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Teaching a course on religions of the world is challenging, especially considering the cogent critiques of that paradigm and the history of its construction. In our courses and text, we have employed a strategy comparing different representations of a single religion to help students develop analytical and critical thinking skills. Within this approach, we employ a functionalist methodology that addresses how each representation of a religion empowers particular groups as well as how the practices and ideas within each religion function. Organizing a course and textbook in this fashion coordinates with assignments that ask students to compare the construction and functions of different representations of the same religion, thus reinforcing to students that no single description of a religion is complete or free from individual and group interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Were European public reactions to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in line with the external threat hypothesis? Accordingly, the invasion should have increased the perception of threat from Russia's territorial ambitions and support for collective defence. We review survey data from a diverse sample of ten European countries, collected before and after the event, showing that this was indeed the case. Threat perceptions and attitudes toward various aspects of collective defence – the general principle, readiness to defend other European nations, and NATO – increased fairly consistently across countries, and the association between perceptions and attitudes also increased. Findings regarding (changes in) attitudes towards defence efforts of the European Union were more ambiguous. We discuss the implications of these findings for the future of collective defence in Europe and the resilience of European societies more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I have proposed wedding the theories of belief known as dispositionalism and interpretivism. Krzysztof Poslajko objects that dispositionalism does just fine on its own and, moreover, is better off without interpretivism's metaphysical baggage. I argue that Poslajko is wrong: in order to secure a principled criterion for individuating beliefs, dispositionalism must either collapse into psychofunctionalism (or some other non-superficial theory) or accept interpretivism's hand in marriage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nietzsche's injunction to examine "the value of values" can be heard in a pragmatic key, as inviting us to consider not whether certain values are true, but what they do for us. This oddly neglected pragmatic approach to Nietzsche now receives authoritative support from Bernard Reginster's new book, which offers a compelling and notably cohesive interpretation of Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality. In this essay, I reconstruct Reginster's account of Nietzsche's critique of morality as a "self‐undermining functionality critique" and raise three problems for it: (i) Is there room within an etiological conception of function for the notion of self‐undermining functionality? (ii) If Nietzsche's critique is internal and based solely on the function it ascribes to morality, where does that critique derive its normative significance from? (iii) Does Reginster's account not make out ascetic morality to be more universally dysfunctional than it is, given that some priestly types have done remarkably well out of morality? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I reply to the comments offered by R. Jay Wallace, Matthieu Queloz, and Claire Kirwin on my book, The Will to Nothingness. An Essay on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality (OUP, 2021). These comments and my replies cover central features of the book, including my analysis of ressentiment as an expression of the will to power; the concept of self‐undermining functionality I introduce to make sense of Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal; and my reasons for omitting to examine the "unconditional will to truth," which he presents as the latest embodiment of this ideal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study sought to examine the attitude of teachers towards the teaching and learning of the Social Studies in Junior High Schools in the Prestea Huni-Valley Municipality. This study sampled 70 participants for the study. Seventy (70) Junior High School social studies teachers were randomly sampled from the Prestea Huni-Valley Municipality. The research was qualitative and descriptive in nature and a self-developed and structured questionnaire was used to collect data for the study. The study was informed by the Structural functionalist theory of education by examining the dominant role of teachers in education. The findings of the study revealed teachers have low status attached to the subject, low morale, and low confidence level in teaching Social Studies among others. The study, therefore, recommends teachers should develop a positive attitude toward the teaching of social studies by exerting confidence in teaching the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the functionalist perspective of emotion to demonstrate that the influence of sadness on indulgent consumption depends on the presence of a hedonic eating goal. Sadness heightens a person's sensitivity to the potentially harmful consequences of indulgent consumption, which decreases indulgence when a hedonic eating goal is salient. As sadness is often associated with a loss, this protective function is geared toward preventing future losses. The execution of this function is mitigated by feelings of safety, a counterforce to concerns about the harmful consequences of goal pursuit. Alternatively, when a hedonic eating goal is not salient, or a salient goal does not have harmful consequences, sadness results in emotion regulation (i.e., indulging as a means of feeling better). This conceptualization and findings show that the effects of emotions on indulgent consumption can be goal-dependent, and that emotions can aid consumers in the balancing of long-term goals and well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author examines the theory of the metaphysics of color that he considers quality-space functionalism about color. He discusses the theories of color in anti-realist views, mind-dependent views and mind-independent views. He argues that quality-space functionalism is a realist theory of color that is compatible with naturalism.

