Search

This eighteenth volume of the acclaimed Handbook of Philosophical Logic includes many contributors who are among the most famous leading figures of applied philosophical logic of our time. Coverage includes deontic logic, practical reasoning, homogeneous and heterogeneous logical proportion, and talmudic logic. Overall, it will appeal to students, practitioners, and researchers looking for an authoritative resource in these areas. The contributors first explore models in terms of dynamic logics for information-driven agency. The paradigm they use is dynamic-epistemic logics for knowledge and belief and their current extensions to the statics and dynamics of agents'preferences. Next, in the presentation of preference based agency, coverage examines a large number of themes, including interactive social agents and scenarios with long term patterns emerging over time. From here, the book moves on to offer an introduction to homogeneous and heterogeneous logical proportions. Readers will also learn more about the general challenge that the problem of formalizing practical reasoning presents to logical theory. The contributors survey the existing resources that might contribute to the development of such a formalization. They conclude that, while a robust, adequate logic of practical reasoning is not yet in place, the materials for developing such a logic are now available. The last chapter explores topics that deal with the logic of Jewish law and the logic of the Talmud. This includes obligations and prohibitions in Talmudic deontic logic, the handling of loops in Talmudic logic, Temporal Talmudic logic, and quantum states and disjunctive attacks in Talmudic logic. The Talmudic logic system presented are also exported to general logic and to Artificial Intelligence.

It is with great pleasure that we are presenting to the community the second edition of this extraordinary handbook. It has been over 15 years since the publication of the first edition and there have been great changes in the landscape of philosophical logic since then. The first edition has proved invaluable to generations of students and researchers in formal philosophy and language, as weIl as to consumers of logic in many applied areas. The main logic artiele in the Encyelopaedia Britannica 1999 has described the first edition as'the best starting point for exploring any of the topics in logic'. We are confident that the second edition will prove to be just as good.! The first edition was the second handbook published for the logic commu­ nity. It followed the North Holland one volume Handbook 0/ Mathematical Logic, published in 1977, edited by the late Jon Barwise. The four volume Handbook 0/ Philosophical Logic, published 1983-1989 came at a fortunate at the evolution of logic. This was the time when logic temporal junction was gaining ground in computer science and artificial intelligence cireles. These areas were under increasing commercial pressure to provide devices which help andjor replace the human in his daily activity. This pressure required the use of logic in the modelling of human activity and organisa­ tion on the one hand and to provide the theoretical basis for the computer program constructs on the other.

It is with great pleasure that we are presenting to the community the second edition of this extraordinary handbook. It has been over 15 years since the publication of the first edition and there have been great changes in the landscape of philosophical logic since then. The first edition has proved invaluable to generations of students and researchers in formal philosophy and language, as weIl as to consumers of logic in many applied areas. The main logic article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica 1999 has described the first edition as'the best starting point for exploring any of the topics in logic'. We are confident that the second edition will prove to be just as good! The first edition was the second handbook published for the logic commu­ nity. It followed the North Holland one volume Handbook 0/ Mathematical Logic, published in 1977, edited by the late Jon Barwise. The four volume Handbook 0/ Philosophical Logic, published 1983-1989 came at a fortunate temporal junction at the evolution of logic. This was the time when logic was gaining ground in computer science and artificial intelligence circles. These areas were under increasing commercial pressure to provide devices which help and/or replace the human in his daily activity. This pressure required the use of logic in the modelling of human activity and organisa­ tion on the one hand and to provide the theoretical basis for the computer program constructs on the other.

conceptual, realist) theories of predication. Chapter IV.4 centers on an important class of expressions used for predication in connection with quantities: mass expressions. This chapter reviews the most well-known approaches to mass terms and the ontological proposals related to them. In addition to quantification and predication, matters of reference have constituted the other overriding theme for semantic theories in both philosophical logic and the semantics of natural languages. Chapter IV.5 of how the semantics of proper names and descrip­ presents an overview tions have been dealt with in recent theories of reference. Chapter IV.6 is concerned with the context-dependence of reference, in particular, with the semantics of indexical expressions. The topic of Chapter IV.7 is related to predication as it surveys some of the central problems of ascribing propositional attitudes to agents. Chap­ ter IV.8 deals with the analysis of the main temporal aspects of natural language utterances. Together these two chapters give a good indication of the intricate complexities that arise once modalities of one or the other sort enter on the semantic stage. in philosophical Chapter IV.9 deals with another well-known topic logic: presupposition, an issue on the borderline of semantics and prag­ matics. The volume closes with an extensive study of the Liar paradox and its many implications for the study of language (as for example, self­ reference, truth concepts and truth definitions).

The aim of the first volume of the present Handbook of Philosophical Logic is essentially two-fold: First of all, the chapters in this volume should provide a concise overview of the main parts of classical logic. Second, these chapters are intended to present all the relevant background material necessary for the understanding of the contributions which are to follow in the next three volumes. We have thought it to be of importance that the connections between classical logic and its'extensions'(covered in Volume 11) as well as its most important'alternatives'(covered in Volume Ill) be brought out clearly from the start. The first chapter presents a clear and detailed picture of the range of what is generally taken to be the standard logical framework, namely, predicate (or first-order quantificational) logic. On the one hand, this chapter surveys both propositionai logic and first-order predicate logic and, on the other hand, presents the main metalogical results obtained for them. Chapter 1. 1 also contains a discussion of the limits of first-order logic, i. e. it presents an answer to the question: Why has predicate logic played such a formidable role in the formalization of mathematics and in the many areas of philo­ sophical and linguistic applications? Chapter 1. 1 is prerequisite for just about all the other chapters in the entire Handbook, while the other chapters in Volume I provide more detailed discussions of material developed or hinted at in the first chapter.

