristics of interest rates and to test for common features. We conduct cointegration, serial correlation common feature and codependence tests with nominal and real interest rates using quarterly data from 1975 to 2007. Overall we only find little evidence of comovements. Common trends are occasionally observed, but the majority of interest rates are not cointegrated. Although some evidence for codependence of higher order is found among European countries, common cycles appear to exist only in rare cases and cannot be generalized for all interest rates.

This paper constructs new indicators of liquidity for equity, bond and money markets in major advanced and emerging market countries, documents their evolution and co-movements, and assesses the extent to which such measures are determinants of selected spreads and proxy measures of countries' growth opportunities. Three main results obtain. First, there is evidence of an historical increase in market liquidity since the early 1990s, in part as a result of advances in international financial integration, but markets have been increasingly exposed to global systemic liquidity shocks. Second, liquidity indicators appear to be important determinants of bond spreads in advanced economies and EMBI spreads in emerging markets. Third, improvements in market liquidity have significant real effects, as liquidity indicators have a significant positive impact on proxy measures of countries' growth opportunities.

We analyze the importance of global shocks for the global economy and national policy makers. More specifically, we investigate whether monetary policy has become less effective in the wake of financial globalization. We also examine whether there is increasing uncertainty for central banks due to globalization-driven changes in the national economic structure. A FAVAR framework is applied to derive structural shocks on a worldwide level and their impact on other global and also national variables. We estimate our macro model using quarterly data from Q1 1984 to Q4 2007 for the G7 countries plus the euro area. According to our results, global liquidity shocks are a driving force of the global economy and various national economies. However, some other shocks such as originating from house prices, GDP, technology and long-term interest rates play a role at the global level as well. These results prove to be robust across different specifications. Structural break tests indicate that global liquidity shocks have recently become more important as a determinant for house prices. In general, global variables have become more powerful over time in driving national variables.

Arghyrou, Gregoriou and Pourpourides (2009) argue that exchange rate uncertainty causes deviations from the law of one price. We test this hypothesis on aggregate data from the G7-area. We find that exchange rate uncertainty explains to a significant degree deviations from Purchasing Power Parity.

This paper investigates the impact of pyramid ownership structure and multiple controlling shareholders on firm leverage. Pyramids, having at least one controlling shareholder and a subsidiary, rely significantly more on debt financing than non-pyramid firms. Moreover, higher leverage is observed in pyramids where the second controlling shareholders have more voting rights. We also find that the disparity between the voting rights of the first two controlling shareholders is negatively related to firm leverage. Interestingly, the influence of the second controlling shareholder is only present in non-family controlled pyramids. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that controlling shareholders in pyramids use debt to secure their private benefits., Les auteures étudient l'incidence de la structure de propriété pyramidale et de la présence de plusieurs actionnaires dominants sur le levier financier des sociétés. Les pyramides, qui comptent au moins un actionnaire dominant et une filiale, se financent beaucoup plus par emprunt que les autres types de société. Le recours au levier financier est encore plus marqué lorsque les deuxièmes actionnaires en importance ont davantage de droits de vote que les premiers. Les auteures constatent aussi que l'écart entre les droits de vote des deux principaux actionnaires est inversement lié au levier financier des sociétés. Fait intéressant, les deuxièmes actionnaires n'ont d'influence que dans les pyramides qui ne sont pas contrôlées par une famille. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats sont conformes au point de vue selon lequel les actionnaires dominants au sein des pyramides utilisent l'emprunt pour servir leurs intérêts privés.

We analyze the importance of global shocks for the global economy and national policy makers. More specifically, we investigate whether monetary policy has become less effective in the wake of financial globalization. We also examine whether there is increasing uncertainty for central banks due to globalization-driven changes in the national economic structure. A FAVAR framework is applied to derive structural shocks on a worldwide level and their impact on other global and also national variables. We estimate our macro model using quarterly data from Q1 1984 to Q4 2007 for the G7 countries plus the euro area. According to our results, global liquidity shocks are a driving force of the global economy and various national economies. However, some other shocks originating in house prices, GDP, technology and long-term interest rate shocks play a role at the global level as well. These results prove to be robust across different specifications. Structural break tests indicate that global liquidity shocks have recently become more important as a determinant for house prices. In general, global variables have become more powerful over time in driving national variables.