This text posits a novel proposal about what gender is. To this end, it criticizes various metaphysical models on the issue that have been gaining influence within Anglo-Saxon feminist philosophy. In short, these models are evaluated in light of two controversies feminisms are undergoing today: a) should feminism be gender abolitionist? and b) does gender identity reify gender roles? The hypothesis of this text is to point out that the functionalist biases of the models being criticized lead them to prejudge these issues, ignoring other aspects associated with gender in the process. To prevent this unfortunate consequence, this text concludes by taking up elements of various feminist philosophies that permit a more complex conception of gender. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that many popular and academic discussions of boxing tend toward moralism or functionalism. Of course, oftentimes, these two discussions become entangled. But the general features of each can be roughly distinguished. In the first kind of discussion we hear much about the violence that boxing demands and glorifies, the archaic morality at work in the very existence of a legalized blood sport in civilized societies, and tales of hard-scrabble youths who dream of championship belts and are exploited by unscrupulous managers and promoters. This moralist rendering of the sport is populated by a variety of normative positions--claims that seek to justify a legislative ban on boxing, arguments that try to establish the foundations for moral objections to the sport, and even attempts to defend boxing by highlighting what boxers themselves think about and learn from pugilistic practice. Paternalistic claims about the harm done to individual boxers, communitarian concerns about the corrosive effects of boxing on communal norms, and arguments in defense of the individual liberties of boxers are commonplace. In the second kind of discussion, what is central is not establishing normative grounds for the abolition, immorality, or value of boxing but rather explaining the macrolevel causes that push people into the sport. This functionalist rendering of boxing is predominated by causal appeals to background forces such as crime, social exclusion, unemployment, anomie, urban decay, street culture, and racism as various ways to explain the role and function of boxing in society. We are, for reasons sociological, historical, and economic, typically encouraged to look "beyond the ring" and examine the larger coercive social facts that force some members of a given society into the sport of boxing. In this article I draw on work in rational-choice theory to present a more philosophically robust alternative to the moralist and functionalist renderings of pugilism. Specifically, I develop relevant aspects of Jon Elster's constraint theory to outline an account of constraints in the sport of boxing. For in boxing--as in jazz or poetry--more options are not always preferable, or even rational. On the contrary, in pugilism athletes deliberately choose their constraints and reflexively incorporate a coach's or trainer's imposition of additional bounds as a crucial part of becoming skilled in their craft. My core thesis is that, in boxing, athletes undertake to bind themselves in ways that enable creativity and maximize individual skills and that sparring in a boxing gym--with its flexible constraints and approximation of what Elster calls "optimal tightness of bounds"--is a paradigmatic form of such a rational undertaking. Developing this thesis should not only help to clarify what boxers actually do but also demonstrate the rich potential of constraint theory to contribute to a better understanding of the sport of boxing. To be sure, boxers are not alone as athletes who constrain themselves and are, in turn, constrained in various ways. In fact, the analysis of boxing I develop here is part of a larger attempt to outline what I want to call a "constraint theory of sport." Most generally, such a theory holds that in competitive athletic endeavors individuals primarily strive to maximize their skills and creativity within constraints. Put simply, a constraint theory of sport is designed to explain the embedded rationality and creativity of athletic action. The argument is developed as follows. I begin with a brief summary of Elster's constraint theory (Section 1). From there I go on to suggest an account of sport as "constrained maximization" and briefly contrast that account with a related position in the philosophy of sport, that of Suits's discussion of sport as games (Section 2). In the core section of the essay, I develop a constraint theory of boxing (Section 3).