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This article builds upon the protocol for digital transfers described by Goodell, Toliver, and Nakib, which combines privacy by design for consumers with strong compliance enforcement for recipients of payments and self-validating assets that carry their own verifiable provenance information. We extend the protocol to allow for the verification that reissued assets were created in accordance with rules prohibiting the creation of new assets by anyone but the issuer, without exposing information about the circumstances in which the assets were created that could be used to identify the payer. The modified protocol combines an audit log with zero-knowledge proofs, so that a consumer spending an asset can demonstrate that there exists a valid entry on the audit log that is associated with the asset, without specifying which entry it is. This property is important as a means to allow money to be reissued within the system without the involvement of system operators within the zone of control of the original issuer. Additionally, we identify a key property of privacy-respecting electronic payments, wherein the payer is not required to retain secrets arising from one transaction until the following transaction, and argue that this property is essential to framing security requirements for storage of digital assets and the risk of blackmail or coercion as a way to exfiltrate information about payment history. We claim that the design of our protocol strongly protects the anonymity of payers with respect to their payment transactions, while preventing the creation of assets by any party other than the original issuer without destroying assets of equal value., Comment: 28 pages, 2 figures

Blockchain technology streamlines multi-party collaborations in decentralized settings, especially where trust is limited. While public blockchains enhance transparency and reliability, they conflict with confidentiality. To address this, we introduce Multi-Authority Approach to Transaction Systems for Interoperating Applications (MARTSIA). MARTSIA provides read-access control at the message-part level through user-defined policies and certifier-declared attributes, so that only authorized actors can interpret encrypted data while all blockchain nodes can verify its integrity. To this end, MARTSIA resorts to blockchain, Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption and distributed hash-table data-stores.

Blockchain technology is apt to facilitate the automation of multi-party cooperations among various players in a decentralized setting, especially in cases where trust among participants is limited. Transactions are stored in a ledger, a replica of which is retained by every node of the blockchain network. The operations saved thereby are thus publicly accessible. While this aspect enhances transparency, reliability, and persistence, it hinders the utilization of public blockchains for process automation as it violates typical confidentiality requirements in corporate settings. To overcome this issue, we propose our approach named Multi-Authority Approach to Transaction Systems for Interoperating Applications (MARTSIA). Based on Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption (MA-ABE), MARTSIA enables read-access control over shared data at the level of message parts. User-defined policies determine whether an actor can interpret the publicly stored information or not, depending on the actor's attributes declared by a consortium of certifiers. Still, all nodes in the blockchain network can attest to the publication of the (encrypted) data. We provide a formal analysis of the security guarantees of MARTSIA, and illustrate the proof-of-concept implementation over multiple blockchain platforms. To demonstrate its interoperability, we showcase its usage in ensemble with a state-of-the-art blockchain-based engine for multi-party process execution, and three real-world decentralized applications in the context of NFT markets, supply chain, and retail., Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2303.17977

Multi-party business processes rely on the collaboration of various players in a decentralized setting. Blockchain technology can facilitate the automation of these processes, even in cases where trust among participants is limited. Transactions are stored in a ledger, a replica of which is retained by every node of the blockchain network. The operations saved thereby are thus publicly accessible. While this enhances transparency, reliability, and persistence, it hinders the utilization of public blockchains for process automation as it violates typical confidentiality requirements in corporate settings. In this paper, we propose MARTSIA: A Multi-Authority Approach to Transaction Systems for Interoperating Applications. MARTSIA enables precise control over process data at the level of message parts. Based on Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption (MA-ABE), MARTSIA realizes a number of desirable properties, including confidentiality, transparency, and auditability. We implemented our approach in proof-of-concept prototypes, with which we conduct a case study in the area of supply chain management. Also, we show the integration of MARTSIA with a state-of-the-art blockchain-based process execution engine to secure the data flow.

A recent trend in multi-party computation is to achieve cryptographic fairness via monetary penalties, i.e. each honest player either obtains the output or receives a compensation in the form of a cryptocurrency. We pioneer another type of fairness, financial fairness, that is closer to the real-world valuation of financial transactions. Intuitively, a penalty protocol is financially fair if the net present cost of participation (the total value of cash inflows less cash outflows, weighted by the relative discount rate) is the same for all honest participants, even when some parties cheat. We formally define the notion, show several impossibility results based on game theory, and analyze the practical effects of (lack of) financial fairness if one was to run the protocols for real on Bitcoin using Bloomberg's dark pool trading. For example, we show that the ladder protocol (CRYPTO'14), and its variants (CCS'15 and CCS'16), fail to achieve financial fairness both in theory and in practice, while the penalty protocols of Kumaresan and Bentov (CCS'14) and Baum, David and Dowsley (FC'20) are financially fair. This version contains formal definitions, detailed security proofs, demos and experimental data in the appendix.