We systematically examine the comparative predictive performance of a number of alternative linear and non-linear models for stock and bond returns in the G7 countries. Besides Markov switching, threshold autoregressive (TAR), and smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) regime switching (predictive) regression models, we also estimate univariate models in which conditional heteroskedasticity is captured through GARCH, TARCH and EGARCH models and ARCH-in mean effects appear in the conditional mean. Although we fail to find a consistent winner/out-performer across all countries and asset markets, it turns out that capturing non-linear effects is of extreme importance to improve forecasting performance. U.S. and U.K. asset return data are special” in the sense that good predictive performance seems to loudly ask for models that capture non-linear dynamics, especially of the Markov switching type. Although occasionally also stock and bond return forecasts for other G7 countries appear to benefit from non-linear modeling (especially of TAR and STAR type), data from France, Germany, and Italy express interesting predictive results on the basis of simpler benchmarks. U.S. and U.K. data are also the only two data sets in which we find statistically significant differences between forecasting models. Results appear to be remarkably stable over time, and robust to the specification of the loss function used in statistical evaluations as well as to the methodology employed to perform pairwise comparisons.

In this paper, we use survey data to analyze the rationality of professional macroeconomic forecasts. We analyze both individual forecasts and average forecasts. We provide evidence on the properties of forecasts for all the G7-counties and four different macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, we present a modification to the structural model which is commonly used to model the forecast errors of fixed event forecasts in the literature. Our results confirm that average forecasts should be used with caution, since even if all individual forecasts are rational the hypothesis of rationality is often rejected by the aggregate forecasts. We find that there are not only large differences in the performance of forecasters across countries but also across different macroeconomic variables; in general, forecasts tend to be biased in situations where forecasters have to learn about large structural shocks or gradual changes in the trend of a variable.

In den meisten hoch entwickelten Ländern ist die Lebenserwartung im letzten Jahrhundert stark angestiegen. 2004 legte Eckart Bomsdorf, Universität zu Köln, Modellrechnungen zur zukünftigen Entwicklung der Lebenserwartung in Deutschland vor. In diesem vom Bomsdorf zusammen mit Bernhard Babel, Universität zu Köln, verfassten Beitrag werden diese Berechnungen erweitert und Modellrechnungen zur zukünftigen Entwicklung der Lebenserwartung in den G7-Ländern vorgestellt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen einen weiteren Anstieg der Lebenserwartung in den betrachteten Ländern; außerdem deuten die jüngsten Trends auf einen Rückgang der Unterschiede zwischen der Lebenserwartung von Frauen und Männern hin.

This paper uses monthly survey data for the G7 countries for the time period 1989 - 2007 to explore the link between expectations on nominal wages, prices and unemployment rate as suggested by the traditional and Samuelson-and-Solow-type Phillips curve. Three major findings stand out: First, we find that survey participants trust in the original as well as the Samuelson-and-Solow-type Phillips curve relationship. Second, we find evidence in favor of nonlinearities in the expected Samuelson-and-Solow-type Phillips curve. Third, when we take into account a kink in the expected Phillips curve indicating that the slope of the Phillips curve differs during the business cycle, we find strong evidence of this feature in the data which confirms recent the- oretical discussions in the literature that the Phillips curve is flatter in case of an economic downturn.