… [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character : they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content , a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive imperativism. Our proposal is that an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (1), while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (2): More of P! Less of U! If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me! [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article applies the free energy principle to the hard problem of consciousness. After clarifying some philosophical issues concerning functionalism, it identifies the elemental form of consciousness as affect and locates its physiological mechanism (an extended form of homeostasis) in the upper brainstem. This mechanism is then formalized in terms of free energy minimization (in unpredicted contexts) where decreases and increases in expected uncertainty are felt as pleasure and unpleasure, respectively. Emphasis is placed on the reasons why such existential imperatives feel like something to and for an organism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Super‐hydrophobic and oleophobic surfaces on ASTM 1200 H14 aluminum alloy substrates were achieved by chemical etching followed by deposition of organically modified silicate (ORMOSIL) coatings synthesized through sol‐gel method. The chemical etching using FHH solutions (FeCl3 + HCl + H2O2) was adapted for the studied aluminum alloy by varying the concentration of iron (III) chloride and the etching time in order to increase the surface roughness of the material. This chemical etching produces rough surfaces exhibiting superficial square pores with edges about 1 to 2 μm. The chemical modifications with ORMOSIL solutions based on 1H,1H,2H,2H‐perfluorooctyltriethoxysilane (PFOTES) and hexadecyltrimethoxysilane sol‐gel precursors induced water contact angles about 154° and 150°, respectively, and sliding angles smaller than 5°, on the previously optimized etched surface. Moreover, the surface modification with ORMOSIL based on PFOTES reached also an oleophobic character with an oil contact angle about 136° due to air entrapment in the surface roughness at the oil‐aluminum interface. Finally, ORMOSIL coatings produced with varied concentrations of PFOTES and tetraethoxyorthosilane precursors proved that the super‐hydrophobic and oleophobic properties can be maintained with an important decrease of the PFOTES precursor, which should significantly decrease the cost production of such functional surfaces and could favour its mechanical durability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Functional fixedness is a cognitive bias that describes how previous knowledge of a tool's function can negatively impact the use of this tool in novel contexts. As such, functional fixedness disturbs the use of tools during mechanical problem solving. Little is known about whether this bias emerges from different experiences with tools, whether it occurs regardless of problem difficulty, or whether there are protective factors against it. To resolve the first issue, we created five experimental groups: Reading (R), Video (V), Manual (M), No Functional Fixedness (NFF), and No Training (NT). The R group learned to use tools by reading a description of their use, the V group by watching an instructional video, and the M group through direct instruction and active manipulation of the tools. To resolve the remaining two issues, we created mechanical puzzles of distinct difficulty and used tests of intuitive physics, fine motor skills, and creativity. Results showed that misleading functional knowledge is at the core of functional fixedness, and that this bias generates cognitive impasses in simple puzzles, but it does not play a role in higher difficulty problems. Additionally, intuitive physics and motor skills were protective factors against its emergence, but creativity did not influence it. Although functional fixedness leads to inaccurate problem solving, our results suggest that its effects are more limited than previously assumed. Highlights • Functional fixedness is a cognitive bias that affects problem solving • We studied how this bias affects tool use in the context of solving novel mechanical problems • We taught participants to use tools in varying ways to experimentally study how this bias is acquired • Misleading functional information is at the core of this bias and its effect is limited to easy problems • Intuitive physics knowledge and motor skills were protective factors against this bias, but creativity did not influence it [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looking back on the development of computer technology, particularly in the context of manufacturing, we can distinguish three big waves of technological exuberance with a wave length of roughly 30 years: In the first wave, during the 1950s, mainframe computers at that time were conceptualized as “electronic brains” and envisaged as central control unit of an “automatic factory” (Wiener). Thirty years later, during the 1980s, knowledge-based systems in computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) were adored as the computational core of the “unmanned factory”. Both waves dismally stranded on the contumacies of reality. Nevertheless, again thirty years later, we now experience the departure of the “smart factory” based on networks of “artificially intelligent” multi-agent or “cyber-physical systems” (often also addressed as “internet of things”). From the very beginning, these technological exuberances rooted in mistaken metaphors describing the artifacts (e.g. “electronic brain”, “knowledge-based” or “intelligent systems”) and, hence, in delusions about the true nature of computer systems. The behaviour of computers is, as computing science teaches us, strictly restrained to executing computable functions by means of algorithms, it thus neither resembles the performance of a brain as part of a complex sensitive living body nor is it in any meaningful sense “knowledgeable” or “intelligent” (this predicate remaining reserved for the programmer designing the algorithms). When the delusion of being able to implement “smart factories”, despite the countless accomplishment failures before, gains momentum anew, it appears absolutely essential to reflect on underlying misconceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this review essay on The Multiple Realization Book by Polger and Shapiro, I consider the prospects for a biologically grounded notion of multiple realization (MR) which has been given too little consideration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Thinking about MR in the context of biological notions of function and robustness leads to a rethink of what would count as a viable functionalist theory of mind. I also discuss points of tension between Polger and Shapiro’s definition of MR and current explanatory