The essays in this collection are the outgrowth of a workshop, held in June 1976, on formal approaches to the semantics and pragmatics of natural languages. They document in an astoundingly uniform way the develop­ ments in the formal analysis of natural languages since the late sixties. The avowed aim of the'workshop was in fact to assess the progress made in the application of formal methods to semantics, to confront different approaches to essentially the same problems on the one hand, and, on the other, to show the way in relating semantic and pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena. Several of these papers can in fact be regarded as attempts to close the'semiotic circle'by bringing together the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of certain constructions in an explanatory framework thereby making it more than obvious that these three components of an integrated linguistic theory cannot be as neatly separated as one would have liked to believe. In other words, not only can we not elaborate a syntactic description of (a fragment of) a language and then proceed to the semantics (as Montague pointed out already forcefully in 1968), we cannot hope to achieve an adequate integrated syntax and semantics without paying heed to the pragmatic aspects of the constructions involved. The behavior of polarity items,'quantifiers'like any, conditionals or even logical particles like and and or in non-indicative sentences is clear-cut evidence for the need to let each component of the grammar inform the other.

Lambda Calculi: A Guide Interpolation and Definability Discourse Representation Theory

Belief Revision Refutation and systems in Propositional Logic. A Quantifier Scope in Formal Linguistics and Non-deterministic Semantics for Logical Systems.

theywereextensivelydiscussedbyallauthorsina3-dayHandbookmeeting. These are: • a chapter on non-monotonic logic • a chapter on combinatory logic and?-calculus We felt at the time (1979) that non-monotonic logic was not ready for a chapter yet and that combinatory logic and?-calculus was too far re- 1 moved. Non-monotonic logic is now a very major area of philosop- cal logic, alongside default logics, labelled deductive systems,?bring l- ics, multi-dimensional, multimodal and substructural logics. Intensive - examinations of fragments of classical logic have produced fresh insights, including at time decision procedures and equivalence with non-classical systems. Perhaps the most impressive achievement of philosophical logic as arising inthepastdecadehasbeenthee?ectivenegotiationofresearchpartnerships with fallacy theory, informal logic and argumentation theory, attested to by the Amsterdam Conference in Logic and Argumentation in 1995, and the two Bonn Conferences in Practical Reasoning in 1996 and 1997. These subjects are becoming more and more useful in agent theory and intelligent and reactive databases. Finally,?fteen years after the start of the Handbook project, I would like to take this opportunity to put forward my current views about logic in computer science, computational linguistics and arti?cial intelligence. In the early 1980s the perception of the role of logic in computer science was that of a speci?cation and reasoning tool and that of a basis for possibly neat computer languages. The computer scientist was manipulating data structures and the use of logic was one of his options.

such questions for centuries (unrestricted by the capabilities of any hard­ ware). The principles governing the interaction of several processes, for example, are abstract an similar to principles governing the cooperation of two large organisation. A detailed rule based effective but rigid bureaucracy is very much similar to a complex computer program handling and manipulating data. My guess is that the principles underlying one are very much the same as those underlying the other. I believe the day is not far away in the future when the computer scientist will wake up one morning with the realisation that he is actually a kind of formal philosopher! The projected number of volumes for this Handbook is about 18. The subject has evolved and its areas have become interrelated to such an extent that it no longer makes sense to dedicate volumes to topics. However, the volumes do follow some natural groupings of chapters. I would like to thank our authors are readers for their contributions and their commitment in making this Handbook a success. Thanks also to our publication administrator Mrs J. Spurr for her usual dedication and excellence and to Kluwer Academic Publishers for their continuing support for the Handbook.

It is with great pleasure that we are presenting to the community the second edition of this extraordinary handbook. It has been over 15 years since the publication of the first edition and there have been great changes in the landscape of philosophical logic since then. The first edition has proved invaluable to generations of students and researchers in formal philosophy and language, as well as to consumers of logic in many applied areas. The main logic artiele in the Encyelopaedia Britannica 1999 has described the first edition as'the best starting point for exploring any of the topics in logic'. We are confident that the second edition will prove to be just as good.! The first edition was the second handbook published for the logic commu­ nity. It followed the North Holland one volume Handbook 0/ Mathematical Logic, published in 1977, edited by the late Jon Barwise. The four volume Handbook 0/ Philosophical Logic, published 1983-1989 came at a fortunate temporal junction at the evolution of logic. This was the time when logic was gaining ground in computer science and artificial intelligence cireles. These areas were under increasing commercial press ure to provide devices which help and/or replace the human in his daily activity. This pressure required the use of logic in the modelling of human activity and organisa­ tion on the one hand and to provide the theoretical basis for the computer program constructs on the other.

This volume presents a number of systems of logic which can be considered as alternatives to classical logic. The notion of what counts as an alternative is a somewhat problematic one. There are extreme views on the matter of what is the'correct'logical system and whether one logical system (e. g. classical logic) can represent (or contain) all the others. The choice of the systems presented in this volume was guided by the following criteria for including a logic as an alternative: (i) the departure from classical logic in accepting or rejecting certain theorems of classical logic following intuitions arising from significant application areas and/or from human reasoning; (ii) the alternative logic is well-established and well-understood mathematically and is widely applied in other disciplines such as mathematics, physics, computer science, philosophy, psychology, or linguistics. A number of other alternatives had to be omitted for the present volume (e. g. recent attempts to formulate so-called'non-monotonic'reason­ ing systems). Perhaps these can be included in future extensions of the Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Chapter 1 deals with partial logics, that is, systems where sentences do not always have to be either true or false, and where terms do not always have to denote. These systems are thus, in general, geared towards reasoning in partially specified models. Logics of this type have arisen mainly from philo­ sophical and linguistic considerations; various applications in theoretical computer science have also been envisaged.