Search

The paper explores "uniqueness bias," a behavioral bias defined as the tendency of planners and managers to see their decisions as singular. For the first time, uniqueness bias is correlated with forecasting accuracy and performance in real-world project investment decisions. We problematize the conventional framing of projects as unique and hypothesize that it leads to poor project performance. We test the thesis for a sample of 219 projects and find that perceived uniqueness is indeed highly statistically significantly associated with underperformance. Finally, we identify how decision makers can mitigate uniqueness bias in their projects through what Daniel Kahneman aptly called "decision hygiene," specifically reference class forecasting, premortems, similarity-based forecasting, and noise audits., Comment: 30 pages

Digitalization is a core component of the green transition. Today's focus is on quantifying and pre-dicting the climate effects of digitalization through various life-cycle assessments and baseline sce-nario methodologies. Here we argue that this is a mistake. Most attempts at prediction are based on three implicit assumptions: (a) the digital carbon footprint can be quantified, (b) business-as-usual with episodic change leading to a new era of stability, and (c) investments in digitalization will be delivered within the cost, timeframe, and benefits described in their business cases. We problema-tize each assumption within the context of digitalization and argue that the digital carbon footprint is inherently unpredictable. We build on uncertainty literature to show that even if you cannot predict, you can still mitigate. On that basis, we propose to rethink practice on the digital carbon footprint from prediction to mitigation.

The present paper is an update of the "Oxford Olympics Study 2016" (Flyvbjerg et al. 2016). We document that the Games remain costly and continue to have large cost overruns, to a degree that threatens their viability. The IOC is aware of the problem and has initiated reform. We assess the reforms and find: (a) Olympic costs are statistically significantly increasing; prior analysis did not show this trend; it is a step in the wrong direction. (b) Cost overruns were decreasing until 2008, but have increased since then; again a step in the wrong direction. (c) At present, the cost of Paris 2024 is USD 8.7 billion (2022 level) and cost overruns is 115% in real terms; this is not the cheap Games that were promised. (d) Cost overruns are the norm for the Games, past, present, and future; they are the only project type that never delivered on budget. We assess a new IOC policy of reducing cost by reusing existing venues instead of building new ones. We find that reuse did not have the desired effect for Tokyo 2020 and also look ineffective for Paris 2024. Finally, we recommend that the Games look to other types of megaprojects for better data, better forecasting, and how to generate the positive learning curves that are necessary for bringing costs and overrun down. Only if this happens are Los Angeles 2028 and Brisbane 2032 likely to live up to the IOC's intentions of a more affordable Games that more cities will want to host., Comment: 27 pages

If managers assume a normal or near-normal distribution of Information Technology (IT) project cost overruns, as is common, and cost overruns can be shown to follow a power-law distribution, managers may be unwittingly exposing their organizations to extreme risk by severely underestimating the probability of large cost overruns. In this research, we collect and analyze a large sample comprised of 5,392 IT projects to empirically examine the probability distribution of IT project cost overruns. Further, we propose and examine a mechanism that can explain such a distribution. Our results reveal that IT projects are far riskier in terms of cost than normally assumed by decision makers and scholars. Specifically, we found that IT project cost overruns follow a power-law distribution in which there are a large number of projects with relatively small overruns and a fat tail that includes a smaller number of projects with extreme overruns. A possible generative mechanism for the identified power-law distribution is found in interdependencies among technological components in IT systems. We propose and demonstrate, through computer simulation, that a problem in a single technological component can lead to chain reactions in which other interdependent components are affected, causing substantial overruns. What the power law tells us is that extreme IT project cost overruns will occur and that the prevalence of these will be grossly underestimated if managers assume that overruns follow a normal or near-normal distribution. This underscores the importance of realistically assessing and mitigating the cost risk of new IT projects up front.

How should government and business solve big problems? In bold leaps or in many smaller moves? We show that bespoke, one-off projects are prone to poorer outcomes than projects built on a repeatable platform. Repeatable projects are cheaper, faster, and scale at lower risk of failure. We compare evidence from 203 space missions at NASA and SpaceX, on cost, speed-to-market, schedule, and scalability. We find that SpaceX's platform strategy was 10X cheaper and 2X faster than NASA's bespoke strategy. Moreover, SpaceX's platform strategy was financially less risky, virtually eliminating cost overruns. Finally, we show that achieving platform repeatability is a strategically diligent process involving experimental learning sequences. Sectors of the economy where governments find it difficult to control spending or timeframes or to realize planned benefits - e.g., health, education, climate, defence - are ripe for a platform rethink.