practice in neuroscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Metaphysical functionalism holds that the nature of the mental is its functional role. Proponents of the absent qualia objection to functionalism assert that mental states with essential phenomenal qualities might have had functional duplicates without qualia. Michael Tye has argued that this purported possibility is incoherent. Robert van Gulick has criticized Tye's argument. It is contended here that although van Gulick's criticism does not refute the argument, Tye's argument is unsuccessful. It is also contended that our evidence very strongly supports the possibility of absent qualia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article consists of replies to the reviewers. For Ambasciano I show that his concern about the taint of epistemic phenomenologies can be largely deflected by understanding the exact contextualization of the materials he questions, particularly their place in the function, structure and serialized nature of the argument. Responding to Segal I try to clarify the evolutionary role of functionalism, the relation of Durkheim and Eliade as I am using them, and the role of difference in comparativism. Willard’s questions about the relations of my natural history approach to the cultural evolution model provides a good opportunity to point out their complementarity and differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review praises William Paden’s focus on some of the key issues in the study of religion. It questions Paden’s position on three topics: (a) the relationship between evolutionary psychology and functionalism; (b) the compatibility of Durkheim with Eliade; and (c) the ‘newness’ of Paden’s new comparativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I note the multitude of ways in which, beginning with the classic paper by Machamer et al. (Philos Sci 67:1-25, 2000), the mechanists have qualify their methodological dicta, and limit the vulnerability of their claims by strategic vagueness regarding their application. I go on to generalize a version of the mechanist requirement on explanations due to Craver and Kaplan (Philos Sci 78(4):601-627, 2011) in cognitive and systems neuroscience so that it applies broadly across the life sciences in accordance with the view elaborated by Craver and Darden in In Search of Mechanisms (2013). I then go on to explore what ramifications their mechanist requirement on explanations may have for explanatory 'dependencies' reported in biology and the special sciences. What this exploration suggests is that mechanism threatens to eliminate instead of underwrite a large number of such 'dependencies' reported in higher-levels of biology and the special sciences. I diagnose the source of this threat in mechanism's demand that explanations identify nested causal differences makers in mechanisms, their components, the components further components, and so forth. Finally, I identify the 'love-hate' relationship mechanism must have with functional explanation, and show how it makes mechanism an extremely interesting thesis indeed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My thesis is that liberal and progressive education models respectively refer to dual and unitary conceptions of intellectual development, and that these differences account for their pedagogical antagonisms. I test the validity of this argument by using it to account for the evolution of Western pedagogy and the fate of liberal and progressive education. I introduce the dualist epistemological premises of the major educational models that have followed one after the other in the history of Western education. Then, I account for the impact of classical empiricism, and later evolutionary doctrines, on the discredit of liberal education and the emergence of educational progressivism. Progressive educational conceptions are rooted in a representation of humankind developed under the influence of the Darwinian revolution. They justify an adaptive model of the mind within the framework of a functionalist psychology. According to alternative currents of modern educational thought, the use of auxiliary means of thought marks a rupture with human biological development. These currents underpin a dual conception of human reason according to which rational or theoretical understanding is a sui generis dimension of thought. They offer support for a modernized version of liberal education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Functional motor disorder (FMD), also called psychogenic motor disorder or conversion disorder, describes impairments of motor function where there is no evidence of organic disease. The diagnosis is usually confirmed by positive clinical signs, such as Hoover's sign, in which normal power returns when attention is diverted away from the affected limb. This suggests that selective attention is an important determinant of these functional symptoms. The present study is the first specifically to explore the shifting of spatial attention in relation to the side of FMD. We tested 14 patients with unilateral functional upper limb weakness on three tasks requiring detection of visual targets close to the affected or unaffected hand, or touches to the hand itself. Targets were preceded by central cues promoting voluntary shifts of attention, or peripheral cues promoting automatic shifts. We observed a reduced response to visual and/or tactile targets on the affected side in around half of the patients, by comparison with age-matched controls, indicating that some degree of detection cost often accompanies FMD. Additionally, although the patient group showed normal cueing effects on the visual tasks, they had a unilateral absence of cueing effect on the affected side in the tactile task. Consideration of the data in the context of recent theory suggests that the abnormality may be not in the shifting of attention itself, but rather in the consequences of attending to the affected side. Specifically, the expected cueing effects may be absent on the affected