1. China Decoupling Handbook: WHERE WE ARE, WHAT TO DO
- Author
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Scissors, Derek
- Subjects
United States. Department of the Treasury -- International economic relations ,United States. Department of Commerce -- International economic relations ,Exports ,Financial disclosure ,Foreign policy ,Handbooks, vade-mecums, etc. -- International trade ,Foreign corporations ,Imports ,Logistics ,Securities -- International trade ,Social sciences - Abstract
The case for a smaller US-China economic relationship keeps getting stronger. China will not become a better partner under Xi Jinping, he has permitted no voices advocating for future pro-market reform, and the economy has been slowing for more than a decade. This is on top of repression at home and China's aggressive foreign policy actions. Signs of decoupling have started to appear. American investment in Chinese securities fell in 2021 and 2022 after soaring from 2017 through 2020. Imports from China plunged in 2023 and have slipped a bit more this year. But these changes do not result from any effective American policies. The Trump tariffs barely scratched the trade deficit in 2018-22. The Biden administration has stressed technology controls but left gaping exceptions for large foreign firms to continue their business in China. Years of talk on outbound investment have yielded no implementation, and supply-chain resilience has been largely avoided as too difficult. Policies are needed to partially decouple the US from China. The first step is to identify critical sectors in law and treat them differently. * Imports. New legislation expanding the permissible use of quotas should be considered. In critical sectors, Chinese participation should be limited to levels that can be quickly replaced in a crisis. Quotas are the most sure, direct means to accomplish this. * Exports, Especially of Technology. Congress should either craft legislation allowing outright bans on exports that boost Chinese capabilities in critical sectors or require the Department of Commerce to implement a presumption of denial for export licenses in these sectors. * Inbound Investment. Sustained low inbound Chinese investment means no action is necessary. If high tariffs are maintained, Chinese companies may invest to avoid them, which could benefit the US but should be screened to make certain. * Outbound Investment. The US has no details on what its direct investment supports in China and no information at all on American holdings of Chinese stocks and bonds. Opposition to transparency is anti-market. Legislation should require much greater disclosure. * Supply Chains. Policy should work to ensure China cannot disrupt American supply chains while welcoming other participants who are willing to cooperate with the US. This will require mandates to keep critical sectors free of possible Chinese leverage. Decoupling policies have not been pursued for the obvious reason: They have costs. It's true there are a variety of costs, but most turn out to be minor. The largest is likely to be share price declines for stocks exposed to China, including some large technology companies. The costs are outweighed by the benefits, vastly so if reducing risk from Beijing's economic coercion is rightly seen as a benefit. Partial decoupling offers the US greater resilience in a crisis involving China, such as over Taiwan. It would better protect American technology, which is currently siphoned off by China with no consequences, and enable continued American leadership. Finally, there would be less US culpability in the actions of Xi's regime., Economic decoupling from China has received a good deal of attention. And some notable decoupling has occurred recently. But it's been due to private-sector decisions, which can be reversed. In [...]
- Published
- 2024