Behavioral science has witnessed an explosion in the number of biases identified by behavioral scientists, to more than 200 at present. This article identifies the 10 most important behavioral biases for project management. First, we argue it is a mistake to equate behavioral bias with cognitive bias, as is common. Cognitive bias is half the story; political bias the other half. Second, we list the top 10 behavioral biases in project management: (1) strategic misrepresentation, (2) optimism bias, (3) uniqueness bias, (4) the planning fallacy, (5) overconfidence bias, (6) hindsight bias, (7) availability bias, (8) the base rate fallacy, (9) anchoring, and (10) escalation of commitment. Each bias is defined, and its impacts on project management are explained, with examples. Third, base rate neglect is identified as a primary reason that projects underperform. This is supported by presentation of the most comprehensive set of base rates that exist in project management scholarship, from 2,062 projects. Finally, recent findings of power law outcomes in project performance are identified as a possible first stage in discovering a general theory of project management, with more fundamental and more scientific explanations of project outcomes than found in conventional theory.

Most cost-benefit analyses assume that the estimates of costs and benefits are more or less accurate and unbiased. But what if, in reality, estimates are highly inaccurate and biased? Then the assumption that cost-benefit analysis is a rational way to improve resource allocation would be a fallacy. Based on the largest dataset of its kind, we test the assumption that cost and benefit estimates of public investments are accurate and unbiased. We find this is not the case with overwhelming statistical significance. We document the extent of cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and forecasting bias in public investments. We further assess whether such inaccuracies seriously distort effective resource allocation, which is found to be the case. We explain our findings in behavioral terms and explore their policy implications. Finally, we conclude that cost-benefit analysis of public investments stands in need of reform and we outline four steps to such reform., Comment: 25 pages, 1 table, 1 figure

Scale-up is the process of growing a venture in size. The paper identifies modularity and speed as keys to successful scale-up. On that basis four types of scale-up are identified: Smart, dumb, forced, and fumbled. Smart scale-up combines modularity and speed. Dumb scale-up is bespoke and slow, and very common. The paper presents examples of each type of scale-up, explaining why they were successful or not. Whether you are a small startup or Elon Musk trying to grow Tesla and SpaceX or Jeff Bezos scaling up Amazon - or you are the US, UK, Chinese, or other government trying to increase power production, expand your infrastructure, or make your health, education, and social services work better - modularity and speed are the answer to effective delivery, or so the paper argues. How well you deal with modularity and speed decides whether your efforts succeed or fail. Most ventures, existing or planned, are neither fully smart nor fully dumb, but have elements of both. Successful organizations work to tip the balance towards smart by (a) introducing elements of smart scale-up into existing ventures and (b) starting new, fully smart-scaled ventures, to make themselves less dumb and ever smarter.

The Olympic Games are the largest, highest-profile, and most expensive megaevent hosted by cities and nations. Average sports-related costs of hosting are $12.0 billion. Non-sports-related costs are typically several times that. Every Olympics since 1960 has run over budget, at an average of 172 percent in real terms, the highest overrun on record for any type of megaproject. The paper tests theoretical statistical distributions against empirical data for the costs of the Games, in order to explain the cost risks faced by host cities and nations. It is documented, for the first time, that cost and cost overrun for the Games follow a power-law distribution. Olympic costs are subject to infinite mean and variance, with dire consequences for predictability and planning. We name this phenomenon "regression to the tail": it is only a matter of time until a new extreme event occurs, with an overrun larger than the largest so far, and thus more disruptive and less plannable. The generative mechanism for the Olympic power law is identified as strong convexity prompted by six causal drivers: irreversibility, fixed deadlines, the Blank Check Syndrome, tight coupling, long planning horizons, and an Eternal Beginner Syndrome. The power law explains why the Games are so difficult to plan and manage successfully, and why cities and nations should think twice before bidding to host. Based on the power law, two heuristics are identified for better decision making on hosting. Finally, the paper develops measures for good practice in planning and managing the Games, including how to mitigate the extreme risks of the Olympic power law., Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1607.04484