side, because attention to a functionally weak limb increases the perception of the symptom, including any reduced sensory response. This preliminary research suggests promising new lines of investigation into the role of attention, and particularly somatic attention, in FMD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to attributor virtue epistemology (the view defended by Ernest Sosa, John Greco, and others), S knows that p only if her true belief that p is attributable to some intellectual virtue, competence, or ability that she possesses. Attributor virtue epistemology captures a wide range of our intuitions about the nature and value of knowledge, and it has many able defenders. Unfortunately, it has an unrecognized consequence that many epistemologists will think is sufficient for rejecting it: namely, it makes knowledge depend on factors that aren't truth-relevant, even in the broadest sense of this term, and it also makes knowledge depend in counterintuitive ways on factors that are truth-relevant in the more common narrow sense of this term. As I show in this paper, the primary objection to interest-relative views in the pragmatic encroachment debate can be raised even more effectively against attributor virtue epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent papers, Eric Schwitzgebel ( Philosophical Studies, 172, 1697-1721, 2015, Philosophia, 44, 877-883, 2016) argues that if physicalism is true, then the United States is probably conscious. My primary aim here is to demonstrate that the source of Schwitzgebel's conditional argument is the 'Problem of Other Minds,' which is a general problem; wherefore, Schwitzgebel's conclusion should be revised and applied not only to physicalism, but to most contemporary theories of the mind. I analyze the difference between Schwitzgebel's argument and other arguments against functionalism, arguing that the difference between them is rooted in referring to the causal role of the whole system, rather than referring to the casual role of the system's parts. This key difference between functionalism and behaviorism explains why the source of Schwitzgebel's argument stems from the problem of other minds. I conclude that however counterintuitive from a metaphysical point of view, the United States may have its own stream of consciousness, but it has nothing to do with physicalism in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Optimising the 4E (embodied-embedded-extended-enactive) revolution in cognitive science arguably requires the rejection of two guiding commitments made by orthodox thinking in the field, namely that the material realisers of cognitive states and processes are located entirely inside the head (internalism), and that intelligent thought and action are to be explained in terms of the building and manipulation of content-bearing representations (representationalism). In other words, the full-strength 4E revolution would be secured only by a position that delivered externalism plus antirepresentationalism. I argue that one view in 4E space-extended functionalism-is appropriately poised to deliver externalism but not antirepresentationalism. By contrast, in the case of a competing 4E view-radical enactivism-even if that view can deliver antirepresentationalism, its pivotal notion of extensiveness falls short of establishing externalism. These conclusions are justified via an examination of, and by responding critically to, certain key arguments offered in support of their view (and against extended functionalism) by the radical enactivists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In discussing the famous case of Otto, a patient with Alzheimer's disease who carries around a notebook to keep important information, Clark and Chalmers argue that some of Otto's beliefs are physically realized in the notebook. In other words, some of Otto's beliefs are extended into the environment. Their main argument is a functionalist one. Some of Otto's beliefs are physically realized in the notebook because, first, some of the beliefs of Inga, a healthy person who remembers important information in her head, are physically realized in her internal memory storage, and, second, there is no relevant functional difference between the role of the notebook for Otto and the role of the internal memory storage for Inga. The paper presents a new objection to this argument. I call it 'the systems reply' to the functionalist argument since it is structurally analogous to the 'the systems reply' to Searle's Chinese room argument. According to the systems reply to the functionalist argument, what actually follows from their argument is not that beliefs of Otto are physically realized in the notebook but rather that the beliefs of the hybrid system consisting of Otto and his notebook are physically realized in the notebook. This paper also discusses Sprevak's claim that the functionalist argument entails radical versions of extended mental states and shows that his argument is also vulnerable to the systems reply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper motivates taking seriously the possibility that brains are basically protean: that they make use of neural structures in inventive, on-the-fly improvisations to suit circumstance and context. Accordingly, we should not always expect cognition to divide into functionally stable neural parts and pieces. We begin by reviewing recent work in cognitive ontology that highlights the inadequacy of traditional neuroscientific approaches when it comes to divining the function and structure of cognition. Cathy J. Price and Karl J. Friston, and Colin Klein identify the limitations of relying on forward and reverse inferences to cast light on the relation between cognitive functions and neural structures. There is reason to prefer Klein’s approach to that of Price and Friston’s. But Klein’s approach is neurocentric - it assumes that we ought to look solely at neural contexts to fix cognitive ontology. Using recent work on mindreading as a case study, we motivate adopting a radically different