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The latter half of the mid-nineteenth century was a period of tremendous and continuous naval transformation--much like the current time. In many ways, twenty-first-century politicians and admirals are arguing in [...]

A study into the development of politics of ethnicity in the new-nation state of Syria under French domination is presented. The archives had shown the High Commission's intelligence services sudden interest in the residents of Hayy al-Akrad, the Kurdish quarter of Damascus in the later 1930s. The French had seen the Kurds as a factor in their relation with neighboring states.

A study of documents in French archives detailing British intelligence agencies secret activities in the Middle East during and after the war is presented. The documents give details of the extensive use of bribery of prominent Lebanese and Syrian politicians by officers of Special Operations Executive. Britain was able to keep its hold over the region due to their collaboration.

The article gives an account of Guelph conspiracy of negotiating with France, Austria and Italy for alliance in 1867 against Prussia to restore power over Hanover which was annexed by Prussia in 1866 along with other German states.

The defense sector is understudied which is a victim of an assumption of military exceptionalism in the last two decades. The ordering of Airbus A400M military transporter is taken into consideration and a cognitive approach to policy analysis is unpacked to analyze the set of actors and distribution of power that make French procurement decisions.

France's revised nuclear strategy announced by President Jacques Chirac in June 2001, represents a move away from the Cold War 'anti-cities' strategy to one based on a more extensive range of options, including more precise and discriminate capabilities. Three interrelated issue, the cost of nuclear forces, their political and strategic relevance, and their significance for the European Union are the main issues of the debate.

On 13 June 1995, when President Jacques Chirac announced a final round of a dozen nuclear tests [in French Polynesia], his irrevocable decision caused concern and dismay. Without bothering at […]

Since the end of World War II, various negotiations, with or without the immediate agreement of the two 'superpowers' of the time, the United States and the Soviet Union, have […]

The article by Jean-Marc Regnault on 'The Nuclear Issue in the South Pacific' calls for a few reservations about the way it approaches the French nuclear tests in French Polynesia. […]

The study of nuclear testing in the Pacific by French scholar Jean-Marc Regnault is to be welcomed. But there are a number of areas where I would place a different […]

For fifty years, from 1946 to the last French test in 1996, nuclear bombs exploded in pristine Pacific environments, in the atmosphere, underwater, and even in space, leaving behind radioactive […]

This article examines the role of nuclear deterrence in France, which the author asserts is still seen favorably by most French polticians despite growing concerns over nuclear waste dispossal and nuclear reactor safety. Reasons for the support of deterrence include the need for national security in an increasingly unstable world, and the national independence and autonomy provided by nuclear capability.

France has been extremely hostile to the idea of U.S. defense against ballistic missiles, yet France at the height of its power was sheltered behind a complex and effective multilayered defense system. The desire to see the value of its nuclear investment preserved is one of the major motivating factors behind current French policy. Yet the world is changing and perhaps French policy may change with it. Key Words: French Strategic Policy, French Military History, Ballistic Missile Defense, Nuclear Strategy, NATO, Military Technology, European Defense Policy. Antimissile weapons, French-U.S. Relations.

During the 1930s the protection of its far-flung empire posed numerous difficulties for France. Faced with widespread internal dissent across French North Africa, the Levant mandates, and Indochina and determined to utilize colonial troops for the defense of the metropole, French military planners attached limited importance to questions of imperial defense per se. This article sets the formulation of French imperial defense within the wider framework of general staff planning. Analyzing the work of specialist imperial defense planning committees such as the Comite consultatif de defense des colonies and the Haut Comite militaire, it suggests that France's schemes of empire defense were always unbalanced. This disequilibrium was the product of several factors investigated here. Apart from the understandable preoccupation with the Axis threat in Europe, the French Army staff was reluctant to plan the defense of empire on a truly global scale. This resulted in piecemeal, poorly coordinated strategic planning. Indeed, French imperial defense schemes were at their best in those overseas territories where Ministry of Colonies and Ministry of Marine influence was strongest, notably, in the sub-Saharan federations of Afrique occidentale francaise and Afrique equatoriale francaise.

The implications of the attack against French troops by Moroccans at the Ait Ya'qub fort on Jun 8, 1929 are analyzed. It is argued that the attack indicated that the 'Maroc utile' and 'peaceful penetration' military policies were no longer effective. The 'Maroc utile' policy divided Morocco into so-called useful and useless zones wherein the latter would be left uncolonized. Under peaceful penetration policy, the inhabitants of unsubdued areas were allowed to maintain their anarchic existence in the mountains.

In 1996 President Chirac announced a sweeping reform of the French armed services. In particular, the plan to end conscription is meant to achieve specific strategic goals. France's international aspirations cannot be fulfilled by a force made up of conscripted soldiers. However, conscription is an inherently political issue. A discussion of the importance of conscription to the French state and an analysis of why the conscription system became obsolete is followed by a look at the political debate and the special role of the French President in matters of national defence. The conclusion focuses on the problems that may face the French armed forces in the next century., On 22 February 1996, French President Jacques Chirac took to the national airwaves and announced a sweeping reform of the French military, perhaps the most comprehensive reform in the history [...]

France continued with its nuclear weapons testing programme in the South Pacific during Jun 1997 despite being involved in international talks to set up a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). Ecologists are assessing how much impact the region's marine environment has sustained through radiation leakage during testing. The CTBT programme has lost credibility since France's defiant action.

When Henry VIII declared war on France in June 1543, he was faced by the need to build an army that could operate seriously on the battlefields of Europe. He [...]

During an annual meeting of French ambassadors last August 31, President Jacques Chirac announced that France might eventually offer its nuclear weapons to a common European defense. France, said Chirac, [...]

Two main arguments feature in debates on France's future nuclear weapons strategy and nuclear policy, one favoring a 'more operational' nuclear military force and another defending a 'less operational' nuclear deterrent force oriented toward nuclear non-proliferation. The debates are dominated by questions over France's autonomy and international status and the influence of global nuclear policy decisions on French nuclear strategy. The existing French nuclear policy scenario suggests that future nuclear strategy will amount to a consensus between the 'more operational' and 'less operational' nuclear policy options.

This article examines French defence policy making. It has two aims: first to examine how far the sector is characterised by the forms of 'heroic' leadership usually associated with it, and second to place these empirical findings within the context of the literature that deals with the analysis of policy processes and public policy. The article shows how, contrary to the received wisdom, Mitterrand in particular has found it increasingly difficult to impose his personal preferences on defence policy. That this is so is a function partly of the nature of the policy process itself, and partly of the legacy -- both institutional and in terms of policy -- of de Gaulle. In illustrating shifting models of policy making and policy output, it reveals both the specific nature of the defence sector as well as the factors which influence the policy-making processes over time., DEFENCE AS DIFFERENT Defence has received little attention in the public policy literature. Many politics text books fail to refer to defence at all, and whilst policy making case studies [...]

Leon Blum's Front Populaire government was elected in 1936 largely on a platform of innovative social reform but its rearmament goals gained priority soon after the election and burdened the French economy. Blum attempted to gain military standing through developing the industrial ability to build military weapons especially airplanes and managed to reorganize the industrial infrastructure. However, his efforts were limited by a weakened economy and lack of support for extensive government spending. Blum's term established a foundation for further rearmament efforts after he resigned.