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Services play a more important role in trade and employment in the United Kingdom than in most other OECD countries. The UK services sector is supported by an open and transparent trade regime, policies that support competition and innovation, and regulatory transparency that facilitates the creation of new services businesses and start-ups. That said, certain barriers to services trade remain. This report sheds light on the role of services trade in the UK economy, describing recent trends and highlighting future challenges, and explores policy options to support a sustainable recovery from the COVID-19 crisis.

The increasing importance of services trade in the global economy contrasts with the lack of timely data to monitor recent developments. The nowcasting models developed in this paper are aimed at providing insights into current changes in total services trade, as recorded in monthly statistics of the G7 countries. Combining machine-learning techniques and dynamic factor models, the methodology exploits traditional data and Google Trends search data. No single model outperforms the others, but a weighted average of the best models combining machine-learning with dynamic factor models seems to be a promising avenue. The best models improve one-step ahead predictive performance relative to a simple benchmark by 30-35% on average across G7 countries and trade flows. Nowcasting models are estimated to have captured about 67% of the fall in services exports due to the COVID-19 shock and 60% of the fall in imports on average across G7 economies.

This report casts light on the impact of regulatory restrictions on the movement of people across international borders on services trade costs. Such restrictions were implemented on health and safety grounds following the COVID-19 outbreak in March 2020. The analysis relies on several illustrative scenarios in which all the countries are assumed to close their borders to passengers, but leave freight trade open. Services trade costs are estimated to increase by an average of 12% of export values across sectors and countries in the medium term in such a hypothetical scenario. The analysis identifies a large variability in the increase in services-trade costs across sectors and across countries, reflecting the stringency of initial regulations and the relative importance of business travel and labour mobility to international services trade.

Digital transformation has enabled easier tradability of traditional services across borders and the emergence of new services that create value from data. But the benefits derived from digitalisation risk being derailed by existing and emerging trade barriers. The OECD Digital Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (Digital STRI) is a new tool that identifies, catalogues, and quantifies cross-cutting barriers between 2014 and 2018 that affect trade in digitally-enabled services across all G20 countries. This index is comprised of a regulatory database of existing trade barriers based on publicly available laws and regulations, as well as composite indices that measure the trade restrictiveness of these policies. The Digital STRI shows that the regulatory environment is complex and diverse across G20 countries, and that there is scope to reduce trade barriers, particularly with respect to communications infrastructure and burdensome measures that affect cross-border data transfers. The Digital STRI can also map regulatory heterogeneity across the G20, and help monitor regulatory convergence, e.g. from regulatory cooperation in trade agreements.

This paper presents new data on regulatory barriers affecting services trade within the European Economic Area (EEA), covering 25 EEA countries, 22 sectors and five years (2014-2018). Following the methodology of the OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI), qualitative information is scored and weighted to produce binary composite indices. The resulting intra-EEA STRIs reveal that services trade restrictiveness within the Single Market is considerably lower than the applied MFN regime of those EEA members. Moreover, they show that EEA members have achieved significant regulatory harmonisation through their integration process.

La competencia es un factor esencial para el buen funcionamiento de los mercados. Fomenta la innovacion, la productividad y el crecimiento, lo cual, a su vez, genera riqueza y ayuda a reducir la pobreza. En los ultimos anos, Mexico ha puesto en marcha ambiciosas reformas para liberalizar y fortalecer su economia. La competencia se incremento en muchos sectores, sobre todo en el energetico —electricidad, petroleo y gas— y en los servicios de telecomunicaciones. La funcion de los reguladores se fortalecio y se faculto a las autoridades en materia de competencia para desalentar la colusion y otras practicas anticompetitivas.

Competition is essential to the functioning of markets. It fosters innovation, productivity and growth, which, in turn, create wealth and help to reduce poverty. Over the past years, Mexico has implemented ambitious reforms to free up its economy. Competition was enhanced in many sectors, most notably in the energy sector – electricity, oil and gas – and in telecommunication services. The role of regulators has been strengthened and the competition authorities have been empowered to deter collusion and other anticompetitive practices. Building on these achievements, Mexico now needs to ensure that entrepreneurship thrives and opportunities are spread evenly across the country. Removing existing barriers in services trade would benefit manufacturing and further facilitate the country’s integration into global value chains.

This book synthesises recent work by the OECD analysing services trade policies and quantifying their impacts on imports and exports, the performance of manufacturing and services sectors, and how ...

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for logistics services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, the People’s Republic of China, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for logistics services and captures regulations in force in 2014. The scores range from 0.08 to 1 for cargo-handling services, 0.04 to 1 for storage and warehouse services, 0.02 to 0.58 for freight transport agency services and 0.03 to 1 for customs brokerage services. It is observed that the regulatory profile differs across countries. In cargo-handling and storage and warehouse services, one country reserves all services provision to a statutory monopoly while another country reserves cargo-handling to a monopoly at port. Freight transport agency has the lowest average score among four subsectors while restrictions on foreign entry, restrictions on the movement of people and regulatory transparency significantly contribute to the results. One country is completely closed to foreign participation in customs brokerage services. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results.

