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Il presente contributo ripercorre la storia culturale dell’ambasciata di Francia a Venezia nel primo Cinquecento, che fu un vero e proprio laboratorio dell’ellenismo francese. Accanto agli impegni di natura politica e militare, gli ambasciatori del re di Francia furono appassionati di cultura antica: per conto del re ma anche per sé stessi, raccolsero rari manoscritti e volumi in greco, reperiti sul mercato librario veneziano ma anche in Oriente. Alcuni di loro furono in prima persona studiosi raffinati degli autori greci, di cui tradussero le opere in latino e in francese. Grazie all’operato di quelle figure poliedriche di diplomatici umanisti aperti alle nuove idee religiose – uomini come Giano Lascaris, Jean de Pins, Ludovico di Canossa, Lazare de Baïf, Georges de Selve, Guillaume Pellicier – la cultura della Grecia classica ma anche della patristica greca penetrò nel regno di Francia. This essay focuses on the cultural history of the French embassy in Venice in the early Sixteenth century, which was a real laboratory of French Hellenism. Alongside the political and military commitments, the ambassadors of the king of France were passionate about ancient culture: on behalf of the king but also for themselves, they collected rare manuscripts and volumes in Greek, found on the Venetian book market but also in the East. Some of them were also personally refined scholars of the Greek authors, whose works they translated into Latin and French. Thanks to the work of those multifaceted figures of humanist diplomats open to new religious ideas – men like Giano Lascaris, Jean de Pins, Ludovico di Canossa, Lazare de Baïf, Georges de Selve, Guillaume Pellicier – the culture of classical Greece but also of patristics Greek entered the kingdom of France.

Résumé : L’objet de cet article est d’étudier la politique espagnole de Georges Pompidou et l’évolution des relations franco-espagnoles au cours des années 1969-1974. Centré sur le discours présidentiel, il examine les rapports franco-espagnols vus de l’Élysée, en s’appuyant sur l’étude des archives présidentielles, diplomatiques et médiatiques françaises. Soucieuse d’assurer une politique de bon voisinage avec l’encombrante dictature franquiste, d’encourager l’européanisation de l’Espagne, d’occuper une position de choix sur le marché espagnol, la diplomatie française œuvre à cette époque en faveur d’un resserrement des liens politiques entre les deux pays au-delà des considérations idéologiques. Abstract: This article analyses the Spanish policy of French president Georges Pompidou and the development of French-Spanish relations between 1969 and 1974. Based on French presidential, diplomatic and media archives, it focuses on French-Spanish relations from a presidential perspective. Moving away from ideological considerations, French diplomacy in this period worked to strengthen the ties between the two nations through three main objectives: maintaining a good neighborhood policy with the embarrassing Franco dictatorship, promoting Spain’s Europeanization, and developing favorable trade relations between France and Spain. Resumen: Este artículo tiene como objetivo estudiar la política española de Georges Pompidou y la evolución de las relaciones franco-españolas durante los años 1969-1974. Centrado en el discurso presidencial, el artículo analiza las relaciones bilaterales desde el Eliseo basándose en el estudio de los archivos presidenciales, diplomáticos y mediáticos franceses. Preocupado por mantener una política de buena vecindad con la dictadura franquista, de promover la europeización de España y de ocupar una posición clave en el mercado español, la diplomacia francesa fomenta un acercamiento político entre ambos países lejos de consideraciones ideológicas.

This article analyses the Spanish policy of French president Georges Pompidou and the development of French-Spanish relations between 1969 and 1974. Based on French presidential, diplomatic and media archives, it focuses on French-Spanish relations from a presidential perspective. Moving away from ideological considerations, French diplomacy in this period worked to strengthen the ties between the two nations through three main objectives: maintaining a good neighborhood policy with the embarrassing Franco dictatorship, promoting Spain’s Europeanization, and developing favorable trade relations between France and Spain., Este artículo tiene como objetivo estudiar la política española de Georges Pompidou y la evolución de las relaciones franco-españolas durante los años 1969-1974. Centrado en el discurso presidencial, el artículo analiza las relaciones bilaterales desde el Eliseo basándose en el estudio de los archivos presidenciales, diplomáticos y mediáticos franceses. Preocupado por mantener una política de buena vecindad con la dictadura franquista, de promover la europeización de España y de ocupar una posición clave en el mercado español, la diplomacia francesa fomenta un acercamiento político entre ambos países lejos de consideraciones ideológicas., L’objet de cet article est d’étudier la politique espagnole de Georges Pompidou et l’évolution des relations franco-espagnoles au cours des années 1969-1974. Centré sur le discours présidentiel, il examine les rapports franco-espagnols vus de l’Élysée, en s’appuyant sur l’étude des archives présidentielles, diplomatiques et médiatiques françaises. Soucieuse d’assurer une politique de bon voisinage avec l’encombrante dictature franquiste, d’encourager l’européanisation de l’Espagne, d’occuper une position de choix sur le marché espagnol, la diplomatie française œuvre à cette époque en faveur d’un resserrement des liens politiques entre les deux pays au-delà des considérations idéologiques.

