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Some scholars have suggested that when faced with domestic political problems, leaders employ simplified decision processes, preferring action to deliberation and highly visible diversionary uses of force to alternative policies. Others contend that domestically embattled leaders will pursue a more rational examination of the costs and benefits of various options--the sort of deliberation that will lead them to reject diversionary force in favor of less risky measures. Drawing on research in political psychology, we argue that leaders' cognitive processes are not constants but variables, and that both models are correct under certain circumstances. Leaders low in conceptual complexity, and especially those with hawkish leanings, will pursue simplified decision making procedures and embrace diversionary strategies, while leaders who are high in complexity will pursue a more thorough consideration of risks and alternatives and generally avoid diversionary actions. We examine these expectations by testing the interactive effect of economic misery and leaders' conceptual complexity on American force usage for the period 1953-2000. The findings indicate that more conceptually simple leaders-- particularly when high in distrust, a trait linked to more hawkish policy inclinations--are significantly more likely to engage in diversion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholarship has long assumed that strong co-partisan majorities in Congress provide presidents with latitude in the conduct of coercive foreign policy. Using new data on congressional opposition to presidential crisis policy since 1918, this paper poses a fundamental challenge to this conventional wisdom. Analyses reveal that while divided government and increased representation does invite opposition party criticism to crisis policy, congresspersons of the president's party are much more likely to criticize presidential crisis policy when government is unified and when their partisan contingent is large. All told, rather than providing presidents with increased autonomy, it would seem that increased party strength in Congress and unified government generally provide legislative and executive co-partisans with an "invitation to struggle" over the shape of crisis policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though much research has sought to identify factors that might influence the likelihood of militarized diversion, little attention has been paid to how leaders vary in their perceptions of domestic conditions and diversionary utility. We seek to address this lacuna by developing an individual-level approach to the political use of force. Adapting concepts from political psychology, we posit that leaders' innate beliefs, approaches to decision-making, and ways of dealing with others act to determine (generally) whether they view political force usage as a viable policy option and (more specifically) whether they use political force with the intention of generating misdirection or forcefully neutralizing domestic opposition. Statistical analyses of the American use of force from 1953 to 2000 reveal that, while several psychological indicators of risk ignorance / acceptance and hardline policy orientation (conceptual simplicity, self-confidence, belief in one's ability to control events, and distrust of others) are associated with increased force usage at higher levels of economic misery, a predisposition towards catering towards one in-group is negatively associated with force usage given economic misery. In finding that even when presidents do use force in the wake of economic problems they do not generally appear to try to achieve "classical" diversionary goals, this project suggests a considerable upside to the employment of psychological approaches in the study of diversion. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, international relations scholars have posited that, though economically unsuccessful democratic leaders may have incentives to divert via international conflict, their potential adversaries are also privy to their plight and may seek to avoid fighting them at such junctures. However, this "strategic conflict avoidance" (SCA) perspective offers few insights concerning the impact of a potentially important source of leadership weakness: legislative opposition to leadership policy. Indeed, scholars seem uncertain about whether general legislative opposition actually drives leaders to divert or leads them to refrain from international ventures. This paper seeks to develop and test a general theory concerning the targeting of leaders who face legislative opposition to their foreign policies. Its main predictions are that, while economic distress increases "conflict avoidance" on the part of potential adversaries, overt legislative opposition specifically concerning leadership foreign policy decreases the utility of diversion and creates transparent elite divisions that invite targeting. Negative binomial generalized estimating equations (GEE) models of the US foreign policy experience from 1949-1988 support these predictions, in that the US is less likely to be the target of incident initiation by other states when the economic misery index increases, but is more likely to be targeted when members of Congress voice displeasure with presidential foreign policy. Further analyses show that these findings are strongest in the context of enduring rivalries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bombings of commuter trains in Madrid in March 2004 and subsequent electoral victory of the "underdog" Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (POSE) raised international awareness of the potential political ramifications of terrorism. Given the POSE's decision to remove Spanish troops from Iraq, it is reasonable to speculate that terrorist activity targets and impacts political decision-making at the highest levels. Do terrorists regularly conceive of national elections as especially important opportunities to pursue their political goals? In this paper, we address this question in the context of the government that most regularly contends with terrorist attacks, Israel. We posit that terrorists optimally seek to engage in violence when it is most likely to influence Israeli political outcomes and decision-making. Thus, we hypothesize that such attacks are likely to increase in periods preceding Israeli general elections, called or otherwise. Empirical tests of this hypothesis across the period 1968-2000 reveal evidence contradicting the hypothesis: terrorist violence, in fact, declines marginally ahead of planned elections and during called elections. One intuitive explanation for this lack of support in the Israeli case (and, in a related manner, the absence of additional terrorist attacks in the US after 9/11) is that terrorists believe that the alternative presented by the opposition party is not palatable enough to step up violent actions before elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For Panel Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy #031005 The diversionary hypothesis holds that leaders have incentives to create ?rally effects? by using force abroad when facing domestic unrest, dissatisfaction with their policies, and/or lagging economic conditions. Recent scholarship suggests that, given the considerable uncertainty associated with international outcomes and the costs of fighting, leaders should be expected to target militarily weaker states when attempting to divert. This ?contemporary? perspective differs from the ?traditional? (sociological) view of diversion, which implies that groups experiencing disunity will target entities with which conflict is likely to be prolonged. This paper uses directed-dyadic event count analyses of militarized interstate incidents in the period 1890-1992 to examine whether the United States used force against weaker or stronger opponents in times of relative economic difficulty. Negative binomial generalized estimating equation (GEE) results generally show that, irrespective of whether times are bad or good economically, the US is much more likely to target relatively strong states than relatively weak ones. Further, marginal effects