This paper applies the recently developed maximum-likelihood-panel cointegration method of Larsson and Lyhagen (2007) to test the strong PPP hypothesis during the recent ‡oat period on data for the G7 countries. This method is robust in several important dimensions relative to previous methods, including the well-known issue of cross-sectional dependence of error terms. The findings using this new method are contrasted to those from the Pedroni (1995) cointegration tests and fully modified OLS and dynamic OLS estimators of the cointegrating vectors. Although the shortcomings of previous methods do matter in various cases, the overall results are the same across approaches: The strong PPP hypothesis is forcefully rejected in favor of the weak PPP hypothesis with heterogeneous cointegrating vectors. As a consequence, the strong PPP hypothesis does not even seem to be an acceptable approximation of observed data.

The focus of this paper is the evaluation of a very popular method for potential output estimation and medium-term forecasting - the production function approach - in terms of predictive performance. For this purpose, a forecast evaluation for the three to five years ahead predictions of GDP growth for the individual G7 countries is conducted. To carry out the forecast performance check a particular testing framework is derived that allows the computation of robust test statistics given the specific nature of the generated out-of sample forecasts. In addition, medium-term GDP projections from national and international institutions are examined and it is assessed whether these projections convey a reliable view about future economic developments and whether there is scope for improving their predictive content.

In this paper we specify and estimate different Markov-switching (MS) regime autoregressive models. The empirical performance of the univariate MS models used to describe the switches between different economic regimes for the G-7 countries is in general not satisfactory. We extend these models to verify if the inclusion of asymmetric oil shocks as an exogenous variable improves the ability of each specification to identify the different phases of the business cycle for each country under scrutiny. Following the wide literature on this topic, we have considered six different definitions of oil shocks: oil price changes, asymmetric transformations of oil price changes, oil price volatility, and oil supply conditions. We measure the persistence of each economic regime, as well as the ability of each MS model to detect the business cycle dates as described by widely acknowledged statistical institutions. Our empirical findings can be summarized as follows. First, the null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of a MS specification is always rejected by the data. This suggests that regime-dependent models should be used if a researcher is interested in obtaining statistically adequate representations of the output growth process. Second, three-regime MS models typically outperform the corresponding two-regime specifications in describing the business cycle features for each country. Third, the introduction of different oil shock specifications is never rejected. Fourth, positive oil price changes, net oil price increases and oil price volatility are the oil shock definitions which contribute to a better description of the impact of oil on output growth. Finally, models with exogenous oil variables generally outperform the corresponding univariate specifications which exclude oil from the analysis.

Sharp increases in the price of oil are generally seen as a major contributor to business cycle asymmetries. Moreover, the very recent highs registered in the world oil market are causing concern about possible slowdowns in the economic performance of the most developed countries. While several authors have considered the direct channels of transmission of energy price increases, other authors have argued that the economic downturns arose from the monetary policy response to the inflation presumably caused by oil price increases. In this paper a structural cointegrated VAR model has been considered for the G-7 countries in order to study the direct effects of oil price shocks on output and prices and the reaction of monetary variables to external shocks. Empirical analysis shows that, for most of the countries considered, there seems to be an impact of unexpected oil price shocks on interest rates, suggesting a contractionary monetary policy response directed to fight inflation. In turn, increases in interest rates are transmitted to real economy by reducing output growth and the inflation rate.

Economic theory predicts that the integration of financial markets lowers the volatility of consumption. In this paper, we study long-term trends in the consumption volatility of the G7 countries. Using different measures of financial openness, we find some evidence that greater financial openness has been associated with lower consumption volatility. However, volatility of consumption relative to output has not declined.

