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Despite the considerable morbidity and mortality of Yellow fever virus (YFV) infections in Brazil, as well as its widespread presence in non-human primate host, our understanding of disease outbreaks is hampered by limited viral genomic data. Determining the timing and spatial corridors of YFV spread, as well as the geographic hotspots that link the endemic north of the country with epidemic extra-Amazonian regions, are central to predicting and preventing future outbreak events and epidemics. Here, we tracked the recent spread of the virus by integrating genome sequences of new YFV infections sampled from infected non-human primates and humans with both epidemiological and vector data. Through a combination of phylogenetic and epidemiological models we reconstructed the recent transmission history of YFV within different epidemic seasons in Brazil. A suitability index based on the highly domesticatedAedes aegyptiwas able to capture the seasonality of reported human infections. Spatial modelling revealed spatial hotspots with both past reporting and low vaccination coverage, which coincided with many of the largest urban centres in the Southeast. Phylodynamic analysis unravelled the circulation of three distinct YFV lineages, and provided proof of the directionality of a known spatial corridor of viral spread that connects the endemic North with the extra-Amazonian basin. This study illustrates that genomics linked with field sampling of animals and humans within a One Health framework can provide new insights into the landscape of YFV transmission, augmenting traditional approaches to infectious disease surveillance and control.

The efficacy of digital contact tracing against COVID-19 epidemic is debated: smartphone penetration is limited in many countries, non-uniform across age groups, with low coverage among elderly, the most vulnerable to SARS-CoV-2. We developed an agent-based model to precise the impact of digital contact tracing and household isolation on COVID-19 transmission. The model, calibrated on French population, integrates demographic, contact-survey and epidemiological information to describe the risk factors for exposure and transmission of COVID-19. We explored realistic levels of case detection, app adoption, population immunity and transmissibility. Assuming a reproductive ratio R = 2.6 and 50% detection of clinical cases, a ~20% app adoption reduces peak incidence by ~35%. With R = 1.7, >30% app adoption lowers the epidemic to manageable levels. Higher coverage among adults, playing a central role in COVID-19 transmission, yields an indirect benefit for elderly. These results may inform the inclusion of digital contact tracing within a COVID-19 response plan., This study was partially supported by the ANR project DATAREDUX (ANR-19-CE46-0008-01) to AB, VC and PYB; EU H2020 grants MOOD (H2020-874850) to VC, CP, and PYB, and RECOVER (H2020-101003589) to VC; the Municipality of Paris (https://www.paris.fr/) through the programme Emergence(s) to JAML, BAG, PB, FP and CP; the ANR and Fondation de France through the project NoCOV (00105995) to PYB, CP; the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation to JAML and BAG, the AEI and FEDER (EU) under the grant PACSS (RTI2018-093732-B-C22) JAML and BAG; the Maria de Maeztu program for Units of Excellence in R&D (MDM-2017-0711) to JAML and BAG.

Cross-reactivity to SARS-CoV-2 from previous exposure to endemic coronaviruses (eHCoV) is gaining increasing attention as a possible driver of both protection against infection and severity of COVID-19 disease. Here, we use a stochastic individual-based model to show that heterogeneities in individual exposure histories to endemic coronaviruses are able to explain observed age patterns of hospitalisation due to COVID-19 in EU/EEA countries and the UK, provided there is (i) a decrease in cross-protection to SARS-CoV-2 with the number of eHCoV exposures and (ii) an increase in potential disease severity with number of eHCoV exposures or as a result of immune senescence. We also show that variation in health care capacity and testing efforts is compatible with country-specific differences in hospitalisation rates. Our findings call for further research on the role of cross-reactivity to endemic coronaviruses and highlight potential challenges arising from heterogeneous health care capacity and testing.

It is widely believed that the herd immunity threshold (HIT) required to prevent a resurgence of SARS-CoV-2 is in excess of 50% for any epidemiological setting. Here, we demonstrate that HIT may be greatly reduced if a fraction of the population is unable to transmit the virus due to innate resistance or cross-protection from exposure to seasonal coronaviruses. The drop in HIT is proportional to the fraction of the population resistant only when that fraction is effectively segregated from the general population; however, when mixing is random, the drop in HIT is more precipitous. Significant reductions in expected mortality can also be observed in settings where a fraction of the population is resistant to infection. These results help to explain the large degree of regional variation observed in seroprevalence and cumulative deaths and suggest that sufficient herd-immunity may already be in place to substantially mitigate a potential second wave.

Summary Background The novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) epidemic has spread from China to 25 countries. Local cycles of transmission have already occurred in 12 countries after case importation. In Africa, Egypt has so far confirmed one case. The management and control of COVID-19 importations heavily rely on a country's health capacity. Here we evaluate the preparedness and vulnerability of African countries against their risk of importation of COVID-19. Methods We used data on the volume of air travel departing from airports in the infected provinces in China and directed to Africa to estimate the risk of importation per country. We determined the country's capacity to detect and respond to cases with two indicators: preparedness, using the WHO International Health Regulations Monitoring and Evaluation Framework; and vulnerability, using the Infectious Disease Vulnerability Index. Countries were clustered according to the Chinese regions contributing most to their risk. Findings Countries with the highest importation risk (ie, Egypt, Algeria, and South Africa) have moderate to high capacity to respond to outbreaks. Countries at moderate risk (ie, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya) have variable capacity and high vulnerability. We identified three clusters of countries that share the same exposure to the risk originating from the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, and the city of Beijing, respectively. Interpretation Many countries in Africa are stepping up their preparedness to detect and cope with COVID-19 importations. Resources, intensified surveillance, and capacity building should be urgently prioritised in countries with moderate risk that might be ill-prepared to detect imported cases and to limit onward transmission. Funding EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation Horizon 2020, Agence Nationale de la Recherche.

