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Copyright of SIRIUS - Zeitschrift fur Strategische Analysen is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Nuclear cooperation has been a consistent feature of the Australia-US alliance. In the 1950s and 1960s, Canberra explored transferring US nuclear weapons to Australian forces operating in Southeast Asia. Since the 1960s, Australian governments have supported hosting joint facilities that contribute to America's ability to execute global nuclear operations. And Australia has regularly invoked the nuclear umbrella as part of the alliance. We explain the key sources of nuclear cooperation in the alliance by leveraging realist and institutionalist theories of alliance cooperation. While realism explains limits to US nuclear commitments in the 1950s, institutional explanations are more relevant in pinpointing the sources of nuclear cooperation and in explaining why Australia has often achieved its policy preferences as the junior partner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

America’s alliances in Europe and East Asia all involve some institutional cooperation on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, planning or employment—from consultative fora in Asia to joint policy and sharing of nuclear warheads in NATO. Such cooperation is often analyzed through the prism of “extended nuclear deterrence,” which focuses on the extension of U.S. security guarantees and their effect on potential adversaries. This article argues that this underplays the importance of institutional factors: Allies have historically addressed a range of objectives through such cooperation, which has helped to catalyze agreements about broader alliance strategy. The varied form such cooperation takes in different alliances also flows from the respective bargaining power of allies and the relative importance of consensus, rather than perceived threats. The article concludes that nuclear weapons cooperation will remain crucial in successful U.S. alliance management, as allies negotiate their relationship with each other in the face of geostrategic change.ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHERCopyright of Contemporary Security Policy is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Vietnam War, Australian defence policy has been based on the concept of self-reliance—the ability to defend Australia without allied combat forces. Self-reliance arose from concerns about US support in conflict with Indonesia. It has implications for Australian foreign policy, force structuring, joint operations and the defence industry, which were most coherently laid out in the 1987 White Paper. Later White Papers adapted this framework, but the 2013 White Paper seems to move towards a new approach to defence policy and strategy, which continued use of the term ‘self-reliance’ obscures rather than elucidates. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 2013 Defence White Paper places greater emphasis than its predecessors on defence engagement, and begins to link regional security to the defence of Australia itself. It does not explain, however, what Australia has to do to achieve its objectives, or what commitments it would have to enter to do so. Overall, the White Paper moves towards a reinterpretation of 'self-reliance' that focuses more on the way in which Australia would operate in a coalition conflict, but developing a new defence strategy that links force structure, posture and employment to the achievement of Australia's strategic objectives is left to future White Papers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Strategy in practice inevitably involves the forecasting of future cause-effect relationships. Four basic sources of uncertainty that make it difficult to predict and ‘test’ these relationships, associated variables, as well as parameters can be distinguished: aleatory uncertainty; complex systems; mental, cognitive and physiological limits; and the enemy. To a varying degree, all four contribute to the difficulty inherent in predicting the international security environment, intelligence and deception, friction, strategic interactions with the enemy, and revolutions in military affairs. Since none of the basic sources of uncertainty can be eliminated by technical or organizational measures, strategy will always remain difficult. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the relationship between new specialized nuclear weapons and U.S. intra-war deterrence threats. Deterrence threats have to be both severe and credible, and a deterrence posture can be based on denial or punishment. At present, the United States primarily relies on nuclear punishment for intra-war deterrence. The severity of the U.S. threat to use its current, relatively high-yield nuclear arsenal is high, but its credibility is low. By deploying new specialized nuclear weapons for hardened and deeply buried target or agent defeat, the United States would enhance the credibility of its threat, but reduce its severity. Therefore, these weapons alone may not strengthen U.S. deterrence of rogue states' use of weapons of mass destruction. Either the deterrence strategy or the nuclear arsenal have to be adapted. Threats of punishment could be made more credible if low-yield nuclear weapons, designed for use against military targets on the battlefield, were introduced. Alternatively, a shift to deterrence through denial should be contemplated, based on a threat of first use of nuclear weapons to destroy hardened and deeply buried targets and chemical and biological agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]