We start from the assertion that a useful monetary policy design should be founded on more realistic assumptions about what policymakers can know at the time when policy decisions have to be made. Since the Taylor rule - if used as an operational device - implies a forward looking behaviour, we analyze the reliability of the input information. We investigate the forecasting performance of OECD projections for GDP growth rates and inflation. We diagnose a much better forecasting record for inflation rates compared to GDP growth rates, which for most countries are almost uninformative at the time a Taylor rule should sensibly be applied. Using this data set, we find significant differences between Taylor rules estimated over revised data compared to real-time data. There is evidence that monetary policy seems to react more actively in real time than rules estimated over revised data suggest. Given the evidence of systematic errors in OECD forecasts, in a next step we attempt to correct for these forecast biases and check to which extent this can lower the errors in interest rate policy setting. An ex-ante simulation for the years 1991 to 2001 supports the proposal that correcting for forecast errors and biases based on an error model can lower the resulting policy error in interest rate setting for most countries under consideration. In addition we investigate to what extent structural changes in the policy reaction behaviour can be handled with moving instead of expanding samples. Our results point out that the information set available needs a careful examination when applied to instrument rules like those of the Taylor type. Limited forecast quality and significant data revisions recommend a more sophisticated handling of the dated information, for which we present an operational procedure that has the potential of reducing the risk of severe policy errors.

We examine the implications of time variation in the correlation between the equity premium and nondurable consumption growth for equity return dynamics in G-7 countries. Using a VAR-GARCH (1,1) model, we find that the correlation increases with recession indicators such as above-average unemployment growth and with proxies for stock market wealth. The combined effect is that the correlation increases during a recession. We find that the effect of a countercyclical correlation is that the equity premium, Sharpe ratio, and risk aversion are also generally countercyclical. These findings survive several robustness checks such as allowing the mean return to depend on its conditional variance and controlling for lower consumption volatility during the post-1990 period. The evidence is stronger for countries that have larger stock market capitalization relative to GDP. Our results show the importance of combining financial and macroeconomic indicators for explaining time variation in the consumption correlation and the equity premium.

Emphasising the scope for further growth in institutional investment, in Europe in particular, this paper focuses on the impact of institutional investment on the efficiency and stability of financial systems. The paper stresses the scope for efficiency gains arising from an increasing role of institutional investors, reflecting - inter alia - their role in improving corporate governance. The paper also argues that institutional investors tend to enhance financial system stability although they may sporadically exacerbate market volatility or liquidity problems. This calls for a close focus of regulators and monetary policy makers on institutional behaviour, while inter alia continuing the shift envisaged in the current EU Pension Funds (IORP) Directive towards a 'prudent-person rule' for investment, and focusing closely on the long-term sustainability of guarantees being offered on life policies, annuities and pensions.

The literature on endogenous growth cycles predicts countercyclical R&D expenditure. Aggregate R&D expenditure in G7 countries from 1973 to 1997 seems to be procyclical. Implications for future theoretical research are discussed.

Changes in the seasonal patterns of macroeconomic time series may be due to the effects of business cycle fluctuations or to technological and institutional change or both. We examine the relative importance of these two sources of change in seasonality for quarterly industrial production series of the G7 countries. We find compelling evidence that the effects of gradual institutional and technological change are much more important than the effects attributable to the business cycle.

We investigate into the role of the trade channel as important determinant of a country's current account position and the degree of business cycle synchronization with the rest of the world by comparing the predictions of two types of DGE models. It is shown that the behavior of a country's external balance and the international transmission of shocks depends amongst other things on two factors: i) the magnitude of trade interdependence, ii) the degree of substitutability between importable and domestically-produced goods. Using time series data on bilateral trade flows, we estimate the magnitude of trade interdependence and the elasticity of substitution between importable and domestic goods for the G7 countries. Given these estimates, idiosyncratic supply shocks potentially induce changes in the current account and foreign output that vary in direction and magnitude across G7 countries. The relationship between the magnitude of foreign trade and the import substitutability with various correlation measures is examined empirically in a cross-sectional dimension. First Draft, July 2001. Final Draft, November 2001. Klassifikation: E32, F41

Industrial production in G7 countries is assumed to be driven by two exogenous disturbances. Those disturbances are identified in a VAR model so they can be interpreted as country-specific and global supply shocks. The dynamic properties of the model are analyzed and the relative importance of each shock is measured. It is shown that the VAR model matches most of the theoretical predictions of standard intertemporal open-economy models. The identified structural disturbances are analyzed with regard to their impact on the current account and investment. First Draft, October 2000. Final Draft, January 2001. This paper is based on the second chapter of my doctoral dissertation at the University of Frankfurt. Klassifikation: E32, F41