This study provides an independent, outside-in estimate of the cost and schedule risks of nuclear waste storage projects. Based on a reference class of 216 past, comparable projects, risk of cost overrun was found to be 202% or less, with 80% certainty, i.e., 20% risk of an overrun above 202%. Based on a reference class of 200 past, comparable projects, risk of schedule overrun was found to be 104% or less, with 80% certainty, i.e., 20% risk of overrun above 104%. Cost risk and schedule risk are both substantial for nuclear waste storage projects., Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1901.03698

This report was commissioned by the Commission of Inquiry Respecting the Muskrat Falls Project to provide the national and international context in which the Muskrat Falls Project took place. The Commission asked for the report to cover three specific topics of questions: (1) What is the national and international context of the Muskrat Falls Project with regards to cost overrun and schedule overrun? (What are the typical cost and schedule overruns of hydro-electric dam projects? How do hydro-electric dams compare to other capital investment projects? How do Canadian projects compare to other countries?), (2) What are the causes and root causes of cost and schedule overruns? (3) What are recommendations, based on international experience and research into capital investment projects, to prevent cost and schedule overruns in hydro-electric dam projects and other capital investment projects? Keywords: Hydroelectric Dams, Megaprojects, Cost Overrun, Schedule Overrun, Optimism Bias, Strategic Misrepresentation, Infrastructure, Capital Investment Projects, Canada, Muskrat Falls, Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1802.07312 by other authors

This report reviews the Edinburgh tram project's risk management. Projects frequently overrun their cost and timelines and fall short on intended benefits. Cost, schedule, and benefit risk of projects need to be carefully considered to avoid this. The report describes and evaluates risk assessment and management for the Edinburgh tram. The report was produced as part of the Edinburgh Tram Inquiry. Keywords: risk assessment, risk management, infrastructure, megaprojects, optimism bias, strategic misrepresentation, planning fallacy, behavioral science.

This paper asks and answers the question of whether Kahneman's planning fallacy or Hirschman's Hiding Hand best explain performance in capital investment projects. I agree with my critics that the Hiding Hand exists, i.e., sometimes benefit overruns outweigh cost overruns in project planning and delivery. Specifically, I show this happens in one fifth of projects, based on the best and largest dataset that exists. But that was not the main question I set out to answer. My main question was whether the Hiding Hand is "typical," as claimed by Hirschman. I show this is not the case, with 80 percent of projects not displaying Hiding Hand behavior. Finally, I agree it would be important to better understand the circumstances where the Hiding Hand actually works. However, if you want to understand how projects "typically" work, as Hirschman said he did, then the theories of the planning fallacy, optimism bias, and strategic misrepresentation - according to which cost overruns and benefit shortfalls are the norm - will serve you significantly better than the principle of the Hiding Hand. The latter will lead you astray, because it is a special case instead of a typical one.

Reference class forecasting is a method to remove optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation in infrastructure projects and programmes. In 2012 the Hong Kong government's Development Bureau commissioned a feasibility study on reference class forecasting in Hong Kong - a first for the Asia-Pacific region. This study involved 25 roadwork projects, for which forecast costs and durations were compared with actual outcomes. The analysis established and verified the statistical distribution of the forecast accuracy at various stages of project development, and benchmarked the projects against a sample of 863 similar projects. The study contributed to the understanding of how to improve forecasts by de-biasing early estimates, explicitly considering the risk appetite of decision makers, and safeguarding public funding allocation by balancing exceedance and under-use of project budgets.

This paper asks, "Do classics exist in megaproject management?" We identify three types of classic texts: conventional, Kuhnian, and citation classics. We find that the answer to our question depends on the definition of "classic" employed. First, "citation classics" do exist in megaproject management, and they perform remarkably well when compared to the rest of the management literature. A preliminary Top Ten of citation classics is presented. Second, there is no indication that "conventional classics" exist in megaproject management, i.e., texts recognized as definitive by a majority of experts. Third, there is also no consensus as to whether "Kuhnian classics" exist, i.e., texts with paradigmatic clout. The importance of classics seems to be accepted, however, just as work to develop, discuss, and consolidate classics is seen as essential by megaproject scholars. A set of guidelines is presented for developing classics in megaproject management research.

