Search

Objective: Primary caregivers should be aware of recent progress in the genetics of Alzheimer disease (AD) and of the clinical and ethical considerations raised regarding the introduction of genetic testing for purposes of disease prediction and susceptibility (risk) analysis in asymptomatic individuals and diagnosis in patients who present clinically with dementia. This statement addresses arguments for and against clinical genetic testing.Participants: The 20 participants were selected by the investigators (S.G.P., T.H.M., A.B.Z., and P.J.W.) to achieve balance in the areas of genetics, counseling, ethics, and public policy, and to include leadership from related consensus projects. The consensus group met twice in closed meetings and carried on extensive correspondence over 2 years (1995-1997). The project was supported by the National Human Genome Research Institute of the National Institutes of Health.Evidence: All 4 involved chromosomes were discussed in group meetings against a background of information from several focus group sessions with AD-affected families. The focus groups comprised volunteers identified by the Cleveland Area Chapter of the Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders Association and represented a variety of ethnic populations.Consensus Process: The first draft was written in April 1996 by the principal investigator (S.G.P.) after the consensus group had met twice. The draft was mailed to all consensus group members 3 times over 6 months for extensive response and redrafting by the principal investigator until all members were satisfied.Conclusions: Except for autosomal dominant early-onset families, genetic testing in asymptomatic individuals is unwarranted. Use of APOE genetic testing as a diagnostic adjunct in patients already presenting with dementia may prove useful but it remains under investigation. The premature introduction of genetic testing and possible adverse consequences are to be avoided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared.

A screening test for more than 50 cancers at earlier stages would strike many as a godsend. Such a test would promise, prima facie, to save 160,000 lives annually from a premature death from cancer, reduce the intensity of medical treatment, and reduce social costs. In brief, this is what is promised by the Galleri test. We will delineate those claims in greater detail and critically assess them from medical, economic, and ethical perspectives. We conclude, with many others, that this test lacks clinical validity and clinical utility. In addition, annual public funding of $100 billion for this test would be socially unaffordable; the opportunity costs would be unacceptable for both ethical and economic reasons. Further, the least well off with respect to cancer care would be made worse off if this test were publicly funded for everyone over the age of fifty.

Can Rawlsian public reason sufficiently justify public policies that regulate or restrain controversial medical and technological interventions in bioethics (and the broader social world), such as abortion, physician aid-in-dying, CRISPER-cas9 gene editing of embryos, surrogate mothers, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis of eight-cell embryos, and so on? The first part of this essay briefly explicates the central concepts that define Rawlsian political liberalism. The latter half of this essay then demonstrates how a commitment to Rawlsian public reason can ameliorate (not completely resolve) many of the policy disagreements related to bioethically controversial medical interventions today. The goal of public reason is to reduce the size of the disagreement by eliminating features of the disagreement that violate the norms of public reason. The norms of public reason are those norms that are politically necessary to preserve the liberal, pluralistic, democratic character of this society. What remains is reasonable disagreement to be addressed through normal democratic deliberative processes. Specific issues addressed from a public reason perspective include personal responsibility for excessive health costs, the utility of a metaphysical definition of death for organ transplantation, and the moral status of excess embryos generated through IVF and/or their use in medical research.

What exactly is a "wicked problem"? It is a social or economic problem that is so complex and so interconnected with other issues that it is extraordinarily difficult or impossible to resolve. This is because all proposed resolutions generate equally complex, equally wicked problems. In this essay, I argue that precision medicine, especially in the context of the U.S. healthcare system, generates numerous wicked problems related to distributive justice. Further, I argue that there are no easy solutions to these wicked problems. The need for trade-offs is inescapable. Rough justice is the best outcome we can hope for, and that outcome requires a commitment to processes of public reason that are fair and inclusive.

The Dobbs decision has precipitated renewed medical, political, and professional interest in the issue of abortion. Because this decision handed responsibility for regulation of abortion back to the states, and because the states are enacting or have enacted policies that tend to be very permissive or very restrictive, the result has been legal and professional confusion for physicians and their patients. Medical education cannot resolve either the legal or ethical issues regarding abortion. However, medical education must prepare future physicians for caring for patients seeking abortion-related services. Physicians must be prepared to interact appropriately (sensitively and with integrity) with patients or colleagues whose views on abortion differ significantly from their own. This essay describes our educational effort to achieve that objective. The motto that governed this exercise was "No Easy Answers."

John Rawls has held up as a model of public reason the U.S. Supreme Court. I argue that the Dobbs Court is justifiably criticized for failing to respect public reason. First, the entire opinion is governed by an originalist ideological logic almost entirely incongruent with public reason in a liberal, pluralistic, democratic society. Second, Alito's emphasis on "ordered liberty" seems completely at odds with the "disordered liberty" regarding abortion already evident among the states. Third, describing the embryo/fetus from conception until birth as an "unborn human being" begs the question of the legal status of the embryo/fetus, as if an obiter dictum settled the matter. Fourth, Alito accuses the Roe court of failing to exercise judicial restraint, although Alito argued to overturn Roe in its entirety. In brief, the Dobbs opinion is an illiberal, disingenuous, ideological swamp that swallows up public reason and the reproductive rights of women.