approach to cognitive ontology. Promoting the Protean Brain Hypothesis, we posit the possibility that we may need to look beyond the brain when deciding which functions are being performed in acts of cognition and in understanding how the brain contributes to such acts by adapting to circumstance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Neurological soft signs (NSS) in motor coordination and sequencing occur in schizophrenia patients and are an intrinsic sign of the underlying neural dysfunctions. The present longitudinal study explored the relationships among NSS, psychiatric symptoms, and functional outcomes in 151 Chinese patients with chronic schizophrenia across a 6-month period. The participants completed neurological assessments at baseline (Time 1), psychiatric interviews at Time 1 and 3-month follow-up (Time 2), and self-report measures on daily functioning at 6-month follow-up (Time 3). Two possible (combined and cascading) path models were examined on predicting the functional outcomes. Direct and indirect effects of Time 1 NSS on Time 3 functional outcomes via Time 2 psychiatric symptoms were evaluated using path analysis under bootstrapping. Motor coordination and sequencing NSS did not have significant direct effects on functional outcomes. Motor coordination NSS exerted significant and negative indirect effects on functional outcomes via psychiatric symptoms. These results contribute to a better understanding of the determinants of functional outcomes by showing significant indirect pathways from motor coordination NSS to functional outcomes via psychiatric symptoms. That motor sequencing NSS did not affect functional outcomes either directly or indirectly may be explained by their trait marking features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay on the meaning of behaviorism in the history of economics and psychology is presented. It states that behaviorism in psychology is about behavior control. It also discusses economist Paul Samuelson's ordinalist approach regarding consumer demand theory. The author notes that economists have mistaken notions about behaviorism and have created a behaviorist myth. It also mentions functionalism and its role of mental animal life and behavior.

Given the scientific possibility of Boltzmann Brains, and the theory from philosophy of mind known as Functionalism, it is quite possible to construct a model of pantheism which is not as implausible as restricted theism or traditional models of pantheism. The aim of this article is to explain how this might work, but also to say why, in the end, it will not do the same job as restricted theism, even if it turned out to be true. The article does not aim to defend its premises, such as pantheism or functionalism, in more than a cursory way; the conclusions of the article are tentative and conditional: if functionalism is true, then physicalist pantheism may be true. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Numerous texts from the New Testament deal with passions in a wide variety of genres. Historical-critical methods have been applied but cannot be regarded as complete. Especially for texts dealing with passions, no consensus of methodology has yet been established. The situation is further complicated by the existence of differing or ambiguous definitions and many unclear categories. This article highlights some important aspects we ought to consider when describing and analyzing passions in their given literary contexts with precision. They belong to abstract concepts; they appear in explicit terms, but also in paraphrases - that is, in a descriptive manner represented by facial expressions and gestures, for example. They are expressed by descriptions of diverse physical symptoms and by metaphors. This variety results in semantic problems. Many additional factors have to be taken into account. The duration, quality, and intensity of passions described ought to be considered. Emotions are embedded in psychological processes, and they might be connected to pragmatic intentions. The different genres and concepts of texts in which they occur should not be neglected either. Most of the emotional phenomena are culturally acquired forms of expression and communication. Therefore, it is always necessary to be aware of the danger of anachronism, and to consider the historical and cultural background along with its respective display rules: namely, the socially accepted patterns and rituals in which these passions could be encountered. In the last section of this article, a functional psychological approach of exegesis with concrete examples is offered to assist with finding suitable methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should 'the physical' be defined for the purpose of formulating physicalism? In this paper I defend a version of the via negativa according to which a property is physical just in case it is neither fundamentally mental nor possibly realized by a fundamentally mental property. The guiding idea is that physicalism requires functionalism, and thus that being a type identity theorist requires being a realizer-functionalist. In §1 I motivate my approach partly by arguing against Jessica Wilson's no fundamental mentality constraint. In §2 I set out my preferred definition of 'the physical' and make my case that physicalism requires functionalism. In §3 I defend my proposal by attacking the leading alternative account of 'the physical,' the theory-based conception. Finally, in §4 I draw on my definition, together with Jaegwon Kim's account of intertheoretic reduction, to defend the controversial view that physicalism requires a priori physicalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alethic functionalism, as propounded by Michael Lynch, is the view that there are different ways to be true, but that these differences nevertheless contain enough unity to forestall outright pluralism. This view has many virtues. Yet, since one could conceivably apply Lynch’s “one and many” strategy to other debates, I try to show how his argumentative