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While the U.S. Treasury market remains the deepest and most liquid securities market in the world, several episodes of abrupt deterioration in market functioning over recent years have brought the market's resilience into focus. The adoption of all-to-all trading in the Treasury market could be one avenue to strengthen market resilience. Conceptually, all-to-all trading would allow any market participant to trade directly with any other market participant. This could be particularly helpful in times of stress, when the capacity of traditional intermediaries may be tested. In this paper, we discuss what all-to-all trading would mean for the cash secondary Treasury market, the benefits it might bring, and the conditions that might make adoption of the protocol more likely. We also review several trading protocols operating in the Treasury market that widen the field of trading partners and discuss the challenges to broader adoption of such protocols.

Market disruptions in response to the COVID pandemic spurred calls for the consideration of marketwide central clearing of Treasury securities, which might better enable dealers to intermediate large customer trading flows. We assess the netting efficiencies of increased central clearing using nonpublic Treasury TRACE transactions data. We find that central clearing of all outright trades would have lowered dealers' daily gross settlement obligations by roughly $330 billion (60 percent) in the weeks preceding and following the market disruptions of March 2020, but nearly $800 billion (70 percent) when trading was at its highest. We also find that expanded central clearing would have substantially lowered settlement fails. The estimated benefits would likely be greater if dealers' auction purchases were included in the analysis or if the increased central clearing included repo transactions.

In March 2020, massive customer selling of U.S. Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic overwhelmed dealers' capacity to intermediate trades, contributing to a marked deterioration of market functioning. The Federal Reserve promptly took numerous steps to address the market disruptions, including the initiation of market functioning purchases of Treasury securities and agency MBS. Purchases quickly expanded to over $100 billion per day as the Fed announced plans to buy securities "in the amounts needed" to support market functioning and the effective transmission of monetary policy. Market liquidity improved steadily after mid-March, suggesting that the Fed's efforts were effective, and the security purchases were scaled back accordingly.

This paper studies a recent tick size reduction in the U.S. Treasury securities market and identifies its effects on the market's liquidity and price efficiency. Employing difference-indifference regressions, we find that the bid-ask spread narrows significantly after the change, even for large trades, and that trading volume increases. Market depth declines markedly at the inside tier and across the book, but cumulative depth close to the top of the book changes little or even increases slightly. Furthermore, the smaller tick size enables prices to adjust more easily to information and better reflect true value, resulting in greater price efficiency. Price informativeness remains largely similar before and after, suggesting that the reduction in trading costs does not result in increased information acquisition. However, there is clear evidence of an information shift from the futures market toward the smaller-tick-size cash market. Overall, we conclude that the tick size reduction improves market quality.

This study examines the resolution of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in order to clarify the sources of complexity in its resolution and to inform the debate on appropriate resolution mechanisms for financial institutions. The authors focus on the settlement of Lehman’s creditor and counterparty claims, especially those relating to over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, where much of the complexity of Lehman’s bankruptcy resolution was rooted. They find that creditors’ recovery rate was 28 percent, below historical averages for firms comparable to Lehman. Losses were exacerbated by poor bankruptcy planning and mitigated by timely funding from the Federal Reserve. The settlement of OTC derivatives was a long and complex process, occurring on different tracks for different groups of derivatives creditors. Consequently, the resolution process was less predictable than expected, and it was difficult to obtain an informed view of the process.

We study how the Indian government bond market functions, how it has changed over time, and what factors help explain some of its features. Looking at the primary market, we describe how underwriting obligations are allocated to primary dealers via auction and identify several significant determinants of the underwriting commission cutoff rate, including the launch of the Negotiated Dealing System-Order Matching System (NDS-OM) electronic trading platform. Turning to the secondary market, we explore the importance of benchmark bonds, the launch of NDS-OM, the growth in trading activity, and the migration of activity from the over-the-counter (OTC) market to NDS-OM. We find that benchmark bonds, larger issues, and recently issued bonds tend to trade more actively, but that the launch of NDS-OM is associated with a reduced likelihood of a bond trading but greater trading volume conditional on trading. Benchmark bonds, larger issues, and recently issued bonds are associated with a greater share of NDS-OM trading volume (as opposed to OTC trading volume), suggesting that the NDS-OM platform is especially attractive for trading bonds with benchmark attributes.

We examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities--the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)--that provided liquidity against a range of assets during 2008-09. Dealers with lower equity returns and greater leverage prior to borrowing from the facilities were more likely to participate in the programs, borrow more, and--in the case of the TSLF--at higher bidding rates. Dealers with less liquid collateral on their balance sheets before the facilities were introduced also tended to borrow more. There also appear to be some interaction effects between financial performance and balance sheet liquidity in explaining dealer behavior. The results suggest that both financial performance and balance sheet liquidity play a role in LOLR utilization.