BackgroundThe novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) epidemic has spread to 23 countries from China. Local cycles of transmission already occurred in 7 countries following case importation. No African country has reported cases yet. The management and control of 2019-nCoV introductions heavily relies on country’s health capacity. Here we evaluate the preparedness and vulnerability of African countries against their risk of importation of 2019-nCoV.MethodsWe used data on air travel volumes departing from airports in the infected provinces in China and directed to Africa to estimate the risk of introduction per country. We determined the country’s capacity to detect and respond to cases with two indicators: preparedness, using the WHO International Health Regulation Monitoring and Evaluation Framework; and vulnerability, with the Infectious Disease Vulnerability Index. Countries were clustered according to the Chinese regions contributing the most to their risk.FindingsCountries at the highest importation risk (Egypt, Algeria, Republic of South Africa) have moderate to high capacity to respond to outbreaks. Countries at moderate risk (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya) have variable capacity and high vulnerability. Three clusters of countries are identified that share the same exposure to the risk originating from the provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, and Beijing, respectively.InterpretationSeveral countries in Africa are stepping up their preparedness to detect and cope with 2019-nCoV importations. Resources and intensified surveillance and capacity capacity should be urgently prioritized towards countries at moderate risk that may be ill-prepared to face the importation and to limit onward transmission.FundingThis study was partially supported by the ANR project DATAREDUX (ANR-19-CE46-0008-03) to VC; the EU grant MOOD (H2020-874850) to MG, CP, MK, PYB, VC.

International audience; As at 27 January 2020, 42 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) cases were confirmed outside China. We estimate the risk of case importation to Europe from affected areas in China via air travel. We consider travel restrictions in place, three reported cases in France, one in Germany. Estimated risk in Europe remains high. The United Kingdom, Germany and France are at highest risk. Importation from Beijing and Shanghai would lead to higher and widespread risk for Europe.

The interaction among multiple microbial strains affects the spread of infectious diseases and the efficacy of interventions. Genomic tools have made it increasingly easy to observe pathogenic strains diversity, but the best interpretation of such diversity has remained difficult because of relationships with host and environmental factors. Here, we focus on host-to-host contact behavior and study how it changes populations of pathogens in a minimal model of multi-strain interaction. We simulated a population of identical strains competing by mutual exclusion and spreading on a dynamical network of hosts according to a stochastic susceptible-infectious-susceptible model. We computed ecological indicators of diversity and dominance in strain populations for a collection of networks illustrating various properties found in real-world examples. Heterogeneities in the number of contacts among hosts were found to reduce diversity and increase dominance by making the repartition of strains among infected hosts more uneven, while strong community structure among hosts increased strain diversity. We found that the introduction of strains associated with hosts entering and leaving the system led to the highest pathogenic richness at intermediate turnover levels. These results were finally illustrated using the spread of Staphylococcus aureus in a long-term health-care facility where close proximity interactions and strain carriage were collected simultaneously. We found that network structural and temporal properties could account for a large part of the variability observed in strain diversity. These results show how stochasticity and network structure affect the population ecology of pathogens and warn against interpreting observations as unambiguous evidence of epidemiological differences between strains., Author summary Pathogens are structured in multiple strains that interact and co-circulate on the same host population. This ecological diversity affects, in many cases, the spread dynamics and the efficacy of vaccination and antibiotic treatment. Thus understanding its biological and host-behavioral drivers is crucial for outbreak assessment and for explaining trends of new-strain emergence. We used stochastic modeling and network theory to quantify the role of host contact behavior on strain richness and dominance. We systematically compared multi-strain spread on different network models displaying properties observed in real-world contact patterns. We then analyzed the real-case example of Staphylococcus aureus spread in a hospital, leveraging on a combined dataset of carriage and close proximity interactions. We found that contact dynamics has a profound impact on a strain population. Contact heterogeneity, for instance, reduces strain diversity by reducing the number of circulating strains and leading few strains to dominate over the others. These results have important implications in disease ecology and in the epidemiological interpretation of biological data.

A growing body of studies on systemic risk in financial markets has emphasized the key importance of taking into consideration the complex interconnections among financial institutions. Much effort has been put in modeling the contagion dynamics of financial shocks, and to assess the resilience of specific financial markets - either using real network data, reconstruction techniques or simple toy networks. Here we address the more general problem of how shock propagation dynamics depends on the topological details of the underlying network. To this end we consider different realistic network topologies, all consistent with balance sheets information obtained from real data on financial institutions. In particular, we consider networks of varying density and with different block structures, and diversify as well in the details of the shock propagation dynamics. We confirm that the systemic risk properties of a financial network are extremely sensitive to its network features. Our results can aid in the design of regulatory policies to improve the robustness of financial markets.

288 cases have been confirmed out of China from January 3 to February 13, 2020. We collected and synthesized all available information on these cases from official sources and media. We analyzed importations that were successfully isolated and those leading to onward transmission. We modeled their number over time, in relation to the origin of travel (Hubei province, other Chinese provinces, other countries) and interventions. We characterized importations timeline to assess the rapidity of isolation, and epidemiologically linked clusters to estimate the rate of detection. We found a rapid exponential growth of importations from Hubei, combined with a slower growth from the other areas. We predicted a rebound of importations from South East Asia in the upcoming weeks. Time from travel to detection has considerably decreased since the first importation, however 6 cases out of 10 were estimated to go undetected. Countries outside China should be prepared for the possible emergence of several undetected clusters of chains of local transmissions.