This paper presents the scoring and weighting methodology for calculation of the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for 18 sectors. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The scoring system is based on binary scoring. To reconcile the complexity of services trade restrictions with binary scoring, non-binary measures are broken down to multiple thresholds; complementary measures are grouped and scored as zero only if all measures in the bundle are not restrictive. Finally in cases where one restriction renders others irrelevant, those measures that are rendered irrelevant are automatically scored one. The paper presents the general methodology that applies to the core measures found in all sectors as well as sector-specific scoring where relevant.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for construction, architecture and engineering services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for construction, architecture and engineering services and captures de jure regulations in force in 2013. The results for construction services indicate that the overall level of restrictiveness is relatively low, ranging from 0.05 to 0.32, with an average of 0.16. The more elevated levels of restriction can be largely attributed to general measures affecting all sectors of the economy. The STRI also supports the view that architecture and engineering services are less restrictively regulated than other accredited professional services, notably legal and accounting services. The average value for the STRI among the countries in the sample is 0.22 for architecture services, connoting a relatively low degree of regulatory restrictiveness; the corresponding value is only marginally lower, 0.2, for engineering services. The majority of regulations affecting trade in these sectors concern the movement of people.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for transport and courier services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for transport and courier services and captures de jure regulations in force in 2013. The STRI supports the view that these services are subject to very different regulatory frameworks and, in some cases, to a relatively elevated degree of regulation. Indices for air transport covering measures affecting commercial establishment and accompanying movement of natural persons are on average quite high (0.43), with little variation across countries. A preliminary assessment of restrictiveness in cross-border trade in the sector shows that, while some progress in easing restrictions has been achieved through open skies agreements, significant limitations remain in place. The maritime transport sector is moderately open with an average STRI of 0.25. Foreign equity restrictions are still quite common in the sector and contribute significantly to the index. Most other sector-specific restrictions are found in the cabotage market and in ports. In road freight transport, the results confirm that the domestic road freight transport regime has been significantly liberalised over the years, and currently commercial establishment in the sector is largely affected by horizontal measures. The overall level of restrictiveness is relatively low with an average of 0.16, but exhibits pretty large variation. With respect to rail freight, the STRI also supports the view that considerable reforms have been undertaken in the sector in the past decades. The average level of restrictiveness is moderate at 0.22, although two countries maintain a statutory state-owned monopoly, which implies that the sector is completely closed to foreign suppliers. Finally, for courier services the results show that the overall level of restrictiveness is moderate with a sample average of 0.26. There is, however, large variation in STRI indices among countries. The elevated levels of restrictiveness are found in countries where foreign equity restrictions or statutory monopolies exist.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for financial services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for commercial banking and insurance services and captures regulations in force in 2013. The scores in commercial banking range between 0.06 and 0.55, with a sample average of 0.19. The scores in insurance services range between 0.05 and 0.63, with a sample average of 0.20. The results are mainly driven by restrictions on market entry, where significant impediments remain in the form of foreign equity limits, restrictions on legal form, discriminatory licensing criteria and restrictions on cross-border transactions. Barriers to competition, including regulation of products and prices and preferential treatment granted to state-owned financial institutions, also make a substantive contribution to the index values. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for the regulated professions of legal and accounting services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for legal and accounting services and captures de jure regulations in force in 2013. The STRI supports the view that legal and accounting services are subject to a relatively high level of regulation. Restrictiveness for legal services ranges from 0.11 to 0.73, with an average of 0.31. Accounting and auditing services show an average of 0.3 and STRI values ranging from 0.13 to 1. The results provide useful policy insights, particularly in order to identify priorities for reform at the national and international levels. Notably, in the case of legal and accounting services, easing a few prominent restrictions could result in a significantly more liberal and competitive market environment.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for telecommunications. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for telecommunications and captures regulations in force in 2013. The scores range between 0.06 and 0.61, with a sample average of 0.22. Barriers to competition, reflecting inadequate regulation of incumbents with significant market power, and state ownership in some countries make the largest contribution to the index value, followed by restrictions on foreign entry. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for computer services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for computer services and captures regulations in force in 2013. The scores range between 0.08 and 0.34, with a sample average of 0.18. Explicit barriers to trade in computer services are rare, but the sector is subject to a number of economy-wide restrictions facing all sectors. Among these, restrictions on movement of people (mode 4 in GATS terminology) make the largest contribution to the index value, followed by regulatory transparency issues. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for distribution services. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for distribution services and captures regulations in force in 2013. The scores range between 0.02 and 0.40, with a sample average of 0.13. It is observed that the regulatory profile differs across countries. Restrictions on foreign ownership and other market entry conditions significantly contribute to the results for almost half of the countries covered by the STRI. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results.

