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The rise of economic inequalities in advanced economies has been often linked with the growth of spatial inequalities within countries, yet there is limited comparative research that studies the relationship between national and subnational economic inequality. This paper presents the first systematic attempt to create internationally comparable evidence showing how different countries perform in terms of geographic wage inequalities. We create cross-country comparable measures of spatial wage disparities between and within similarly-defined local labour market areas (LLMAs) for Canada, France, (West) Germany, the UK and the US since the 1970s, and assess their contribution to national inequality. By the end of the 2010s, spatial inequalities in LLMA mean wages are similar in Canada, France, Germany and the UK; the US exhibits the highest degree of spatial inequality. Over the study period, spatial inequalities have nearly doubled in all countries, except for France where spatial inequalities have fallen back to 1970s levels. Due to a concomitant increase in within-place inequality, the contribution of places in explaining national wage inequality has remained fairly constant over the 40-year study period, except in the UK where we document a significant increase. Whilst common global social, economic and technological shocks are important drivers of spatial inequality, this variation in levels and trends of spatial inequality opens the way to comparative research exploring the role of national institutions in mediating how global shocks translate into economic disparities between places.

In this paper, we examine the mental health effects of lowering the UK's benefit cap in 2016. This policy limits the total amount a household with no-one in full-time employment can receive in social security. We treat the reduction in the cap as a natural policy experiment, comparing those at risk of being capped and those who were not, and examining the risk of experiencing poor mental health both before and after the cap was lowered. Drawing on data from ~900,000 individuals, we find that the prevalence of depression or anxiety among those at risk of being capped increased by 2.6 percentage points (95% confidence interval: 1.33–3.88) compared with those at a low risk of being capped. Capping social security may increase the risk of mental ill health and could have the unintended consequence of pushing out-of-work people even further away from the labour market.

‘Levelling up’ - a policy agenda focused on reducing regional inequalities - has become the new mantra in British politics. This paper critiques the policy programme from its emergence in 2019 to the publication of the 2022 levelling up white paper. While it is a welcome recognition of gross regional inequality, local institutions lack capacity to deliver, there has been little genuine devolution and our analysis shows that little new funding has been committed. “Levelling up” could simply become the latest in a list of politically useful but empty slogans which are used as a substitute for resources and devolution.

‘Levelling up’ - a policy agenda focused on reducing regional inequalities - has become the new mantra in British politics. This paper reviews and critiques the agenda from its beginnings in 2019 to the publication of the 2022 Levelling Up White Paper. The agenda is an overdue recognition of gross regional inequality, and the new ‘missions’ which are set out to drive change are welcome. Yet local institutions lack capacity to deliver, there has been little genuine devolution, and the mechanisms through which the ‘missions’ will actually be delivered are unclear. Our analysis of spending commitments shows little new money has been committed, and what has been committed has tended to be through top-down competitive bids. There is a danger that levelling up becomes the latest in a list of politically useful but empty slogans which are used as a substitute for resources and devolution.

Mark Fransham and Insa Koch examine how intensifying inequality in the UK plays out at a local level. They distinguish differing dynamics of ‘elite-based’ polarisation (in Oxford and Tunbridge Wells) and ‘poverty-based’ polarisation (in Margate and Oldham). They write that, although across these four towns marginalised communities express a sense of local belonging, tensions between social groups remain strong and all towns are marked by a weak or ‘squeezed middle’.

This article examines how intensifying inequality in the UK plays out at a local level, in order to bring out the varied ways polarisation takes place ‘on the ground’. It brings a community analysis buttressed by quantitative framing to the study of economic, spatial and relational polarisation in four towns in the UK. We distinguish differing dynamics of ‘elite-based’ polarisation (in Oxford and Tunbridge Wells) and ‘poverty-based’ polarisation (in Margate and Oldham). Yet there are also common features. Across the towns, marginalised communities express a sense of local belonging. But tensions between social groups also remain strong and all towns are marked by a weak or ‘squeezed middle’. We argue that the weakness of intermediary institutions, including but not limited to the ‘missing middle’, and capable of bridging gaps between various social groups, provides a major insight into both the obstacles to, and potential solutions for, re-politicising inequality today.

A recent “return to the city” by middle-class professionals in England, with the increasing “suburbanisation” of poverty and an ongoing housing crisis, has increased the salience of concerns about neighbourhood gentrification via the involuntary displacement of established working class residents. This paper reports a systematic analysis of gentrification and income poverty in England that adopts innovative methodological approaches: a multivariate index of gentrification, propensity score matching to establish a comparison group, and sensitivity testing with respect to different “gentrification” definitions. The paper investigates three possible theoretical processes that could have driven the observed decline in income poverty rates in gentrifying areas: inward mobility to areas, outward mobility from areas, and in situ changes in poverty status. The post-recession period 2010–2014 is studied using data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study. There is good evidence from aggregate and individual-level analyses for a relationship between “inward” mobility, poverty status, and area gentrification. In addition, people moving to gentrifying areas were more likely to have a university degree and more likely to be in the professional occupational class than people who moved to nongentrifying comparison areas. On the other hand, no such relationships are found for “outward” mobility. The strongest evidence is found for “exclusionary displacement” (the restricted ability of low-income households to move in to an area) rather than “direct displacement” (increased outward mobility of existing residents) as the dominant driver of gentrification in this period.