analyses of the period 1949-1992 reveal that the positive impact of high unemployment on incident initiation is greatest when relative power parity exists between the US and its opponent. This finding runs counter to the expectations of ?contemporary? diversionary theorists, and suggests that the ?traditional? view or the ?strategic conflict avoidance? perspective may be more applicable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A perusal of contemporary empirical tests of US diversionary activity reveals that behavioral general manifest indicators of domestic dissatisfaction, such as low public approval, are rarely associated with subsequent uses of force in any consistent fashion. Indeed, some scholars have found that manifest dissatisfaction or opposition is negatively related or entirely unrelated. This paper relies on a reassessment of the diversionary hypothesis to develop a different theoretical explanation of the relationship between manifest opposition and the American use of force abroad. Generally, I posit that presidents wish to implement policies that maximize the likelihood of addressing the underlying causes of dissatisfaction. Due to difficulties in portraying international victories as long-term solutions to the problems underlying opposition to domestic policies, presidents should actually be less likely to use force as a diversion from such opposition. Instead, they should be more likely to use force as a means of quelling opposition to foreign policy, as victories in the international realm are more easily linked to successful or resolute foreign policy. Measures of dissatisfaction currently in use (like overall declines in approval) do not identify the nature of the issues underlying dissatisfaction and are thus, in light of this reassessment, unsuitable. I use instead Mayhew?s (2000) compilation of opposition actions by members of Congress as the basis for constructing two variables, one measuring opposition to domestic policy and one measuring opposition to foreign policy. Negative binomial generalized estimating equation (GEE) analyses of annual data on directed-dyadic US conflict behavior from 1866 to 1988 yield support for my expectations: congressional opposition to presidential foreign policy is positively associated with the use of force, while congressional opposition to domestic policy is negatively associated with the use of force. In a separate analysis, an aggregate measure of all opposition actions is not related to the use of force, providing further support for the notion that presidents take the issues underlying opposition into account when formulating policy solutions. Finally, I provide evidence that presidents are more likely to make major speeches concerning domestic policy in quarters followed by congressional opposition to domestic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research on strategic conflict avoidance and targeting in the American case shows that states avoid militarily targeting presidents whose domestic situations might be improved by diversionary conflict, and that congressional opposition to presidential foreign policy invites increased targeting by decreasing other states' perceptions of likely American resolve. This paper seeks to reassess these processes by considering the intervening effects of partisan ideology. Based on the likelihood that military ventures are viewed more favorably by conservative constituencies than their liberal counterparts, I contend that diversion is a more viable option for Republican than for Democratic presidents, resulting in greater incentives for strategic avoidance of Republicans. Conversely, the relative liberal aversion to military ventures means that the resolve-undermining effects of congressional opposition are likely more pronounced for Democrats. Analyses of the American foreign policy experience from 1949 to 2001 provide support for these hypotheses, as increases in the misery index are related to substantial decreases in the targeting of Republican administrations and congressional foreign policy opposition acts are related to substantial increases in the militarized targeting of Democratic administrations. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The possession of nuclear weapons confers many benefits on a state. The path of proliferation, however, is often violent. When a state initiates a nuclear weapons program, it signals its intent to fundamentally alter its bargaining environment. States that once had an advantage will now be disadvantaged. This change in the environment is not instantaneous, but evolves slowly over time. This gives states a chance (and incentive) to resolve underlying grievances (by force if necessary) before a nuclear weapons program is completed. Our analysis of nuclear weapons program and the onset of militarized conflict confirms this expectation. In particular, the closer a state gets to acquiring nuclear weapons, the greater the risk it will be attacked (especially over territorial issues). Once nuclear weapons are acquired, however, the risk of being attacked dramatically drops. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to most analysts of counterinsurgent strategy, it is crucial for democratic governments facing terrorist threats to facilitate the gathering of intelligence, maintain a vigilant position of non-negotiation towards terrorists, and use the military and/or police to effectively combat terrorists. At the same time, however, these analysts staunchly oppose counterterrorist ?overreactions? that generally threaten the integrity of democratic institutional arrangements/structures and the ascendancy of the democratic rule of law. How successful have democratic targets been in achieving this ?balancing act?? Though this question has been examined in the context of specific cases, statistical inquiry across broad spatial domains and temporal periods has yet to be conducted. This paper seeks to build upon the quantitative analysis of state response by testing the effects that terrorist violence has on institutional openness, participatory opportunity, and political freedom in democratic states. Analyses of the period 1951-1997 reveal no significant relationship between international or domestic terrorist events in the previous year and levels of or changes in democratic states? POLITY IV democracy scores or Freedom House scores. However, a measure of the average number of international terrorist events over the previous three years is negatively associated with levels of and changes in both measures of democracy. This finding implies that prolonged terrorist threats generally cause democratic states to ?overreact? by becoming fundamentally more authoritarian. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Literature on the determinants of American congressional election outcomes indicates that executive success in important political events will result in aggregate gains for members of the president’s party in Congress in upcoming elections. However, none of these studies fully explicates or tests for the independent effect of two such classes of events – involvement or successes in international crises – on seat change. Incorporating existing theory concerning institutional crisis signaling and expanding upon the previously noted importance of party evaluations to presidential “coattail effects,” this paper argues that electoral gains stemming from executive crisis involvement and success are contingent upon the degree to which co-partisans in Congress have supported or opposed the president’s crisis positions. Specifically, if members of the president’s party in Congress voice opposition to the president at junctures where the president is involved in international conflict or achieves international victories, then the president’s party is likely to be punished – not rewarded – at the ballot box. Multivariate analyses of congressional seat change for the period 1914-2000 largely bear out one of these predictions, in that the coincidence of co-partisan foreign policy opposition in Congress with victories or forced concessions in international crises in election years negatively impacts the percentage of seats won by the president’s party. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]