Solidarity is a fundamental social value in many European countries, though its precise practical and theoretical meaning is disputed. In a health care context, I agree with European writers who take solidarity normatively to mean roughly equal access to effective health care for all. That is, solidarity includes a sense of justice. Given that, I will argue that precision medicine represents a potential weakening of solidarity, albeit not a unique weakening. Precision medicine includes 150 targeted cancer therapies (mostly for metastatic cancer), all of which are extraordinarily expensive. Our critical question: Must a commitment to solidarity as defined mean that all these targeted cancer therapies should be guaranteed to all within each country in the European Union, no matter the cost, no matter the degree of effectiveness? Such a commitment would imply that cancer was ethically special, rightfully commandeering unlimited resources. That in itself would undermine solidarity. I offer multiple examples of how current and future dissemination of these targeted cancer drugs threaten a commitment to solidarity. An alternative is to fund more cancer prevention efforts. However, that too proves a threat to solidarity. Solidarity, with or without a sense of justice, is too abstract a notion to address these challenges. Further, we need to accept that we can only hope to achieve "rough justice" and "supple solidarity." The precise practical meaning of these notions needs to be worked out through a fair and inclusive process of rational democratic deliberation, which is the real and practical foundation of just solidarity., (© 2022. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.)

Accelerated approval of aducanumab for mild Alzheimer's by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration on June 7, 2021, has generated substantial medical, scientific, and ethical controversy. That approval was contrary to the nearly unanimous judgment of the FDA's Advisory Committee that little reliable evidence existed of significant benefit, even though the drug did reduce β-amyloid. Three major ethical problems were created by this approval: (1) Medicare resources would be unjustly squandered, given the drug's $56,000 annual price and the 3.1 million older potential American patients needing the drug; (2) physicians will feel ethically compelled to provide the drug to desperate, insistent patients, given FDA approval and in spite of side effects of brain bleeds and brain swelling; (3) and false hopes are generated for patients. A needed corrective by the federal government would reduce reimbursement to the bare cost of producing the drug (plus only a modest profit) until a phase IV trial has been successfully completed., (© 2021 The Hastings Center.)

In the view of many, heritable human genome editing (HHGE) harbors the remedial potential of ridding the world of deadly genetic diseases. A Hippocratic obligation, if there ever was one, HHGE is widely viewed as a life-sustaining proposition. The national go/no-go decision regarding the implementation of HHGE, however, must not, in the collective view of the authors, proceed absent thorough public engagement. A comparable call for an "extensive societal dialogue" was recently issued by the International Commission on the Clinical Use of Human Germline Genome Editing. In this communication, the authors lay out the foundational principles undergirding the formation, modification, and evaluation of public opinion. It is against this backdrop that the societal decision to warrant or enjoin the clinical conduct of HHGE will doubtlessly transpire.

Our health care system in the United States reflects the inequities that are part of the larger society, which is why our system for financing access to needed and effective health care is so complicated and unfair., (© 2020 The Hastings Center.)

This personal narrative tugs at the heart strings. However, personal narratives are not sufficient to justify public funding for any screening policy. We have to take seriously the 'just caring' problem. We have only limited resources to meet virtually unlimited health care needs. No doubt, screening tests often save lives. The author wants public funding for prostate-specific antigen screening for prostate cancer. However, why only prostate cancer? Numerous cancers at various stages can be screened for. Are all of them equally deserving of public funding? What about screening for a very long list of other life-threatening medical disorders? There is nothing ethically special about cancer. Where does the money come from to pay for all these screening tests? Do we reduce expensive life-prolonging care for patients in late-stage diseases? Ultimately, a balance must be struck between saving statistical lives through screening and saving identifiable lives in the intensive care unit. Achieving a just balance requires rational democratic deliberation as justification for these choices, not personal narratives., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Warwick Heale has recently defended the notion of individualized and personalized Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) in connection with health care resource allocation decisions. Ordinarily, QALYs are used to make allocation decisions at the population level. If a health care intervention costs £100,000 and generally yields only two years of survival, the cost per QALY gained will be £50,000, far in excess of the £30,000 limit per QALY judged an acceptable use of resources within the National Health Service in the United Kingdom. However, if we know with medical certainty that a patient will gain four extra years of life from that intervention, the cost per QALY will be £25,000. Heale argues fairness and social utility require such a patient to receive that treatment, even though all others in the cohort of that patient might be denied that treatment (and lose two years of potential life). Likewise, Heale argues that personal commitments of an individual (religious or otherwise), that determine how they value a life-year with some medical intervention, ought to be used to determine the value of a QALY for them. I argue that if Heale's proposals were put into practice, the result would often be greater injustice. In brief, requirements for the just allocation of health care resources are more complex than pure cost-effectiveness analysis would allow.