The concept of polarisation, where the extremes of a distribution are growing and where there is a missing or shrinking ‘middle’, has attracted recent interest driven by concerns about the consequences of inequality in British society. This paper brings together evidence of economic, spatial and relational polarisation across four contrasting towns in the United Kingdom: Oldham, Margate, Oxford and Tunbridge Wells. Deploying a comparative community analysis, buttressed by quantitative framing, we demonstrate the need to recognise how local social processes vary amongst places that on the face of it display similar trends. We show how local polarisation plays out differently depending on whether it is driven ‘from above’ or ‘from below’. Across all four towns, we draw out how a ‘missing middle’ of intermediaries who might be able to play roles in cementing local relations poses a major challenge for political mobilisation in times of inequality

Spatial inequality in economic outcomes is increasingly seen as a problem for national economies. This paper considers spatial inequality in the UK labour market, its causes, and potential policy solutions. Relative to other European countries, the UK is highly spatially uneven, but it is not as unequal as the United States. The most common explanations for growing spatial inequality are economic, in particular the linked processes of manufacturing decline, the rise in knowledge-based services, and London’s growth as an international service hub. However, these explanations ignore the importance of spatial labour market institutions on different local economies. In this paper we argue that labour market institutions are one of the key missing explanations for the changing patterns of spatial inequality in the UK, and that the impact of labour market policy is likely to dwarf the limited funding provided for local economic development policy. We conclude with some suggestions for how policy might better address spatial labour market inequality in the UK and start to create good jobs across the country.

In this paper, we examine the labour market effects of lowering the UK's benefit cap in 2016. This policy limits the total amount a working-age non-disabled household with no-one in employment can receive in social security. We treat the sharp reduction in this benefit cap as a natural experiment, comparing those at risk of being capped and those who were not before and after the cap was lowered. Drawing on data from ~500,000 individuals, we find that this reform reduced unemployment compared to those not at risk of being capped. The reform also increased economic inactivity, partly because the cap harmed mental health but also because those at risk of being capped were eligible to claim disability-related welfare payments that made them exempt. Limiting total monthly welfare payments of low-income families may increase employment for some but it can also push others out of the labour market altogether.

In November 2016, the UK government announced they would be lowering the benefit cap, the total amount a family with no-one in full-time employment can receive from the government in social security. This policy change reduced financial support for large (often lone parent) families and those with high housing costs, and broke the link between needs and entitlements in the British social security system. This policy was intended to incentivise people to return to work but it may have also harmed mental health, especially because those affected by the reform may struggle to find appropriate work or move to cheaper housing. We treat this reform as a natural policy experiment, comparing those at-risk of being capped and those who were not, and then examining the risk of experiencing poor mental health both before and after the cap was lowered. The main outcome is a binary measure of self-reported mental health problems. Drawing on data from 1.4 million individuals collected between January 2015 and December 2018, we find that the prevalence of depression or anxiety among those at-risk of being capped increased by 2.6 percentage points (95% confidence interval: 1.33 to 3.88) compared with those at a low risk of being capped. This association is consistent to a variety of sensitivity tests. We conclude that lowering the total amount of financial assistance families can receive in social security may increase the risk of mental ill health and could have the unintended consequence of pushing out-of-work people even further away from the labour market.

The rise of economic inequalities in advanced economies has been often linked with the growth of spatial inequalities within countries, yet there is limited comparative research that studies the relationship between national and subnational economic inequality. This paper presents the first systematic attempt to create internationally comparable evidence showing how different countries perform in terms of geographic wage inequalities. We create cross-country comparable measures of spatial wage disparities between and within similarly-defined local labour market areas (LLMAs) for Canada, France, (West) Germany, the UK and the US since the 1970s, and assess their contribution to national inequality. By the end of the 2010s, spatial inequalities in LLMA mean wages are similar in Canada, France, Germany and the UK; the US exhibits the highest degree of spatial inequality. Over the study period, spatial inequalities have nearly doubled in all countries, except for France where spatial inequalities have fallen back to 1970s levels. Due to a concomitant increase in within-place inequality, the contribution of places in explaining national wage inequality has remained fairly constant over the 40-year study period, except in the UK where we document a significant increase. Whilst common global social, economic and technological shocks are important drivers of spatial inequality, this variation in levels and trends of spatial inequality opens the way to comparative research exploring the role of national institutions in mediating how global shocks translate into economic disparities between places.