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People who are marginalized experience disproportionate harms when their privacy is violated. Meeting their needs is vital for developing equitable and privacy-protective technologies. In response, research at the intersection of privacy and marginalization has acquired newfound urgency in the HCI and social computing community. In this literature review, we set out to understand how researchers have investigated this area of study. What topics have been examined, and how? What are the key findings and recommendations? And, crucially, where do we go from here? Based on a review of papers on privacy and marginalization published between 2010-2020 across HCI, Communication, and Privacy-focused venues, we make three main contributions: (1) we identify key themes in existing work and introduce the Privacy Responses and Costs framework to describe the tensions around protecting privacy in marginalized contexts, (2) we identify understudied research topics (e.g., race) and other avenues for future work, and (3) we characterize trends in research practices, including the under-reporting of important methodological choices, and provide suggestions for establishing shared best practices for this growing research area., Comment: This paper has been accepted for publication in the Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction and will be presented at CSCW 2022

While the Internet has dramatically increased the exposure that research can receive, it has also facilitated harassment against scholars. To understand the impact that these attacks can have on the work of researchers, we perform a series of systematic interviews with researchers including academics, journalists, and activists, who have experienced targeted, Internet-facilitated harassment. We provide a framework for understanding the types of harassers that target researchers, the harassment that ensues, and the personal and professional impact on individuals and academic freedom. We then study preventative and remedial strategies available, and the institutions that prevent some of these strategies from being more effective. Finally, we discuss the ethical structures that could facilitate more equitable access to participating in research without serious personal suffering.

By choice or by necessity, some contributors to commons-based peer production sites use privacy-protecting services to remain anonymous. As anonymity seekers, users of the Tor network have been cast both as ill-intentioned vandals and as vulnerable populations concerned with their privacy. In this study, we use a dataset drawn from a corpus of Tor edits to Wikipedia to uncover the character of Tor users' contributions. We build in-depth narrative descriptions of Tor users' actions and conduct a thematic analysis that places their editing activity into seven broad groups. We find that although their use of a privacy-protecting service marks them as unusual within Wikipedia, the character of many Tor users' contributions is in line with the expectations and norms of Wikipedia. However, our themes point to several important places where lack of trust promotes disorder, and to contributions where risks to contributors, service providers, and communities are unaligned.

User-generated content sites routinely block contributions from users of privacy-enhancing proxies like Tor because of a perception that proxies are a source of vandalism, spam, and abuse. Although these blocks might be effective, collateral damage in the form of unrealized valuable contributions from anonymity seekers is invisible. One of the largest and most important user-generated content sites, Wikipedia, has attempted to block contributions from Tor users since as early as 2005. We demonstrate that these blocks have been imperfect and that thousands of attempts to edit on Wikipedia through Tor have been successful. We draw upon several data sources and analytical techniques to measure and describe the history of Tor editing on Wikipedia over time and to compare contributions from Tor users to those from other groups of Wikipedia users. Our analysis suggests that although Tor users who slip through Wikipedia's ban contribute content that is more likely to be reverted and to revert others, their contributions are otherwise similar in quality to those from other unregistered participants and to the initial contributions of registered users., Comment: To appear in the IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, May 2020

In a wireless network, mobile nodes (MNs) repeatedly perform tasks such as layer 2 (L2) handoff, layer 3 (L3) handoff and authentication. These tasks are critical, particularly for real-time applications such as VoIP. We propose a novel approach, namely Cooperative Roaming (CR), in which MNs can collaborate with each other and share useful information about the network in which they move. We show how we can achieve seamless L2 and L3 handoffs regardless of the authentication mechanism used and without any changes to either the infrastructure or the protocol. In particular, we provide a working implementation of CR and show how, with CR, MNs can achieve a total L2+L3 handoff time of less than 16 ms in an open network and of about 21 ms in an IEEE 802.11i network. We consider behaviors typical of IEEE 802.11 networks, although many of the concepts and problems addressed here apply to any kind of mobile network., Comment: 16 pages, 49 references, 12 figures, 3 tables