This paper contains a theoretical and empirical study of sacrifice ratios with long-lived effects including possible strong persistence effects or even hysteresis effects The empirical analysis is based on G-7 quarterly output data as well as unemployment data from 1960 to 1999 In this paper I develop some new methods to measure sacrifice ratios with long-lived effects I reach four conclusions: First sacrifice ratios with long-lived effects are larger than sacrifice ratios that do not account for long-lived effects Second from a theoretical model and simulation the standard method of measuring sacrifice ratios by Ball (1994) has a larger downward bias for countries with larger long-lived effects Third both random and fixed effect models show that there is a negative relationship between sacrifice ratios and initial inflations which can provide one explanation of the large magnitude of sacrifice ratios with long-lived effects in the 1990s compared with other periods Fourth there is no significant negative relationship between sacrifice ratios with long-lived effects and nominal wage rigidities.

This study of the major industrial countries' interbank markets for overnight loans links the behavior of very short-term interest rates to the operating procedures of the countries' central banks. Previous studies have focused on key features of the U.S. federal funds rate's behavior. We find that many of these features are not robust to changes in institutional details and in the style of central bank intervention, along both cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of our data. Our results suggest that the empirical features of the day-to-day behavior of short-term interest rates are more strongly influenced by institutional arrangements than by extensively researched market frictions.

This paper examines the interaction of G7 real exchange rates with real output and interest rate differentials. Using cointegration methods, we generally find a link between the real exchange rate and the real interest differential. This finding contrasts with the majority of the extant research on the real exchange rate - real interest rate link. We identify a new measure of the equilibrium exchange rate in terms of the permanent component of the real exchange rate that is consistent with the dynamic equilibrium given by the cointegration relation. Furthermore, the presence of cointegration also allows us to identify real, nominal and transitory disturbances with only minimal identifying restrictions. Our findings suggest that persistent deviations of real exchange rates from their equilibrium value can have feedback effects on the underlying fundamentals, hence altering the equilibrium exchange rate itself. This has important implications for the persistence measures of real exchange rates that are reported elsewhere in the literature.

The paper investigates which factors determine the expected real long-term interest rates of the G7-countries as a whole within a single equation error correction model. Inflationary expectations are generated using the low frequency component of inflation provided by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. A comparision of the calculated expected inflation rates with those resulting from index-linked and conventional UK bonds suggests this approach to be appropriate. Expected real long-term interest rates turn out to be influenced positively by real short-term interest rates, capacity utilization and structural public borrowing.

Two theoretical modeis are developed. One describes the behavior of monetary policy before elections, in case of policy instruments being controlled by the government. The other one discusses the effects of a change in the ruling party, if parties differ in the weight they attribute to Inflation in their loss function. Next, the propositions of the modeis are tested for the industrial countries. Furthermore, it is tested whether the independence of the central bank prevents such politicaüy motivated cycles in monetary policy. Simple empirical methods and estimated reaction functions of the G7-countries are applied in this investigation. The empirical evidence is mixed. There is some evidence of opportunistic cycles in monetary policy. But the evidence of positive effects of the independence of the central bank is rather weak. Scarcely any evidence is found of partizan cycles in monetary policy.

Real effective exchange rates and economic activity in trading partner countries have a considerable impact on real exports of the G7-countries. Using an errorcorrection framework we find that the short-run and the long-run effects differ substantially between the countries. The relative importance of both influences is demonstrated in a simulation with standardized shocks. For five countries, the effects are more or less the same; in Japan, however, the exchange rate effect dominates the effect stemming from foreign economic activity, the opposite is true for France. Finally, exchange rate volatility does not systematically affect export growth in the majority of the countries.