We examine the relationship between monetary policy operations and interbank borrowing and lending of funds using sovereign bonds as collateral. We first establish that, in the precrisis period, there are important but rather weak relations between these funding sources and that this relationship varies within maintenance periods and at the end of the year. Official funding conditions did not meaningfully constrain repo market activity in the 2003-05 period but, in the immediate precrisis period, rate increases led to a sharp contraction in repo activity. Focusing on the crisis period, we identify potentially benign substitution effects between official auctions and repo market activity but our empirical analysis shows that positive innovations in the cost of official funding, due to aggressive bidding, and a limited allotment response, encouraged increased use of the interbank repo market. The analysis informs a discussion of the merits of returning to variable rate operations.

The financial turmoil that began in mid-2007 produced severe stress in interbank markets and prompted significant changes in central banks’ funding operations. We examine the changing characteristics of ECB official interventions through the crisis and assess how they affected the efficiency and reliability of the secondary repo market as a mechanism for the distribution of interbank funding. The limit orderbook from the BrokerTec electronic repo trading platform is reconstructed to provide a range of indicators of participating banks’ aversion to the risk of failing to fund their liquidity needs. These indicators anticipate similar variables from ECB reverse repo auctions and are also affected by surprise outcomes of auctions.

This paper assesses the microstructure of the U.S. Treasury securities market, using newly available tick data from the BrokerTec electronic trading platform. Examining trading activity, bid-ask spreads, and depth for on-the-run two-, three-, five-, ten-, and thirty-year Treasury securities, we find that market liquidity is greater than that found in earlier studies that use data only from voice-assisted brokers. We find that the price effect of trades on BrokerTec is quite small and is even smaller once order-book information is considered. Moreover, order-book information itself is shown to affect prices. We also explore a novel feature of BrokerTec - the ability to enter hidden ('iceberg') orders - and find that, as predicted by theory, such orders are more common when price volatility is higher.

We characterize the microstructure of the market for Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) using novel tick data from the interdealer market. We find a marked difference in trading activity between on-the-run and off-the-run securities, as in the nominal Treasury securities market. We find little difference in bid-ask spreads or quoted depth between on-the-run and off-the-run securities, in contrast to the nominal market, but we do find a sharp difference in the incidence of posted quotes. Intraday activity differs strikingly from the nominal market, with activity peaking in the mid-to-late morning. Announcement effects also differ from the nominal market, with auction results and consumer price index announcements eliciting particularly sharp increases in trading activity.

Using data on U.S. Treasury dealer positions from 1990 to 2006, we find evidence of a significant role for dealers in the intertemporal intermediation of new Treasury security supply. Dealers regularly take into inventory a large share of Treasury issuance so that dealer positions increase during auction weeks. These inventory increases are only partially offset in adjacent weeks and are not significantly hedged with futures. Dealers seem to be compensated for the risk associated with these inventory changes by means of price appreciation in the subsequent week.

We show that Treasury bill auction procedures create classes of price-equivalent discount rates for bills with fewer than seventy-two days to maturity. We argue that it is inefficient for market participants to bid at a discount rate that is not the minimum rate in its class. The inefficiency of bidding at a rate other than the minimum is related to a quantity shortfall rather than an unexploited profit opportunity. Auction results for weekly offerings of four-week bills and occasional offerings of cash management bills show that market participants frequently bid at inefficient rates. However, they are more likely to bid at efficient rates than chance would suggest.

U.S. Treasury securities fill several crucial roles in financial markets: they are a risk-free benchmark, a reference and hedging benchmark, and a reserve asset to the Federal Reserve and other financial institutions. Many of the features that make the Treasury market an attractive benchmark and reserve asset are likely to be adversely affected by the paydown of the federal debt, and recent developments suggest that this may be happening already. Market participants are responding by moving away from Treasuries as a reference and hedging benchmark toward agency debt securities, corporate debt securities, and interest rate swaps. The Federal Reserve is taking steps to adjust its portfolio and should be able to do so with minimal implications for monetary policy.

This paper examines a comprehensive set of liquidity measures for the U.S. Treasury market. The measures are analyzed relative to one another, across securities, and over time. I find highly significant price impact coefficients, such that a simple model that explains price changes with net order flow produces an R² statistic above 30 percent for the two-year note. The price impact coefficients are highly correlated with bid-ask spreads and with episodes of reported poor liquidity (such as the fall 1998 financial markets turmoil). Quote and trade sizes correlate modestly with these episodes and with the other liquidity measures, as do yield spreads between on-the-run and off-the-run securities. In contrast, trading volume and trading frequency are only weakly correlated with these other measures, suggesting that they are poor liquidity proxies. The various measures are positively correlated across securities, almost without exception, especially for Treasury notes.