The article presents „the secret of Dauphine of France”, i.e. the actions taken by Marie-Josephe of Saxony (1731–1767), the wife of Dauphin of France Louis Ferdinand, to bring her brother, Prince Francis Xavier de Saxony, to the Polish throne. The „secret” reconstructed in works published between 1901 and 1902 by Casimir Stryienski occupies a marginal but permanent place in the historiography literature. In the light of this analysis, which takes into account the legal and traditional position of Dauphine at the French court, the foreign policy of France in Central and Eastern Europe in the middle of the 18th century, and the knowledge that Maria Józefa possessed on the realities of the Polish policies, it turns out that the „secret” in its current version was an exaggerated, literary construct rather than a diplomatic reality.

У статті мова йде про інформацію французького дипломата Шарля (Клод-Шарля) де Пейссонеля, яка стосується території сучасної України та українського козацтва. Зазначимо, що робота Шарля де Пейссонеля “Observations historiques et géographiques, sur les peuples barbares qui ont habité les bords du Danube & du Pont-Euxin” (1756) не має перекладу з французької мови у повному обсязі. У даній статті вперше публікуються фрагмети з цієї роботи щодо теорії походження та місця локалізації українського козацтва., В статье речь идет об информации французского дипломата Шарля (Клод-Шарля) где Пейссонеля, касающейся территории современной Украины и украинского казачества. Отметим, что работа Шарля де Пейссонеля “Observations historiques et géographiques, sur les peuples barbares qui ont habité les bords du Danube & du Pont-Euxin” не имеет перевода с французского языка в полном объеме. В данной статье впервые публикуются фрагменты из этой работы дипломата относительно теории происхождения и места локализации украинского казачества., The article deals with the observation of the French diplomat Charles de Peyssonelya relating to the territory of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Cossacks. It should be noted that the work of Charles de Peyssonelya «Historical and geographical observation barbarians who live on the banks of the Danube and Black Sea» has no translation from the French language in its entirety. In this work, first published reflections diplomat as to the origin of the theory of localization and place of the Ukrainian Cossacks. Interest Charles de Peyssonelya was primarily associated with those regions that were strategic in nature for France. One of these regions was the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Interesting for a diplomat was the territory of the Cossacks, which directly bordered with the Tatar and Nogai ulus and entered the sphere of influence of the Crimean Khanate - vassal of the Ottoman Empire at that time. This article submitted four pieces of source «Historical and geographical observation barbarians who live on the banks of the Danube and Black Sea» which generally can be divided into two informative blocks. The first - a version of the origin of the Cossacks and the etymology of the name "Cossack", the second - information sharing Cossack groups and their localization. Focuses on the mission Peyssonelya in Crimea, during of which was written by his work «Historical and geographical observation barbarians who live on the banks of the Danube and Black Sea». Because of his work as close to the contemporary geographical and political situation. Most work «Historical and geographical observation barbaric peoples who lived on the banks of the Danube and Pontus Evksinski» 1765 is an important historical source for the history of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Cossack history in particular. We serve only fragments of these sources and note that the full translation of this work is not, and so the «Historical and geographical observation barbarians who live on the banks of the Danube and Black Sea» are important to study».

Lors de la présence diplomatique française à Sinope, de 1803 à 1809, seuls des voyageurs français liés à la diplomatie (Pierre et Adrien Dupré, Beaujour et Tancoigne) ont visité et décrit les vestiges archéologiques de la cité. Ils ont bénéficié des commentaires et des réflexions de Pascal Fourcade, consul de France à Sinope, érudit et passionné d’archéologie, auteur de mémoires perdus sur l’histoire et les antiquités de Sinope. Leurs récits sont très utiles pour la connaissance des vestiges antiques de Sinope et témoignent de l’intérêt français pour l’archéologie au début du xixe s. During the French diplomatic presence in Sinope, between 1803 and 1809, only French travellers linked to diplomacy (Pierre and Adrien Dupré, Beaujour and Tancoigne) visited and described the archaeological reminds of the city. They were bestowed commentaries and reflections by Pascal Fourcade, the French consul in Sinope, a scholar, in love with archaeology, author of lost memories upon the history and the antiquities of Sinope. Their relations are usefull for the knowledge of the ancient remains of Sinope and are a testimony of the French interest for archaeology in the begining of the xixth Century.