steps can be used to solve—not just the controversy pertaining to truth—but any controversy that surrounds a “What is X?” question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary way that explanations are constructed in cognitive psychology is by methodological functionalism: in short, functionally defined components are proposed in order to explain how inputs (i.e., stimuli from the environment) are turned into behavior. But despite its close association with cognitive psychology, methodological functionalism is a technique that can be used to describe any natural system. I look at how methodological functionalism has fared when used by other special sciences and what lessons can be learned from these cases. Three explanations of chemical and biological systems that were developed using methodological functionalism are examined: Willis’s (1684) explanation of fermentation, Farr’s (mid-1800s) explanation of cholera, and Mendel’s (mid-1800s) explanation of inheritance. The discovery of HIV in the early 1980s, an investigation that rejected methodological functionalism early on, is also discussed. The assessment of methodological functionalism is not positive. This technique has limitations. The implications for cognitive psychology are considered, and one conclusion is that cognitive psychology will eventually cease relying on methodological functionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The majority of cognitive psychologists, when pressed, would hold for scientific realism as their philosophy of science and ontological position. However, it is functionalism which undergirds the ontology of scientific realism. Moreover, functionalists claim that cognitive psychology, including sensation, perception, memory, and the higher cognitive functions, can be fully accounted for by functionalism. The question is then: Is functionalism up to the task? Recently, Spalding and Gagné (2013) made the case that concept formation, a key element in all aspects of higher order cognition, can be better accounted for by an Aristotelian-Thomistic (A - T) meta-theory, and Stedman (2013) pointed out parallels between Aristotle's model and current cognitive psychology. This essay argues that the A - T viewpoint is a better model for all elements of cognitive psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on illustrative examples of the functional and cognitive psychology in contemporary research, the present article emphasizes the primacy of functional relationships, which provide the fundament for all attempts to uncover invisible cognitive processes. Cognitive research is not only inherently more difficult and much more ambitious than functional research. It also suffers from several home-made problems, such as unwarranted inferences from model fitting, the mediation-analysis cult and the failure to take environmental influences into account. However, despite the primacy of functional psychology and the problems associated with the ambitious goals of cognitive research, the two partners in this unequal pair are firmly connected and jointly responsible for the most impressive examples of progress in behavioural science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The functional-cognitive meta-theoretical framework has been offered as a conceptual basis for facilitating greater communication and cooperation between the functional/behavioural and cognitive traditions within psychology, thus leading to benefits for both scientific communities. The current article is written from the perspective of two functional researchers, who are also proponents of the functional-cognitive framework, and attended the 'Building Bridges between the Functional and Cognitive Traditions' meeting at Ghent University in the summer of 2014. The article commences with a brief summary of the functional approach to theory, followed by our reflections upon the functional-cognitive framework in light of that meeting. In doing so, we offer three ways in which the framework could be clarified: (a) effective communication between the two traditions is likely to be found at the level of behavioural observations rather than effects or theory, (b) not all behavioural observations will be deemed to be of mutual interest to both traditions, and (c) observations of mutual interest will be those that serve to elaborate and extend existing theorising in the functional and/or cognitive traditions. The article concludes with a summary of what we perceive to be the strengths and weaknesses of the framework, and a suggestion that there is a need to determine if the framework is meta-theoretical or is in fact a third theoretical approach to doing psychological science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scientific goals, values and assumptions of functional and cognitive researchers have propelled them down two very different scientific pathways. Many have, and continue to argue, that these differences undermine any potential communication and collaboration between the two traditions. We explore a different view on this debate. Specifically, we focus on the Functional-Cognitive ( FC) framework, and in particular, the idea that cognitive and functional researchers can and should interact to the benefit of both. Our article begins with a short introduction to the FC framework. We sweep aside misconceptions about the framework, present the original version as it was outlined by De Houwer (2011) and then offer our most recent thoughts on how it should be implemented. Thereafter, we reflect on its strengths and weaknesses, clarify the functional (effect-centric vs. analytic-abstractive) level and consider its many implications for cognitive research and theorising. In the final section, we briefly review the articles contained in this Special Issue. These contributions provide clear examples of the conceptual, empirical and methodological developments that can emerge when cognitive, clinical, personality and neuroscientists fully engage with the functional-cognitive perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]