CHAT has its limits. It is a three-hour exercise. However, the real world problems of healthcare rationing and priority-setting are too complex for a three-hour exercise. What is needed, as a supplement, are sustained processes of rational democratic deliberation that can address the challenges to healthcare justice posed by costly emerging medical technologies, such as these targeted cancer therapies., (© 2018 The Author(s); Published by Kerman University of Medical Sciences. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.)

Meeting healthcare needs is a matter of social justice. Healthcare needs are virtually limitless; however, resources, such as money, for meeting those needs, are limited. How then should we (just and caring citizens and policymakers in such a society) decide which needs must be met as a matter of justice with those limited resources? One reasonable response would be that we should use cost effectiveness as our primary criterion for making those choices. This article argues instead that cost-effectiveness considerations must be constrained by considerations of healthcare justice. The goal of this article will be to provide a preliminary account of how we might distinguish just from unjust or insufficiently just applications of cost-effectiveness analysis to some healthcare rationing problems; specifically, problems related to extraordinarily expensive targeted cancer therapies. Unconstrained compassionate appeals for resources for the medically least well-off cancer patients will be neither just nor cost effective.

Because the demand for intensive care unit (ICU) beds exceeds the supply in general, and because of the formidable costs of that level of care, clinicians face ethical issues when rationing this kind of care not only at the point of admission to the ICU, but also after the fact. Under what conditions-if any-may patients be denied admission to the ICU or removed after admission? One professional medical group has defended a rule of "first come, first served" in ICU admissions, and this approach has numerous moral considerations in its favor. We show, however, that admission to the ICU is not in and of itself guaranteed; we also show that as a matter of principle, it can be morally permissible to remove certain patients from the ICU, contrary to the idea that because they were admitted first, they are entitled to stay indefinitely through the point of recovery, death, or voluntary withdrawal. What remains necessary to help guide these kinds of decisions is the articulation of clear standards for discontinuing intensive care, and the articulation of these standards in a way consistent with not only fiduciary and legal duties that attach to clinical care but also with democratic decision making processes.

Clinicians must inevitably make therapeutic decisions under nonideal conditions. They practice in circumstances that involve incomplete evidence. They deliver care in health care systems that are complex and poorly coordinated. Each of the patients that they take care of is unique while research offers evidence regarding relatively homogeneous populations of patients. Under these circumstances, many parties-medical scientists, reviewing agencies, insurers, and accountable care organizations-can and should contribute to optimizing the development, approval, funding, and prescription of therapies-particularly expensive and marginally beneficial therapies. In aggregate, they should aspire to achieve a pattern of fair, cost-effective therapeutic decisions to ensure a sustainable health care system. Here we offer some suggestions regarding decisions that physicians might pursue to facilitate fair and cost-effective patient care., (© 2017 American Medical Association. All Rights Reserved.)

The American College of Physicians in its ethics manual endorsed the idea that physicians ought to improve their ability to provide care to their patients more parsimoniously. This elicited a critical backlash; critics essentially claimed that what was being endorsed was a renamed form of rationing. In a recent article, Tilburt and Cassel argued that parsimonious care and rationing are ethically distinct practices. In this essay I critically assess that claim. I argue that in practice there is considerable overlap between what they term parsimonious care and what they define as rationing. The same is true of the Choosing Wisely campaign endorsed by the American Board of Internal Medicine. In both cases, if the goal is to control healthcare costs by reducing the use of marginally beneficial care that is not cost effective, then a public conversation about the justness of specific choices is essential.

As healthcare reform evolves, nurse practitioners (NP) will play key roles in improving health outcomes of diverse populations. According to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 2011 report, The Future of Nursing: Leading Change Advancing Health, nurses should be change advocates by caring for populations within complex healthcare systems. The IOM reports asserts, "advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs) should be able to practice to the fullest extent of their education and training" (IOM, 2011, s8). However, existing barriers in the healthcare arena limit APRN practice. This article will discuss some of these barriers and provide suggestions for possible ways to decrease the barriers.

Personalized medicine has been touted as a revolutionary form of cancer care. It has been portrayed as precision medicine, targeting with deadly accuracy cancer cells and sparing patients the debilitating broad-spectrum side effects of more traditional forms of cancer therapy. But personalized medicine still has its costs to patients and society, both moral and economic costs. How to recognize and address those issues will be the focus of this essay. We start with these questions: Does everyone faced with cancer have a moral right to the most effective cancer care available, no matter what the cost, no matter whether a particular individual has the personal ability to pay for that care or not? Or are there limits to the cancer care that anyone has a right to at social expense? If so, what are those limits and how are those limits to be determined? Are those limits a matter of both morality and economics? I will answer this last question in the affirmative. This is what I refer to as the "Just Caring" problem in health care., (© 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc.)