The prevalent view in the economics literature is that a high level of infrastructure investment is a precursor to economic growth. China is especially held up as a model to emulate. Based on the largest dataset of its kind, this paper punctures the twin myths that, first, infrastructure creates economic value, and, second, China has a distinct advantage in its delivery. Far from being an engine of economic growth, the typical infrastructure investment fails to deliver a positive risk adjusted return. Moreover, China's track record in delivering infrastructure is no better than that of rich democracies. Where investments are debt-financed, overinvesting in unproductive projects results in the buildup of debt, monetary expansion, instability in financial markets, and economic fragility, exactly as we see in China today. We conclude that poorly managed infrastructure investments are a main explanation of surfacing economic and financial problems in China. We predict that, unless China shifts to a lower level of higher-quality infrastructure investments, the country is headed for an infrastructure-led national financial and economic crisis, which is likely also to be a crisis for the international economy. China's infrastructure investment model is not one to follow for other countries but one to avoid.

Given that Olympic Games held over the past decade each have cost USD 8.9 billion on average, the size and financial risks of the Games warrant study. The objectives of the Oxford Olympics study are to (1) establish the actual outturn costs of previous Olympic Games in a manner where cost can consistently be compared across Games; (2) establish cost overruns for previous Games, i.e., the degree to which final outturn costs reflect projected budgets at the bid stage, again in a way that allows comparison across Games; (3) test whether the Olympic Games Knowledge Management Program has reduced cost risk for the Games, and, finally, (4) benchmark cost and cost overrun for the Rio 2016 Olympics against previous Games. The main contribution of the Oxford study is to establish a phenomenology of cost and cost overrun at the Olympics, which allows consistent and systematic comparison across Games. This has not been done before. The study concludes that for a city and nation to decide to stage the Olympic Games is to decide to take on one of the most costly and financially most risky type of megaproject that exists, something that many cities and nations have learned to their peril., Comment: 28 pp

In this paper we characterise the propensity of big capital investments to systematically deliver poor outcomes as "fragility," a notion suggested by Nassim Taleb. A thing or system that is easily harmed by randomness is fragile. We argue that, contrary to their appearance, big capital investments break easily - i.e. deliver negative net present value - due to various sources of uncertainty that impact them during their long gestation, implementation, and operation periods. We do not refute the existence of economies of scale and scope. Instead we argue that big capital investments have a disproportionate (non-linear) exposure to uncertainties that deliver poor or negative returns above and beyond their economies of scale and scope. We further argue that to succeed, leaders of capital projects need to carefully consider where scaling pays off and where it does not. To automatically assume that "bigger is better," which is common in megaproject management, is a recipe for failure.

We identify and document a new principle of economic behavior: the principle of the Malevolent Hiding Hand. In a famous discussion, Albert Hirschman celebrated the Hiding Hand, which he saw as a benevolent mechanism by which unrealistically optimistic planners embark on unexpectedly challenging plans, only to be rescued by human ingenuity, which they could not anticipate, but which ultimately led to success, principally in the form of unexpectedly high net benefits. Studying eleven projects, Hirschman suggested that the Hiding Hand is a general phenomenon. But the Benevolent Hiding Hand has an evil twin, the Malevolent Hiding Hand, which blinds excessively optimistic planners not only to unexpectedly high costs but also to unexpectedly low net benefits. Studying a much larger sample than Hirschman did, we find that the Malevolent Hiding Hand is common and that the phenomenon that Hirschman identified is rare. This sobering finding suggests that Hirschman's phenomenon is a special case; it attests to the pervasiveness of the planning fallacy, writ very large. One implication involves the continuing need for unbiased cost-benefit analyses and other economic decision support tools; another is that such tools might sometimes prove unreliable.

This paper takes stock of megaproject management, an emerging and hugely costly field of study. First, it answers the question of how large megaprojects are by measuring them in the units mega, giga, and tera, concluding we are presently entering a new "tera era" of trillion-dollar projects. Second, total global megaproject spending is assessed, at USD 6-9 trillion annually, or 8 percent of total global GDP, which denotes the biggest investment boom in human history. Third, four "sublimes" - political, technological, economic, and aesthetic - are identified to explain the increased size and frequency of megaprojects. Fourth, the "iron law of megaprojects" is laid out and documented: Over budget, over time, over and over again. Moreover, the "break-fix model" of megaproject management is introduced as an explanation of the iron law. Fifth, Albert O. Hirschman's theory of the Hiding Hand is revisited and critiqued as unfounded and corrupting for megaproject thinking in both the academy and policy. Sixth, it is shown how megaprojects are systematically subject to "survival of the unfittest," explaining why the worst projects get built instead of the best. Finally, it is argued that the conventional way of managing megaprojects has reached a "tension point," where tradition is challenged and reform is emerging.