This paper presents the services trade restrictiveness indices (STRIs) for motion pictures, television and broadcasting and sound recording. The STRIs are composite indices taking values between zero and one, zero representing an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers. The indices are calculated for 40 countries, the 34 OECD members and Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa. The STRIs capture de jure restrictions. This report presents the first vintage of indicators for audio-visual services and captures regulations in force in 2013. The scores range between 0.06 and 0.72 for motion pictures, 0.07 to 0.78 for television and broadcasting, and between 0.05 and 0.37 for sound recording. The sample averages are 0.18 for motion pictures, 0.28 for television and broadcasting and 0.16 for sound recording. Limitations on foreign entry, including foreign equity limits contribute to about two thirds of the index values in television and broadcasting. In motion pictures screen quotas contribute to the indices in many of the countries with scores above average. Sound recording, i.e. music, is the most open of the three audio-visual services sectors where limitations on movement of people account for more than 40% of the index value. The paper presents the list of measures included in the indices, the scoring and weighting system for calculating the indices and an analysis of the results.

Cet article traite de l’asymétrie de transmission des prix (ATP) dans la filière des produits de la mer en utilisant un modèle autorégressif à effet de seuil (consistent TAR et M-TAR). Un seuil non nul permet de révéler certains comportements stratégiques et des coûts fixes d’ajustement qui ne seraient pas observables sur de faibles variations de prix autour d’un seuil nul. On s’attend à ce que l’aquaculture, en vertu d’un degré de contrôle supérieur sur l’offre, engendre une plus faible asymétrie comparativement à la production halieutique. Une asymétrie de transmission est néanmoins observée à la fois dans le cas du cabillaud sauvage et du saumon d’élevage commercialisés en France, mais uniquement à partir de seuils endogènes et l’ATP agissant en sens opposé. Les résultats sont commentés au regard des restrictions commerciales imposés par la Politique Commune des Pêches européenne., The present study deals with asymmetric price transmission (APT) along the fish value chain by using a consistent threshold autoregressive (consistent TAR and momentum-threshold autoregressive [M-TAR]) model. A nonzero threshold captures strategic behaviors and adjustment costs that are not observable with small price changes around a zero threshold. Fish farming, because of greater control over supply, is expected to produce less asymmetry than wild harvesting. Asymmetry is notwithstanding found for both wild cod and farmed salmon marketed in France, but only with consistent thresholds and operating in opposite ways. The results are discussed with regard to the trade restrictions imposed by the Common Fisheries Policy.

To what extent are governments drawing on relevant international standards in their technical regulations, as mandated by the WTO TBT Agreement? A number of sources of data exist, including electronic databases maintained by governments, but they cannot be used to obtain systematic, international perspective, because there is no harmonised international format and they are incomplete. This study develops an analytical frame for collecting and presenting data on the use of standards in regulation in any sector, as a basis for effective monitoring of the actual extent of use of international standards in regulation and for empirical analysis of the trade effects. This template is then applied to collect and report for five OECD countries detailed factual information on technical regulations, their objectives and standards use in three sectors – electrical household appliances, equipment for natural gas and telephony. The research finds that core government policies confirm the receptiveness of policy and regulation to the use of international standards. It illustrates the difficulty of identifying, for a given sector, which standards are used, for which regulatory objectives, and with which links – direct or indirect – to standards used internationally. The data collected in the harmonised format of the template show how transparency of data on standards use could be improved. Improved transparency can facilitate efforts to improve harmonisation where this can help to remove barriers to trade. Explicit identification of regulatory objectives can ensure that attempts to promote wider harmonisation take account of those objectives. Also, the range of non-national standards actually used as a basis for technical regulation is greater than sometimes acknowledged, and wider knowledge of their availability and use could be helpful to regulators. Another benefit of transparency is that factual presentations of the use of standards in technical regulations provide a source of rich and accurate data for use in empirical work on how regulatory use of standards influences international trade.

Since the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) came into force, Members have invested considerable efforts in adopting and promoting the use of measures intended to reduce conformity assessment (CA) related barriers to trade. Our knowledge of the impact of specific trade facilitating programmes in the CA field is limited so far, making empirical studies of their trade impact desirable. This study investigates the impact of Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity (SDOC) on trade flows. As under SDOC regimes suppliers themselves provide written assurance of conformity to applicable technical regulations of a market, the costs of compliance are assumed to be smaller than for CA regimes requiring certification by third parties. The study focuses on three cases of SDOC introduction in the European Union covering eligible products from the medical devices, telecommunications equipment and machinery sectors. The paper explains the rationale for using SDOC, expected benefits and design characteristics of SDOC regimes. The quantitative analysis uses a gravity model and finds compelling evidence that the introduction of SDOC in the EU was a factor that influenced the evolution of import flows into EU markets positively. Intra-EU trade flows and imports from extra-EU OECD countries increased for SDOC-eligible radio and telecommunications equipment and low-risk medical devices, whereas the results for machinery are ambiguous. The most striking increases, visible in all three sectors, are found for exports to EU markets from non-OECD (developing) countries included in the sample. Analysis of the effect of SDOC for selected individual EU members furthermore suggest that the magnitude of effect depends on the nature of the CA regime that SDOC replaced.