International audience; This contribution explores French diplomatic posture and interest in the organisation of the Guadeloupe four-powers summit of 1979. It amply profits from French presidential and diplomatic archives.

The dissertation analyses development of Euro-Mediterranean policy since 2006 up to the present. Therefore the work analyses the newest institution Union for the Mediterranean, European Neighborhood Policy, change of institutional framework of the European foreign policy due to the Lisbon Treaty and also reaction of the European Union on the Arab spring and ongoing economic crisis whose impact on the external relation is significant. On the grounds of theoretical definition when on one hand the European Union presents itself as a normative actor (according to constructivist approaches) and on the other hand it pursues its realistic interests the dissertation concludes that this dilemma between normative rhetoric and realistic pursuing of interests leads to ineffective and untrustworthy foreign policy of the European Union in the Mediterranean. Then the dissertation brings comparison between French and Spanish approaches (whose interests are similarly defined in the Mediterranean) for influencing formulation and conduct of the EU foreign policy in this region. After application of the concept of Europeanization there is a conclusion that despite similar interests these two member states use different strategies toward the European level which in the end can bring influence in the European institutions.

Aux xviie et xviiie siècles, les échanges de la France avec la Russie reposent sur un paradoxe. Les productions du royaume y sont très demandées, alors que ses négociants ne s’intéressent pas au marché russe. Les marchandises russes sont également recherchées en France, surtout les fournitures navales, mais elles y sont apportées par des étrangers, en particulier les Hollandais. Pour le gouvernement français, l’une des solutions serait de pouvoir accéder directement au marché russe via la mer Noire. La fondation de Kherson en 1778, à la suite de la victoire de l’impératrice Catherine II sur les Turcs, ouvre de nouveaux horizons au commerce franco-russe. Afin d’attirer les négociants russes, Versailles leur accorde une série de privilèges douaniers. Mais les espoirs du gouvernement reposent davantage sur la personne d’Antoine Anthoine. Ce négociant marseillais est chargé d’une mission en Russie en 1781-1782, à l’issue de laquelle il obtient le droit de faire le commerce de la mer Noire. Mais il déchante rapidement, tout comme le secrétariat d’État à la Marine qui comptait sur lui pour obtenir des approvisionnements abondants et bon marché. En 1789, Anthoine renonce, sonnant ainsi le glas des ambitions du gouvernement français dans le commerce de la mer Noire. In the 17th and 18th centuries, exchanges between France with Russia relied on a paradox. French products were very much in demand, but French merchants were not interested in that commerce. Russian goods were also in great request in France, especially as far as naval stores were concerned, but they were brought to France by foreign merchants, particularly the Dutch. For the French government, a solution could be to get a direct access to the Russian market via the Black sea. The foundation of Kherson in 1778, as a result of Empress Catherine II’s victory over the Turks, opened new perspectives for the Franco-Russian trade. In order to attract the Russian merchants, Versailles granted them several custom privileges. But the French government’s hopes rested ultimately on the person of Antoine Anthoine. This merchant from Marseilles was in charge of a mission in Russia in 1781-1782, at the end of which he obtained the right to trade in the Black sea. But he was rapidly disappointed, just as the French secretary of State of the Navy who relied upon him to get abundant and cheap supplies. In 1789, Anthoine gave up this trade, and it represented the end of the ambitions of the French government on the Black sea trade.

Victor Place and Unification of the Principalities (1856-1859). The French consuls in Bucharest and Iasi, respectively Léon Béclard and Victor Place presented frequently, exactly and with perspicacity the arguments used by the Romanians for the union of Moldova and Wallachia, sometimes describing with plenty of details some of the significant events of the Principalities. They were trying to provide convincing information to their superiors about the ideals and interests of the Romanian society in the problematic context of those times. Victor Place, consul in Iasi, totally won in favor of the Romanian cause, in general, and especially of the Union, proved to have a more energetic, more enterprising and more enthusiastic nature. He considered that his mission included not just the observation and comment of the events, but also a personal involvement in the promotion and defense of the French interests along the political and diplomatic line that was set to him. Consequently, he carried out a remarkable activity in support of the Romanians during the years 1856-1859., Oncescu Iulian. Victor Place et l’Union des Principautés (1856-1859). In: Annales d'Université "Valahia" Târgovişte. Section d'Archéologie et d'Histoire, Tome 11, Numéro 2, 2009. pp. 79-85.

French diplomacy in the Baltic area in the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th century. French diplomatic relations with Sweden, Denmark, Prussia and Russia.