A brisk building boom of hydropower mega-dams is underway from China to Brazil. Whether benefits of new dams will outweigh costs remains unresolved despite contentious debates. We investigate this question with the "outside view" or "reference class forecasting" based on literature on decision-making under uncertainty in psychology. We find overwhelming evidence that budgets are systematically biased below actual costs of large hydropower dams - excluding inflation, substantial debt servicing, environmental, and social costs. Using the largest and most reliable reference data of its kind and multilevel statistical techniques applied to large dams for the first time, we were successful in fitting parsimonious models to predict cost and schedule overruns. The outside view suggests that in most countries large hydropower dams will be too costly in absolute terms and take too long to build to deliver a positive risk-adjusted return unless suitable risk management measures outlined in this paper can be affordably provided. Policymakers, particularly in developing countries, are advised to prefer agile energy alternatives that can be built over shorter time horizons to energy megaprojects.

Using a methodology similar to that used the in the worldwide research, the cost performance of Dutch large-scale transport infrastructure projects is determined. In the Netherlands, cost overruns are as common as cost underruns but because cost overruns are larger than cost underruns projects on average have a cost overrun of 16.5%. The focus on one country further enabled to consider cost overruns during different project development phases. It turned out that in the Netherlands the majority of the cost overrun occurs in the pre-construction phase (the period between the formal decision to build and the start of construction). The frequency as well as the magnitude of pre-construction cost overrun is significantly higher than in the construction phase. The used methodology of calculating cost overruns does however not take lock-in into account. This phenomenon shows that the real decision to build was taken much earlier in the decision-making process. Since estimated costs are usually lower during these earlier stages, the cost overruns based on this real decision to build are likely to be much higher. Cost overruns presented in studies are therefore often underestimated and the problem of cost overruns is much larger than we think.

Cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects know no geographical limits, overruns are a global phenomenon. Nevertheless, the size of cost overruns varies with location. In the Netherlands, cost overruns appear to be smaller compared to the rest of the world. This paper tests whether Dutch projects perform significantly better in terms of cost overruns than other geographical areas. It is concluded that for road and tunnel projects, the Netherlands performs similarly to the rest of the world. For rail projects, Dutch projects perform considerably better, with projects having significantly lower percentage cost overruns in real terms (11%) compared to projects in other North West European countries (27%) and in other geographical areas (44%). Bridge projects also have considerably smaller cost overruns: 7% in the Netherlands compared with 45% in other NW European countries and 27% in other geographical areas. In explaining cost overruns, geography should therefore clearly be taken into consideration.

This paper examines three independent explanatory variables and their relation with cost overrun in order to decide whether this is different for Dutch infrastructure projects compared to worldwide findings. The three independent variables are project type (road, rail, and fixed link projects), project size (measured in terms of estimated costs) and the length of the project implementation phase. For Dutch projects, average cost overrun is 10.6% for rail, 18.6% for roads and 21.7% for fixed links. For project size, small Dutch projects have the largest average percentage cost overruns but in terms of total overrun, large projects have a larger share. The length of the implementation phase and especially the length of the pre-construction phase are important determinants of cost overruns in the Netherlands. With each additional year of pre-construction, percentage cost overrun increases by five percentage points. In contrast, the length of the construction phase has hardly any influence on cost overruns. This is an important contribution to current knowledge about cost overruns, because the period in which projects are most prone to cost overruns is narrowed down considerably, at least in the Netherlands. This means that period can be focused on to determine the causes and cures of overruns.

Dan Lovallo and Daniel Kahneman must be commended for their clear identification of causes and cures to the planning fallacy in "Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines Executives' Decisions" (HBR July 2003). Their look at overoptimism, anchoring, competitor neglect, and the outside view in forecasting is highly useful to executives and forecasters. However, Lovallo and Kahneman underrate one source of bias in forecasting - the deliberate "cooking" of forecasts to get ventures started.

