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Table of Contents I. Introduction 735 II. Clarifying the Significance of the Conceptual Problem 736 III. Basic Strategies for Addressing the Conceptual Problem 739 IV. A Solution to the Conceptual [...]

The history of philosophy is a history of moral circle expansion. This history correlates with a history of expansionism about consciousness. Recently, expansionism about consciousness has exploded: to invertebrates, to plants, to logic gates, and to fundamental entities. The last of these expansions stems from a surge of interest in panpsychism. In an exploratory spirit, this paper considers some largely uncharted territory: the ethical implications of panpsychism. Our conclusion is that while panpsychism probably does significantly expand our moral circle, it's also probably short on anything of practical significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We normally assume that there’s just one conscious individual per animal. Some question this, suggesting that there may be nonhuman taxonomic groups whose normal, adult members house more than one conscious subject. Call this the multitudes view (‘MV)’. Our aim is methodological: we hope to understand how we might assess whether MV is true. To that end, we distinguish two strategies for counting conscious subjects: the duplication strategy and the mind-first strategy. We use human split-brain patients and octopuses to illustrate the prospects and limitations of each approach, as some have argued that both sets of individuals contain multitudes. We’ll contend that while the duplication strategy is applicable to split-brain patients, it isn’t apt for octopuses. The mind-first strategy fairs better here, but there’s a catch: it requires, in a way the duplication strategy does not, numerous contentious assumptions about the nature of mentality, the individuation of minds, and consciousness to simply get off the ground. These difficulties clarify just what it would take to establish MV. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]