1927 m. Europos politinis „žvaigždynas“ patyrė tam tikrų pokyčių, atsiradusių dėl Vokietijos grįžimo į Europos politikos didžiąją areną. Faktas, kad Vokietija buvo pakviesta į Tautų Sąjungą ir jai suteiktas nuolatinio Tarybos nario statusas, reiškė, kad susiformavo mažiau palanki padėtis Prancūzijai. Šie įvykiai kėlė strateginius klausimus; atsakymus Prancūzija tikėjosi rasti Rytų Europoje ir kituose geopolitiniuose regionuose, pvz., Balkanuose bei Centrinėje Europoje. Rytų Europa patraukė tuo, kad su Lenkijos pagalba buvo galima daryti spaudimą Vokietijai, nukreipiant pagrindinį dėmesį į Rytų Prūsiją. Tačiau Lietuvos-Lenkijos konfliktas trukdė šiems planams. Todėl Prancūzija pradėjo tam tikrus diplomatinius žingsnius, bandydama išspręsti konfliktą. Prancūzų diplomatijos veiksmai negąsdino Lietuvos. Nesitikėta sulaukti pagalbos Vilniaus klausimu iš Sovietų Sąjungos ar Vokietijos. Nusivylimas tradiciniais sąjungininkais iššaukė poreikį ieškoti kitų galimybių, keliant Vilniaus klausimą tarptautiniu mastu. Būtent šiuo tikslu Lietuvos ministras pirmininkas prof. A. Voldemaras susitiko su prancūzų pasiuntiniu Gabrieliu Puaux. Tačiau viltys neišsipildė. Po beveik aštuonių mėnesių diplomatinių pastangų Lietuvos ir Lenkijos santykiai pablogėjo tiek, kad 1927 m. buvo laukiama karo. Diplomatinė misija žlugo dėl subjektyvių ir objektyvių priežasčių. Objektyvios priežastys – Lietuvos ir Lenkijos psichologinis klimatas, abiejų šalių vadovų ambicijos. Subjektyvios priežastys – skirtingas konfliktuojančių pusių statusas. Lenkijai priklausė konflikto objektas, be to, būdama gerokai didesnė šalis, galėjo sau leisti ignoruoti Lietuvos ar trečiosios šalies pasiūlymus. Dėl aukščiau minėtų priežasčių Vakarų šalys labiau domėjosi Lenkija, nei Lietuva. Gabrielio Puaux diplomatinės misijos nesėkmė grėsė dideliais nemalonumais Lietuvai. Šioje kovoje Lenkija įgijo psichologinį ir moralinį pranašumą, o lietuviams galutinai prilipo „nesutaikomųjų“ etiketė. In 1927 the European political 'constellation' experienced certain changes brought about by a gradual coming back of Germany to the big arena of European politics. The fact that Germany was in invited to join the League of Nations and was conferred the status of a permanent member in the Council meant for France that a less favourable political grouping had formed. Such processes raised strategic questions, the answers for which France was seeking to find in East Europe, in addition to other geopolitical regions, such as the Balkans and Central Europe. East Europe was attractive in that with the help of Poland it was possible to exercise pressure on Germany directing the main attention to East Prussia. However, a conflict between Poland and Lithuania interfered with such plans. It is due to these reasons that France took up certain diplomatic steps to resolve the conflict. The course of actions taken by French diplomacy did not threaten Lithuanian interests. The hope to get some help from the Soviet Union or Germany in order to settle the case of Vilnius was minimal. The disappointment with traditional allies necessitated the need to find other possibilities in raising the question of Vilnius on an international level. It was this aim that the Prime Minister of Lithuania, professor Augustinas Voldemaras, had set out to achieve when he met the French envoy Gabriele Puaux. However, the hopes did not come true. After almost eight months of diplomatic attempts the relationships between Poland and Lithuania deteriorated to the extent that in 1927 a war was pending. The reasons for the failure of the diplomatic mission can be claimed to be subjective and objective in character. The former included the psychological climate that existed between Poland and Lithuania, as well as the ambitions of the leaders of both countries. The subjective reason can be defined as the unequal status of the two conflicting states. Poland, having in its hands the object of the conflict, as well as having in mind the fact that it was a much bigger country, could afford to ignore proposals made by Lithuania or a third party. Therefore, other Western countries were more interested in winning Poland to their side, and not Lithuania, for the reasons mentioned above. The failure of Puaux's diplomatic mission had a more negative impact on Lithuania than on Poland. In its battle with Kaunas, Poland had achieved some psychological and moral advantages, whereas Lithuanians were evaluated as a 'unreconcilable' nation.