The cost-benefit analysis formulates the holy trinity of objectives of project management - cost, schedule, and benefits. As our previous research has shown, ICT projects deviate from their initial cost estimate by more than 10% in 8 out of 10 cases. Academic research has argued that Optimism Bias and Black Swan Blindness cause forecasts to fall short of actual costs. Firstly, optimism bias has been linked to effects of deception and delusion, which is caused by taking the inside-view and ignoring distributional information when making decisions. Secondly, we argued before that Black Swan Blindness makes decision-makers ignore outlying events even if decisions and judgements are based on the outside view. Using a sample of 1,471 ICT projects with a total value of USD 241 billion - we answer the question: Can we show the different effects of Normal Performance, Delusion, and Deception? We calculated the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of (actual-forecast)/forecast. Our results show that the CDF changes at two tipping points - the first one transforms an exponential function into a Gaussian bell curve. The second tipping point transforms the bell curve into a power law distribution with the power of 2. We argue that these results show that project performance up to the first tipping point is politically motivated and project performance above the second tipping point indicates that project managers and decision-makers are fooled by random outliers, because they are blind to thick tails. We then show that Black Swan ICT projects are a significant source of uncertainty to an organisation and that management needs to be aware of.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of causes of cost escalation in transport infrastructure projects. The study is based on a sample of 258 rail, bridge, tunnel and road projects worth US$90 billion. The focus is on the dependence of cost escalation on (1) length of project implementation phase, (2) size of project and (3) type of project ownership. First, it is found with very high statistical significance that cost escalation is strongly dependent on length of implementation phase. The policy implications are clear: Decision makers and planners should be highly concerned about delays and long implementation phases because they translate into risks of substantial cost escalations. Second, it is found that projects have grown larger over time and that for bridges and tunnels larger projects have larger percentage cost escalations. Finally, by comparing cost escalation for three types of project ownership--private, state-owned enterprise and other public ownership--it is shown that the oft-seen claim that public ownership is problematic and private ownership effective in curbing cost escalation is an oversimplification. Type of accountability appears to matter more to cost escalation than type of ownership.

Implementing large-scale information and communication technology (IT) projects carries large risks and easily might disrupt operations, waste taxpayers' money, and create negative publicity. Because of the high risks it is important that government leaders manage the attendant risks. We analysed a sample of 1,355 public sector IT projects. The sample included large-scale projects, on average the actual expenditure was $130 million and the average duration was 35 months. Our findings showed that the typical project had no cost overruns and took on average 24% longer than initially expected. However, comparing the risk distribution with the normative model of a thin-tailed distribution, projects' actual costs should fall within -30% and +25% of the budget in nearly 99 out of 100 projects. The data showed, however, that a staggering 18% of all projects are outliers with cost overruns >25%. Tests showed that the risk of outliers is even higher for standard software (24%) as well as in certain project types, e.g., data management (41%), office management (23%), eGovernment (21%) and management information systems (20%). Analysis showed also that projects duration adds risk: every additional year of project duration increases the average cost risk by 4.2 percentage points. Lastly, we suggest four solutions that public sector organization can take: (1) benchmark your organization to know where you are, (2) de-bias your IT project decision-making, (3) reduce the complexities of your IT projects, and (4) develop Masterbuilders to learn from the best in the field., Comment: Published in Commonwealth Secretariat (Eds.): Commonwealth Governance Handbook 2012/13: Democracy, development and public administration, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, December 2012. ISBN 978-1-908609-04-5

This article asks how planning scholarship may effectively gain impact in planning practice through media exposure. In liberal democracies the public sphere is dominated by mass media. Therefore, working with such media is a prerequisite for effective public impact of planning research. Using the example of megaproject planning, it is illustrated how so-called "phronetic planning research," which explicitly incorporates in its methodology active and strategic collaboration with media, may be helpful in generating change in planning practice via the public sphere. Main lessons learned are: (1) Working with mass media is an extremely cost-effective way to increase the impact of planning scholarship on practice; (2) Recent developments in information technology and social media have made impact via mass media even more effective; (3) Research on "tension points," i.e., points of potential conflict, are particularly interesting to media and the public, and are especially likely to generate change in practice; and (4) Tension points bite back; planning researchers should be prepared for, but not afraid of, this.

This article examines five common misunderstandings about case-study research: (1) Theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (2) One cannot generalize from a single case, therefore the single case study cannot contribute to scientific development; (3) The case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, while other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building; (4) The case study contains a bias toward verification; and (5) It is often difficult to summarize specific case studies. The article explains and corrects these misunderstandings one by one and concludes with the Kuhnian insight that a scientific discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and that a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one. Social science may be strengthened by the execution of more good case studies.