Personalized medicine has been presented in public and professional contexts in excessively optimistic tones. In the area of cancer what has become clear is the extraordinary heterogeneity and resilience of tumors in the face of numerous targeted therapies. This is the problem of cancer drug resistance. I summarize this problem in the first part of this essay. I then place this problem in the context of the larger political economic problem of escalating health care costs in both the EU and the US. In turn, that needs to be placed within an ethical context: How should we fairly distribute access to needed health care for an enormous range of health care needs when we have only limited resources (money) to meet virtually unlimited health care needs (cancer and everything else)? This is the problem of health care rationing. It is inescapable as a moral problem and requires a just resolution. Ultimately that resolution must be forged through a process of rational democratic deliberation.

In the age of genomic medicine we can often now do the genetic testing that will permit more accurate personal tailoring of medications to obtain the best therapeutic results. This is certainly a medically and morally desirable result. However, in other areas of medicine pharmacogenomics is generating consequences that are much less ethically benign and much less amenable to a satisfactory ethical resolution. More specifically, we will often find ourselves left with 'wicked problems,' 'ragged edges,' and well-disguised ethical precipices. This will be especially true with regard to these extraordinarily expensive cancer drugs that generally yield only extra weeks or extra months of life. Our key ethical question is this: Does every individual faced with cancer have a just claim to receive treatment with one of more of these targeted cancer therapies at social expense? If any of these drugs literally made the difference between an unlimited life expectancy (a cure) and a premature death, that would be a powerful moral consideration in favor of saying that such individuals had a strong just claim to that drug. However, what we are beginning to discover is that different individuals with different genotypes respond more or less positively to these targeted drugs with some in a cohort gaining a couple extra years of life while others gain only extra weeks or months. Should only the strongest responders have a just claim to these drugs at social expense when there is no bright line that separates strong responders from modest responders from marginal responders? This is the key ethical issue we address. We argue that no ethical theory yields a satisfactory answer to this question, that we need instead fair and respectful processes of rational democratic deliberation., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

What should be the content of a package of health care services that we would want to guarantee to all Americans? This question cannot be answered adequately apart from also addressing the issue of fair health care rationing. Consequently, as I argue in this essay, appeal to the language of "basic," "essential," "adequate," "minimally decent," or "medically necessary" for purposes of answering our question is unhelpful. All these notions are too vague to be useful. Cost matters. Effectiveness matters. The clinical circumstances of a patient matters. But what we must ultimately determine is what we mutually agree are the just claims to needed health care of each American in a relatively complex range of clinical circumstances. Answering this question will require a public moral conversation, a fair process of rational democratic deliberation aimed at defining both just claims to needed health care and just limits.

What does it mean to be a "just" and "caring" society in meeting the health care needs of the terminally ill when we have only limited resources to meet virtually unlimited health care needs? That question is the focus of this essay. Put another way: relative to all the other health care needs in our society, especially the need for lifesaving or life-prolonging health care, how high a priority ought the health care needs of persons who are terminally ill have? On the one hand, we might see the terminally ill as being among the "medically least well off" and therefore deserving very high priority. On the other hand, we might see them as squandering vast medical resources for marginal medical benefits, thereby denying needed resources to others who would benefit much more. We begin the essay by making a number of morally relevant distinctions with regard to the category of "being terminally ill." We note, given contemporary medicine, that individuals may be terminally ill several times in the course of a life. Not all such circumstances make equal just claims to needed health care. We also note that our conceptions of health care justice are ultimately incapable of making very fine-grained, morally justified rationing judgments in complex medical circumstances. We conclude that we must finally rely upon fair processes of rational democratic deliberation to articulate such judgments for our own future, possibly terminally ill selves, thereby undercutting the rhetoric of "death panels.", (© 2011 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Inc.)

Engaging communities of color in the genetics public policy conversation is important for the translation of genetics research into strategies aimed at improving the health of all. Implementing model public participation and consultation processes can be informed by the Communities of Color Genetics Policy Project, which engaged individuals from African American and Latino communities of diverse socioeconomic levels in the process of "rational democratic deliberation" on ethical and policy issues stretching from genome research to privacy and discrimination concerns to public education. The results of the study included the development of a participatory framework based on a combination of the theory of democratic deliberation and the community-based public health model which we describe as "community-based dialogue."

Consent to treat with thrombolytic therapy for acute ischemic stroke presents an ethical dilemma for hospitals, physicians, patients, and their families. This article presents four aspects of this controversial topic and provides recommendations for conditions that allow for ethical consent to treat.