This paper argues, first, that a major problem in the planning of large infrastructure projects is the high level of misinformation about costs and benefits that decision makers face in deciding whether to build, and the high risks such misinformation generates. Second, it explores the causes of misinformation and risk, mainly in the guise of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Finally, the paper presents a number of measures aimed at improving planning and decision making for large infrastructure projects, including changed incentive structures and better planning methods. Thus the paper is organized as a simple triptych consisting in problems, causes, and cures., Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1303.6571, arXiv:1303.6654, arXiv:1303.6571, arXiv:1302.3642

Back cover text: Megaprojects and Risk provides the first detailed examination of the phenomenon of megaprojects. It is a fascinating account of how the promoters of multibillion-dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. It shows, in unusual depth, how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. This results in projects that are extremely risky, but where the risk is concealed from MPs, taxpayers and investors. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory and hard, scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be essential reading in its field for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians, journalists and interested citizens., Comment: Cambridge University Press, 2003

The Economist recently reported that infrastructure spending is the largest it is ever been as a share of world GDP. With $22 trillion in projected investments over the next ten years in emerging economies alone, the magazine calls it the "biggest investment boom in history." The efficiency of infrastructure planning and execution is therefore particularly important at present. Unfortunately, the private sector, the public sector and private/public sector partnerships have a dismal record of delivering on large infrastructure cost and performance promises. This paper explains why and how to solve the problem.

Project promoters, forecasters, and managers sometimes object to two things in measuring inaccuracy in travel demand forecasting: (1) using the forecast made at the time of making the decision to build as the basis for measuring inaccuracy and (2) using traffic during the first year of operations as the basis for measurement. This paper presents the case against both objections. First, if one is interested in learning whether decisions about building transport infrastructure are based on reliable information, then it is exactly the traffic forecasted at the time of making the decision to build that is of interest. Second, although ideally studies should take into account so-called demand "ramp up" over a period of years, the empirical evidence and practical considerations do not support this ideal requirement, at least not for large-N studies. Finally, the paper argues that large samples of inaccuracy in travel demand forecasts are likely to be conservatively biased, i.e., accuracy in travel demand forecasts estimated from such samples would likely be higher than accuracy in travel demand forecasts in the project population. This bias must be taken into account when interpreting the results from statistical analyses of inaccuracy in travel demand forecasting.

With a point of departure in the concept "uncomfortable knowledge," this article presents a case study of how the American Planning Association (APA) deals with such knowledge. APA was found to actively suppress publicity of malpractice concerns and bad planning in order to sustain a boosterish image of planning. In the process, APA appeared to disregard and violate APA's own Code of Ethics. APA justified its actions with a need to protect APA members' interests, seen as preventing planning and planners from being presented in public in a bad light. The current article argues that it is in members' interest to have malpractice critiqued and reduced, and that this best happens by exposing malpractice, not by denying or diverting attention from it as APA did in this case. Professions, organizations, and societies that stifle critique tend to degenerate and become socially and politically irrelevant "zombie institutions." The article asks whether such degeneration has set in for APA and planning. Finally, it is concluded that more debate about APA's ethics and actions is needed for improving planning practice. Nine key questions are presented to constructively stimulate such debate., Comment: Flyvbjerg, Bent, 2013, "How Planners Deal with Uncomfortable Knowledge: The Dubious Ethics of the American Planning Association," Cities

Risk, including economic risk, is increasingly a concern for public policy and management. The possibility of dealing effectively with risk is hampered, however, by lack of a sound empirical basis for risk assessment and management. The paper demonstrates the general point for cost and demand risks in urban rail projects. The paper presents empirical evidence that allow valid economic risk assessment and management of urban rail projects, including benchmarking of individual or groups of projects. Benchmarking of the Copenhagen Metro is presented as a case in point. The approach developed is proposed as a model for other types of policies and projects in order to improve economic and financial risk assessment and management in policy and planning.

Out-of-control information technology (IT) projects have ended the careers of top managers, such as EADS CEO Noel Forgeard and Levi Strauss' CIO David Bergen. Moreover, IT projects have brought down whole companies, like Kmart in the US and Auto Windscreen in the UK. Software and other IT is now such an integral part of most business processes and products that CEOs must know their IT risks, which are typically substantial and overlooked. The analysis of a sample of 1,471 IT projects showed that the average cost overrun was 27% - but that figure masks a far more alarming 'fat tail' risk. Fully one in six of the projects in the sample was a Black Swan, with a cost overrun of 200%, on average, and a schedule overrun of almost 70%. This highlights the true pitfall of IT change initiatives: It's not that they're particularly prone to high cost overruns on average - it is that there are a disproportionate number of Black Swans. By focusing on averages instead of the more damaging outliers, most managers and consultants have been missing the real risk in doing IT. In conclusion, the article outlines ideas as to what can be done to avoid Black Swans.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of traffic forecasts in transportation infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, covering 210 projects in 14 nations worth US$59 billion. The study shows with very high statistical significance that forecasters generally do a poor job of estimating the demand for transportation infrastructure projects. The result is substantial downside financial and economic risks. Such risks are typically ignored or downplayed by planners and decision makers, to the detriment of social and economic welfare. For nine out of ten rail projects passenger forecasts are overestimated; average overestimation is 106 percent. This results in large benefit shortfalls for rail projects. For half of all road projects the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is more than plus/minus 20 percent. Forecasts have not become more accurate over the 30-year period studied. If techniques and skills for arriving at accurate demand forecasts have improved over time, as often claimed by forecasters, this does not show in the data. The causes of inaccuracy in forecasts are different for rail and road projects, with political causes playing a larger role for rail than for road. The cure is transparency, accountability, and new forecasting methods. The challenge is to change the governance structures for forecasting and project development. The article shows how planners may help achieve this., Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1302.2544, arXiv:1303.6571, arXiv:1302.3642

The article first describes characteristics of major infrastructure projects. Second, it documents a much neglected topic in economics: that ex ante estimates of costs and benefits are often very different from actual ex post costs and benefits. For large infrastructure projects the consequence is cost overruns, benefit shortfalls, and the systematic underestimation of risks. Third, implications for cost-benefit analysis are described, including that such analysis is not to be trusted for major infrastructure projects. Fourth, the article uncovers the causes of this state of affairs in terms of perverse incentives that encourage promoters to underestimate costs and overestimate benefits in the business cases for their projects. But the projects that are made to look best on paper are the projects that amass the highest cost overruns and benefit shortfalls in reality. The article depicts this situation as "survival of the un-fittest." Fifth, the article sets out to explain how the problem may be solved, with a view to arriving at more efficient and more democratic projects, and avoiding the scandals that often accompany major infrastructure investments. Finally, the article identifies current trends in major infrastructure development. It is argued that a rapid increase in stimulus spending combined with more investments in emerging economies combined with more spending on information technology is catapulting infrastructure investment from the frying pan into the fire., Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1302.3642

Because of the prominent position of urban rail in reducing urban transport-related problems, such as congestion and air pollution, insights into the costs of possible new urban rail projects is very relevant for those involved with cost estimations, policy makers, cost-benefit analysts, and other target groups. Knowledge of the differences in costs per kilometre, including explanations of differences and their breakdowns is currently lacking in the literature. This paper aims to provide a first stage insight into how cost per kilometre varies across urban rail projects. The methodology applied is a simple cost comparison across projects where the data collected are comparable. We conclude that capital costs per route-kilometre of urban rail vary highly between projects. Looking at European projects and excluding outliers, the total capital costs per route-kilometre (including stations and rolling stock) lie mainly between US$50-100 million (2002 prices). Including US projects, the range is US$50-150 million. The main reasons for the high variation in the route-kilometre costs are differences between projects as regards the ratio of underground to above-ground construction, ground conditions, station spacing, type of rolling stock, environmental and safety constraints and labour costs. We warn, however, that the observations used to reach the conclusions are too few to obtain results with statistical significance. Our results must therefore be seen as a first step towards collecting more data so that a more succinct statistical analysis can be conducted. Another conclusion is therefore that this area has future research potential.

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth US$90 billion and representing different project types, geographical regions, and historical periods, it is found with overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether such projects should be built are highly and systematically misleading. Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying. The policy implications are clear: legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts., Comment: 40 pages

A major source of risk in project management is inaccurate forecasts of project costs, demand, and other impacts. The paper presents a promising new approach to mitigating such risk, based on theories of decision making under uncertainty which won the 2002 Nobel prize in economics. First, the paper documents inaccuracy and risk in project management. Second, it explains inaccuracy in terms of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Third, the theoretical basis is presented for a promising new method called "reference class forecasting," which achieves accuracy by basing forecasts on actual performance in a reference class of comparable projects and thereby bypassing both optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Fourth, the paper presents the first instance of practical reference class forecasting, which concerns cost forecasts for large transportation infrastructure projects. Finally, potentials for and barriers to reference class forecasting are assessed., Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1302.2544